NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF IRELAND

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF IMAGINATION

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE .................................................. 1  

PART ONE (Husserl and Imagination)  
Chapter I.  
PROLEGOMEMON TO A PHENOMENOLOGY OF IMAGINATION ..... 1  

Chapter II.  
DISCOVERY OF A PHENOMENOLOGY OF IMAGINATION .......... 21  

Chapter III.  
DEVELOPMENT OF A PHENOMENOLOGY OF IMAGINATION ...... 38  

PART TWO (Sartre and Imagination)  
Chapter IV.  
EXEGESIS OF SARTRE'S THEORY OF IMAGINATION .......... 61  

Chapter V.  
CRITIQUE OF SARTRE'S THEORY OF IMAGINATION .......... 100  

Chapter VI.  
CONSEQUENCE OF SARTRE'S THEORY OF IMAGINATION ...... 125  

PART THREE (Dialectic and Imagination)  
Chapter VII.  
THREE DIALECTICAL THINKERS .............................. 178  

CONCLUSION .................................................. 208  

Footnotes .................................................. 225  

BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................. 294
ABSTRACT

This thesis is an attempt to explore the relationship between phenomenology and imagination. It offers a detailed and critical assessment of the ways in which Edmund Husserl, the inaugurator of phenomenology, and Jean-Paul Sartre, one of his leading disciples, have provided a basis for a new understanding of imagination. The key role played by the phenomenological notion of 'intentionality' in this reappraisal of imagination is particularly underscored.

In the first chapter an exposition of our title The Phenomenology of Imagination is offered, as well as a cursory review of the traditional theories of imagination. It concludes with a justification of our selection of Husserl and Sartre as the two principal exponents of a phenomenological theory of imagination. The second chapter contains a precise analysis of Husserl's theory of imagination. It examines firstly, the way in which imagination serves the phenomenological method; and secondly, the way in which phenomenology serves imagination. This analysis is followed in chapter three by a critique of the three main themes of Husserl's theory: (1) the image as 'super-perceptual' (2) the image as 'fictional', and (3) the image as 'possibility'. These three chapters comprise the first part of this thesis, entitled 'Husserl and Imagination'.

The second part of this thesis is entitled 'Sartre and Imagination'. It is also divided into three chapters. The first consists of a detailed exegesis of Sartre's theory of the image. The second offers a critical appraisal of its main conclusion; and the third explores the profound influence which these conclusions exerted on Sartre's subsequent theories of ontology, aesthetics and politics.

The third and final part of this thesis is entitled 'Dialectic and Imagination'. It explores the way in which three thinkers of phenomenological persuasion, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Gaston Bachelard and Martin Buber, have served to develop and improve the theories of Husserl and Sartre by introducing a dialectical perspective. This third part concludes with a consideration of some of the major implications of such a dialectical phenomenology of imagination both for artistic and everyday experience.
PREFACE

I wish to preface this thesis with a few remarks concerning its range, originality and necessary limitations.

The range of research indicated by the title of our thesis, *The Phenomenology of Imagination*, is a vast one. Some dozen original thinkers, not to mention critics and commentators, have contributed, directly or indirectly, to this area of enquiry. For the sake of clarity and coherence, however, I have confined my investigation to the two most principal and preeminent exponents of a phenomenological theory of imagination—Edmund Husserl and Jean-Paul Sartre. In the first chapter I indicate my reasons for this selection and provide a brief assessment and outline of the other main contributors. Moreover, three of these—Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Martin Buber and Gaston Bachelard—receive particular attention in the penultimate chapter of this work.

One might also expect from such a title an extensive treatment of previous theories of imagination. Such treatment would, nevertheless, be an impractical task for us here, requiring not only elaborate study of the theories of imagination to be found in the Western tradition of philosophy, but also of those in the Judaic and the Oriental tradition. I have thought best to forego such an immodest undertaking, and to confine myself to a summary critique of the Western tradition in chapter one.

Though previous criticism of phenomenological theories of imagination has been copious it has not been comprehensive. Indeed, this thesis is, to my knowledge, the first attempt to gather the different phenomenological treatments of the image into one single framework, establishing its development and determining the various influences, cross-references and reactions. What is more, though one finds several commentaries on the respective theories of Husserl, Sartre or Bachelard one rarely, if ever, finds an attempt to relate these individual theories to the total work of any of these philosophers. This oversight is particularly lamentable in the case of Husserl who claims that imagination is the very 'life-source' of phenomenology, and of Sartre whose whole philosophical development
was conditioned by the ontological conclusion reached in his first major work *The Psychology of Imagination*. There has, surprisingly, never been a single study of Merleau-Ponty's treatment of imagination; a serious omission when one considers the importance of this treatment both as a critique of Sartre's position and as a central pivot of Merleau-Ponty's own theory of 'symbolic expression'. Moreover, Buber's significant contribution to the phenomenological investigation of imagination has received no previous recognition or commentary.

This thesis attempts to redress the balance in this field of inquiry. Though its scope is radically curtailed it may, at times, border on eclecticism. This danger is particularly apparent in its free commerce with such disparate disciplines as ontology, aesthetics, psychology and politics. Such diversity of investigation is indispensable, however, if one is to deal at all adequately with the wide range of application and influence to which the phenomenology of imagination has been subjected.

A few words are also necessary regarding translation and annotation. All quotations and titles of works are cited in English in the text where a translation has been used. Where works have been consulted in the original, because of the unavailability of an adequate translation, the title is rendered in the original. Citations thus consulted are, however, rendered in English in the text and in the original in annotation. Notes have been placed at the end of the thesis, for their length and frequency of occurrence would serve to impede rather than abet the flow of the argument if placed at the foot of each page.

I wish to acknowledge the generous help and encouragement of Prof. Desmond Connell, Dr. Jack Chisolm, and particularly Prof. Patrick H「terson who supervised and directed this thesis. Thanks are also due to Dr. Patrick H「ermann, Dr. John F「tamura and my brother Timothy, whose support and kindness were invaluable during the writing of this work.
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF IMAGINATION
PART ONE: HUSSERL AND IMAGINATION

CHAPTER ONE: PROLEGOMENON TO A PHENOMENOLOGY OF IMAGINATION
CHAPTER TWO: DISCOVERY OF A PHENOMENOLOGY OF IMAGINATION
CHAPTER THREE: DEVELOPMENT OF A PHENOMENOLOGY OF IMAGINATION
In this first chapter I shall attempt to chart and delimit the precise range of my investigation. I shall begin by defining what I mean by the title itself, proceeding by means of a methodological suspension whereby all that is not phenomenology of imagination will be put between parenthesis. Once the exact region of inquiry has been thus circumscribed, there will follow a critical reduction to the particular exponents of a phenomenology of imagination whose work will be examined in this thesis.

Phenomenology of imagination is more than the juxtaposition of a method to investigate (phenomenology) and a faculty to be investigated (imagination). It is one of the purposes of this thesis to show that in an important perse, each needs the other in order to be revealed for what it really is. At the outset therefore, a preliminary analysis of the relation between phenomenology and imagination would appear not just appropriate but necessary. The analysis will be divided into three main sections 1) the significance of imagination for phenomenology, 2) the significance of phenomenology for imagination and 3), the rationale of our selections of specific writings on the phenomenology of imagination as the subject matter of this thesis.

The first question to be answered here is in what way and to what extent is imagination significant for phenomenology? In Ideas (1914) Husserl explicitly proclaims the dependence of phenomenology on imagination:

If anyone loves a paradox, he can readily say, and say with strict truth if he will allow for ambiguity, that the element which makes up the life of phenomenology, as of all eidetic sciences, is 'fiction', that fiction is the source whence the knowledge of eternal truths draws its sustenance (1).

Our immediate task is to point out what Husserl means by this paradox and how such a claim for the imagination may be justified. The surest clue to the riddle is provided by Husserl himself in an adjoining footnote. "This sentence", he tells us, "should be
particularly appropriate as a quotation for bringing ridicule from the naturalistic side on the eidetic way of knowledge (2).

Things can only be known in their essence (eidos) when they are apprehended not only as actuality but as possibility; and for Husserl possibility is the special preserve of imagination. It is because possibility has priority over actuality in the revelation of essences and because phenomenology sees its primary task as the discovery and description of these essences, that the imagination is described as the life force of phenomenology. The reason that such a claim should draw the scorn of the naturalists is that naturalism refutes all attempts to transcend the world as actuality, that is, the world as given 'naively', 'objectively', and 'independently of human consciousness'. But Husserl's view of consciousness as intentional - as consciousness which is always consciousness of a world - precludes the existence of a world which is not a phenomenon of consciousness. There is no such thing as an 'objective' world set over against a 'subjective' knower. Man is a being-in-the world: man and the world come into being through each other.

The naturalist attitude remains at the level of the traditional subject/object dichotomy and thus ignores the relational essence of man and his world. Phenomenology discovers this essence by suspending the naturalistic prejudice for a reified and objective reality, and by acknowledging imagination as an indispensable agent for the disclosure of this essence. The fallacy of naturalism is to begin by positing two separate and autonomous substances and only afterwards to attempt to establish a relation between them. Naturalism is also mistaken, Husserl believes, in maintaining that this subsequent relation constitutes a co-naturality of consciousness and world, for both of which the laws of nature (those of time, space and causality) are equally valid. According to this view, consciousness and the world are causally connected and truth is the adequatio between these two 'natural' entities (3). Phenomenology reverses this process and posits the relation as anterior to the separation of its terms (4).
Phenomenology refuses the naturalist tendency to examine man and the world in terms of their apparently divorced existence. It concentrates on the intentional nexus of experience where the world appears to man for the first time. In this shift of attention from the factual existence of things to their intentional being in consciousness (Bewusstsein), imagination is recognized as the surest means of grasping essences. Imagination releases things from their contingent status as facts and grants them an ideal status as possibilities, possibilities of which each fact is but a single instance. It is this return to things as they emerge in the intentional ideality of consciousness that Husserl is referring to in his slogan 'back to the things themselves' (Zu den Sachen selbst). Husserl is his own best spokesman on this subject:

The positing of the essence... does not imply any positing of individual existence whatsoever; pure essential truths do not make the slightest assertion concerning facts (5).

He goes on to assert that 'the general and essential nature of immediate, intuitive essence-apprehension' (6) is assured more by pure essence 'exemplified intuitively in the mere data of imagination' than by pure essence 'exemplified in the data of experience, of perception, memory and so forth' (7).

Husserl proposed phenomenology as the only method capable of establishing an absolute, presuppositionless and apodeictic science of truth. Truth can only be attained by means of an intuition of permanent and ideal essences. Natural experience is too preoccupied with facts to trouble itself with essences. Some other mode of apprehension, able to attend to essences, because free from all fidelity to facts, must therefore be discovered. To conceive of 'essence' after the naturalistic mode is to construe it as a purified copy of fact reached through a process of intellectual abstraction. For Husserl, however, an essence is far more than a hypostasized fact, a second-hand reminder of first-hand experience. Essences are not so much copies of realities as ideals constitutive of 'the things themselves'. To discover these essences one must replace the abstractive process of intellection with the ideational process of imagination.
Husserl states explicitly that the 'intuitive content' of things is 'imaginative' (8). He even goes so far, on one occasion, as to remark that 'every intuitive presentation of something objective represents it according to the mode of imagination' (9). This characterization of pure essences as fictions of the imagination obviates the traditional overshadowing of essences by facts. Fictions are neither impressions of fact nor by-products of perception. They are not reducible to empirical data. On the contrary, they represent a thing possible as opposed to merely actual modes of existence. Absolutely free creations of fancy, they constitute the sine qua non of absolutely necessary evidence. This conception of imagination as the source of both freedom and necessity emancipates essence from the fact-world and establishes that 'paradox' which as Husserl says above, lies at the very heart of phenomenology.

Phenomenology needs imagination in order to transcend man's natural bondage to factual existence and to establish a realm of possibility whose very freedom is the token of a 'necessary' (that is for Husserl: absolute and apodeictic) science of essences. This paradox remains unsolved. The operative terms of this thesis - imagination, essence, freedom, necessity, ideation, intuition and even phenomenology itself - are still in need of clarification. Furthermore, the relation between phenomenology and imagination is far more complex and equivocal than the purely positive one outlined here. It will be the purpose of our next chapter to provide just such solutions, definitions, and detailed analyses. At this point, it is sufficient that we have a general understanding of the importance of imagination to phenomenology as a method for the discovery of 'eternal truths'.

The second question to be answered is: 'in what way is phenomenology significant for imagination'? In this section it will be suggested that phenomenology alone serves to discover fully the potentiality of imagination, a potentiality which was to a greater or lesser degree obscured by all previous treatments of this subject. In order to fully substantiate this claim an exhaustive inventory of the history and
development of the concept of imagination would be required. Such a task is clearly beyond the scope of this thesis. Quite evidently, the Hebrew term Yezer (10), the oriental term Iki (11) and the Hellenic term Phantasia all refer to different human activities and may all be broadly rendered in English as imagination. The semantic and cultural discrepancies alone would be enough to dissuade such a global undertaking. In order to compare and contrast the phenomenological concept of imagination with those of its predecessors we will confine our investigation to the specifically 'western' history of this term as determined by its original Hellenic conception.

Previous studies of the history of imagination have almost invariably been of a fragmentary nature confining themselves, for the most part, to its purely literary and aesthetic significance. Two notable examples of this kind are Coleridge's Biographia Literaria and Croce's Aesthetic. Remarkably little has been written on the philosophical and psychological theories of which these aesthetic theories are derivative. The first schematic survey of the different philosophies of imagination was carried out by the Italian Renaissance scholar Pico della Mirandola. It was entitled De Imaginacione and provided an eclectic overview of the major medieval interpretations of this faculty; particularly those of Aquinas, Augustine, Avicenna and the Neoplatonists. For almost four hundred years this piece of scholarship, brief, limited, and censorious as it was, represented the only seriously philosophical study of Western theories of imagination. It was not until D.W. Bundy's Greek and Medieval Theories of Imagination appeared in 1933 that a major advance was made in the critique of the history of imagination. Jean-Paul Sartre's work on the imagination entitled L'imagination, was published one year afterwards and served, unwittingly, as a perfect supplement to Bundy's research. It completed the picture by tracing the history of the imagination from the principal metaphysical theories of Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, through Associationism, German idealism and Bergson to the phenomenological theory of Husserl (12).

A mere recital of this research would be superfluous. Of extreme pertinence, however, would be a concise analysis of the origins of the Hellenic understanding of imagination which, as Bundy
demonstrates, determines the entire Western heritage in this regard. A resumé of the ways in which the Medieval and Modern theories of imagination are said to conform to this Hellenic tradition will conclude this section.

The Hellenic imagination stems from the roots, Eiko and Phaino. Eiko means 'to be like', or 'to be capable of comparison'. From this root comes the active very Eikaso, 'to make like', 'to copy' or 'to imitate', and the noun Eikasia, which from Euripides to Plato was commonly used to designate imagination as an agent of mimesis. The more prevailing root, Phaino means 'appear' or 'to come to light'. This gives rise to the nouns Phainomenon meaning 'that thing which appears' and the closely related Phantasis used to designate imagination as an agent of 'coming into appearance' or more correctly, 'appearing to come to be' (13).

The pre-Socratics defined imagination as a human faculty conversant with 'images', understood in the sense of 'copies' (Eikon) or 'appearances' (Phainomenon). But no sooner was imagination thus defined than men started questioning the representational validity of its images. This interrogation led in turn to discussion concerning the relation of the image not only to the thing of which it was purported to be a copy, but also to impressions and to thought. The Ionians believed the image to be identical with the original and consequently regarded it as a 'thing which appeared' (Phainomenon as mental). Democritus and the Materialists first distinguished between the impression and the stimulus, calling the former the image (Eikon) and thus raising the whole problem of the truth or falsity of these sensory representations. The Pythagoreans had avoided the problem by considering as real whatever was perceived by the senses; in thus declining to go beyond the image to its cause in the external world, they implied that all images are necessarily true. Anaxagoras also eschewed the problem, but in a contrary fashion, by proclaiming that the unreliability of the senses precluded the possibility of a criterion adequate to judge between the image and the original, and that, in consequence, every image must be deemed the private property of its perceiver. Pythagoras' conclusion led to the extreme of subjectivism
(what is imagined must be true in itself); Anagorgos' to the extreme of solipsism: (what is imagined can only be true for the imaginer). Confronted with these extreme alternatives, Gorgias and the Sophists despaired of a treatise and adopted an uncompromising scepticism. The disciples of Parmenides, on the other hand, reacted by formulating an equally uncompromising monism, according to which reason (Nous) was acclaimed as the only guide to immutable reality and imagination (Phantasia) relegated to the deceptive flux of appearances. The pre-Socratic dilemma may be summed up as follows: once the distinction between stimulus and sensation has necessitated the recognition of the image as something in the beholder rather than in the reality beheld, how is one to determine the correspondence of these internal images with their putative external cause? (14)

'Up to the time of Plato', Bundy writes, 'there was no comprehensive view of the relation of matter to spirit, of the outer to the inner, necessary to an adequate conception of the nature and function of 'phantasy'. And he goes on: 'It was only after Plato had built up out of these materials, his great philosophical system that there could come into being, from such unfavourable beginnings, a theory of imagination' (15).

The locus classicus of Plato's observations on imagination is book four of The Republic. Attempting to provide a solution to the pre-Socratic problems of the relation between the image and reality, he espouses a transcendental Idealism most inimical to the former. The Idea (Idos) becomes the absolute criterion for all judgements; sensation, a mere simulacrum of this Idea, is demoted to a position of secondary importance- and the image, a mere simulacrum of a simulacrum, is disparaged altogether. Defined according to a metaphysical epistemology, imagination is ranked the lowest of four main faculties. Highest in the scale is Reason (Nous) or the faculty for the apprehension of Ideas and concepts deriving therefrom; next comes Understanding (Dianoia), whereby we apprehend mathematical and other purely deductive truths; next Belief (Pistis) or that commonsense world of opinions concerning our moral behaviour and the everyday world in which we act; and lastly, Imagination (Eikasia) or that illusory world of shadows, reflections and secondhand impressions (16).
In book ten of this same work Plato discusses the implications of such a theory for aesthetics. The artist is denounced for producing images which stand at a 'third remove from reality'. Taking the concept of 'bed' as his example, he defines three distinct categories:

The first exists in the ultimate nature of things, and if it was made by anyone it must have been made by God. The second by the carpenter, the third by the painter...the artist's representation is therefore a long way removed from truth, and he is able to reproduce everything because he never penetrates beneath the superficial appearance of anything (17).

Art is therefore, he concludes, a 'poor child born of poor parents' and those who practice it must be refused admission to the ideal Republic.

The unfortunate outcome of this attack was the association of imagination with imitation (Mimesis), which in the light of Plato's dualistic metaphysic of Episteme and Doxa spelt the inevitable banishment of this faculty to the far side of the 'dividing line'. Plato held that there is no power to imagine or form mental images of the intellectual Ideas which are the objects of true knowledge. The information we derive through sense perception (Doxa) is necessarily inferior and uncertain. Where we rely on mental imagery rather than direct perception a further element of uncertainty and unreliability is introduced (18). Consequently, in the Sophist the imaginative man is described as one who creates falsely by creating false images and in the Cratylus Socrates reinforces his offensive thus: 'Things have their own proper essence and are not in relation to us or influenced by us, fluctuating according to our imagination' (19). In the Philebus images (Phantasmata) are defined as the sensory embodiments of thought and due to the moral menace of their erotic and appetitive power, are consigned to the regulative leash of reason (20).

In two of his later dialogues, the Timaeus and the Phaedrus, Plato seems to modify this disparagement of the imagination somewhat by admitting that under unique oniric conditions divine images may be implanted in the human psyche. Thus it is, he tells us in the Phaedrus, that the gift of prophecy is given not to the wise but
to the fools, poets and dreamers (21) whose imaginations have become fit receptacles for the divinely communicated Ideas. In this way, Plato advances the paradox that such man can accede to the highest truth (Kalagathon) through the lowest means (Phantasia). While this notion of human Phantasia as a power which may grasp the truths made 'imaginable' by divine Phantasia signifies a reconciliation between man and God, it does so only by establishing as precondition the complete 'passivity', 'surrender' and 'madness' of the former. The inspiration of the imagination proves to be a 'divine mania' whereby man is totally 'possessed' by god; and while surpassing the limits of human reason it only does so by forfeiting its humanity altogether (22).

The admission of a 'mystical' imagination is, however, the exception and not the rule. For the most part, Plato's theory places this faculty well below reason and only condones its expression in so far as it is strictly supervised by a noetic overlord. In this perspective, the one which prevailed in the Middle ages, imagination was shackled to the senses and could not therefore even attempt to bridge the gulf which Plato's metaphysical dualism had created between spirit and matter (23).

Aristotle, the founder of the second great Hellenic tradition, devised quite a different theory of imagination. Reacting against Plato's metaphysical idealism, he sought to rescue imagination from the partiality of dividing lines. His refusal to even mention either of the platonic synonyms for imagination - Eikasia and Phantasia - in the Poetics, can only be interpreted as a deliberate break with the Platonic connection between imagination and the representative theory of art. The result was that art became respectable and imagination, as an aesthetic power, faded into the background (24). Aristotle also rejected Plato's theory of divinely inspired dream-images, dismissing the claim in the Timaeus that the human imagination can be assimilated by the divine in order to produce mystical visions and prophecies. Carefully distinguishing between a primary dream-image of sensation and a secondary dream-image of thought, Aristotle analysed the psychology of dream experience by reducing it to an analogous psychology of waking experience. Every dream, he maintained, has its source ultimately
in sensation and should be interpreted not in terms of some dubious connection between imagination and immutable Ideas, but by establishing its relation to the material world known through the senses. On one occasion, Aristotle even suggests that such 'divine' inspirations are but the products of an unruly phantasy when reason is obscured by passion, disease or sleep (25).

Having criticized Plato's theory of imagination, Aristotle proceeded in the De Anima to define imagination as a mediating psychological faculty between sensation and thought (26). In a thorough and meticulous analysis he noted the laws of its operations and clearly delineated the boundaries between it and the other faculties. He first differentiated it from thought and sensation: 'imagination is different both from sensation and from thought though it does not occur without sensation and without it there can be no belief' (27). He then went on to distinguish it from Plato's disparaged realm of Doxa and defined it in accordance with his own central idea of movement:

It is a movement imparted by the senses...by virtue of which what possesses it may act and be acted upon in a number of ways (28). It is by virtue of desire that an animal moves itself; and it cannot have desire without imagination, and all imagination is either deliberative (Boulentiké) or sensuous (Aesthetiké); the latter of these the animals share with man (29).

In other words, Aristotle accredited the psychological faculty of imagination (Phantasia) with a legitimate appetitive function but one which in rational beings must be transformed into a 'deliberative' agency in obedience to the imperatives of reason. This psychological distinction was to prove one of the main sources of the classical opposition between reason and imagination which persisted until recent times.

In the De Anima phantasy was defined in terms of its three faculty characters: firstly, the simple image or impression, a function of the lower animal soul intimately related to passion and appetite; secondly, the composite image, resulting from the habits and conventions of the Sensus Communis; and thirdly, the reproductive deliberative image operative in the higher regions of the mind as an indispensable embodiment of thought: 'There is no
thought without its image' (30). We see, therefore, that despite all Aristotle's efforts to transcend the Platonic dualism between external things and internal image by ratifying imagination as an intermediary faculty between mind and matter, he ultimately reverts to dualism in his analysis of two opposing types of imagination, rational and animal. Other notable aspects in his theory would seem to be his silence on the relation of imagination to artistic creation and his failure to recognize its sui generis powers of expression. 'Ancient psychology', Bernadetto Croce points out, 'knew fancy or imagination as a faculty midway between sense and intellect, but always as conservative and reproductive of sensuous impressions or conveying conceptions to the senses, never as a creative autonomous activity' (31).

Aristotle's main contribution to the Hellenic development of imagination was to recognize the reality of the sensory particulars of experience with which it conversed, and by so doing to establish it as an indispensable agent in the process of human knowledge and action. Swayed by a fundamental realism, he founded imagination in the tradition of empirical psychology, directly opposed to the idealistic and mystical tradition of Plato. In reversing his mentor's priority of the ideal over the real, he dispelled the stigma attached to imagination's quasi-material nature. But this recognition of imagination as a respectable ambassador of mind to matter was gained at the price of its being reduced to the status of a subservient buffer-faculty.

From the foregoing account of the way in which the two major schools of Plato and Aristotle served to define the Western notion of imagination, three central characteristics emerge. Firstly, there is a dualism in the role of the image which is explicit in Plato though only implicit in Aristotle. Secondly, there is the conviction that the image is primarily concerned with representing external things to the mind. This representational capacity is more evident in the Aristotelian interpretation of imagination as a pictorial faculty between the senses and the intellect, though Plato's motive for denouncing imagination as the lowest activity of man is, we remember precisely his fear of its false representation of the Forms. Thirdly, there is the view common to both theories that the image is not only a
a copy of a thing but is itself a type of thing. This notion of
the image as a thing at one remove, a sort of species or index which
exists in the mind, was initially proposed to account for its ability
to perdure in memory and to provoke strong emotional reactions when
used in a certain way. This reification of the image by Plato and
Aristotle was to prove its most enduring feature. Sartre calls it the
'illusion of immanence' (that is, the illusion that the image is a thing
immanent in the mind) and maintains that it has prejudiced every
treatment of the imagination up to phenomenology.

The three-fold Hellenic characterization of imagination as
'dualistic', 'representational' and 'reified' was evidenced in some
form or other in all Medieval, Renaissance and Modern theories on
this subject. Despite the serious efforts of Philostratus,
Augustine, Hume and the German idealists to redefine the role of
the imagination, it was not until Edmund Husserl proposed that its
essence was intentionality, that the image was freed from this
restrictive framework. Only from this point, Sartre maintains, could
the traditional 'illusion of immanence' be overcome:

By revealing the image to be an intentional structure, Husserl
frees it from the condition of an inert content of conscious-
ness. At one stroke vanish, along with the immanentist metaph-
ysics of images, all the difficulties concerning the rela-

tion ship of the simulacrum to its real object, and of pure thought
to the simulacrum... Husserl freed the psychic world of a weighty
burden and eliminated almost all the difficulties that clouded
the classical problem of the relations of images to thoughts (32).

In his work on the Greek and Medieval theories of imagination, Bundy
demonstrates how the two major theories of Plato and Aristotle
determined the entire subsequent development of the concept. He
divides this development accordingly into a Platonic school of
metaphysical idealism and an Aristotelian school of empirical
realism. In the former tradition, he places the theories of
Philostratus, Plotinus, Proclus, Porphyry, Synesius,
Augustine, Richard of St. Victor and Bonaventura. In the latter
tradition, he situates the interpretations of such 'faculty psych-
ologists' as John of Salisbury, Avicenna and Averroes, and the
scholastic commentaries of Albertus Magnus and Aquinas. While the
Platonic tradition tended to speak of a 'phantasia protersa' in
league with corporal passions and requiring to be kept under the
strict tutelage of reason, the Aristotelian construed imagination as
a 'storehouse' of forms received through the senses' (33), situated somewhere between the faculty of Sensum on the one hand, and those of Ratio and Intellectus on the other.

The Modern theories of imagination beginning with Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza tried to break away from the Hellenic understanding of this term. But as Sartre argues in his first critical work on the imagination (Imagination), all remained in some way or other victim to the 'illusion of immanence'. Descartes, for example, in his attempt to overcome the opposition between the image and idea simply reduced the former to a purely mechanical excrescence of the body, produced by means of an external impulse. The image was still conceived of as an internal 'thing' similar to external things, and the imagination described as a psychic faculty for the deciphering of this physical entity. This mechanical division of image and imagination into the respective realms of corporeity and intellect, in no way explained the anomaly of how any interaction can occur between the two, without the former being in some way mental and the latter being in some way material. In essaying to transcend dualism Descartes plunged deeper into it (34). Spinoza espoused a similar dualism by annexing his treatment of the image to his description of the body and by contrasting both to the clear and distinct ideality of the understanding. He distinguishes between the 'true ideas' of understanding and the 'false ideas' of imagination and concludes that 'one may take any view one likes of the imagination so long as one acknowledges that it is different from understanding and that we can free ourselves therefrom by the help of the understanding' (35). Leibniz, Sartre goes on to argue, tried to solve the dilemma by annexing imagination to reason under the vague and equivocal rubric of 'expression'. By intellectualizing the image he hoped to dispel it altogether; but since he never fully succeeded in freeing it from its 'representational' connotations, he stood condemned by his own principle that 'there can be no natural representation of one realm by another' (36).

Sartre also deals, at considerable length, with the novel treatments which imagination received from Hume and the Associationists, Kant, Bergson and the Würzburg school. Hume sought to
overcome the dualism of image and idea, expounded by the Hellenes and embraced by the Medievals, not like Leibniz by reducing the image to the idea, but by reducing the idea to the image. As Sartre puts it: 'Whereas Leibniz tended to discount the image as such in order to resolve the opposition between the image and thought, the empiricism of Hume strove rather to put all thought to the account of a system of images' (37). Hume held that the complex processes of the mind were ultimately reducible to discrete sensory images. Although refuting the traditional view of the imagination as one 'faculty' among others, he nonetheless retained the belief in the image as a res existing in the mind. It is this notion of the image as a mere 'reflection' of the sense-impression, differing only by its lower degree of 'force and vivacity', that identifies Hume as yet another perpetrator of Hellenic 'representationalism' (38). However, it is interesting to note that of all the traditional theories of imagination, Husserl himself singles out Hume's as being the most significant 'anticipatory discovery' of the pivotal role played by images in the constitution of meaning; though he adds that this discovery is shrouded in an 'absurd theory' of associationism. It was this associationism which ultimately prevented Hume from recognizing the sui generis and intentional nature of imagination:

For this positivism, things are reduced to empirically regulated complexes of psychic data and their identity...Reality is turned into a pure fiction. This is not only a false doctrine totally blind to essential phenomenological factors, but it is also contradictory since it does not see that even fictions have their own mode of being, their mode of evidence (39).

Sartre also acknowledges the contributions which Kant, Bergson and the Würzburg school made to the understanding of the imagination and concludes that in so far as all their theories persisted in regarding the image as an intermediary schema between a pure individual sense-datum and a pure thought, they lapsed into the old Hellenic errors of 'reification', 'representation' and 'dualism'. (40).

The 'classical postulate' common to all these different theories is the metaphysical identity of images and perceptions(41). Sartre argues that this identity is thoroughly mistaken and points out that even our common sense experience demands that a distinction be made between true images which are one with perception and false images which are not. But if there is said to be no metaphysical difference
between images and percepts, it is impossible to distinguish between them. In short, one finds oneself back with the pre-Socratic problem of how to discover 'the characteristics of the true image' (42). As it happened, this false identification of image and percept lead to an equally false distinction between the image as it is and the image as it appears to be. The only solution, Sartre asserts, lies in Husserl's recognition that the image is precisely its appearance (son paraître):

We may conclude that any theory of imagination must satisfy two requirements. It must account for the spontaneous discriminations made by the mind between its images and its perceptions. And it must explain the role that images play in the operations of thought. Whatever form it took, the classical conception of images was unable to fulfill these two essential functions. To endow an image with a sensory content is to make it a thing obeying the laws of things, not the laws of consciousness. The mind is thus deprived of all hope of distinguishing images from the other things belonging in the world and by the same token there is no way at all to conceive the relation of this thing to thought (43).

As long as the image is conceived after the classical fashion as a thing in consciousness rather than after the phenomenological fashion as an act of consciousness, imagination can never be fully recognized for what it really is. It was not until Husserl's recognition of the imagination as a free and creative intentionality that the Hellenic 'illusion of immanence' could be finally overcome. Simply stated: imagination needs phenomenology, for without it, it cannot be itself. Sartre encapsulates the phenomenological insight as follows:

There are not, and never could be, images in consciousness. Rather an image is a certain type of consciousness. An image is an act, not some thing. An image is a consciousness of something (44).

The influence of the phenomenological treatment of imagination has been considerable. This influence has been evidenced not only in metaphysics and psychology, but also in the inauguration of an entirely original aesthetic of the image.
In the present thesis I intend to focus on the work which Husserl and Sartre carried out in these areas. The choice of Husserl is obvious and requires no further justification. He was the founder of phenomenology. The choice of Sartre as the other principal exponent of a phenomenology of imagination, rests on the claim that nowhere else in the phenomenological movement does one find a thinker who has contributed so extensively and rigorously to this subject in all three major areas - Psychology, ontology and aesthetics, but before proceeding to substantiate this claim, I would first like to outline the other main contributors to a phenomenological understanding of imagination. Husserl's findings have stimulated wide ranging research both in the phenomenological movement itself and in such non-phenomenological movements as the British analytic school and structuralism.

Gurvitz, Todes, Binzwanger, Merleau-Ponty and Rollo May have all contributed in different ways to a phenomenological psychology of imagination. Their respective reflections on this subject unfortunately, however, share a fragmentary character and could not be said, individually or together, to constitute a consistent or comprehensive theory. Although each recognizes the intentional nature of the image none, with the exception of Merleau-Ponty, represents any significant advance on the original theory of Husserl. Consequently, only Merleau-Ponty will receive particular consideration in the final stages of our investigation. This does not mean, however, that the others will not be used at appropriate junctures for critical and comparative purposes.

The phenomenological imagination also features significantly in contemporary ontology. Eugene Fink and Maria Saraiva both attempted a systematic analysis of Husserl's theory of imagination from a metaphysical perspective. Fink's study Vergegenwärtigung und Bild was abandoned after the first section with the result that it produced little or no impact on phenomenological research in Germany or elsewhere, furthermore, there has been no English translation of it to date. Taking up where Fink left off, Maria Saraiva's lengthy study L'Imagination Selon Husserl, also untranslated, sought to synthesize Husserl's scattered references to imagination into some coherent theory. Her attempt leaves much to be desired however (45). Not
only does her three-fold division of his theory into the almost synonymous rubrics of 'Imagination and Intuition', 'Imagination and Presentation' and 'Imagination and Neutralization', allow for too much repetition; but the restriction of her study to merely two works of Husserl, Ideas and the Logical Investigations, means that her overall treatment is quite inadequate. The central themes of fiction and possibility are scarcely touched on, and Saraiva makes little or no attempt to link Husserl's theory with those of later phenomenologists. Finally, although her critical approach is sharp and accurate, she does not contribute any thing significantly original to the subject.

Moving from such critical commentators to the more 'original' thinkers, we find Martin Buber declaring 'image-making' to be one of the most fundamental dimensions of man's being-in-the-world; while another German phenomenologist, Martin Heidegger, is claimed to have deployed imagination as the underlying principle of his entire thought, early and late. It would be almost impossible, nevertheless, to justify the choice of either philosopher as a principal exponent of a phenomenology of imagination. Buber's treatment of imagination comprises no more than two essays in his entire corpus and is, some argue, as inspired by Dilthey as it is by Husserl. On the other hand, Heidegger's preoccupation with imagination, remains unacknowledged by the author himself. The argument in favour of the case, advanced by A. Perararo, is based on the assumption that Heidegger's phenomenological reworking of Kant's 'transcendental imagination' as the intentional source of human temporality (46), is the cardinal intuition of both Being and Time and his later Time and Being. While there is probably some truth in this view, the dubious biographical information drawn on to account for the pseudonymous role of imagination in Heidegger's ontology does not bear serious scrutiny. Furthermore, that Heidegger is a phenomenologist does not mean that his treatment of imagination is, ipso facto, phenomenological. It is highly debateable indeed, whether the later Heidegger is a phenomenologist at all (47). These remarks do not deny that Buber and Heidegger were deeply concerned with a phenomenology of imagination. They merely disqualify both as candidates for a key position in an inquiry that must always seek to operate with certain or certifiable information.
The third and perhaps most immediate field to evince the significance of a phenomenology of imagination is aesthetics. This is not surprising since no philosophy of imagination is complete without some consideration of its implications for art. Gaston Bachelard never tired in his later works of stressing the importance of phenomenology for a genuine understanding of the creative imagination. In his introduction to The Poetics of Space he points to the inadequacy of all previous attempts to interpret imagining in terms of causality, and adds that 'in order to clarify the problem of the poetic image philosophically, one has to have recourse to a phenomenology of the imagination' (19). Other significant contributors to a phenomenological aesthetic of imagination include the Polish phenomenologist and personal associate of Husserl, Roman Ingarden, and the French phenomenologist, Mikel Dufrenne.

Although the copious and professedly phenomenological nature of Bachelard's work on imagination immediately recommends him for serious consideration, he does not occupy a central role in this thesis for two reasons. Firstly, because of the absence (acknowledged by himself) of any attempt at philosophical consistency, rigour and systematization in his writing; and secondly, because his phenomenology of the poetic image is far more concerned with the image as poetic, than as phenomenological. He rarely if ever states his debt to Husserl, and while deeply preoccupied with the implications of the image as an intentional phenomenon rather than a mere 'thing', he invariably attends to its significance for poetry rather than for philosophy. However, his acknowledgment of the dynamic 'being' of an image, together with his pertinent criticisms of Sartre's notion of the image will receive due attention in our final section on the 'Dialectical Imagination'.

Ingarden's debt to Husserl is both extensive and acknowledged. His major study on art Untersuchungen Zur Ontologie Der Kunst (49) constitutes perhaps the finest single attempt to construct a phenomenological aesthetic. It has also the advantage of completing and synthesizing the various aesthetic investigations of Husserl's earliest disciples e.g., Conrad (Der Ästhetische Gegenstand), Geiger, (Zugänge Zur Ästhetik), Claus (Das Verstehen Des Sprachlichen Kunstwerks) and Kaufman (Die Bedeutung der Künstlerischen Stimmung). Unfortunately, however, Ingarden's interest was primarily in the
status of the artistic object itself rather than in the imaginative process which produced it. Indeed, it is surprising that his frequent reference to the intentional nature of creativity, should not have induced him to undertake a thorough phenomenological study of the imagination. The fact remains that he did not choose to do this. And so while taking cognizance of the many valuable insights which his work affords, we must ultimately look elsewhere for our principal exponents of the phenomenology of the imagination.

Dufrenne falls equally short of our requirements. The former's concern with a phenomenology of imagination is nowhere explicitly stated even though his whole phenomenological approach to the criticism of literature and art, appears to be deeply inspired by its implications. What is even more surprising, he does not once during the entire corpus of his aesthetic writing refer to Husserl's theory of imagination. To establish such a connection in any definitive sense would, however, prove an impractically difficult task.

And so we come to a justification of our selection of Jean-Paul Sartre as the second principal exponent of the phenomenology of imagination. The first, of course, being Husserl himself. Firstly, Sartre's work on the imagination is considerably more comprehensive than that of any other phenomenologist. Secondly, there is absolutely no doubt as to the 'phenomenological' nature of his treatment of the subject: his first major work, 'Imagination', consists of a critique of the principle theories of imagination prior to Husserl and concludes with an acknowledgement of the revolutionary insight which the latter's phenomenology provided on that matter: his second major work The Psychology of Imagination was subtitled The Phenomenological Psychology of Imagination but ranged far beyond psychology to an examination of the metaphysical and aesthetic implications of imaginative consciousness. Thirdly, these implications themselves provide the basis for all his subsequent writing on art and artists (copious and wide-ranging in nature) and fundamentally determine the ontology of being and nothingness. Some critics argue that his phenomenological understanding of imagination ultimately conditions his political theory also. There is, furthermore, a large corpus of drama and prose which serves, as we shall see, to accurately exemplify the author's theory of imagining as an act of 'nihilation'. All these areas combined furnish us with an incomparably rich spectrum for inquiry.
furnish us with an incomparably rich spectrum for inquiry.

Lastly, there is the important fact that Sartre's phenomenology of imagination has provoked extensive comment and criticism both within and without the phenomenological movement. To date, some twenty-one critical works, comprising articles, chapters of books and an entire issue of *The Journal of the British Society of Phenomenology (J.B.S.P.)*, have been produced in direct or indirect response to his theory. An impressive figure, no less indicative of the significance of his work as of its deep complexity and provocative insight.

This entire area of debate is profoundly confused and greatly in need of clarification and synthesis. This is particularly true of the specifically 'phenomenological' nature of Sartre's theory (a factor ignored by the majority of his critics) and to its formative influence on his other work. But the prime reason for choosing Sartre as the chief exponent of the phenomenology of imagination is the simple fact that no one else has yet succeeded in demonstrating so clearly or conclusively the imagination's significance for phenomenology and phenomenology's significance for imagination.

To understand why this is so, indeed to understand exactly what a phenomenology of imagination meant for Sartre in the first place, we must first offer a detailed account of the original theory of Edmund Husserl.
CHAPTER TWO: DISCOVERY OF A PHENOMENOLOGY OF IMAGINATION

(An Analysis of Edmund Husserl's treatment of Imagination).
Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, never explicitly formulated a theory of imagination. This is not surprising when we remember that Husserl's concern was primarily with the establishment and exposition of a methodological foundation on the basis of which all phenomenological studies could be carried out with rigour and certainty. The entire corpus of his published work, and particularly the *Ideas of Phenomenology* (1907), *The Paris Lectures* (1910), *Ideas* (1914), and *The Cartesian Meditations* (1929), bear witness to this preoccupation with method rather than content. Though there is good reason to believe that the unpublished Archives in Louvain contain several practical applications of the method (1), Husserl dedicated himself almost exclusively to the elucidation of 'beginnings' and called to his disciples to develop these in the concrete investigation of such primary intentional realms as perception, appreciation, emotion, desire and imagination etc. (2). With regard to imagination it was, we have suggested, Jean Paul Sartre, who first and most effectively rallied to this call.

But to say that Husserl has no explicitly formulated theory of imagination is not to say that he has no theory of imagination. In fact, the very exigencies of his method compelled him to recognize imagination as one of the most vital factors in the intuition of essences; and this in turn, led to the revolutionary discovery of imagination as intentionality. Though the predominantly 'heuristic' nature of Husserl's consideration of the imagination made for a fragmentary rather than systematic treatment of the subject, it is still quite possible to discern a comprehensive and coherent thesis emerging throughout his works.

We have already had occasion to cite Husserl's claim that 'fiction is the element which makes up the life of phenomenology... the source whence the knowledge of 'eternal truths' draws its sustenance' (3). Furthermore, we have suggested that this claim can only be understood in the light of Husserl's programme for a 'science of essences'. The precise nature of the role which imagination plays in this programme must now be examined. We will begin with a general account of Husserl's theory of the image, showing how,
on the one hand, imagination serves the phenomenological method, and how, on the other, the phenomenological method serves imagination. A detailed critique of the three principal themes of this theory:
1) the image as 'super-perceptual'
2) the image as 'fictional'
3) the image as 'possible', will follow in chapter three.

In phenomenology as in all eidetic sciences', Husserl remarks, 'images assume a privileged position over against perception' (4). This privilege he explains, is due to the fact that images afford 'a freedom which opens...for the first time an entry into the spacious realms of essential possibility with their infinite horizons of essential knowledge' (5). Imagination thus provides a place of vantage from which to apprehend consciousness as a unique phenomenon, rather than a mere cause of its effects or a hidden premiss of its conclusions. Imagination is a prerequisite of all phenomenological inquiry as a demonstration to consciousness of its own powers (6).

Husserl maintains that the image is the consequence of the 'neutralization of the positional act of representation' (7). It permits us therefore to contemplate 'what is being performed' in representation 'without helping to bring it about' (8). It provides us with a dis-positional (i.e. neutralized) attitude with which to investigate the positional attitude of our normal consciousness. This dis-positional attitude of imagination views things as 'mere pictures' without imparting to them 'the stamp of being or not-being or the like' (9). By using such images as tools for its self-investigations consciousness frees itself from the tyranny of fact and discovers the intentional nature of its own life. The self-investigations are not, Husserl points out, 'analyses in the usual sense (analyses into really immanent parts), but uncoverings of intentional implications, advancing from a factual experience to the system of experiences that are delineated as possible' (10). Without the 'possible' depth and clarity of the image, the intentionality of consciousness could not be adequately disclosed. Because the image is not a copy of the datum of being, but a pure creation of consciousness, it can best reveal the essence
of consciousness to itself as a perpetual movement towards being. In this way, the classical notions of consciousness as either a passive tabula rasa or an active imprint, are refuted and replaced by a new notion of consciousness as a phenomenon of reciprococity; an intentionality of what is other than itself. It is precisely because the imagination imparts nothing about 'being' that it is best capable of imparting something about consciousness as an attitude towards being (11).

It is Husserl's conviction that the image is exemplary with respect to essences in so far as it is neutral with respect to facts. Perception not imagination, is concerned with the essence of consciousness, Husserl is adamant that the two be clearly distinguished:

The fancy-image is not a mere faded datum of sense, but in its own way a fancy of the corresponding sense-datum; further, this 'of' cannot find its way in through any thing, however drastic, of the intensity of the content etc., of the sense datum in question (12).

The image is qualitatively distinct from the percept and not a mere after-image of it as the Hellenic theories maintained. It is in itself 'an ideal phenomenon' freely repeatable ad infinitum, in contrast to the common sense-datum which perishes because it is a sensatory phenomenon of perception (13). This freedom of imagination allows it to form a manifold of 'possible' acts of consciousness. In this way, consciousness learns to detach itself from its immediate object in perception and to reflect upon itself in the form of an 'as if' mode of consciousness which it can vary and alternate, at will, for the purposes of clarity and definition. It seems clear indeed, that it is this function of imagination that lies at the basis of Husserl's theory of phenomenological reduction. Marvin Farber explicates this relationship between imagination, possibility and reduction succinctly as follows:

It is thus seen that phantasy and the consciousness of possibility are essentially related to one another. Phantasy 'gives' possibilities originally. Reflection in phantasy yields possibilities of consciousness originally and these are indubitable. The phenomenological reduction can thus be made in the infinite domain of phantasy. This extends the region of absolute giveness over the whole field of possible consciousness, as a sphere of 'transcendentally purified' possibilities (14).
Imagination enables consciousness to free itself from its immersion in the world of actuality (first phase of reduction), and to return to a realm of pure possibility (second phase of reduction) where its own essence as intentionality is given in an intuition of immediate and apodictic certainty (third phase of reduction). This was the indispensable role which Husserl assigned to imagination in the phenomenological method. But imagination is not only indispensable for a disclosing of the essence of consciousness as an act of intending things. It is also and equally indispensable for disclosing the essence of the intended 'things themselves'. Or, to use Husserl's more technical terminology: the imagination is that which reveals not only the 'noetic' but also the 'noematic' essence of intentionality. (14a).

Husserl defines phenomenology as a science of the essence of things. By essences, he means certain ideal contents which cannot be grasped within the natural attitude. They can emerge only through the 'possible' world of imaginative consciousness. Here any given thing may be abstracted from its actual instantiation in the world and freely varied through an infinite series of possibilities until such a point (which Husserl never specifies adequately) that an invariant structure emerges. This invariant structure is what Husserl calls the essence or eidos. It has the advantage of being totally immune to the vagaries and contingencies of things as they exist factually, and provides the imaginer with an intuition of the things as they exist ideally (15). The question as to how the eidos emerges is problematical and will be critically analysed in our next chapter.

Husserl first formulates this process of imagining essences in the Logical Investigations and calls it 'free variation' or 'ideation' (16). It arises in the context of his refutation of Hume's notion of consciousness as a sum of discrete and contiguous impressions. Husserl wishes to show that consciousness is a continuous and constitutive activity operating according to certain universal and apriori 'laws of essences'. He proposes 'free variation' as the most effective method for discovering these laws. Because it is a process of imagination rather than perception it allows us, Husserl says, 1) to see beyond the actual mode of existence of a
thing to the variations of other possible modes of being, and 2) to intuit thereby an ideal unvarying paradigm. But in another way, the phenomenologist refashions the given data by freely varying it in his imagination. He allows the data to move continuously from their actual appearance to 'real possibilities' (Vermöglichkeiten), that is, possibilities prevailing within our real world, and finally to 'essential possibilities' (Hesensmöglichkeiten) transcending this real world (17). In doing this, the imaginier becomes increasingly aware of the open dimensions of possible variations to which an identical phenomenon may be subjected and attains thereby intuition of a general essence (18). The following passage from the Cartesian Meditations furnishes us with a concise formulation of this procedure.

Starting from this table-perception as an example, we vary the perceptual object, table, with a completely free optionalness... Perhaps we begin by fictively changing the shape or colour of the object quite arbitrarily, keeping identical only its perceptual appearing. In other words: Suspending the question of its existence we change the fact of this perception into a pure possibility, one among other quite 'optional' pure possibilities... We, so to speak, shift the actual perception into the realm of non-actualities, that realm of the as-if (als-ob) which supplies us with 'pure possibilities', pure of everything that restricts to this fact or to any fact whatever. As regards the latter point, we keep the aforesaid possibilities not as restricted even to the co-posed de facto ego, but just as a completely free 'imaginableness' of Imagination (19). 

Free variation' reveals that any fact is but one among other possible forms of existence. In addition, it reveals an 'essential necessity' which is equally present to all these other forms. Imagination thus leads to an intuition of essences, which Husserl designates as 'universals not conditioned by any fact' (20). Moreover, their free and flexible nature proves infinitely more apt to the process of uninhibited ideation (21) This would seem to be the basis for Husserl's dictum that 'the science of pure possibilities precedes the science of actualities and alone makes it possible as a science' (22).

By suspending a things' 'real' instantiation and allowing it to float freely as an 'imaginary irreality' (phantasiemässige Unwirklichkeit) amidst an infinitely open series of possibilities, ideation discloses both the essences of the 'things themselves' and
the eidetic laws of necessity which regulate the relations between them (23). But ideation, for Husserl, is not just a stage in a philosophical method. It is actively common to all men in an informal way, and to all artists in a formal way. Whenever men lack this function of imagination they fall victim to the pressures of their environment. No longer able to 'possibilize' alternative modes of living, to transcend the crippling familiarity of their presence in quest of what is other and future and absent, they despair (24).

The eidetic universal of imagination differs from the empirical universal of ordinary experience, in so far as it is concerned with the a priori structure of an object. Imagination allows us to contrive fictional examples of an object which we could never encounter in the world: 'We stand then in a pure fantasy world, a world of absolutely pure possibilities' (25). Because of this ad libitum nature of variation, the particular instance with which we began the process forfeits its priority. For we realize that we might well have begun with an other instance of the a priori essence of the object and come across our original instance as just another of the infinite possibilities (26).

Since the essence is derived from imagined instances and since no such instance has any priority over any other, all contingency is overcome. But it may be objected that there must be contingency to the extent that we must have experienced at least one, albeit any, instance of the essence in question. But this limitation too is overcome by the fact that it is enough that we can imagine the first instance. The only limitation at this level, then, arises from ourselves and not from some external world. The limitation is a result of our free choice (27). The world of contingency vanishes before the world of essences.

Imagination allows essences to present themselves through multiple rather than merely single instances. To be sure, the a priori essence is present in every single instance of its actual experience, that is, in our perception. But it is present in a partial and implicit way, as but one moment of its total horizon.
Free variation allows this essence to present itself in a full and explicit way, by filling out the total horizon with fictional instances. This filling out intuitive process is what Husserl calls 'constitution'. The essence does not actually exist prior to our constitution of it. Rather, it comes to be through the process of free variation. As Husserl puts it: 'The being of the universal in its different levels is essentially a being-constituted (Konstit-vier-Sein) in these processes'(28).

Whereas empirical universals are always open to alteration by additional actual experience, an essential universal is not subject to correction once it has been distinctly intuited as an a priori limit in itself. No experience, Husserl tells us, can further determine an eidos once it has been acquired through imaginative free variation. On the contrary, it is experience which is determined by it (29).

Essences may be acquired by imagination in both a positive and negative fashion. Positively, essences are reached by an intuition of the invariant paradigm within individual variants. This was Husserl's principal approach and we have dealt with it already in some detail. But there is also a negative mode of free variation, based on the principle that removal or addition of certain movements in a variant, destroy it as an instance of the eidos we are trying to explicate (30). If we try to imagine a material thing without extension, or a melody without time, for example, we no longer have a material thing or a melody. Extension and temporality are thus shown 'negatively' to be of the essence of thinghood and music respectively. Husserl concludes accordingly that disclosure of the eidos must take place in imagination not only because a pure essence must be free from the contingency of perceptual experience, but also because if our variation stayed within perception, it could never reach beyond empirical generality to eidetic necessity. From perception alone we could never conclude that extension is integral to thinghood as an eidetic necessity. For if we were confined to our immediate perception, we could not imagine instances where this might not be so, and thereby (by a process of negation) discover that it must be so. In perception, we could not present the test variations that turn out to be impossible and so mark the essential limits
of an object; only the imagination has the freedom to transcend
the limits of what the object is, in order to guarantee the impossi-
bility of violating them. An eidos is not an eidos until we have
confirmed the impossibility of eliminating any of its parts without
eliminating the whole. Therefore only the freedom of imagination
can secure the necessity of things (31).

But could not signification or conceptualization suffice here?
In contrast to concepts or signs which are but empty intentions,
imaginative variants alone provide an intuition of the object.
Imagination allows us to look to the things themselves, not just to
our words or thoughts about them. Merely to define time and tone
as integral to music is not sufficient. We must begin with instances
of music and freely vary these in the imagination until we can
register the impossibility of it being what it is unless such
attributes belong to it.

Without free variation man could not know either the essence
of the things of which he is conscious, or the essence of conscious-
ness itself. To cause the datum of consciousness to vary imaginat-
ively is to discover not only the eidos of the experienced thing
but also the eidos of consciousness as an a priori possibility.
The eidos of consciousness, what Husserl calls the eidos-ego, is
intentionality. But it is my intentionality. For it is the purity
of my consciousness reached through imaginings of my own life.
Here Husserl finds himself confronted with the problems of solips-
sism (32).

However freely it may vary the facts of the world or of the self,
imagination can never transcend the self. It is tied to the ball
and chain of the first person singular. The reduction of my conscious
experience to its most universal essence cannot secure access to any
self in general, from which I might get back into the plurality
of consciousness. My most universal essence remains always my most
universal essence. I have no access to the plural by way of the
universal. In other words, the phenomenological imagination can
save us from the anonymity of facts; but it cannot save us from
the uniqueness of our own essence (33). Paul Ricouer states Husserl's
dilemma neatly as follows:
Phenomenology is a victory over brute fact by the method of imaginative variation.... Thus even the Ego must be 'imagined' in order to separate it from brute fact. This breaking away from my own contingency is essential to the birth of the Ego meditans.... The remarkable thing is that this passage to the eidos-ego brings into play only variations of my own ego and has no reference to the other in the second person. Thus I imagine myself as other without imagining an other. This is quite necessary since before constituting the other, my ego is the only ego... in this way the eidetic ego definitely has no reference to the similarity between the first and second person and works its variations on the solipsistic plane (34).

Solipsism is the most immediate problem confronting Husserl's theory of imagination. It is all the more surprising then to discover him in the fifth Cartesian Meditation seeking to solve the problem by means of imagination. Husserl's argument is based on the following programme of 'imaginative variation': I am 'here' (hic), the other is there (ille); but 'there' (ille) is where I could be if I were to move. From 'over there' (ille) I would see the same things but under a different perspective. Hence, through imagination I can co-ordinate the other places, the other perspectives to my place and to my perspective (35). But because the life of the other is not given to me in an 'original production' (Leistungen) but merely in a fictive 'reproduction' in the mode of the 'as if (als ob) I were there', the life of the other can never become for me the equivalent of the one life of which I have originary experience, that is my own. Husserl cannot escape the mesh which his own theory of imagination has cast: solipsism. His principal disciple in this area Jean-Paul Sartre was to prove equally troubled by this dilemma.

The importance of imagination as a method for the disclosure of essences should now be apparent. This disclosure operates according to a process of free variation and leads to the intuition of both noetic and noematic eide. But there is a third and final sort of eidos which the phenomenological imagination can disclose: 'the ultimate telos of all our eidetic investigations, objective and subjective... the eidos of a philosophy as the all embracing science' (36).

This teleological eidos motivates all our intentional life. It is what leads us out from the solitude of consciousness towards the otherness of a world. It is what regualtes and presides over all
other essences, noetic and neomadic alike. It is the 'Eidetic Apriori' of all truth (37), and manifests itself in both thought and life.

Because of this conviction, Husserl is inclined to review the history of philosophy as a married man might review an adolescent diary: he speaks of it, retrospectively, as an 'asymptotic' striving for an ideal rationality, a complex of contradictory systems which, unbeknownst to itself, veils a 'concealed unity of intentional interiority' (Verborgene Einheit intentionaler Innerlichkeit). Husserl concludes accordingly that phenomenology is the 'sweet nostalgia' of all modern thought from Descartes to Kant (38).

It is imagination which permits the ideal possibility of phenomenology to raise its head. It does so by freely varying the possibilities of the ultimate telos situating each past philosophy as a particular instance and suggesting the best possible ways in which this telos may be further realized in the future. In imaginative variation the history of thought emerges as an infinite struggle towards the telos of absolute reason. In this way, philosophy is shown to be a vocation of man; a vocation which, Husserl maintains, resulted at one particular period in the geometric objectivism of Galileo and Spinoza, at another in the more advanced transcendental subjectivism of Descartes, Hume and Kant, and in this century approximates still closer to the final eidos in his own phenomenology (39). But philosophy does not end with phenomenology; it begins. Indeed, it is precisely through the phenomenological method of imaginative variation that even this final eidos is seen to 'imply the 'and so forth' of endless possibilities' (40).

In his later thought, Husserl became convinced that the teleological eidos motivates not only the philosophical world of man, but also his life-world (Lebenswelt). He attempted to explain this correlation by their common source in a universal programme of intentionality which expresses itself in a series of perpetual intersubjective operations (Leistungen). Husserl claims that the constitution of life-worlds evinces, despite its prima facie relativity, certain invariant 'habits' (Gewohnheiten) and 'typicalities' (Wesensgesetzlichetypiken). The imagination discovers these
in free variation. By prescinding from any single Lebenswelt, it projects a whole variety of possible Lebenswelten and thus discloses the universal eidos of any Lebenswelt whatsoever (41). By tracing the worlds we live in back to their common intentional source (Sinngenesis), the imagination can divine the eidos of human society and project ways in which it might be historically brought about. In The Origin of Geometry Husserl enunciates this possibility:

In imagination we have the capacity of complete freedom to transform our human historical existence and what is there exposed as its 'life-world'. And precisely in this activity of free variation, and in running through the conceivable possibilities for the life world, there arises with apodictic self-evidence, an essential general set of elements going through all the variants; and of this we can convince ourselves with truly apodictic certainty. This freedom and the direction of our gaze upon the apodictic invariant, results in the latter again and again, and can be fixed in univocal language as the essence constantly implied in the flowing, vital horizon (42).

To the extent that Husserl recognized this power of imagination, he founded an ontology of the Lebenswelt. Imagination treats the present world as but one of many possible life-worlds. So doing, it aims to discover the logos of its being and the telos of its becoming. It is precisely this aim of imagination that constitutes for Husserl, 'the ultimate and highest problem of phenomenology'. In his article for the Encyclopaedia Britannica he states this unequivocally as follows:

Phenomenology recognizes its particular function within a possible life for man... It recognizes the absolute norms which are to be picked out from this life of man, and also its primordial teleological-tendential structure in a striving towards the universal ideal of absolute perfection which lies in infinity, a striving which becomes free through the imaginative process of disclosure (43).

Here again, we confront the paradox of freedom and necessity which surrounds Husserl's treatment of the imagination. If imagination is that which frees us by 'suspending' our servility to the facts of the 'natural' world and by 'returning' us to the world of possibility, it is also that power of 'ideation' which discloses the laws of 'eidetic necessity' (44). Free variation leads to necessary invariation. At this point a phenomenology of imagination points towards a phenomenology of God. Husserl was well aware of this but reluctant to allow of anything which might transgress the limits of an 'absolute and presuppositionless' phenomenology (45). Because of
Husserl's unwillingness to carry phenomenology into the realm of theology except for an occasional identification of the telos and God his treatment of imagination remains at all times this essential paradox (45a). Simply stated; if the imagination creates the essences then how is Husserl to escape the charge of 'subjective idealism'? And if it does not create them then who does? Husserl seems to suggest that imaginative variation, as opposed to induction, does not construct a universal essence out of particular facts, but discovers this essence to be the a priori condition of these facts (46). This discovery is what Husserl calls 'constitution'. There is much confusion surrounding the phenomenological theory of constitution. The existentialist interpretation, based largely on the unpublished manuscripts at Louvain, maintains that Husserl meant constitution as a 'clarification' (Klarung) of the potentialities implicitly contained in experience (47). This is what Merleau-Ponty calls the 'miraculous paradox of consciousness' which brings to light 'afterward' what was already there 'before' (48). It is in this sense also that Brand interprets Husserl's statement that the imagination does not deny the world altogether, but 'only prevents me from affirming that the assumed reality of the pre-given world has the value of an absolute foundation, so that I may examine the laws by which this world is constituted in the first place' (49).

Another group, including Knocklemans, Siegelberg and Suzanne Bachelard - lays the emphasis on the more idealist notion of constitution as a pure creation unrelated to experience (50). Both groups can cite much evidence in support of their respective interpretations, and it is certainly not a simple matter of choosing between them. We shall return to this paradox of freedom and necessity in the second part of this chapter. For the moment it is sufficient to acknowledge that the paradox exists.

Whatever about the paradoxical implications of imagination as a disclosure of essences, the fact remains that phenomenology could not exist without it. One of Husserl's closest disciples, Felix Kaufman, sums up its significance in the following no uncertain terms:

Phenomenology must be intuitive - and that means; imaginative in the sense of eidetic intuition, or it will lose its identity as a philosophical movement... Phenomenology ventures out into a new possibility of existence, an adventure of imagination - which, I submit, is the very destiny of man if
he has imagination enough to grasp it (51).

In this statement we discern yet another paradox: how can imagination disclose the essence of imagination as a disclosure of essence, unless it is already disclosed as a disclosure of essence in the first place? More simply put: if it takes imagination to know imagination, how do we move from the prephenomenological imagination which does not recognize its own essence, to a phenomenological imagination which does? This hermeneutic circle cannot be obviated short of appealing to a telos which would motivate imagination to move from its self-unawareness in the natural attitude, to its self-awareness in the phenomenological attitude. But this is merely to return to the first paradox of how a telos can determine our freedom.

Postpôing for the moment a more detailed critique of the circularity in Husserl's treatment of the imagination, we now proceed to the second part of this chapter: a discussion of the way in which the phenomenological method serves to disclose the essence of imagination. Having analysed up to this point, the various ways in which imagination served the phenomenological method by discovering noetic, noematic and teleological essences, we shall now analyse how the phenomenological method serves in turn to disclose the essence of imagination itself as a sui generis mode of intentionality. In other words, we now move from an analysis of imagination as the organ of phenomenology to an analysis of imagination as an object of phenomenology.

In Ideas (1913) Husserl first suggests how the phenomenological method might lead to a radically new conception of imagination. He rejects what he considers to be the traditional methodological extremes of induction and deduction. Induction, he maintains, can only construe the imagination from within the 'natural attitude' as an object of empirico-metric experimentation. It reduces the vital 'experience' of this mode of consciousness to a collection of merely 'probable' sense-data (52). Deduction, on the other hand, is equally erroneous in its attempt to establish the nature of imagin-
ation from certain logical presuppositions. The phenomenological method, in contrast to both, operates on the conviction that there are certain unique modes of consciousness, imagination being one of the most central, which can only be 'experienced' in an equally unique mode of 'reflection', free from all empiricist and rationalist premises.

Husserl strove for a theory of consciousness erected on a foundation as rigorous and certain as that of the natural sciences. Contrary to 'naturalistic' belief, Husserl held that such a foundation could not be reached by simple observation of the empirically given. Before one can experiment with and observe something one must know what that something is. Before understanding how something exists one must understand the fundamental essence of the existent. In this connection, Husserl reminds us that the ultimate foundation of the physical sciences is not, as is commonly supposed, a system of empirical induction, but a geometry of 'essential relations' more fundamental than these sciences themselves (53). Husserl in no way wishes to suggest that geometrical extension was the only essential character of things. He merely argues that it is one of the indispensable eidetic structures for empirical physics. Nor does he wish to suggest that mathematics could provide the correlative eidetic structure for a science of the imagination. The phenomenology of imagination differs from the empirical sciences in so far as it is an inquiry into the 'intentional', rather than the merely 'formal', essence of its object. It cannot, therefore, presume to secure the exactness of these sciences concerned exclusively with the 'facts of things'. The phenomenological method aims at another type of certainty, more complex and more fundamental; in short, more appropriate to that particular eidos of intentionality which Husserl calls imagination (54).

The formulation of this eidos cannot then be accomplished either by a pure mathematics of extension or by pure empirical induction. It requires a phenomenological method, equally reflective in its manner of investigation, but more sensitive to the constitutive and dynamic process of consciousness. Husserl does not maintain that such a method denies the validity of the other approaches. What he does maintain is that it is only after such an eidetic
investigation has taken place, that experimental and existential evidence can be legitimately adduced. It is in this light that phenomenology proclaims itself the only method adequate to a pure and presuppositionless description of the essence of imagination (55).

Referring to the imaging of a centaur, Husserl writes 'that in the very essence of the experience lies determined not only that but also whereof it is a consciousness' (56). Imagination is, for Husserl, a sui generis mode of intentionality. This definition rests upon his claim that there is an essential distinction between the imagination per se and the object which it intends (i.e. is conscious of) by means of the image. Husserl resolves the classical problem of whether to construe the image as an internal thing (the fallacy of immanence) or an external thing (the fallacy of sensism), by arguing that it is not a thing at all. Phenomenology redefines the image as a relation, an act of consciousness directed to an object beyond consciousness. The object of the image remains always outside of the imagination: Something transcendent, real and perduring in itself. Imagination cannot reduce the world to a myriad of internal images as Hume maintained. The world is a really existing thing which remains at all times transcendent of the consciousness which intends it (57). Under no circumstances, can the object in itself be translated into an image in consciousness. Indeed it was precisely the conception of the image as an internalized or lesser 'thing' which prejudiced all the Hellenic theories of imagination. The phenomenological method redresses this error by disclosing the essence of the image to be an intentional actus, not a static res (58).

In our first chapter we analysed how the Hellenic conception of the image as an internal element in consciousness led to a distortion of the evidos of imagination. The 'traditional' image, conceived merely as quantitatively rather than qualitatively unique, was deemed 'true' when it represented well, and 'false' when it represented badly, its external original. This notion of the 'reified' and 'representative' image was, Husserl demonstrates, primarily due to a confounding of the role of imagination with that of perception. The subsequent problem of distinguishing the image from the percept was thus rendered absurd and insoluble. For once one begins by stating the qualitative sameness of two things, it is
of course impossible to later establish the difference between them. As long as the image was thus construed as a material content in a sort of relay ascent from sensory perception to mental representation, no recognition of its essentially sui generis mode of being was possible.

Phenomenology reveals the true nature of the image as an intention of consciousness as opposed to an element in consciousness. It shows that in its very constitution, the image differs not only from the things of the world, but also from the percepts of consciousness which are constituted according to a quite distinct mode of intention (59). Thus all the Hellenic labors of establishing truth-standards and reality-criteria for the image, is shown to have been null and void. As different modes of intentional consciousness, image and percept are conscious of their difference (60).

Phenomenology reveals that all modes of consciousness can exist only as being conscious that they exist; for it reveals that all intentions are purposive determinations of a conscious (be it thetic or non-theitic) ego. Consequently, qua intentions of consciousness, images prove to be pure self-conscious and self-transparent spontaneities (61). As such, they can no longer be mistaken for sensory things which might function as supports for thought. Nor can they be mistaken for inert entities which might surface up from the memory or the senses, causing us to feel and react in this way or that. The image cannot serve as an efficient cause of action as was commonly supposed by the Hellenic theories (62). It cannot cause intentions for the simple reason that it itself is the intention. Images do not determine our consciousness; they are themselves determinations of consciousness. Images are not things which exist like other things in the world; they are acts which exist as intentions of consciousness (63).

The phenomenological method dispenses with the Hellenic scruple as to the 'reality' of images and accepts the mode of being of the image as its appearance to consciousness (64). Phenomenology draws a fundamental distinction between the laws of things and the laws of consciousness. It thus goes beyond all previous theories of imagination which invariably confounded the nature of internal images with things. The discovery of the intentionality of imaginations reveals that the image is not an atom in consciousness but
an instance of it. Husserl admits that the image is similar to the percept in so far as they are both a consciousness of something, but insists that the something of the image is intended in a radically different sense to the something of the percept (65). He seeks to clarify this difference by returning to his centaur example:

The flute-playing centaur which we freely imagine is certainly a presentation we have ourselves constructed...but only if we mean by 'presentation' that which is presented and not if we mean a psychic state. Naturally the centaur itself is not psychic. It exists neither in the soul nor in consciousness, nor anywhere else, it is in fact 'nothing', mere 'imagination'; or, to be more precise, the living experience of imagination is the imagining of a centaur. To this extent, indeed, 'the centaur as intended', the centaur as imagined, belongs to the experience itself as lived. But we must also beware of confusing this lived experience of imagination with that in the experience which is imagined qua object imagined (66).

In this passage Husserl is suggesting that the fact that the centaur does not actually exist does not entitle us to dismiss it as a mere psychic entity. The object of the centaur image-intention is; quite obviously, an irreality; but qua irreality it can, Husserl argues, still maintain a transcendence vis-à-vis the mind (67). To perceive something and to imagine something, are two different ways of intending the same transcendent object. The intentional percept refers to the same object as the intentional image; the difference is that the first intends it as real, the latter as unreal. In this way, phenomenology rescues imagination from its Hellenic confusion with perception, and restores it to its essential role as a power capable of intending the 'unreal' in the 'real', the 'absent' in the 'present', the 'possible' in the 'actual'. Husserl thus strove to overcome the Hellenic prejudice by means of an eidetic method which would reveal imagination not as a mere 'intermediary faculty' in which images are contained, purified and transmitted, but as a sui generis mode of intentionality.
CHAPTER THREE: DEVELOPMENT OF A PHENOMENOLOGY OF IMAGINATION.
This chapter is designed to serve as a critique of some contradictions in Husserl's theory of imagination. The problem of solipsism and circularity have already been noted. Here, these and other problems shall be examined in terms of the following three themes: 1) The image as super-perception, 2) The image as fiction, 3) The image as possibility.

THE IMAGE AS SUPERCEPTION:

'Between perception, on the one hand, and on the other, presentation in the form of an image, there is an unbridgeable and essential difference' (1). Throughout his many fragmented writings on the relationship of image and perct, Husserl is adamant, though not always consistent on this point.

In the Logical Investigations (1900-1901) Husserl first outlines a basis for a distinction between imagination and perception. In a refutation of the traditional 'imagery theory' which confounded the mode of presentation with the object presented, Husserl retorts that the image and the perct are different modes of presentation, eventhough they may be intending the same object. Furthermore, since the object imagined is not itself the image, then it is of no real importance, he adds, whether this object really exists or not (2). At this early stage, however, Husserl does not deal with the possible objection that if the image is an intention of something (as every intention must be) then how can the image be of nothing, or at least, nothing that exists.

In these investigations Husserl regards imagination and perception as homologous in so far as they are both intuitive rather than signitive modes of intentionality. Signs and what is signified 'have nothing to do with one another' (i.e. the sign 'red' has nothing to do with the action of stopping). Images and percepts, by contrast, are intrinsically connected with the object intended (i.e. the perct or image of a horse must resemble a horse). This means, in effect, that while the sign intends an object without intuiting it, the image and the perct both 'present' the object intended in some sort of 'fulfilling' intuition. But, while similar in their difference from signs, images and percepts also differ very radically from each other, in so far as the object of per-
ception is intuited 'in itself, and not merely in an image' (3). The verdict is plain: the percept has priority over both the sign and the image.

Though Husserl does at one point concede that imagination is as valid as perception for the purpose of intuitions essences (e.g. the essence 'red', the essence 'triangle', the predominant view expressed in the Logical Investigations is that perception has ultimate superiority (4). Indeed, on one occasion he even refers to images as 'mere supplementaries' of a 'pure perception', the aim of the latter being to exclude gradually everything symbolic or pictorial so as to reach an adequate intuition of the object as it really is in its own original self-manifestation (5).

Husserl displays a similar preference for perception in his treatment of the subject in his next major work The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness (1905). Here Husserl rejects Brentano's theory that the origin of the apprehension of time lies exclusively in the sphere of imagination. He argues that Brentano failed to differentiate between time as perceived and time as imagined, because he failed to originally differentiate between the act of apprehending time and the object apprehended in time (6). On the basis of this difference Husserl distinguishes between 'primary memory' (based on an original perception) and a 'secondary memory' (based on imagination) (7). The former he defines as being founded on a 'retention' of originally given percepts which are still lively enough to be 'presented'. The latter he defines as being founded on a 'reproduction' of percepts which are so far past that they can only be 'presented' mediately, that is, through the medium of an image. Since the image is prone to modification, however, there is no way of determining whether it refers to something which exists or not. Though Husserl admits that imaginative presentification is much freer than perceptual presentification (8), he is, at this stage, still unequivocally on the side of perception:

Imagination is not a form of consciousness that can bring forth some kind of objectivity or other...as self-given. Not to be self-giving is the essence of imagination. Even the concept of imagination does not arise from imagination. For
if we claim originally to have given what imagination is, then we must form images, but this itself does not mean givenness. We must naturally observe the process of phantasy i.e. perceive it. The perception of imagination is the primordially giving consciousness for the formation of the concept of imagination. In this perception we see what imagination is, we grasp it is the consciousness of self-givenness (9).

While Husserl confirms here his original view, set forth in the Investigations, that there is a difference between imagination and perception as modes of presenting an object, he differs from his earlier position in so far as he now defines imagination as an empty, as opposed to a full intention:

We can divide simple ideas into those which are empty and those which are intuitive. An empty idea can, however, also be a symbolic one which not only represents the object voidly but also represents it 'by means of' signs and images. (10).

In the Idea of Phenomenology, a series of five lectures delivered in Göttingen in 1907, Husserl announced the complementarity of imagination and perception (II). Whereas he had previously claimed that imagination was inferior to perception in so far as it was only by means of the latter that it could be known, he here categorically redresses the balance:

I can picture to myself in imagination a perception and survey it as so given to imagination. In that case I am no longer vacuously talking about perception or having a vague intention or idea of it. Instead perception itself stands open to my inspection as actually or imaginatively given to me...I have here put on the same level the 'seeing' act of reflective perception and the 'seeing' act of reflective imagination (I2).

Husserl claims that he is going beyond his previous 'Cartesian' viewpoint, which emphasized perception first (I3). Any data of perception, he now declares, can also be data of imagination. He categorically refutes his earlier view that images could only be
intuited 'emptily' and asserts that they can, in fact, be intuited in 'full clarity' (14). This assertion can only be understood in the context of Husserl's theory of essences. While transcendent objects can only provide an evidence of quasi-giveness phenomena existing in the intentional life of consciousness furnish us with evidence of absolute givenness (15). Since it is these phenomena, once purified of all 'naturalistic' suppositions, that constitute the very stuff of eidetic intuition, Husserl concluded that 'for a consideration of essences, perception and imagination are to be treated exactly alike' (16). He gives the following example:

By perceiving colour and exercising reduction on this perception I arrive at the pure phenomenon of colour. And if I now achieve a pure abstraction, I will get to the essence of phenomenological colour as such. But I am equally in possession of this essence if I have a clear image (17).

This equation of the validity of perception and imagination as agents of eidetic intuition, rests ultimately on Husserl's initial distinction between intention and the objects intended. Because phenomenology recognizes that consciousness is not an empty sack into which outside objects are placed (18); but rather a dynamic intentionality which constitutes the very objects as they are in themselves (19), it matters little whether one begins with a perceived or a merely imagined thing. It is not the existence but the essence of things, as constituted in the intentional life of consciousness, that concerns phenomenology. And for this purpose, imagination which intuits 'irreal' objects, is as valid as perception which intuits 'real' ones (20).

Husserl is not, as it may seem, refuting his original distinction between perception and imagination as two different acts of intention. He is merely saying that as heterogeneous acts, they are complementary in their ability to intuit the essence of things. At this point, however, Husserl confuses the issue by raising the question of the ontological status of the imagined object:

If I give free rein to fantasy, so that, I see a Knight like St. George killing a dragon, is it not evident that the fantasy phenomenon represents precisely St. George, and even St. George as described in such and such a way, and that thus
it here represents something transcendent?. Can I not make evident judgments here about the object which appears?
To be sure, it is evident that this object, this Knight St.
George, lies within the meaning of the phenomenon, and is
manifested there as a datum of a sort proper to its
appearance (21).

Husserl recognizes the necessity of distinguishing between a
number of 'different basic forms of objectivity' (22), but fails to
do so adequately himself. The only solution he intimates is the
possibility of some 'teleological coherence' which would determine
the 'ultimate bearing' of all the different modes of consciousness
(23). This solution, however, is only intimated, not argued. One
is left with the puzzle: how can perception and imagination succeed
in intuiting the same 'essence', when both their acts of intending
and the status of their objects intended, are radically heterog-
enuous in nature.

This dilemma is still unresolved in the first volume of Ideas
(1916). This work provides the most comprehensive treatment of
the whole perception/imagination problematic. One of the most
crucial passages is Husserl's classic contrast of two intentional
modes of apprehending Dürer's engraving. The Knight, Death and the
Devil:

We distinguish here in the first place the normal perception
of which the correlate is the 'engraved print' as a thing,
this print in the portfolio. We distinguish in the second
place the consciousness within which in the black lines of the
picture there appear to us the small colourless figures,
'Knight on horseback', 'death', and 'devil'. In aesthetic
observation we do not consider these as the objects (Objecten);
we have our attention fixed on what is portrayed 'in the
picture', more precisely on the depicted realities (Algebildet) —
the knight of flesh and blood, and so forth (24).

In this example we see clearly how both perception and imagination,
while referring to the same canvass object of lines, shades and
shapes, intend it in entirely different ways. In the aesthetic or
imaginative attitude, consciousness undergoes what Husserl calls
'a neutrality-modification' whereby all 'positional' attitudes
regarding the existence or non-existence of the things imagined are
'bracketed' (25). But, Husserl is quick to remind us, this does
not in any way mean a 'privation' of all existence, but only a
'neutralization' of the problem thereof. More precisely, 'the
process of imagination in general is the neutrality modification
of the 'positing' act of representation' (26).

Here again imagination is described as a sui generis mode of intentional consciousness. To imagine, as opposed merely to perceiving an already created image (i.e. the Dürrer engraving) is to re-create the invisible intention which lies behind the visible lines on the paper. The matter upon which the percept and the image are formed is the same matter (a print on a page); it is in the way in which this matter is intended that the difference resides. The image, Husserl tells us, is always a 'spontaneous' way of intending its object, whereas the percept, directed to an existing and present object, can never be (27).

Perhaps the most significant advance which Husserl makes in Ideas on his previous treatment of imagination is to be found in his notion of hyle. Husserl distinguishes between three different components of any image or percept: 1) An act of intention 2) An object aimed at through this intention 3) a hyle (or basic matter) enlivened by this intention. The hyle becomes part of the act; the object remains totally apart from the act; the act itself unites the two by aiming at the latter through the former. Referring to his example of the Dürrer engraving, Husserl suggests that the hyle we apprehend in imagining the Knight is the very same as the hyle we apprehend in perceiving it i.e. the print. The difference here lies not in the hyle which is but the mediation of the invention, nor in the object (the knight) which is its goal, but in the intention itself.

In perception the object must be given 'really' whereas in the case of imagination the object can only be given 'irreally'. Nevertheless all 'irrealities' of imagination, such as the knight death and the devil, are out of consciousness (28). They cannot therefore be in consciousness as the Hellenic theories of imagination supposed. But if Husserl succeeded in revealing the image to be an act of consciousness intending an 'irreality' transcendent of consciousness, he did not succeed in explaining what precisely he meant by this 'irreality' (29). This in turn, prevented him from ever adequately explicating the distinction between perception and imagination (30).

Another notable shortcoming in Husserl's treatment of imagina-
ation is his failure to distinguish between the hyle of internal and external images. Although he demonstrates how an external image and a corresponding perception can constitute different intentions and yet share the same hyle, he does not demonstrate how an internal (or mental) image can have the same hyle as a percept. An example of an external image would be an intention based on Dürer's picture of the knight, death and the devil; an example of an internal image would be our image of these three without any such external picture to incarnate them.

Although in some passages in the Logical Investigations and The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness (31), he tended towards the view that the basic matter (hyle) of both an image and a percept is the same, in Ideas he declares such a view untenable. By stressing the importance of the 'reduction' in this work, Husserl rendered it impossible to distinguish a percept and an image by means of their respective positing or non-positing of the object intended. On the other hand, this also involved a reduction of the objects themselves, both of imagination and perception, to the status of an 'irreality'-what he calls the 'noematic' - and thus eliminated any possibility of distinguishing between them by reference to their objective reality or unreality. In other words, if the tree perceived is just as 'irreal' as the tree imagined, how are we to know that the one is perceived and the other imagined?. Husserl now recognizes that a difference in the noesis or the transcendent object itself is not enough. There must also be a difference in very noematic hyle of the image and the percept:

It may be in each case a matter of a blossoming tree and that tree may appear in each case in such a manner that a faithful description of that which appears as such would have to use scrupulously the very same terms. Yet the noematic correlates are not for all that any less different on essential grounds when we are treating of perception and imagination...Now the apparition is characterized as 'reality in flesh and blood', now as 'fiction' etc. These are characters which we find as inseperable features of the perceived, imagined etc...as necessarily belonging to these in correlation with the respective types of noetic experience (32).

This concession is by no means as unequivocal as it appears. What does Husserl mean when he says that we 'find' a difference
between a perceptual noema and an imagined noema? Does this mean that the 'irreal' hyle can themselves motivate different types of intention? Or does it mean that the hyle are conditioned as different by the different noetic intentions?. But if the latter be the case we are still left with the original question: what determines the intention as either percept or image in the first place?. Once again, the circle. Husserl does offer a hint of a solution when he says that the hyle of an image calls for a 'spontaneous' intention, whereas the hyle of a percept does not. (This, as we shall see was to become a major consideration of Sartre's theory of imagination). It was not, however, until the Cartesian Meditations (1929) that Husserl developed this insight into a comprehensive differentiation between a 'passive synthesis' of perception (operating according to a necessary association) and an 'active synthesis of imagination', (operating according to a free spontaneity):

In active synthesis the ego functions as creatively constitutive by means of subjective processes that are specifically acts of consciousness. The universal principle of passive genesis is (by contrast) concerned with the constitution of all objectivities given completely prior to the creations of activity (33).

Though an advance on his previous thought on the matter, this explanation still leaves much to be desired. Even if Husserl grants the fact that images are active syntheses, he still has to determine whether this synthesis involves a difference in the hyle or merely in the way the intention alters the hyle. If the latter, then we have no guarantee against a relapse into the illusion of immanence. This is particularly true in relation to internal images, where the hyle cannot be something out there in the world to be examined (like the lines on the Dürer drawing). If we cannot distinguish between the hyle of the image and the hyle of the percept in themselves, then how are we to avoid the Hellenic error of treating the internal image as just a purified or faded percept?.

Certainly Husserl seemed aware that an adequate explanation of the distinction between mental images and percepts cannot be sought in intentionality alone; but he himself did not succeed in providing any consistent or convincing alternative. Because of his failure to differentiate between the hyle of these two modes of intentionality. Husserl's overall treatment of the relation between
imagination and perception may be considered necessary but not sufficient to an adequate phenomenology of imagination.

THE IMAGE AS FICTION

Husserl's treatment of the image as fiction is as innovative and inconsistent as his treatment of the image as superperception. This is not surprising when we consider that his different approaches to fiction are very largely conditioned by his assessment of the latter issue. On the one hand, Husserl describes the fiction as a 'free fancy' which assumes a privileged position over against sensation; on the other, he maintains that the data of 'outer experience' are 'prior to the data of fiction' (34).

We have already noted that Husserl granted imagination the highest and most privileged position of intuiting essences by means of a 'free variation'. We must now examine this more closely. Imagination's power of 'suspending' the natural attitude and 'returning' to the phenomenological attitude, is for Husserl the surest guarantee against the classical error of reducing essences to facts. Not reality, but fiction, he holds, is the source of 'insight into pure essences in manifold variety' (35). Fiction is the term which Husserl uses to designate the specific role of the image in the free variation and intuition of essences. Fiction, thus defined, is a creation of human freedom rather than a mere epiphenomenon of facticity. It is, as he puts it, a 'seeing' not a 'sensing' (36). Fiction terminates our submission to experience by leading us to a place where we may 'see' the possibility of things having essences. The 'fictional 'seeing' is twofold. On the one hand, it allows us to envisage the possibility of essences in things; on the other, it allows us to envisage the possibility of things in essences. In short, fiction provides essences with visible forms and things with invisible ones. By defining fiction as the portal leading from the natural to the eidetic realm, Husserl bound imagination and phenomenology in a gordian knot (37).

Fiction can afford an ease and clarity in our apprehension of
things, impossible in experience and indispensable to the intuition of essences. Such ease and clarity is possible, Husserl holds, only when consciousness 'enters into the spacious realms of essential possibility with their infinite knowledge' (38). Fiction can gain access to these realms of essential possibility by holding the realms of existential actuality at arms length. In Ideas Husserl gives us the following example of the geometer:

The geometer when he thinks geometrically operates with imagery vastly more than he does with percepts of figures and models... Whereas in actual drawing and modelling he is restricted; in imagination he has perfect freedom in the arbitrary recasting of the figures he has imagined, in running over continuous series of possible shapes, in the production there of an infinite number of new creations; a freedom which opens up to him for the first time an entry into the spacious realms of essential possibility with their infinite horizons of essential knowledge (39).

Husserl seems to be suggesting here that in so far as there is an essential geometrical knowledge, geometrical imagery precedes geometrical experience. Geometrical images show the geometrical essences of things, while geometrical models merely write those images large. Here we find a perfect example of the way in which a fiction (as a possibility) serves to incarnate an essence (as a truth of geometry) in a fact (as an experimental datum-model of science).

It is interesting to note that this account is in total contradiction to a previous account of the geometer's activity in volume two of the Logical Investigations (40), where Husserl deprecates rather than applauds the use of fiction. But such a conflicting assessment of this particular function of fiction, is entirely in keeping with Husserl's ambiguous treatment of the role of fiction in general. On the one hand, there is the positive assessment outlined above. This leads to the view that 'the freedom of research in the region of the essence necessarily demands that one should operate with the help of imagination' (41). Fictions are here regarded as the prerequisite of 'freedom of research'. They are said to enable us to research the thing in its 'essential' evidence, after the 'natural attitude' has merely searched its 'apparent' evidence. This essential evidence applies, as we have seen, not merely to things but also to consciousness itself, for the fiction is nothing other than a certain type of consciousness at play with possibil-
ities. Kuspit argues that because phenomenology recognizes fiction as the freedom to research both self and world, it recognizes the priority of art over science:

In art...the thing's features stand out with fictitious clarity, because the thing's factuality - obscuring insight into it - has been taken from it. In fiction the thing's essential features are no longer unclear as they are in the factual things. Thus with art's glance at things goes science's hope for complete certainty about things...consciousness invents art to free itself of experience so that it can glance at what is not obviously given in experience, viz., pure essence (42).

'Fiction' reveals not only that things have unexpected essences but that consciousness is an unexpected activity, a process of fancy (43). Without the freedom and clarity afforded by fiction, consciousness would remain a helpless wax tablet enlivened only by the imprints of external sensations. Husserl makes this quite clear in a crucial passage in *Ideas* where he states: 'it is naturally important to make rich use of fiction in that service of perfect clearness, for the free transformation of data'; and adds that 'we can draw extraordinary profit from what art and particularly poetry have to offer us in this regard' (44).

But there is also a more negative assessment of the role of fiction. Sometimes it seems that Husserl is inferring that consciousness merely intends fictions as a means towards controlling its experience of things (45). This utilitarian approach to fiction is by no means the most hostile. In the *Idea of Phenomenology*, for example, Husserl talks of 'mere fiction' and refuses to grant it any superiority vis-à-vis sensation (46). Another reason that Husserl often assesses fiction negatively in his early work, and particularly the *Logical Investigations*, is probably the desire to attack two psychologistic versions of the Hellenic theory of fictionalism. One was the view that fiction was essential to the understanding of an expression, a view which tended to obscure all differences between 'imagination' and 'intellection' (47); the other was the view, attributed to scholastic nominalism, that took ideas as dexterous (Kunstgriffe) ways of handling things (48). In both these instances, we find fiction being treated in its traditional role as an impoverished middleman between things and ideas. It was not until Husserl had firmly rejected the Hellenic formulation of the image that he could start redefining it as an act of intentionality.

But even in its 'intentional' definition, fiction is never
entirely free from ambiguity. Although Husserl tells us in Ideas that 'free fancies assume a privileged position over against sensation' (49), he can also tell us in the same work that the process of fiction in general is no more than 'the neutrality-modification of the 'positing' act of representation; and therefore, of remembering in the widest sense of the term' (50).

But to declare this dependence of fiction on memory is to deny its priority over experience. As an agent of free variation, fiction cannot merely be a form of revived memory. For memory does not transcend experience while this form of fiction necessarily does. In short, fictions are either 'free fancies' indispensable to the disclosure of essences, or neutralized memories. They cannot, as Husserl seems to have failed to realize, be both.

This ambivalence concerning the role of fiction is deepened by Husserl's increasing emphasis on the notion of époche or 'reduction' as a formal component of his method. Époche formalizes the fictionalization of facts into essences. Fiction is now tended to be regarded as but a preliminary (51). Époche has also favoured to the extent that it obviates the equivocation already latent in fiction. This equivocation is due to its suspect Hellenic ancestry and Husserl's own recurring doubts as to whether it (fiction) furnishes 'full' or 'empty', 'adequate' or 'inadequate' evidence. Husserl's predilection for the axiomatic certitude of logic seems to have further cautioned him against the 'free floating' and 'spontaneous' nature of fiction. All these considerations combined serve to clarify somewhat Husserl's frequently expressed view that fiction, in and of itself, is insufficient as the guide to essences and requires the rigour and indubitability of Époche.

In summary we may say that Husserl tended to treat fiction in three ways: 1) as a 'free fancy' of eidetic variation, capable of intuiting the possibilities of essences in things and of things in essences; 2) as a modified memory, regarded as a sort of passive 'intention' based on associated sense-experience; 3) as a mere 'thing' to be refuted at all costs. The second and third views, somewhat undermine Husserl's revolutionary claim for a phenomenology of imagination based on the first view (52).
A third area of Husserl's theory of imagination requiring critical attention is his notion of possibility. Some indication of the relationship between imagination and possibility was implicit in all of Husserl's writings, but it was not until the Cartesian Meditations (1929) that he explicitly formulated its importance. In the Second Meditation Husserl described phenomenology as an a priori science which concerns itself with the 'realms of pure possibility, pure imaginableness.' (53). 'Instead of judging about actualities of transcendental being', he says, phenomenology uses imagination to 'judge about its a priori possibilities and thus at the same time prescribe rules a priori' (54). This identification of 'imaginableness' and possibility is made more explicit in the Fourth Meditation when Husserl speaks of imagination as intuiting the essence of perception by reducing it to a world of 'as-if':

We shift the actual perception into the realm of non-actualities, the realm of the as-if, which supplies us with 'pure' possibilities, pure of everything that restricts to this or that fact whatever. As regards the latter point, we keep the aforesaid possibilities...just as a completely free 'imaginableness' of phantasy. Thus removed from all factuality, (perception) has become the pure 'eidos' of perception whose 'ideal' extension is made up of all ideally possible perceptions, as purely phantasiable processes...and with 'essential necessity', for every fact can be thought of merely as exemplifying a possibility (55).

But what precisely does Husserl mean by possibility?. Here, as elsewhere in his treatment of imagination, Husserl is equivocal. On some occasions, Husserl defines possibility as 'pure', meaning by this a certain a priori, ideal status, totally unrelated to reality, (56). In Experience and Judgment Husserl describes its use as follows:

We can go beyond experience and the comparison of objects actually given in experience and pass over into possibility... Thus to every concept belongs an infinite extension of purely possible particulars. The concept in its ideality must be understood as something objective which has a purely ideal being, a being which does not presuppose the actual existence of corresponding particulars...Correlative to the pure being of the universal is the being of the pure possibilities which participate in it and which must be constructed as its bases and as an ideally infinite extension of the bases of the pure
abstraction giving access to the universal (57).

On other occasions, Husserl refers to possibility as 'real'. 'Real' here designates an a posteriori status and is used to denote these possibilities grounded in empirical reality (58). In an appendix to the same work, Husserl defines 'real' possibility accordingly:

It is possibility as possible reality; i.e. every such complete sense could evidently be the 'content' of a reality... It is not the correlate of a pure imagining, but a common essence in the perceived as such and in what is imagined as corresponding to the perceived according to an exact parallelism (59).

In correlation to this dual use of possibility, Husserl distinguishes between 'pure' and 'mere' imagination (60). Pure imagination deals with pure possibilities which, though unfounded in real experience, may still lay claim to a certain ideal 'being'. But to say that the 'being' of pure possibility is 'ideal' is not to say that it is 'idealism' (61). Far from being a mere project of immanent subjectivity, pure possibility is, according to Husserl, a 'transcendent objectivity'. That is to say, qua possibility, it is not confined to the imagination of man, even though it is only through the 'reduction' of imagination that man can first intuit it:

Provided only that they are subjected to our reduction to what is included in the ego's ownness, all the corresponding phantasies i.e., 'p.r.' possibilities, eidetic objectivities... offer themselves as transcendental (62).

What Husserl calls 'mere' imagination, on the other hand, deals with 'real possibilities'. Real possibilities also manifest themselves in the form of images. These images are not, however, of a sui generis mode of being. They are actualities that are modified to an 'as-if' mode of being. 'The as-if character is', Husserl tells us, 'always connected with the fact that the ego is an experiencing ego; that it accomplishes unmodified acts at the first level, and that in its internal consciousness, it has, among such acts those of imagination, whose objects then have a modified character' (63). On this score, real possibilities constitute objects. But objects dependent for their very being on the being of actual experience. They are possibilities which follow from, rather than precede, reality. Husserl defines them as 'illusions within the world of objects as such', which are what they are only
as referred to 'lived experience as such (64).

Here often than not, Husserl confuses these two forms of possibility. Even in those few passages where he does manage to make some sort of distinction between them, we are left with two irreconcilable uses of imagination. The notion of possibility as 'pure' is original to phenomenology and follows directly from Husserl's discovery of imagination as a free intentionality. The notion of possibility as 'real', by contrast, springs from the traditional view of the image as a mere efflorescence of actuality. By failing to consistently differentiate these two quite distinct meanings of possibility, Husserl further obfuscated the revolutionary significance of his discovery of imagination as intentionality (65).

This fundamental confusion in Husserl's theory of the image as possibility also affects his theory of 'horizon'. In his later works, Husserl tended to speak increasingly of 'horizons' of possibility which stretch out beyond the given reality and constitute consciousness as 'an intending-beyond-itself' (66). This notion of horizon as a temporal transcendence of the present towards the future was to prove one of the most significant insights of phenomenological existentialism in general, and of Sartre's phenomenological theory of imagination in particular. Husserl's theory of horizons is profoundly ambiguous, however, due to his uncertainty as to whether the horizontal flow is directed towards 'pure' or 'real' possibilities. Sometimes he opts for the former interpretation. This is evident in the following description of the relation between the temporal horizon and imagination in general:

Time is certainly represented in imagination, and even represented intuitively, but it is a time without actual, strict localisation of position — a quasi-time... Every act of imagination (being disconnected from all temporal connections), has its own 'possible' imagination-time, and there are as many such as there are imaginings, infinitely many (67).

Other times, he clearly follows the latter interpretation and talks of the 'uncovering of the potentialities implicit in actualities of consciousness'. (68). According to this view, horizons
are 'predelineated possibilities' which it is quite possible to 'explicate' and 'unfold' by analysing any single moment of our present consciousness (69). "Precisely thereby", Husserl assures us, we can 'uncover the objective sense meant implicitly in the actual cogito' (70). Husserl is, in fact, suggesting here that horizons are more conditioned by their actual present than by their 'purely' possible future. He even goes so far, at one stage, to suggest that the closer the horizon is to perception and the further away from imagination the better:

As contrasted with mere (blessed) clarification by means of anticipative 'imaginings', there takes place, by means of an actually continuing perception, a fulfilling further determination...with new horizons of opening (71).

More often than not, however, the mutually contradictory theories of possibility as 'real' and as 'pure' lie awkwardly side by side. The following passage from the Cartesian Meditations is one of many examples:

Phenomenological explication of the perceived as such is not restricted to that perceptual explication of it, which comes about as perception continues. On the contrary, phenomenological explication makes clear what is implicit in the sense of the cogitatum, by making present in phantasy the possible perceptions that would make the invisible visible. That is true of any intentional analysis, which as intentional reaches out beyond the isolated subjective processes that are to be analysed (72).

There is an obvious ambiguity here as to whether this reaching out beyond the presentness of the perception, is a reaching out into possibility as a mere projection of the self, or into possibility as something than the self. If we view possibility as 'real', that is, as a mere explicitation of something already implicit in reality, then imagination remains a soliloquy of the self. If, however, we view possibility as something beyond the real, then imagination becomes a dialogue between the self and the other-than-self (73). The latter is the only view consistent with Husserl's original definition of the image as intentional; that is, as a consciousness of something other than consciousness itself. If imagination is merely consciousness of possibilities as possibilities immanent in its own actuality, then we can no longer speak of the object of the intention as a transcendence. If this be the case, we find ourselves
once again prey to the traditional 'illusion of immanence'. Clearly then, the value of Husserl's theory of imagination lies in his interpretation of images as 'pure' possibilities revealed to consciousness rather than represented in it. Representation in this sense may be broadened to signify not only revival from the past per se, but a revival from the past in the shape of a projection into the future. Either way, however, the possibility represented in consciousness is one generated from its own depths: an Odysseus returning to its Ithaca - a circle.

Husserl thus finds himself in a dilemma. If possibility is 'pure' and emancipated from all ties with reality, then how does its very freedom avoid degenerating into arbitrariness? If, on the other hand, possibility is 'real', then to be sure it is no longer arbitrary, but now at the expense of no longer being free.

This dilemma induced Husserl to search for some sort of transcendent telos which could satisfy the requirements of both freedom and necessity. Only in terms of such a telos could possibility be said to remain 'pure' and, at the same time, 'motivated' in its very purity by some supreme possibility towards which it strives. This teleological possibility would be that which unites all other possibilities into 'a universal constitutive synthesis'. It would be that 'infinite regulative idea' of which every 'presupposable system of possible objects of possible consciousness' would be the 'anticipative idea' (74).

The movement from actuality to possibility is for Husserl the very essence of human being. On the level of philosophy, this takes the form of a movement from the 'natural' to the 'eidetic' world. It constitutes accordingly an entirely 'unnatural' attitude and an entirely 'unnatural' observation of the world and of the self (75). This movement must, Husserl points out, be 'motivated' somehow. Since it cannot be motivated by the 'natural' world of facts - it being itself a transcendence of all that is factual - it can only be motivated by some telos which resides in the world of possibility itself (76). This telos constitutes an 'essential necessity' (77), and manifests itself in the way in which any flow of freely varied possibilities coheres into a certain ideal structure. This telos
is not just a projection of human consciousness but something which
human consciousness discovers:

What can be varied, one into another in the arbitrariness of
imagination, becomes in itself a necessary structure, an eidos;
and therewith necessary laws which determine what must
necessarily belong to an object in order that it can be an
object of this kind... We need not ourselves bring about the
overlapping coincidence, since, with the successive running-
through and the retaining-in-grasp of what is run through,
it takes place of itself (78).

This teleological necessity is not the invention of the ego.
It is, Husserl tells us, 'not conditioned by any fact' and is
'prior to all concepts we, as egos, may have of it' (79). The
actual ego is not the source of this supreme possibility any more
than the actual world is. On the contrary, both these actualities,
find their source in this possibility. As actualities, they remain
but partial instances of their total horizons. The ultimate possi-
bility of each ego is an ultimate completion of his horizon,
an ultimate identification of his past and his present with his
future, and of his actual consciousness with that of which he is
conscious as a possibility. Such, Husserl seems to suggest, is
the telos which 'motivates' all things towards the condition of
essences. Imagination is the indispensable power of intentionality
which allows us to intend beyond our actual world to the 'possible'
world, where we reside as the possibility of total being. In brief,
imagination is precisely that which can redeem us from our bonds of
partiality by showing us the telos of totality.

This dependence of particular actuality on total possibility is
evident in the very intuition of essences. 'Particular evidence
does not produce for us any abiding being', Husserl says. And with-
out possibilities there would be for us no fixed and abiding being
(80). Such 'fixed and abiding being'does not exist actually but
only essentially, that is, as a possibility. This possibility is
accessible only to the imagination. It is by no means arbitrary
however. Possibility is not a mere invention of the mind, but a
potential essence which motivates the progressive development of
its own realisation. This is precisely what Husserl means when he
says that an essence both is and is not an image at the same time
(81). Every essence is the telos of some particular. Since human
experience is necessarily located in time, however, it can possess only the actuality of this particular and not its ideal 'essential' telos. The telos must always remain a possibility. In order to grasp this telos we must imagine the development of the particular as completed in its totality. The imagination substitutes the idealized development (the eidos) in its totality for the entire real development. It is impossible to perceive the development as total since according to Husserl it is in itself infinite (i.e. 'asymptotic'). The only way to intuit the telos of the development is through the imagination. Phenomenology, therefore, holds that the meaning of reality can never be ultimately grasped in reality itself.

Because man has imagined he knows that reality is not something given, but a genesis, an infinite development. The absolute is not 'real'; or at any rate, not yet. The absolute is possible and, as such, can be intuited only through the imagination (82). Husserl's notion of the telos as possibility calls for a free decision on the part of each man in order to break through to the transcendence of the telos (be it the telos of a thing, an ego, philosophy or history itself), and disclose (entfalten) it as a task for all men.

Imagination lies at the basis of such free decision. The imagining of the whole enables us to comprehend the part. It does so, by enabling us to anticipate its total realization in the form of a pure essence. Phenomenology holds that the essence of a thing is a development which can only be intuited by the imagining of its totality. That is, only when the totality of the development can be imagined as if it were completed, can its meaning and unity be revealed. Thus it becomes obvious how imagination transcends perception in its anticipation of the 'possibility' of the whole beyond the 'actuality' of the part. Imagination is the 'ideating' of totalities in the form of the possible. This is what Husserl is referring to in Ideas when he defines the eidos as the means of thematizing an infinite flow of experience.

Possibility is therefore by no means arbitrary. On the contrary, it is the special preserve of an infinite regulative telos. Husserl confuses matters somewhat, however, by referring to this
telos as an 'all embracing Apriori' which he defines in the following enigmatic way:

The system of the all-embracing Apriori is to be designated as the systematic unfolding of the all-embracing Apriori innate in the essence of a transcendental subjectivity - or as the systematic unfolding of the universal logos of all conceivable being (...) Eidetic phenomenology explores this universal Apriori without which neither I nor any transcendental ego whatsoever would be 'imaginable' (83).

The Apriori telos is quite evidently a protean concept. In philosophy, which is the example which Husserl takes here, this telos takes the form of the possibility of an absolute and ideal all-embracing science, and serves to explain Husserl's famous maxim that 'the science of pure possibilities precedes the science of actualities and alone makes it possible as a science' (84). But it also seems to approximate here very closely to the Platonic conception of eidos, which would view possibility as but an innate derivative of a transcendental actuality (85). We may, in short, express this ambiguity by asking how possibility may be considered apriori and teleological at the same time? Or to put it another way: how can possibility be both the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem of actuality? This paradox lies at the very root of Husserl's treatment of imagination and, by extension, at the very root of phenomenology itself.

How then are the eidetic laws of possibility which operate on the basis of an 'essential necessity', to be reconciled with the demands of imagination as a free intentionality?. This recurring problem prompted Husserl to make an important distinction between 'motivation' and 'causality ' (86). Whereas causality operates as an imposition of necessity on things; motivation, on the contrary, operates as a vocation of things to necessity. Causality 'necessitates' our action by propelling us; motivation 'necessitates' our action by calling us. The latter alone allows for total freedom and choice. Although Husserl himself rarely couches this difference in such explicitly 'existentialist' terms, his uncompromising rejection of all forms of determinism in the Crisis confirms this view. Certainly, this was the interpretation which such close disciples as Levinas, Landgrebe, Heidegger and Sartre drew from his writings on the subject. The following quotation from one of
his unpublished manuscripts would seem to further substantiate this view:

So we understand the absolute teleology which is the inseparable unity of all finite beings as a meaning-giving process which relates to each absolute subjectivity as the infinite way along which it moves itself towards its uniquely true being (...) This operates in the clear consciousness of authentic humanity in the form of a chosen ideal (87).

But even if we accept that teleological 'motivation' is compatible with the demands of freedom, we are still left with the question as to whether it is the absolute subjectivity which gives meaning to the telos in the first place or vice versa. In the Cartesian Meditations Husserl declares that since 'transcendental subjectivity is itself the universe of all possible sense, i.e. every imaginable being whether immanent or transcendent, then an outside is precisely - nonsense' (88). In the Ideas on the other hand, Husserl patently contradicts this view. 'The absolute of transcendental subjectivity is in truth no ultimate', he says here: 'it is rather something which in a certain profound and wholly unique sense, constitutes itself, and has its primeval source in what is ultimately and truly absolute' (89). 'All being', Husserl tells us elsewhere again, 'is on the way' (Unter wegen) to the realization of 'an ideal and absolute possibility' (90). It is precisely this ideal, he goes on, which 'guides' consciousness in its constitution of the world and calls each man to the creation of 'an absolutely perfect transcendental, total community' (91). Husserl does in one or two of his manuscripts refer to this telos as 'God', but it is difficult to determine whether Husserl means by this the personal Dity of tradition (92). His insistence here on the Überwahrheit, Überwirklichkeit and Über-an-sichlichkeit of the telos testifies to his final conviction that it is not to be confused with a mere projection of immanent subjectivity (93). On occasion, he even refers to the telos' power of motivation as 'grace' (94). The transcendence of this teleological possibility in no way jeopardizes Husserl's conviction that man's freedom is at all times preserved. He continually speaks of man being motivationally 'directed' rather than causally 'determined' by the telos. Man's supreme possibility is such that he is
entirely at liberty to realize it or not.

Husserl claims that 'in faith' we may 'experience the teleology which directs us' (95). Faith is for Husserl the imaginative consciousness of the telos as our sovereign possibility. Because we can 'intend' this possibility imaginatively, we can also choose not to intend it. If there is evil in the world it follows therefore that man is entirely responsible for it. For evil only arises when men refuse to intend 'the possibility of an absolutely perfect transcendental community' (96). Because man is conscious of the possibility which may (for it is only a possibility) make all things necessary, he is totally free to intend or counter-intend this telos. Imagination is what makes man absolutely free; and at the same time, absolutely responsible (97).

In many ways Marx's criticism that Hegel's phenomenology reached the 'ideal' but in the mind only, could also be applied to Husserl's phenomenology. With the exception of some of the later manuscripts, Husserl's concern is almost invariably with a telos of 'Reason' rather than history. Furthermore, this telos proves to be a profoundly contradictory one. This is so, not only in the senses outlined above, but more particularly in the sense in which Husserl claims that the telos of phenomenology is at once 1) a presuppositionless and a priorically self-evident absolute, and 2) a goal which can never be reached 'absolutely' because of the 'asymptotic' nature of human intentionality (98). This contradiction between the absolute and asymptotic possibilities of teleology is evident in his conclusion to the Cartesian Meditations:

Our meditations, we may venture to say, have in the main fulfilled their purpose, namely: to show the 'concrete possibility' of the Cartesian idea of a philosophy as an all-embracing science grounded on an absolute foundation... though of course in the form of an endless programme (99).

If the foundation of phenomenology is an absolute one then it cannot constitute an endless programme. The contradiction stems from Husserl's ambiguous use of the phrase 'possibility'. 'Concrete possibility' as used in this context, seems to mean both 'real possibility' i.e. residing implicitly in philosophy, and 'pure possibility' i.e. residing as a telos infinitely transcendent of phil-
osophy. In the first instance, philosophy is understood as the possibility of its own absolute foundation. In the second, philosophy is seen as an infinite striving towards some possibility other than itself (100).

Husserl's formulation of possibility as both 1) a self-identical necessity and 2) a never ending horizon of freedom, constitutes a contradictory telos. The first part of this formulation was developed in Heidegger's later theory of 'possibility' as a potency (Vermögen) by means of which Being 'appropriates' (erignet) what is other than itself to what is the same as itself (101). The second part of this formulation was taken up by Sartre in his notion of possibility as a free projection of the human imagination (102). Husserl himself never succeeded in reconciling the opposing exigencies of 'possibility'. His overall theory of imagination as super-perception and fiction as well as possibility, was altogether too confused and too inconsistent to resolve its own contradictions (103). Had Husserl managed to overcome his habitual dislike of everything Hegelian (104), and considered the possibility of a 'dialectical' notion of imagination, he might conceivably have been able to make sense of the contradictory nature of the image as both a free and a necessary intentionality. Short of such a dialectical phenomenology, which could conceive of possibility as at once the same as, and other than, the consciousness of which it is the image, Husserl's theory of imagination - originally heralded as the very 'life source' of phenomenology and the 'sustenance' of its 'eternal truths' - becomes instead the source and the sustenance of its most fundamental contradiction. Nevertheless, as Sartre justly acknowledged: 'Husserl blazed the trail and no study of images after him can afford to ignore the wealth of insights he provided' (105).
PART TWO: SARTRE AND IMAGINATION.

CHAPTER FOUR: EXEGESIS OF SARTRE'S THEORY OF IMAGINATION.

CHAPTER FIVE: CRITIQUE OF SARTRE'S THEORY OF IMAGINATION.

CHAPTER SIX: CONSEQUENCE OF SARTRE'S THEORY OF IMAGINATION.
CHAPTER FOUR: EXEGESIS OF JEAN-PAUL SARTRE'S THEORY OF IMAGINATION.
Jean-Paul Sartre developed Husserl's fragmented intuitions concerning the nature and role of the image into a consistent and comprehensive phenomenology of imagination. Husserl had 'blazed the trail'; it was for his disciple to pave it.

Although Husserl had never dedicated any single work, or indeed any substantial part of any work, to the imagination, Sartre devoted his first two major philosophical studies to this subject. The first of these, L'Imagination (later translated as Imagination) appeared in 1936. It was designed primarily as a critique, from the perspective of phenomenology, of the main philosophical and psychological theories of imagination from Descartes to Behaviourism. As we have dealt with the broad outlines of this critique in our first chapter, we shall not delay further with it here. Suffice it to note that this work culminates with a brief exposition of Husserl's theory of the image. Sartre's conclusion charts the course for a second work on the imagination:

Husserl blazed the trail, and no study of image can afford to ignore the wealth of insights he provided. We know that we must start afresh attempting above all to attain an intuitive vision of the intentional structure of the image....It might be that on the way we would have to leave the realm of eidetic psychology and resort to experimentation and inductive procedures. But eidetic description is the required starting point. The way is open for a phenomenological psychology (1).

This passage states the inspiration and strategy of Sartre's principal work on the imagination, L'Imaginaire: Psychologie Phénoméno
eologique de l'Imagination (1940). It is unfortunate that the English translation of this book (Philosophical Library, 1943) was erroneously entitled The Psychology of Imagination. The reason for this error is a misunderstanding of the function of the word 'Phénoméno
eologique' in the original title, where it serves to dispel any impression of an empirical approach to the subject which the word 'psychologie' would be likely to connote. As one critic justly remarked 'though the book makes use of psychological investigations, it is clearly a work of philosophy throughout' (2). And at this point in his career, philosophy for Sartre was synonymous with phenomenology (3).
This second work was original rather than merely critical in nature. It succeeds in going far beyond Husserl in the explanation and analysis of the 'essential' make up of the image, correcting the master on several points, confirming him on others (3a). The *Psychology of Imagination* constitutes the most cogent, innovatory and all-embracing study of a phenomenology of imagination to date (4). For this reason we devote an entire chapter of this thesis to a detailed exposition of its contents. We shall divide our analysis into the following five headings: (1) Method, (2) Characterization, (3) Function, (4) Composition, (5) Pathology.
Sartre declares that his aim in The Psychology of Imagination is 'to describe the great function of consciousness to create a world of unrealities, or imagination and its noetic correlative, the imaginary' (5). This aim can only be realised with 'certainty' by means of the phenomenological method of eidetic description. 'The method' he tells us, 'is simple: we shall produce images, reflect upon them, describe them; that is, attempt to determine and to classify their distinctive characteristics' (6). Above all else, it is to be distinguished by its concern with the 'essence' of imaginative consciousness rather than with facts in or outside of consciousness.

The method of eidetic description must, according to Sartre, be of a strictly 'reflective' nature. Such a reflective approach is, he informs us, occasioned and necessitated by Husserl's discovery of intentionality (7). Husserl showed that to have an image of something is to be conscious of that something as it appears in the form of an image, rather than to be conscious of the image itself. The image is a relation not a thing. To achieve a description of this image-as-relation therefore, one must detach oneself from the normal first order of imaginative consciousness and move to a second order of reflective consciousness. Only in terms of such a reflection can one gain intuitive access to the relation in which the something is given (e.g. the image of a tree), and not to the something itself (e.g. the tree) (8). Following Husserl again, Sartre maintains that such an act of reflection necessarily involves a suspension of all traditional preconceptions or prejudices concerning the existential status of either the image or the something aimed at (visé) by means of the image. In this sense, reduction to the imaginative consciousness is an indispensable part of reflection. Sartre concludes that only such an act of free and preconceptionless reflection can lead directly to an intuition of the 'essence' of the image, which in so far as it is phenomenologically described, may in turn lay claim to the status of a universal and necessary certainty (9).

It is only after such a process of reflective description has succeeded in furnishing 'essential' knowledge, that the phenomenologist may proceed to legitimately adduce the evidence of inductive and empirical experimentation (10). Empirical evidence remains merely
'probable' however, in contradistinction to the certainty of eidetic evidence. Finally, when the phenomenologist has moved from the certainty of eidetic description to the probability of empirical experimentation, he may ultimately proceed to a critical hermeneutic of the image. Sartre's transition from a method of description to one of interpretation is, as we shall show in our next chapter, closely paralleled by a transition from phenomenological psychology to phenomenological ontology.

In a lengthy introduction to his essay, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions (Esquisse D'une Theorie Des Emotions, 1939), which went by the telling sub-title 'Psychology, Phenomenology and Phenomenological Psychology', Sartre first shows himself specifically concerned to criticize the methods of empirical psychology and to replace them with the methods of phenomenology. Only the latter, according to Sartre, can hope to deal with the various aspects of human consciousness as aspects of human consciousness. Because phenomenology concerns itself with intuitioning essences rather than merely collecting facts, it alone can treat the findings of psychology in terms of their fundamental anthropological significance. Sartre does not deny that psychologists offer many ways of classifying and identifying man, but he argues that their ways constitute nothing more than a provisional working hypothesis, 'a unifying category invented to co-ordinate the infinite series of facts confronting us' (11). He explains the indispensability of Husserl's phenomenology for a true understanding of human consciousness:

> It was in reaction against the insufficiencies of psychology that there grew up, a new discipline, that of phenomenology. Its founder Husserl, was first of all struck by its truth: that there is an incommensurability between essences and facts, and that whoever begins his researches with the facts will never attain to the essences' (12).

'If we want to found a psychology', he concludes, 'we must go beyond the psychic to the very source of man, of the world and of the psychic', that is 'to the transcendental and constitutive consciousness that we attain through a phenomenological reduction, or 'putting the world in brackets' ' (13).

But Sartre does not mean by this that we renounce the idea of 'experience'. On the contrary, he reminds us that the foremost principle of phenomenology is to 'return to' and 'intuit' the things
themselves. Far from renouncing our experience, the phenomenological method serves to deepen and enlarge it. 'Room must be made', Sartre goes on, 'for the experience of essences and values, and we must recognize that instead of inducing essences from particular facts, it is essences alone which enable us to classify and examine facts' (14). If this were not the case, if we did not have implicit recourse to the essence of intentional modes of consciousness e.g. emotion, imagination, perception, etc., it would be impossible for us to distinguish among the multiplicity of psychic or physiological facts, those epitomizing imagination, those perception and emotion, etc. (15). In other words, we must be able to know what the imagination essentially is, before we can examine how it actually behaves. We must be able to define the essence of imagination, before we can identify what facts are manifestations of its essence.

But here already we discern the old Husserlian circularity raising its head: Before we can arrive at a definition of the essence of imagination, we must first be able to freely and reflectively vary some factual instances of imagination; but how are we to identify examples of images from other similar examples of percepts and emotions, if we do not have some definition of what an image is in the first place? (16). More simply, do we not have to know the essence of the image before we can identify images in order to discover their essence?

This problem lies at the very root of Sartre's method (17). It is, as we shall see, to recur again and again throughout his whole theory of imagination, and by extension, throughout his ontology, political philosophy and aesthetics. Whereas Husserl sought to resolve this paradox by appealing to a teleology of possibility, Sartre will reject all such appeals as 'absurd'. Sartre refuses to admit of any source of meaning and value outside man: man himself is the source of value in the world (18). But that is not all; he also refuses any source of value inside man: man is pure emptiness, pure contingency, pure freedom.

Indeed it was precisely to champion this conviction that Sartre devoted his first published article, The 'Transcendence of the Ego', ('La Transcendence de L'Ego' 1937) to a refutation of Husserl's transcendental ego (19). In this piece, written shortly after The Psychology of Imagination, he declares:
'The transcendental field (i.e. consciousness)
purified of all egological structure, recovers its
primary transparency. In a sense it is nothing;
since all physical, psychophysical and psychic objects,
all truths, all values, are outside it' (20).

This transcendental field, he adds, 'is a sphere of absolute existence,
that is to say, a sphere of pure spontaneities which are never objects
and which determine their own existence' (21). Husserl's positing of a
transcendental ego is for Sartre tantamount to saying that there is an
essence in consciousness which determines us in some way. Maintaining
that Husserl's theory of intentionality calls for an 'empty' conscious-
ness intending beyond itself to a 'full' world, Sartre argues that
Husserl travestied this, his most 'central insight', by positing a
personal and substantial ego in consciousness (22). He even suggests
that this theory of the transcendental ego leads Husserl back into the
illusion of immemance he had sought to escape.

But if 'essential' meaning and value lies accordingly neither
outside nor inside consciousness, where are we to locate that 'experience
of essences and values' which Sartre describes as the very core of the
phenomenological method? This problem was never actually resolved by
Sartre. In practice, he simply went ahead and described the essence of
imagination, emotion, 'the anti-semit', 'the bourgeois' etc., ostensibly
unmindful of the paradoxical nature of his method. But this paradox, as we
shall see in our next two chapters, was to haunt the wake of his phen-
omenology of imagination, and by extension, his phenomenology of being
in general.

Whatever the disadvantages of Sartre's phenomenological
method, the advantages are plain. Only phenomenology allows for a
reduction to, and a description of, the essence of imagination as an
intentional form of consciousness. Sartre claims accordingly that only
the phenomenologist 'knows how to take advantage of that absolute pro-
ximity of consciousness to itself, which the empirical psychologists do
not choose to profit by' (23). Sartre no less than Husserl, was aware
of the (special) privileged role which imagination plays here. Because
imagination is, phenomenologically viewed, a self-contained and self-
evident process of intentionality, totally independent of other types
of experience with their concomitant existential complexities, it can
provide the investigator with apodictic and indubitable evidence concern-
ing its own essence. That is to say, because it is autonomous and free
from all external considerations, the act of imagining can be fully
acquainted with itself at every moment of its own duration. Furthermore in light of the fact that every consciousness is always pre-reflectively conscious of itself (24), one may say that imaginative consciousness enjoys the privilege of an immediate mutual co-presence between the act of imagining and the pre-reflective awareness of the imaginer. Consequently, the phenomenological method can be said to find its surest ally in imagination: the absolute proximity of consciousness with itself constitutes an experience of self-certain self-presence (25).

While in a phenomenology of perception the phenomenologist has to put the world in brackets before he can study the world as a purely transcendental phenomenon, in the phenomenology of imagination, he finds the world already bracketed. When Husserl showed that imagination is the 'neutralization-modification' or 'bracketing' of the world, he also showed that it is one of the most indispensable elements of the phenomenological method itself. The phenomenology of imagination was seen to be nothing less than the phenomenology of phenomenology. Perhaps, indeed, it was the very simplicity of this circle which prevented Husserl or Sartre from ever explicitly noting this point themselves. The nearest Husserl came to such an admission was his enigmatic statement in *ideas* concerning the 'paradox' that 'fiction' makes up the life of phenomenology. The nearest Sartre came was in the conclusion to *The Psychology of Imagination* when he conceded: 'If the negation is the unconditioned principle of imagination, it itself can never be realized except in and by an act of imagination...there could be no developing consciousness without imaginative consciousness and vice versa. So imagination, far from appearing as an actual characteristic of consciousness turns out to be an essential and transcendental condition of consciousness' (26). But even though either philosopher ever took explicit cognizance of what we may call the 'phenomenological circle' (concerning the central role imagination plays in phenomenology), both their philosophies were relentlessly dogged by its ghost (26a).

In summary, we may adduce Sartre's succinct definition of the phenomenological method as an eidetic 'reduction', 'description' and 'intuition' which 'abandons the methods of inductive introspection or external observation in its attempt to situate and define the essence of phenomena' (27). This method is rigorously applied in *The Psychology*
of Imagination. From the outset Sartre is scrupulously methodical in his attempt to distinguish the phenomenon of imagination from other similar phenomena e.g., perception or conception. Sartre acknowledges that such a distinction depends upon 'certain features, certain characteristics which immediately determine what I judge to be the image' (28). In spite of having recourse in the second part of this work to the evidence of experimental psychology, Sartre is still primarily concerned with phenomenological essences rather than empirical facts, a concern evidenced in his entitling this second part 'le Probable' in contrast to 'le Certain' of the first (29). Furthermore, the dependence of the entire analysis of 'Le Probable' on the 'essential' findings of 'Le Certain' (i.e. the image as intentional, consciousness, spontaneous or nothingness etc.), show beyond a shadow of doubt that Sartre's study is phenomenological throughout.

Sartre awards precedence to the eidetic as opposed to the empirical method for he believes that it is only as an essence, and not as a mere collection of facts, that imagination can be intuited as humanly significant. Put in another way, Sartre's espousal of phenomenology as the only valid method for an investigation of imagination, rests on his latent conviction that psychology is obsolete unless it is anthropology. In his original exposition of the phenomenological method, in his introduction to Theory of the Emotions, Sartre makes this point explicitly:

The initial precaution of the psychologist is, in effect, to consider the psychic state from an aspect that will divest it of all signification. For him a psychic state is always a fact and as such, always accidental...To the phenomenologist, on the other hand, every human fact is of its essence significant (30).

Thus for Sartre, a phenomenology of imagination will be, of necessity, an interrogation of the act of imagination as an organized and significant form of human existence (31). The underlying motivation of Sartre's whole enquiry is to discover what the essence of imagination can tell us about the essence of human existence in general. Unlike Theory of the Emotions where this anthropological scruple is the acknowledged beginning, in The Psychology of Imagination it is not until the conclusion that Sartre enunciates the essential significance of imagination for man's being-in-the-world-. Moreover, Sartre ultimately reveals that the essence of imagination in particular
and of human being in general, is fundamentally one and the same - negation.

Because Sartre's whole phenomenology is motivated by this anthropological preoccupation, one cannot but suspect at times that his description of what the essence of an image is, is more often a prescription of what the essence of an image should be in order to confirm the essence of human consciousness in general (negation). This suspicion finds its most cogent support in Sartre's initial claim in the introduction to Theory of the Emotions that phenomenologists differ from empirical psychologists precisely in so far as they 'start from the synthetic totality that man is, and establish the essence of man before Beginning their psychology' (32). It is possible, of course, that Sartre simply changed his views between the writing of Theory of the Emotions (1939) and The Psychology of Imagination (1940). I would suggest that it is far more probable, however, that Sartre merely explicitly reversed, while implicitly preserving, this priority. This interpretation would account firstly for the circular nature of his definition of the essence of images; and secondly, for the suspicion that Sartre's overall treatment of imagination is determined by a philo sophical rather than psychological interest.

But whatever about the suspicions concerning the purpose or 'end' of his phenomenological method, the 'means' are clear and convincing. By suspending both the pre-reflective experience of the image and all apriori presuppositions or prejudices concerning the empirical or factual existence of the image, Sartre claims that phenomenology grants us a privileged access to the essence of imagination (33). By means of this phenomenological reduction Sartre determines to describe the characteristics, function and composition of the image.
2. CHARACTERIZATION.

Sartre's phenomenological description of the image leads to the discovery of four 'essential' characteristics: (1) the image as consciousness, (2) the image as quasi-observation, (3) the image as nothingness, (4) the image as spontaneity.

(1) The Image as Consciousness. Sartre's first move in *The Psychology of Imagination* is to confirm Husserl's view that the image is not a thing but a consciousness (33a). To eschew any misunderstanding here, Sartre carefully distinguishes between the strictly phenomenological use of this term (Bewusstsein) to designate an active process of intentionality, and the more common designation of the term as an inert mental state. As we remarked in our first chapter, Sartre maintains that the imagination can never be recognized in its true 'essence' as long as it is subject to the traditional illusion of immanence. This illusion of immanence is based upon two principal claims (1) that the image is a representation inherently like the material reality it represents (34), (2) that the image is an individual psychic content-thing capable of assisting thought but also subject to its laws (35). As we saw in our second chapter this illusion of immanence lead to the erroneous view that perception and imagination are homogenous, the latter being construed as a revived version of the former.

Husserl took the first steps towards a refutation of this view in his revelation of the image as an intention of consciousness. From the evidence provided by his eidetic reflections Sartre sets out to corroborate this refutation (35). Sartre is fully aware of the fact that others besides Husserl had discovered the unfeasibility of the Hellenic conception of the image as something in consciousness: Moultier, Taine and Watson for example (37). But while these reacted by denying the existence of the image altogether, Husserl reacted by seeing here the occasion to discover the true essence of the image.

Sartre explicitates and develops Husserl's contention that imagining is to be distinguished from perceiving not by reference to the objects it intends, but by reference to the act of intending itself. The mental image is not just a thing existing alongside other things. It is a peculiarly unique orientation of consciousness towards things. 'The two worlds, real and imaginary,' Sartre tells us, 'are composed of the
same objects: only the approach to these objects varies. What defines
the imaginary world and also the world of the real, is an attitude of
consciousness' (38). The image and the percept are not different objects
of consciousness; they are different consciousnesses of objects.

The image is the relation of consciousness to the
object; in other words, it means a certain manner in
which the object makes its appearance to consciousness,
or if one prefers, a certain manner in which conscious-
ness presents an object to itself (39).

For this reason Sartre displays a marked preference for such phrases as
the 'consciousness of something as an image' or 'the imaginative
consciousness of something' rather than the traditional designation
'mental image'. To have an image of someone is not to have a conscious-
ness of the image of someone, but to have the imaginative consciousness
of that someone himself. 'The imaginative consciousness I have of Peter
is not', Sartre points out, 'a consciousness of the image of Peter:
Peter is directly reached, my attention is not directed on the image but
on an object' (40). Thus Sartre explains what Husserl had merely
contended: that a phenomenology of imagination would establish that an
image is not an object in consciousness but an act of consciousness which
intends an object beyond consciousness.

Sartre goes further than Husserl, however, in his conviction
that images are 'positional' rather than purely 'dispositional' in nature.
In fact, for Sartre disposition or neutralization is merely one of four
modes in which imagination posits its objects. The four modes of
positing are 1) as non-existing 2) as existing but elsewhere 3) as
existing but absent 4) as neither existing nor non-existing (41). An
example of the first would be the image of an object which we know for
certain does not exist, say the image of Pierre with the body of a
centaurs. An example of the second would be the image of an existing some-
one or something in a particular place other than here, say the image of
the absent Pierre in the North Pole. An example of the third would be
the image of an existing someone or something in no particular place
other than here, say the image of the absent Pierre as simply absent but
nowhere. An example of the fourth would be a 'dis-positional' image, that
is, an image the object of which has been neutralized with regard to the
positing of its existence e.g. an agnostic's image of God.

Perception and imagination, Sartre concludes, differ, not
by intending different objects but by positing the same object, (in this
instance Pierre), in different ways. Perception may posit Pierre as distant or near, hazy or clear; but it always posits him as real. By contrast, imagination may posit Pierre as non-existent, absent, elsewhere etc.; but it always posits him as unreal. When I see and imagine my friend Pierre, it is the same object who is intended in both instances and the same I who intends him. Consequently, it can only be the intention between the intended object and the intending subject which constitutes the variant term. In perception my intention presents Pierre as he really is; as he is 'seen' by me. In imagination, however, my intention presents Pierre in an 'unreal' way i.e., not as he is but as he is imagined to be. Both reach the same Pierre; but the former reaches him in the direct manner of encounter, the latter in the indirect manner of invention.

The matter is not, however, quite as simple as this neat antithesis between reality and unreality suggests. If it is true that the image presents the object in an unreal way, it is equally true that what it wishes to present is the real object. The point of my inventing an image of Pierre is that of trying to perceive Pierre himself, that is, of trying to 'possess' the real Pierre as a spatial entity with his normal perceptual characteristics. Imagination is, Sartre perspicaciously notes, 'an incantation destined to produce the object of one's thought, the thing one desires, in a manner that one can take possession of it' (42). Otherwise put: the way in which we take possession of an object of imagination is by 'presenting' it in an unreal way, as if it were real (43). Therefore, even though imagining and perceiving are two mutually exclusive intentions, 'whenever we think imaginatively of some individual objects it will be these objects themselves that will appear to our consciousness...as they are, that is, as spatial entities with determinations of form and colour etc.' (44).

Imagination is a sui generis mode of intentionality which seeks to deny what it specifically is (unreal), in favour of what it is not (real). Precisely because it is intentional, the image is totally different from the percept in essence (unreal not real), but totally similar in design (the real presentation of the object). Thus from the outset, Sartre intimates the essentially 'absurd' project of imagination; to affirm what it must always negate, to present what must always remain absent, to realise an object by unrealizing it (45).
(2) Quasi-Observation. The second characteristic of the image which eidetic reflection reveals is what Sartre calls the phenomenon of quasi-observation. Because the imagining of Pierre is only a presentation of Pierre as if he were real, that is, as unreal, the object does not yield the full-blooded richness of perceptual observation, but only a 'quasi' observation. The image cannot teach us anything. As a pure invention of our consciousness, it contains nothing that we did not put in it; and therefore, nothing that we do not already know (46).

Sartre contrasts the apprehension of an object (i.e. a cube) which an image affords, with that afforded by a percept and a concept. By means of a detailed phenomenological description he reveals that
1) the percept is a progressive complex of different real presentations: to perceive a cube is to 'present it gradually' and 'exactly' from all its sides.
2) the concept is a single and simultaneous knowledge of the conceived: to conceive a whole cube is to know all of its determinations (length, breadth, height, weight etc.) 'simultaneously' and 'exactly'.
3) the image though 'simultaneous' like the concept, and 'presentative' like the percept, differs from both in that it fails to provide an 'exact' apprehension of the object intended.
Moreover, while concepts for the most part posit the real existence of abstract and universal natures, and while percepts posit the real existence of concrete and sensible natures, images ignore all considerations of real existence, and posit the unreal existence of anything at all, be it abstract, universal, concrete, sensible or otherwise (47).

Sartre is particularly eager to draw our attention to the distinction between the fullness of perception and the 'essential poverty' or 'lack' of imagination. He accounts for this phenomenon as follows:

In a word, the object of the perception overflows consciousness constantly; the object of the image is never more than the consciousness one has; it is limited by that consciousness; nothing can be learned from an image that is not already there (48).

In perception, Sartre says, one can increase one's knowledge of a given object through one's observation of it. I can, for instance, count the columns of a cathedral as I walk around it. Also in perception I can observe and learn more about the relationship of this cathedral with other objects which surround it, e.g. trees, sky, street; or about the relationship of parts within the object e.g. columns and altar and nave.
In imagination, by contrast, the cathedral is given in the single act of intending it. The image is entirely determined by the knowledge I use to create it. It can therefore teach me nothing new; it can reveal nothing more than it contains, and it contains nothing more than I already know. It has a once and for all arbitrariness about it. This also characterizes its relationships with other objects and the relationships between its various parts. If I imagine a cathedral, I find that it floats immediately into my consciousness, total and unresisting. But by the same token, as soon as I try to observe this 'imagined' cathedral, seeking a further and more detailed knowledge of its architecture, measurement and ornamentation etc., I discover that such observation cannot inform me of anything more than I had to already know in order to intend the image in the first place. I discover, in other words, that it is only a quasi observation, not a real one (49).

While in perception everything presents itself as being what it is, in imagination everything presents itself as being what it is not. The image follows its own sui generis laws of time, space and generalization, and defies the logic of ordinary observation (50). To be sure, I do grasp a cathedral, but it is an absent cathedral; and it only appears to me to be present by in some way 'magically possessing' the image which intends it (51). The phenomenon of quasi-observation is, in short, a paradox:

I can do nothing with this object which I believe able to describe, decipher, enumerate. The visible object is there, but I cannot see it - it is tangible but I cannot touch it - audible but I cannot hear it (52).

Sartre's phenomenological description leads to the conclusion that imagination and perception can never overlap in so far as they constitute two heterogeneous modes of observation. Even though the image differs from the concept by virtue of its ability to intuitively 'presentify' its object, it falls far short of its perceptual goal. While prompting us to observation by virtue of its 'quasi' presentation, the image fails to meet the essential 'richness' of real perception. But even a 'quasi' presentation of reality presupposes some sort of observational stance. For it is only, Sartre declares, when we 'assume the attitude of observers in the realm of sensible intuition that the words 'absent', 'far from me' etc. can have a meaning' (53). Moreover, because imagination is a mode of consciousness, it follows that it must be in some way conscious of itself as only a 'quasi' observation,
at the same time it is pretending to a 'full' observation of the object. More simply, in order to 'present' its object as quasi-real, imagination must be conscious of first positing it as absent and unreal (54). This notion of double-think and self-deception was to play a central part in Sartre's later discussion of dreaming, fascination, hallucination, etc., as modes of imaginative consciousness. It was also to provide the basis for his pivotal notion of 'bad faith' in Being and Nothingness.

3) Nothingness. The third essential characteristic of the image revealed in Sartre's description is that of nothingness. Since every act of imagination is constituted either by positing its object as absent, non-existing, existing elsewhere, or as not existentially posited at all, it follows that the object is invariably presented as 'nothing'. 'To say "I have an image of Peter" is, Sartre claims 'equivalent to saying not only "I do not see Peter", but "I see nothing at all"' (55). It would be more correct to say that while intentionality and quasi-observation are characteristics of the imagining act, nothingness is the characteristic of the imaginary object. But Sartre, as we shall see, never succeeded in distinguishing between these two senses of the image.

Sartre goes further than Husserl in establishing a radical dichotomy between the world of the real and the world of the unreal. Whereas Husserl tended to view the antithesis of imagination and perception as but one of several forms their relationship could take, Sartre posited this as the only form consistent with a thorough phenomenological description:

'The unreal object appears as out of reach in relation to reality. Consciousness can only negate reality by stepping back or withdrawing from reality grasped as a totality...The condition necessary for a consciousness to be able to imagine is dual: one must be able to posit the world in its synthetic totality; and at the same time posit the imagined object as out of touch with this synthetic whole, that is, at the same time to posit the world as nothing with respect to the image (56).

For Sartre the real world of perception and the unreal world of imagination are mutually exclusive. To posit an imaginary world is ipso facto to negate the real world. But it is precisely because imagination is essentially 'lacking' in the mundane richness of perception, precisely because it negates the real world which determines perception, that it is
free. By positing the world as nothingness rather than reality, imagination reveals itself as freedom.

Sartre argues that this nothingness of the imaginary takes three main forms 1) as 'spatial unreality', 2) as 'temporal unreality', 3) as 'an unreality of intra-world relationships' i.e., it lacks the coherence and synthetic totality apparent in the real world.

In the imaginary world spatial relationships are entirely sui generis. They do not emerge as normal series of organized external relationships. The distance and size of an imaginary object does not depend on its relationships with other objects as the distance and size of a real object does. Moreover, if the imagined object is itself given with an imaginary background, this latter exists only in relation to it. The imagined room in which the imagined Pierre appears is a mere appendage to Pierre. It exists and has meaning only in so far as he occupies it. If Pierre leaves the room, then the room will have to leave with him. The relationship between the imagined Pierre and the room is not one of contiguity and exteriority, as it is in the real world. It is one of 'internal interdependence' (57).

The temporal dimension of the imaginary world is equally unreal. The duration of an imaginary event is not, Sartre claims, commensurate with the duration of the imaginatative act which intends it. If in reverie, for example, I imagine myself running for ten hours through a forest, the reverie itself may only last for several seconds. Sartre suggests that the objects of imaginative consciousness have a certain timeless quality. Alternatively, the imagined object may be a synthesis of different past and future times, e.g. if I imagine my brother he may appear as an amalgamation of a child, a boy and a man. Imagined time may be faster or slower than real time. In addition, it can be reversed and repeated at will, unlike real time. The time of an imagined object is integral to it, and cannot exist apart from it (58).

Thirdly, the imaginary world evinces the unreality of intra-world relationships. Sartre maintains that phenomenological description reveals the image to be totally lacking in the quality of individuation which prevails in reality (59). Hence the image of someone can often appear as a collage of infinitely different perspectives, and can easily dissolve into the image of someone entirely other. Furthermore, an
imagined object may be endowed with contradictory qualities, i.e. a face may appear upside down or back to front or with six eyes etc. This imaginative phenomenon was, incidentally, ingeniously exploited by many of the surrealist and expressionist painters, especially Picasso, Chagall and Braque. Whereas the different parts of a perceived object are related to each other in a predictable and coherent way; in the imaginary world, no such relationships occur. If I alter any part of an imagined object the whole object will either change completely or not change at all. Thus Sartre attempts to account for the jerky and discontinuous nature of imagining where each single image stands isolated from every other, acting upon nothing and being acted upon nothing other than themselves. And this for the simple reason that they are themselves nothing (60). Because of this shifting and unreal status the image can never yield anything more than a quasi-observation. It is an 'essential poverty' (61).

4) Spontaneity. The fourth and last characteristic described by Sartre is that of spontaneity. Sartre's position here is largely an extrapolation and development of Husserl's original theory of the image as an 'active genesis'. The image, Sartre argues, is spontaneous in that it posits 'nothing' and so is always immediately present to, and identical with, itself. 'The imaginative intention reveals itself to itself, at the same time as it realises itself in and by its own realization' (62).

Perceptual consciousness is conscious of itself as passive, and posits the object passively perceived as really existing. Imaginative consciousness, by contrast, is conscious of itself as active and creative. By the same token, however, it is unable to posit its creation as really existing. 'A perceptual consciousness', Sartre writes 'appears to itself as being passive', but 'an imaginative consciousness presents itself to itself as an imaginative consciousness, that is, as a spontaneity which produces and holds on to the object as an image' (63). In other words, while perceptual consciousness is passive before the object which determines its perception, imaginative consciousness cannot be determined by its object because the object of imagination is nothingness. The image, we saw, owes nothing to consciousness for it itself is created in the act of imagining' (64). At this stage, Sartre seems to confuse the object as it appears in the image (a nothingness), and the object as aimed at through the image (a transcendent reality). This should not prevent us however, from admitting a general validity to his distinction between the
passivity of perception and the spontaneity of imagination.

In Sartre's phenomenological description, the image emerges as a conscious activity sustaining itself by a spontaneous flow. Sartre insists on the *sui generis* nature of this spontaneous flow, and as such hopes to strengthen Husserl's refutation of the Hellenic belief that the image resides in consciousness as a second hand version of perception or thought. Although Sartre goes on in the second part of this work, to argue that the image has both a cognitive and an analogical component, his purpose at this stage is to make quite clear that the image, percept and concept *per se*, remain 'essentially' distinct intentions of consciousness. For Sartre, it would be absurd to say that these intentions could overlap, as it would be to say that a body could be simultaneously solid, liquid and gaseous.

Sartre does admit of variations in the *degree* of imaginative spontaneity however, He proclaims, accordingly, the necessity of distinguishing between the purely mental image which because it relies on nothing outside of itself, possesses the highest degree of spontaneity, and non-mental images which are less spontaneous in that they are related in some way to an external analogue (65). In the case of a portrait, for example, the canvas and colours act as an analogue for the person depicted. Sartre thus classified the spontaneity of images according to the way they relate to such physical analogues: from painting, where the spontaneous act of imagination is most dependent on externals, to miming, and hypnagogic fantasising where the analogue becomes more and more an integral part of consciousness itself. But this relationship between image and material analogue brings us to the third part of this chapter-the function of the image. Let us conclude with Sartre's perceptive remark that spontaneity lies at the root of imagination in so far as imagination is essentially 'a magical act by which one seeks to possess all at once an object, which for perception presents itself only gradually, by degrees, and never as a whole' (66).
3. FUNCTION.

Having phenomenologically described the four 'essential' characteristics of imagination, Sartre next proceeds to a description of its 'essential' function. He distinguishes here between images as immediate intentions and images as mediated intentions. Immediate images are quite simply, synonymous with psychic images. Mediated images, by contrast, are those mediated by some form of material analogue external to the psyche - portraits, caricatures, signs, imitations, photographs, etc. Mediated images combine to form what Sartre calls 'the image family'.

My immediate image of Pierre differs from my mediated image of Pierre, not by virtue of its intention - both intend an absent Pierre as present - but by virtue of the material analogue which carries the intention. In the case of the latter, say a portrait of Pierre, the material which carries the intention exists externally and may also be 'perceived' as a mass of lines and colours on a canvas (67). In the case of the purely immediate image, on the other hand, the material which carries the intention exists internally as a form of psychic disturbance, and can under no circumstances be perceived (68).

The intention of every member of the image family is the same: to make an absent object present. It is only in regard to the material analogue for this intention that they evince a difference of degree (69). We saw in our last chapter how Husserl's notion of hyle was often inconsistent, fragmentary and at times even contradictory. In his detailed discussion of the role of the hyletic or material analogue in the various members of the image family, Sartre endeavours to redress some of his mentor's shortcomings (70).

Sartre holds that the purpose of the image is to make an absent object present, even though that object cannot be made an object of perception. Since imagination is intentional in its essence, every imaginative act of consciousness must be consciousness of some analogue which acts as a sort of equivalent of the absent object (71). When I try to imagine my friend Pierre I want, Sartre says, 'to make him present to me'. And as I cannot bring him before me directly as a perception I have recourse to a certain material which acts as an analogue, as an equivalent, of the perception' (72). To imagine Pierre by conjuring up a mental image of him, or by looking at a photograph or caricature are 'three situations with the same form, but in which the material differs' (73). Consequently
Sartre claims that no phenomenology of imagination is complete until the various analogues of the 'image family' are adequately described.

Sartre very often confuses the absent object of which the image is the intention, and the present analogue of which the image is also the intention. Clearly, Sartre would respond to this objection by stating that the image of a centaur is merely consciousness of the analogue (lines on a page) as a means towards a consciousness of the transcendent object (the centaur itself). This is all very well so long as the analogue is also transcendent of consciousness, as it is for instance in the case of lines on a page which exists outside of the mind. But when the image is immanent in consciousness, as in the case of all mental images, then it would seem that the image cannot be consciousness of the analogue at all. For the analogue is now no longer other than consciousness but consciousness itself. Indeed, it seems at times that Sartre's theory of the mental image comes perilously close to the traditional illusion that images are copies immanent in consciousness (74). We shall return to this point in our next chapter.

Sartre describes the relationship which the imagination engenders between the portrait-analogue of King Charles and the absent King Charles himself as a 'magical' one (75). Though absent in an 'absolute' sense the person depicted in a portrait becomes present in a 'relative' sense through the magical enlivening of the analogue. Once imaginatively intended, King Charles seems to mysteriously incarnate himself in the lines, colours and shapes which originally constituted a mere object of perception (76).

Sartre demonstrates his habitual perspicacity in tracing this phenomenon of magical incarnation back to the primitive belief that the portrait or possessions of an ancestor could preserve him as present (alive) even when absent (dead), and to the use of effigies, relics and shibboleths in magico-religious rites (77). Although Sartre spends no more than a few pages in relating this imaginative phenomenon to such human practices, it is already intimated that his most significant contribution to a phenomenology of imagination will be on the level of anthropology rather than psychology.

This phenomenon of imaginative recreation is also operative in mime or impersonation. Sartre offers a lucid and convincing description
of the imaginative process whereby Franconay, uses her own small body with the aid of a straw hat and a fat protruding lip to 'presentify' the absent Maurice Chevalier. From the point of view of perception this straw hat and fat lip are nothing more than a hat and a lip. From the point of view of imagination however, they become signs which when imaginatively apprehended by the audience, magically incarnate the person which they signify (78).

Sartre describes this relationship of the object impersonated, Chevalier, and the analogue of impersonation, Franconay, as one of 'possession' (79). The impersonator presents the impersonated by allowing herself to be 'possessed' by his most essential features. In order to do this, she, not unlike the portrait painter or photographer, tries to capture the most 'general' and 'typical' traits of the person in the form of some analogue. The aim is that this analogical 'typicality' will solicit the beholder to imaginatively project the image of the person onto it (80).

Here we find the seeds of Sartre's central notion of projection, perhaps the single most important theme of his whole ontology. Simply stated, the creative imagination of the artist, be he impersonator, painter or photographer, requires the re-creative imagination of the beholder if his intended image is to be intentionally imagined. Without the imaginative project of the beholder the art-work remains a static nexus of gestures, hints and traces: a material substrate bereft of life.

Sartre's descriptive analysis also takes note of instances where consciousness creates images without any signs inherent in the analogue itself. He cites as examples the way we read images into stains, clouds, arabesques, flames or coffee grains, etc. Here the role of projection is more clearly in evidence, for the analogue itself is totally passive, indeterminate and without directive. Sartre has surprisingly little to say on the significance of this transition from reciprocal acts of imagination, where the analogue has as much to reveal as the consciousness has to project, to unilateral acts of imagination, where the analogue has nothing to reveal and consciousness everything to project (81). His failure to make this distinction is symptomatic of an increasing tendency to view imagination as solipsistic, a tendency which, as we shall see, ultimately lead to the pour-soi-en-soi dualism of Being and Nothingness.
Sometimes, Sartre remarks, consciousness acts 'imaginatively' without the aid of any external analogue whatsoever. Examples of this would be dreams or purely psychic reveries. Here the material analogue is internal to consciousness itself. It is, moreover, so contingent upon the imagining intention that it actually appears and disappears with it. Sartre's most original contribution here lies in his treatment of the hypnagogic image.

The hypnagogic image is defined as a certain mode of intention which is 'fascinated' by itself. As such it lacks any form of detachment which could enable it to resist the charms of its own effective projections; and so it succumbs to a form of 'fatalism'. Sartre describes with customary phenomenological vividness, how in a state of langour consciousness can create hypnagogic images out of the luminosity of an internal field of phosphenes, and then proceed to fall victim of its 'lifelikeness' (82). This enslavement results from the fact that imaginative consciousness is no longer fully aware that the power of the image is determined by it, and not by some external fate (33).

In so far as hypnagogic images are created from an internal psychic movement of phosphenes, they lack that sense of 'free' play which characterizes normal imaginative projection. This latter quality of freedom would apply to all forms of artistic imagining or even to our intending shapes in coffee beans. In these instances a certain detachment is preserved vis-à-vis the 'magic' of the images. There is always a certain 'willing' in the suspension of disbelief. But once the material analogue is internalized and becomes psychic, the charms of one's own creation cannot be prevailed against without difficulty. Imagination has no longer any 'reference point' outside of itself; and so it tends to conjure up all sorts of images and invest them with an independent existential status.

What Sartre fails to determine adequately, however, is what distinguishes hypnagogic or delirious images, from the normal mental image, given the fact that neither have recourse to any bedrock or reference outside of themselves. Sartre also fails sufficiently to appreciate that this state of imaginative enslavement, which he calls 'fascination', is as applicable to images with external analogues as it is to those with
just internal ones. We need only look to the mindless hysteria produced by such contemporary phenomena as propaganda, advertising and 'pop' cultism (83a). Indeed it is probably correct to say that 'fascination' is far more pernicious in such public and collective projections than it is in the internal and private projections of hypnagogic imagery.

The absence of external analogues is by no means sufficient to account for the phenomenon of 'fascination'. On the contrary, the greatest 'fascination' is often invoked by images not created by the private consciousness at all, but by some public power totally external to it. This is, of course, particularly true of mass-media experience; a factor which should have been obvious to Sartre even as early as 1940, when radio, cinema and the mass broadcasting of political rallies were already features of the day. But this oversight in Sartre's analysis does not seriously impair the originality and suggestiveness of his insight into the whole phenomenon of imaginative 'projection' and 'fascination'.

Sartre shows that all imagined analogues (of the image family), whether internal or external, psychic or physical, free or fascinated, constitute a movement of magical projection. This Sartre calls 'the symbolic movement' (84). All symbolic imagining presupposes both an intention of consciousness and a material analogue of some sort. The first factor has been described at great length and poses no problem. The second factor poses no problem either, in so far as it refers to an external analogue e.g., a photo or portrait, which can be perceived and 'described' after or before it is imagined. In so far as it refers to an internal or mental image however, Sartre concedes that is is impossible for the method of phenomenological reflection to 'describe' it. The moment imaginative consciousness passes away the internal analogue which carries the image passes away also. But the analogue of every act of imagining must for the phenomenologist, be something which can be perceived as transcendent of consciousness, rather than a mere element in it (85). The issue becomes problematic.

Again, because the image is in its essence un-real, it can never exist independently of reality. Consequently every formation of an imaginative consciousness can only come about 'by an annihilation of a perceptual consciousness' (86). This condition is easily satisfied by the external analogues of most acts of imagination and even by the
hypnagogic analogue of entoptic lights which Sartre considers sufficiently material to be 'perceived' (87). But the analogue of the normal mental image must also fulfil this same condition. And here, Sartre concedes, 'we meet with great difficulty':

In the cases we have previously described, when the truly imaginative consciousness wanes, there remains a sensible residue which is describable; namely the painted canvas, or the spot on the wall... It must be admitted, however, that reflective description does not tell us directly anything concerning the material analogue of the mental image. This is due to the fact that when the imaginative consciousness is destroyed, its transcendent content is destroyed with it; no describable residue remains (88).

This dilemma compels Sartre to 'leave the sure ground of phenomenological description and turn to the evidence of experimental psychology' (89). This step involves the forfeiting of eidetic 'certainty' for 'such evidence never permits us to go beyond the probable' (90). In short, since the phenomenologist cannot describe the analogues of internal images, but knows that they must exist if the image is always an intentional consciousness of something transcendent of itself, then the only way to identify this hidden content is, Sartre concedes, 'to form hypotheses and seek evidences in observation and experiment, just as is done in the experimental sciences' (91).
4. COMPOSITION.

Sartre proclaims the necessity of experimental and inductive procedures in order to develop his original phenomenological insights. By these means he hopes to substantiate the insights with 'probable' evidence where 'certain' evidence is no longer possible. The question of the internal composition of psychic imagery is the chief case in point.

Sartre adduces the experimental evidence of such contemporary psychologists as Flasch, Alain, Le Roy and Dewsauvers to support his view that the psychic image is a synthesis of 1) 'knowledge' 2)'affectivity' and 3) 'kinaesthetic movements' arising from complex body sensations, muscular contractions and other physiological disturbances (92). It is not our intention here to enumerate these detailed and meticulously documented experiments, but to outline Sartre's principal conclusions.

Sartre argues that the internal analogue, like the external analogue, is a substratum which the imaginative intention transmutes into a substitute for the intended object. It itself is no more than an excuse or occasion for the imagination to materialize itself in some way. He declares that the 'mental image' (93) is a synthesis between an effective-kinaesthetic analogue which operates as a material medium of 'presence' on the one hand, and a knowledge which envisages the absent object imagined through the analogue, on the other. This presence in absence accounts, he says, for the paradoxical fact that 'the image knows a certain fullness with a certain emptiness' (94).

Every image for Sartre implies an element of 'knowledge'. Because the image is intentional it is not just a material analogue per se but a material analogue which is always an analogue of some particular object. In other words, the analogue is never merely anonymous but always individualized by the object intended. The face of the man now present in my imagination is not just of anyone, but of my friend Pierre. Every image therefore presupposes a certain knowledge of the person or thing intended by means of the image. Unlike the knowledge present in common conceptualization, the knowledge operative in imagination, Sartre argues, does not remain abstract but assumes an intuitive particularity. He calls this a 'degraded knowledge' in so far as it does not yield the fullness or richness of perception. This use of the term 'degraded' to characterize imaginative knowledge recalls Husserl's tendency to give priority to perception over imagination. Sartre, as we shall see, widens
this gulf between imagination and perception and suggests that because all human consciousness is tainted with the negating power of imagination, man himself is at root, a 'degraded' or 'useless' project (95).

The image is not just a casual admixture of such knowledge, affectivity and kinaesthetic impressions; it is a dynamic synthesis of all three (96). Knowledge cannot be construed as something added to an already existing image. On the contrary, it is 'the active structure of imaginative consciousness' (97). Without this knowledge the image could not be an intention of a particular object; for this knowledge is what provides us with the 'information' necessary for the presentation of just this object. Sartre offers here a novel insight not only into the role played by knowledge in the imagining of the creating artist, but also in the imagining of the re-creating audience. For instance, how very much will an audience's appreciation of Franconay's impersonation be heightened, if they know Chevalier in the first place; or again, how much more profound will the reader's appreciation of Joyce's Ulysses be, if he or she knows that Ulysses was a Greek hero of whom Bloom is but a mock-heroic parody.

This indispensable role of knowledge in imagination radically distinguishes it from perception. Whereas we actually see Pierre in a perceptual act, we merely know how to see him in an imaginative one. In contradistinction to the percept, the image is totally dependent on the knowledge of the object imagined for its existence. It is its only recourse to the world (98). But while sharply distinguishing between perception and imagination, Sartre fails sufficiently to account for how the knowledge got there in the first place. To be consistent with his description of the image as nothingness and spontaneity, he must also reject the argument from innate ideas. Ultimately, Sartre's claim that images embody knowledge of a certain sort is unsupported; he lacks any adequate account of the function of the imagination in acquiring knowledge (99).

Imaginative knowledge is, of course, totally impotent without an analogue. The analogue may be either internal or external, and involves a 'kinaesthetic' and 'affective' component.

The kinaesthetic component is the second main ingredient of the image. It's purpose is to incarnate the intended object in a certain
visual concreteness. In the case of external images it is very often induced by the already visual aspects of the material (100). In the case of mental images, it is induced by internal bodily movements. The kinaesthetic analogue accounts for that fundamental character of presence which distinguishes images from purely cognitive concepts. It 'fulfils' the cognitive intention by providing it with a certain intuition of its object. It is that which furnishes the image with its sense of movement and life.

But the presence effected by the kinaesthetic analogue is merely a surface presence. In order to deepen this presence we must turn to the third main component of the image: the 'affective' analogue. 'Affectivity' means more here than just those emotive qualities with which consciousness endows the object. For Sartre the effective analogue is also that which 'synthesizes' the other kinaesthetic and cognitive elements of the image, and 'unifies' them into a 'complete' image. This kind of affective depth and unity is present to lesser or greater degrees in different kinds of images (101).

In the case of the Chevalier impersonation, for instance, what makes for a successful performance is Franconay's ability to elicit from the audience an affective reaction similar to what they would feel in the presence of Chevalier himself. Correlative to the audience's affective imagining is the affective image of Chevalier's face: a certain indefinable quality which Sartre calls its 'meaning' (sens) and which could be read on the impersonator's face (102). It is this affective 'meaning', Sartre says, which synthesizes Franconay's various signs and gestures and 'presents' Chevalier to us. Elsewhere Sartre rates Guardi's paintings of Venice more highly than Canalettos on the grounds that the latter are simply visual reproductions of the city, whereas Venice is present in each of Guardi's canvasses, 'as we have all experienced but as no one has seen' (103). Sartre's distinction here between the image as a superficial kinaesthetic resemblance and as an affective presence, which finally descends into the composition and gives it 'meaning', is to become central in his later theories of art, and particularly his distinction between prose and poetry (104).

This understanding of affectivity as a synthetizing 'meaning' is not easily reconcilable with Sartre's belief that the image constitutes an 'essential poverty'. For 'meaningful' presence, Sartre suggests,
is that which enables some images, usually artistic, to have a unity and depth which surpasses that of the intellectual concept, and even that of the percept e.g. 'Venice as no one has seen it'. But this question is a recurring obscurity in Sartre; and is certainly not wholly unrelated to Husserl's similar ambiguity on the value of the image.

Sartre, we noted, was compelled to leave the 'certain' ground of phenomenological description and to resort to the merely 'probable' evidence of experimental induction, in order to give an adequate account of the role of the analogue in imagination (105). This evidence establishes that the analogue of all images, basically comprises some form of affective-kinesthetic synthesis. No matter whether it is external or internal, this analogue must always be 'transcendent' if it is to satisfy the primary characteristic of imagination as a consciousness of something transcendent of consciousness (106).

Sartre contends that in all cases of imagining a person, there must be an analogue of this absent or non-existent person. This analogue must, furthermore, be something which I am conscious of in a sense equivalent to my consciousness of the person if he was perceptually present. That is to say, the person's analogue, no less than the person as object aimed at through the analogue, must be transcendent of consciousness (107). As we already observed, this poses no problem in the case of external images, such as photographs, paintings, etc.; for here the analogue can be perceived as other than consciousness without any difficulty, as soon as one moves from imaginative to perceptual intentionality. But it is difficult to see how Sartre can justify his claim that the affective-kinesthetic analogue of a mental image is also transcendent of consciousness (108).

Sartre's intentional theory of the image obliges him to reject any notion of an image in consciousness. In this work the full implications of this theory are never thoroughly worked out, and so we are likely to react to Sartre's statement that internal analogues are transcendent with a certain amount of scepticism (109). In Being and Nothingness Sartre goes on to develop these implications into a thorough-going dualism between a totally empty consciousness and a totally full being. If, therefore, in his experimental analysis of the psychic image in
The Psychology of Imagination, Sartre already proclaims the necessary transcendence of all analogues, it would seem to be a result of apriori considerations of what the essence of the image must be, rather than induction from experimental evidence of what the image is. The circularity of Sartre's phenomenological method once again emerges.

Sartre's inductive inquiries also lead him to a categorical rejection of the traditional account of the relationship between the symbol and the image. He refutes the idea that a symbol is merely a combination of pre-packed 'unconscious' images for the illustration of this or that particular message. 'We cannot accept', he says, 'a conception according to which the symbolic function is added to the image from the outside...for the image is symbolic in essence and in its very structure, and the symbolic structure of the image cannot be suppressed without destroying the image itself'(110). Images are not first things which must then be symbolized in order to become meaningful. For Sartre, images are themselves meaningful symbols. Drawing from much experimental evidence, he convincingly argues that all symbolic schemes are the projections of a certain imaginative intentionality which seeks to present itself as an image rather than by means of an image (111). The schematic image is not something which could be used to symbolize some sort of conceptual message which exists prior to it. It cannot be used to symbolize something else, for it is itself a symbol of itself (112). Its role is not that of a pedagogue but that of a 'presentifier'. Sartre's revamping of the whole traditional theory of symbolism is perhaps one of the most original contributions of this book, and prefigures in many ways the current theories of such aestheticians as Northrop Frye, E.H. Gombrich, and Richard Palmer.

Thus far Sartre's treatment of the image has used a wide ranging series of terms viz., characteristic, essence, function, intention, knowledge, affectivity, consciousness, kinaesthetic movement, synthesis, symbol, analogue, hyle, transcendence, object, presence, meaning, composition, content, act and matter etc. Sartre's lack of any systematic nomenclature frequently leads to confusion and ambiguity. Sometimes this confusion is solely the result of terminological difficulty: the tendency to confound several different uses of the term 'object'; or the use of the term 'knowledge' sometimes to refer to the imaginative act of
intentionality which intends objects, other times to refer to one of the composite parts of the imaginative content. Occasionally, however, this confusion is symptomatic of a more serious inconsistency or circularity in Sartre's own thinking.

The nearest overall classification of the composition of the image is to be found in Sartre's triple division into 1) act 2) object 3) content. Although the author does not, regrettably, conform to his own classification, it is worth setting down in the following summary chart for the purposes of clarity and coherence.

**ACT:** the imaginative intention of consciousness.

**OBJECT:** the person or thing intended by consciousness and characterized by its qualities of: 1) Nothingness. 2) Temporal, spatial and relational unreality. 3) Transcendence.

**CONTENT:** the composite elements of the image which carry the intention towards the intended: 1) Knowledge. 2) Affectivity.) Analogues (sometimes referred to as Hyle or matter: they may be internal or external. 3) Kinaesthesia.)
5. PATHOLOGY.

Sartre's investigations of the imagination both descriptive and inductive, open up a whole new world of 'unreality', which Sartre calls 'the imaginary life'. In this section we shall examine how Sartre came to see this experience of unreality as the source of both man's freedom and his self-deception: the double-edged sword of his salvation and his sickness.

We saw how for Sartre the operations of imagination are 'magical' ones in so far as they spontaneously conjure up the objects of our desire, and enable us to take instant possession of them. There is always, as Sartre puts it, something 'imperious and infantile in such a process, a refusal to take distance or difficulty into account'. But this refusal to be bound by the normal constraints contains its own nemesis: although everything obeys the emperor of imagination, appears and disappears at its will and dismissal, it only obeys in so far as it constitutes an empire of nothingness.

Enumerating several pertinent experiments, Sartre illustrates his earlier statement that the space and time of the image world are totally unique and totally 'unreal' (113). He convincingly demonstrates that we can neither count the instants of an imagined act nor compare the real time taken to imagine an act with the time internal to that act itself. The same essential difference he shows to apply to imagined 'space' as testified by our failure to count the columns of an imagined parthenon. The world of perception and the world of imagination are always separated by the Chinese wall of unreality:

Thus the time of unreal objects is itself unreal... it is a shadow of time, like the shadow of the object with its shadow of space. Nothing separates the unreal object from me more surely: the world of the imaginary is completely isolated. I can enter it only by unrealizing myself in it (114).

Sartre argues that even if the imaginer appears at first to react to this world of unreality in much the same manner as he reacts to the real world; at root, the very same deep chasm which separated these two worlds separates our respective modes of behaviour towards them.

Let us begin our discussion of this 'imaginary life' with an analysis of the central behavioural role which Sartre assigns to desire. One may have a desire which is, at first, basically diffuse and without precise intentionality. In organizing itself into an imaginative creation
the desire acquires a certain precision, intensity and coherence (115). But the image, Sartre repeatedly points out, is not something which predates the desire and affixes itself to it from the outside. This would be to treat imagination as a sort of Labour Exchange for images and to regress to the Hellenic illusion of immanence. The image, as phenomenologically described, is an unreality and as such it can never itself be the cause of intentions. It is no more nor no less than an intentional creation of our own desire. Unlike Pygmalion however, it cannot bring its creation into reality. It can lend it life but only its own life and only momentarily. The pride of the image-maker, as Sartre illustrates with his habitual literary flair, hangs on a thread of self-deceit, for he is a creator enthralled by his own creations:

The faint breath of life we breathe into images comes from us, from our spontaneity. If we turn away from them they are destroyed...kept alive artificially, about to vanish at any moment, they cannot satisfy desires. But it is not entirely useless to construct an unreal object for it is a way of deceiving the senses momentarily in order to aggravate them, somewhat like the effect of sea water on thirst...it is but a mirage, and in the imaginative act desire is nourished from itself. More exactly, the object as an image is a definite want; it takes shape as a cavity (116).

Sartre displays equal perspicacity in his hypothesis that it is because the image is a consciousness which is necessarily non-thetically conscious of itself as an unreality, that we account for the strange fact that we often feel the bewitchments of our own imagination even while imagining. The fact that our images are fleeting, protean, and ambiguous, merely serves to aggravate our sense of suspicion and uneasiness (117). Because the image is essentially unreal, it cannot furnish the same density, definiteness and individual locality which the realities of perception can. Hence our experience of the imaginary object as never being fully itself, as always being elsewhere, a presence which functions as a perpetual abstention from being.

The evasion to which they (images) invite us is not only of the sort which is an escape from actuality, from our preoccupations, our boredom, but an escape from all worldly constraints; they seem to present themselves as a negation of the condition of being in the world, as an anti-world (118).

Just as desire can imaginatively intend itself into an image of the desired object, which it then invokes as 'really' present,
so too Sartre concludes, an image has in itself no real 'persuasive', 'erotic' or 'disgusting' power: it is we who persuade, excite and disgust ourselves by the very act in which we construct the image (119). Sometimes the affective or emotional function of our intention overlies itself and induces in us certain violent behavioral reactions viz., nausea and vomiting, which we are often wont to misinterpret as a response to an independently existing 'thing'. Sartre argues that such nausea could not be the effect of any 'repugnant' quality in the image. An image is an unreality which has no qualities unless given them by us. Such a response is but the consequence of the free development of the imaginative emotion as it exceeds its own affective role and returns to plague the inventor (120). This repugnance before the 'unreal' image cannot, Sartre asserts, be considered homogeneous with the repugnance before a 'real' perception, for it is determined by itself, and sustained by its auto-creation. The emotive behaviour of the imagination feasts on its own reflection. And so Sartre offers us the rather perplexing conclusion that if ever we are repulsed by an image we are, in fact, being repulsed by nothing other than ourselves (121).

The imagination thus emerges for Sartre as a sort of labyrinth of mirrors, and the imaginier himself as both Theseus and the Minotaur — the executioner and the victim in one. The fact therefore that when a lover imagines his beloved, it is his desire for her that causes her 'unreal' face to appear to him, and not her 'unreal' face that excites him with desire in the first place, lends a certain tragic solipsism to the whole Sartrean interpretation. As soon as the beloved is absent for some length of time, one's desire becomes something caused not by her as a real and existing presence, but created in order to fill in her absence. As long as she could be perceived the lover's feeling could always be surprised and surpassed by a new richness, a new depth in her personality hitherto undiscovered. But as a mere image she can never be more than a correlative of my feelings for her. Once she is translated into the alien currency of fiction she displays a basic poverty; she becomes, as Sartre puts it, 'šcolastic'. The image of the beloved thus constitutes a sort of corpse desperately trying to give itself the kiss of life. For each time the imaginative intention tries and ultimately fails to reincarnate the absent beloved as a 'real presence', the image lepess more and more of its particularity and nuance. Sartre offers the brilliant insight that love letters are awaited with such impatience not so much
for the news they contain as for their concrete and particular existence, their ability to revivify an affective analogue which is dwindling from within. Increasingly distanced from the real presence of the beloved, which alone could infuse the analogue with a new lease of life, desire resorts to the ploys of imagination. And given Sartre's reading, it cannot but ultimately degenerate into a sort of 'impoverished' love, a love for love's sake, a love that is in love with nothing other than itself.

This means that under the aegis of imagination affection can no longer be genuinely felt, since the object no longer positively affects me, but is rather created by my own intention. It is an icon issuing from a void within the imaginer. There is no longer any receptivity or 'passion' in its real and etymological sense (Latin patio-iri, to allow things to happen to one). There is no longer any contact, reciprocity or dialogue. There is only the imagination writing as it were, visual love letters to itself, answering its own desire with its own desire. Sartre illustrates this point with the following vivid anecdote:

One could speak of a dance before the unreal, in the manner that a corps de ballet dances around a statue. The dancers open their arms, offer their hands, smile, offer themselves completely, approach and take flight, but the statue is not affected by it: there is no real relationship between it and the corps de ballet. Likewise, our conduct before the object cannot really touch it, qualify it any more than it can touch us in return; because it is in the heaven of the unreal beyond all reach (122).

In this heaven of the unreal, desire becomes the dupe of its own creation, the victim of a barren and abstract object, what Sartre calls in a memorable phrase - 'the empty absolute'. The psychic simulacrum of the beloved will, Sartre concedes, conform more to every whim of the lover than would the beloved herself. But the price that must be paid for such unresisting complaisance, is the price of unreality. Unlike the real object with its inexhaustible and independent wealth of resources, the unreal object is condemned to the limits of its own desire. It can never be more than we know it to be; it can never be other than itself.

Sartre argues that at times, and particularly in the instance of 'infatuation', this is exactly what the lover desires. Sartre's analysis of the role of imagination in infatuation is quite masterly and further strengthens our suspicion that the author's real interest lies
more in the meaning than in the mechanics of human imagining. Pining away for an absent and intangible person, the infatuated lover knows deep down that any 'real' contact with this person would temper the excess and cool the fever of his passion. By restoring him to a certain reasonableness and self-possession such contact would, of course, considerably heighten his chances of winning over the loved one. But it is just such a tempering and cooling which the infatuated most fears, for he reckons his 'real' advantage as nothing compared with the loss he thinks he will suffer by the diminution of his present 'imaginary' passion. The touch of reality must be avoided at all costs, for by offering an exit from hopelessness and an avenue to the desired end, it threatens to free us from the delicious lash of our 'imaginary' love torments. At this point in Sartre's analysis we are reminded of the tragic lovers of their own love which people the pages of all literatures: Malvoleo, Don Juan, Julien Sorel, and Emma Bovary who imagined a romantic world uncontaminated by reality but 'rediscovered all the boredom of marriage in adultery'.

The pathological implications of such 'imaginative' behaviour are evident and Sartre does not hesitate to extrapolate them. He cites the example of a psychasthenic who believes himself to be suffering from cancer but in fact is only the victim of his own imagined anguish. Unlike the real victim of cancer, the psychasthenic will dispense all his energy in trying to suffer more rather than less, in trying to convince himself of a disease which he knows despite himself, and cannot but know since he created it himself, to be an unreality:

He cries out in order to bring on anguish, he gesticulates in order to bring it into his body. But in vain: nothing will fill in that annoying impression of emptiness which constitutes the reason and basic nature of his outburst (123).

Sartre also cites here the example of the coward or morbid dreamer who enacts brave deeds in the imagination but shirks, if the opportunity arises, any contact with practical reality (124). After all, images qua images can have no consequences other than the ones I give them: the blood will only flow from the bullet wound if I will it to do so. This radical difference between real and imaginary behaviour accounts for what Sartre calls the 'continuous hiatus between the preparation and the action itself' (125). This is to prove a common dilemma of the Sartrean protagonist as we shall see in our next chapter. At this point, suffice it to adduce the single example of Hugo in Les Mains Sales who
is obsessed by the 'imagined' consequences of his act and so procrastinates ad infinitum and is unable to reach any conscious decision to act at all. Bereft of all recourse to reality, he cries out against his own impotence: 'I live on a stage' (126).

Sartre also discusses the central role which imagination plays in other pathological phenomena, such as obsession, fascination, hallucination and schizophrenia. Contrary to the contemporary vogue of 'divine madness', Sartre insists that the romantic glorification of insanity and excess was, and still is, a fallacious one:

In brief, if the schizophrenic imagines so many amorous scenes it is not only because his real love has been disappointed, but above all, because he is no longer capable of loving (127).

While the object of perception sets up what Husserl calls a 'claim to reality' (Seinsanspruch) the object of the image, by contrast, is always the unreal correlative of an immediate intuition of spontaneity. In other words, it is a non-thetic consciousness of itself as a creation of nothingness (128). The question must then be asked how the patient can believe in the reality of the image which he is conscious of having created as 'unreal' in the first place. Anticipating his existentialist maxim that all men are responsible for their own behaviour, Sartre ingeniously interprets this as a form of double-think, rooted in a fundamental dis-integration of consciousness. Divided against himself the patient claims that the hallucination or obsession imposes itself on the mind, as if the image were some extraneous and reified thing set over against consciousness. This illusion, Sartre insists, can only arise out of a violent opposition between the self and the non-self:

Consciousness is here a sort of victim of itself, clinched in a vicious circle and every effort made to get rid of the obsessing idea is precisely the most effective way to bring it about...the self is no longer an harmonious integration of enterprises in the external world. There are some spasms of the self, a spontaneity that liberates itself; it occurs as a resistance of the self to itself (129).

Thus when a patient speaks of evil thoughts which are 'given' to him, he is according to Sartre, merely bearing witness to his own self-alienation. Sartre goes on to offer the ingenious explanation that the whole idea of 'influence' arises out of the victim's simultaneous belief that it is he who is producing these images as a living and intending spontaneity, and yet that he did not himself will them. In other words,
Sartre would say that demonic possession is a fallacy which stems from the victim's misunderstanding of the phenomenon of counter-spontaneity, an intentionality which asserts and negates itself at the same time. Lacking an integrated centre of intentionality, man's consciousness dis-integrates, and its images are erroneously interpreted as being heterogeneous with the very consciousness which produced them. Sartre warns us here not to confuse this notion of a dis-integrated consciousness with the notion of the unconscious. According to his phenomenological criteria the idea of the unconscious is discarded as a mere by-product of the Hellenic illusion of immanence. Man is consciousness through and through. The pathology of imagination results therefore not by consciousness being possessed by 'demonic' or 'unconscious' images set over against it, but by consciousness being set over against itself. 'Possession' can only be the possession of consciousness by itself.

Following this line of reasoning, the dream must also be seen (though Sartre prefers to ignore this implication) in a pathological perspective, since here too we find consciousness captivated by its own creations. In the dream as in ordinary images, everything that happens happens not because the objects are themselves present to my intuition, but because I imagine them to be present. Consciousness becomes intrigued by the visual possibilities of a whole series of affective-entopic impressions and forfeits the ability to see itself as no more than an imaginative projection. The dreamer is, for Sartre, one who walks through the world of his own creation, utterly seduced by the characters he has imagined for himself:

My consciousness is therefore that of a world, I have projected all my knowledge, all my interest, all my memories and even the necessity of being-in-the-world which imposes itself upon the human being. I have projected all that, but I did so in the imaginary mode of the image which I now construct. What has happened if not that consciousness was completely taken in? It entered completely into the game and it itself was determined to produce syntheses in all their richness, but only in an imaginary way (130).

This phenomenon of total enclosure in the imaginary world is what Sartre calls 'fascination'. The dream is its most explicit manifestation, for here consciousness is compelled to follow its own fascination without constraints. But if Sartre speaks of compulsion, he
makes sure to distinguish sharply between 'determinism' which suggests an influence from without, and 'fatalism' by which he means the self's submission to its own influence. Fatalism, not determinism, is the abverse of freedom. The dreamer is 'unfree' precisely because he has lost his sense of being-in-a-real-world, which would have permitted him to withdraw from his imaginings and direct his intention into another modality of consciousness, perception or reflection for example. Sartre is forced to admit that, although non-thetically conscious of itself even while dreaming, the self can no longer free itself. It has traded-in its freedom for fatalism.

This is the reason why the world of the dream like that of the reader occurs as completely magical; we are haunted by the adventures of the persons in our dreams as we are haunted by the heroes of a novel. It is not that the non-thetic consciousness of imagining ceases to grasp itself as a spontaneity but it grasps itself by means of a spell-bound spontaneity: This is what gives the dream its unique nuance of fatality. The events occur as not being able not to happen, in correlation with a consciousness which cannot help imagining them (131).

But Sartre fails to emphasize the importance of the difference between the attitude of the reader and the attitude of the dreamer. The former retains the freedom to revert to the real world at any moment, to perceive the book as a mere imbroglio of black lines on white pages, or to stop and reflect upon the moral character of the hero etc. Always implied in aesthetic identification is the possibility of aesthetic distance. One sympathizes with the fortunes of fictive heroes rather than being fascinated by them. Consequently, while aesthetic illusion is like dream-illusion in that both demand a suspension of disbelief, it differs in all important fact that its suspension is a 'willing' one. Sartre's tendency to blur such distinctions is all the more surprising in view of the central role which he ascribes to individual 'will' and 'choice' in Being and Nothingness.

To break away from the enchantment of the dream cannot, for Sartre, be a matter of voluntary decision. One may, indeed, be able to say to oneself 'but I am only dreaming'. One may reason with oneself thus and struggle to break out of one's own dream, but everything we say and do is glossed into fiction, transubstantiated despite ourselves back into the imaginary, like foam reconverted into water. Sartre
ends up contending that we may only be woken from the dream by either
1) an external stimulus too strong to be assimilated as material for an
imaginative analogue; 2) an emotion of fear or horror so real in its
evocation that it breaks the fetters of nightmare and motivates a
reflection; 3) a natural caesura in the dream story itself (i.e., I am
executed, I fall of a cliff, I kill the monster, etc.) which causes
consciousness to hesitate momentarily, and thus occasions the possibility
of transition to another modality of intention - wakefulness.

According to Sartre's analysis, to dream is to live a fiction
in such a way as not to be able not to live this fiction. He is thus
lead to the rather frightening conclusion that dreaming is just as path-
ological a manifestation of imagination as schizophrenia or neurasthenia
etc. In for far as it is condemned by its own creation, dreaming evinces
both the power and the danger of imagination:

Just as King Midas transformed everything he touched
into gold, so consciousness is itself determined to
transform into the imaginary everything it gets hold
of: hence the fatal nature of the dream...it is the
odyssey of consciousness dedicated by itself, and in
spite of itself, to build only an unreal world (132).

By failing to distinguish sufficiently the degree of pathology
in such different modes of imaginary life as infatuation, dreaming or
schizophrenia, Sartre tended to confound the notions of sanity and in-
sanity, sickness and health. On this reading of the situation, one of
two conclusions are likely: either all those who imagine (i.e. dream,
love an absent person etc.) are sick, or all the mentally sick are gifted
imaginers. As it transpired, Sartre was ultimately to opt for the former
conclusion. In Being and Nothingness this expresses itself in the view
that all men, because they project beyond what is to an impossibly ideal
image (the synthesis of the in-itself-for-itself) of what might be, are
useless passions in an absurd world.
CHAPTER FIVE: CRITIQUE OF SARTRE'S THEORY OF IMAGINATION.
The imagination emerges from Sartre's analysis as a paradox. The Husserlian legacy is not changed in 'spirit'; though in 'letter' it is radically revised and deepened. This paradox manifests itself most clearly in the conclusion that the essential 'nothingness' of imagination is the source of both man's pathology and his freedom. This conclusion, in turn, is derived from Sartre's hypothesis that the image is a radical negation of reality.

In a lengthy postscript to *The Psychology of Imagination*, Sartre explores the presuppositions of this hypothesis. He departs from the realm of psychology altogether and raises the question of the ontological significance of imagination. This ontological inquiry concerns itself with two primary questions: 1) the anthropological question of what man must be if he is to imagine, and 2) the aesthetic question of what art must be if it is a creation of the imagination. Since the ontological dimension of imagination is clearly Sartre's primary preoccupation, we shall devote this chapter to a detailed critique of its main implications.

In the postscript to *The Psychology Of Imagination*, Sartre reveals the ontological basis of his two major works on imagination, the first predominantly critical, the second predominantly descriptive in nature. This ontological optique offers a novel evaluation of the 'unrealizing' power of the imagination. Far from merely signifying a pathological expression of consciousness, imagination now emerges as the primary condition of consciousness (1). Reviewing the findings of *Imagination* and *The Psychology of Imagination*, Sartre poses the ontological question in the two following forms: 1) 'Is the imaginary function a contingent and metaphysical specification of the essence of consciousness or should it rather be described as a constitutive function of that essence?' 2) 'Are the necessary conditions for realizing an imaginative consciousness the same or different from the conditions of possibility of consciousness in general?' (2). This question, he assures us, can only be properly posed and understood from the phenomenological point of view.

Starting with the first formulation of the question, Sartre sets out to determine what a consciousness must be in order for it to possess the power to imagine. He reasserts the necessity of exposing the 'Illusion of immanence' if one wishes to grasp this problematic of
imagination; the illusion here manifesting itself in the belief that images can be quite unproblematically explained in terms of reborn perceptual sensations. He also underlines the importance of the discovery that the object no less than the intention of imaginative consciousness is radically different from that of perceptual consciousness (3). The 'object as imagined' is, in the final analysis, revealed to be an 'essential nothingness', an 'absence in actuality', not to be confused with real objects existing in the real world (4).

Sartre concludes, therefore, that the sine qua non for a consciousness to be able to imagine is the power to posit an hypothesis of unreality. Having provided throughout his analysis ample evidence of four main ways in which such an hypothesis may be made (as absent, non-existent, as existing elsewhere or as neutralized), he now explores the significance of the fundamental factor common to them all: Negation (néantisation). As a negating mode of consciousness, however, imagination always remains a consciousness of something. The most important question that must now be asked therefore is what is imagination a consciousness of?

In his attempt to answer this question Sartre makes an important distinction between 'being-in-the-world' and 'being-in-the-midst-of-the-world'. Viewed as 'being-in-the-midst-of-the-world', man is a simple spatio-temporal object which can be 'caused', manipulated and measured like other objects in the world. As a 'being-in-the-world' however, man is a specifically human consciousness which is always consciousness of an object, and by the same token consciousness of not being this object. The 'of' distinguishes consciousness from objects, at the same time as it relates it to them. Because it is intentional, consciousness possesses a power of withdrawal such that it can negate the objects of which it is conscious. The terminology here is explicitly Heideggerean and Sartre does not hide his debt. At several points during the postscript, he explicitly acknowledges the influence of Heidegger's theory of 'surpassing' in Being and Time on his own theory of the image as a nothingness and transcendence (5).

Since to be an ordinary consciousness of the world is to negate it, then it follows for Sartre that to be an imaginative consciousness of the world is to doubly negate it. When we imagine, we first posit a world in which our imagined object is absent, in order that we may then imagine it.
a world in which our imagined object is present (6). To imagine something therefore is to 1) constitute the world as a real synthetic totality - which Sartre designates as 'world' - by means of a nihilating withdrawal from it; and 2) negate the 'worldly' existence of the particular something i.e., to posit it as not of this 'world', as an absence, a nothingness.

As a double negation, the image acts as a sort of negative of the already negated world: something like the negative of a photographic plate where the world emerges precisely through its own inversion. Without the negating power of imagination, the real 'world' no less than the imaginary 'world' could not be constituted as 'world' at all. Sartre's thought here is, regretably, far too concise, and not at all clear to anyone unfamiliar with Heidegger's notion of Dasein as a surpassing-negating of the world. This discussion represents Sartre's first explicit approach to ontology, but it was not until four years later in Being and Nothingness that he clearly and consistently worked out a theory of negation. At this point his analysis exhibits much confusion and an inordinate dependence on Heideggerian terminology.

The imagination is not an arbitrary power of negation. On the contrary, it negates the world from a very definite point of view i.e. the one which permits the positioning of the real absence of the object unreally present as an image. Sartre takes up again and develops Husserl's original example of the centaur:

For the centaur to emerge as unreal, the world must be grasped as a world where-the-centaur-is -not, and this can only happen if consciousness is led by different motivations to grasp the world as being exactly the sort in which the centaur has no place...It is the being-in-the-world, grasped as a concrete and individual reality of consciousness, which is the motivation for the construction of any unreal object whatever and the nature of that unreal object is circumscribed by that motivation (7).

The real 'world' emerges as synthetic totality by means of a primary negation; the imaginary 'world' emerges as the inversion of this totality, by means of a secondary negation of this real 'world', to which it is always tied by the umbilical cord of its 'point of view'. The unreal 'world' as a twofold negation must therefore, always be constructed on the basis of the real 'world' which it denies (8). From this observation,
Sartre deduces three features of the act of imagining: 1) Constitution, it constitutes the 'world' which prior to consciousness merely existed as an undifferentiated and unsynthesized manifold. 2) Negation, it negates this 'world' on a second plane and from a particular point of view. 3) Isolation, it isolates the object intended by this second negation as something beyond the real 'world', i.e. as something unreal and out of reach (9).

And so Sartre concludes by answering both formulations of the ontological question in the affirmative. Firstly, if we accept the phenomenological concept of imagination, then we must admit that the conditions for an imaginary consciousness are the same as those for consciousness in general; and that they are, in fact, nothing else than the very essence of that 'consciousness' considered from a particular point of view. Secondly, in so far as we admit that the negating power of imagination is constitutive of the very essence of consciousness (as opposed to being a mere specification of it), it is impossible for us to conceive of a consciousness which would not be 'imaginative'. For, as Sartre points out, if a consciousness could not imagine, it would be 'engulfed in the existent and unable to grasp anything but the existent' (10).

Sartre endorses Husserl's view that it is imagination which allows us to withdraw from the constraints of immediate reality and to regard it with a free and critical eye, that is, to transcend the actual and project ourselves freely into the possible. Deprived of this surpassing and transcending power, consciousness would be submerged in the manifold of the given. If the excess of imagination results in a pathology of self-immersion, then the lack of it, Sartre seems to be suggesting here, results in the equally undesirable extreme of self-surrender to the chaos of existence. Imagination is both our health and our disease (11).

While Sartre's psychological analysis of imagination tended to stress the connection between nothingness and enslavement, his ontological analysis reverses the coin and expounds the fundamental link between nothingness and freedom. The emphasis here is on the fact that in order to imagine something consciousness must be free from all reality. It is consciousness' 'unrealizing' power which endows it with a freedom vis-a-vis the real. 'The unreal is', Sartre claims, 'produced outside of the world by a consciousness which stays in the world, and it is because
he is transcendentally free that man can imagine' (12).

Sartre does not hold that every act of freedom must be an act of imagination in the full sense, that is, an act of double negation, but an act of imagination in the implicit sense, that is, an act of single negation. This implicit act of imagining is equally requisite in the constitution of our everyday real 'world', what Sartre often calls our 'situation'. 'The realizing consciousness', as he puts it, 'always includes a retreat towards a particular imaginative consciousness which is like the reverse of the situation and in relation to which the situation is defined' (13). In other words, it is the possibility of the unreal which provides us with the freedom to found the real; it is the hint of an absent world which pulls our present one into shape and endows it with meaning. The reason for this complex pairing of the real and the unreal, which in Sartre's later ontology will emerge as a dualism of 'being' and 'nothingness', is best expounded by the author himself:

The imaginary appears on the foundation of the world, but reciprocally all apprehension of the real as world implies a hidden surpassing towards the imaginary. All imaginative consciousness uses the world as the negated foundation of the imaginary and reciprocally all consciousness of the world calls and motivates an imaginative consciousness as grasped from the particular meaning of the situation...So imagination, far from appearing as an actual characteristic of consciousness turns out to be an essential and transcendental condition of consciousness (14).

As we shall see in our next section, however, Sartre was neither unequivocal nor consistent on this point.

ii

In the second part of the postscript Sartre discusses the implications of this ontology of imagination for an ontology of art. His hypothesis is that the being of a work of art is a non-being; and his procedure is to demonstrate how this is so in such various arts as painting, music and literature.

If I apprehend a picture of Charles VIII I may, Sartre argues, choose to view him as a reality or as an image. As a reality, I merely 'perceive' an arrangement of different materials - canvas, oil, paint, frame, light, polish etc. - which may be destroyed with the strike of a match. As an image, however, Charles VIII cannot be destroyed; anymore
than 'David Copperfield' could be destroyed by tearing up a particular edition of a Dickens novel, or the 'Seventh Symphony' of Beethoven by planting a bomb in the orchestra pit. The aesthetic image which moves us and which we venture to praise or blame, be it picture, novel or symphony, is an unreality. It is somewhat unfortunate that Sartre did not opt for the Husserlian term 'fiction' in his discussion of art, as the term 'image' carries too many visual connotations. It is difficult, for example, not to feel awkward when referring to a piece of music as an 'image'.

The image of Charles VIII is the consummation of an intentional act of consciousness which aims to present the absent king through a material analogue. Aesthetic qualities do not exist in the painting itself, therefore, but rather in the way in which our intention is fulfilled by the image. We might say that a picture is dead until it is imagined, and that galleries with nobody in them are cemeteries. In this sense, Berkeley's 'esse est percipio' becomes Sartre's 'esse est imaginari'. Every time a spectator assumes an imaginative stance he casts a particular spell over the person or thing intended which renders it present in its absence. Sartre argues from this to the original but rather startling conclusion that the 'beautiful' does not refer to some actual thingness but to a magical property of no-thingness. 'What is beautiful', he says,

is something which cannot be experienced as a perception and which by its very nature is out of this world...The fact of the matter is that the painter did not realise his mental image at all: he has simply constructed a material analogue of such a kind that everyone can grasp the image provided he looks at the analogue. But the image thus provided with an external analogue remains an image (15).

Since it is impossible that the imaginary be made 'real', it is absurd to speak of 'beauty' as an objective or reified entity. Beauty, we might say, does not exist in 'beautiful' objects, but in a certain mode of intending objects 'beautifully'. Thus phenomenology injects new life into the jaded maxim that 'beauty is in the eye of the beholder'. It reveals that aesthetic appreciation is a particular way of intending an 'unreal' object; that it is not directed to the real canvas, but merely passes through it as a means towards the re-creation of an image. But this is only partially true. Sartre seems to ignore the fact that many art forms, particularly sculpture and abstract expressionist painting, rely on their material texture (rough, smooth, jagged, shiny, slippery etc.) for
their effect. Sartre's insight fits the art of acting better. The actor, he shows, does not really become Hamlet but serves as an analogue of gestures and actions by means of which the audience may resurrect the absent prince. To abet this resurrection the good actor will voluntarily assist in this transformation of himself into an 'unreal' Hamlet. He will subordinate his true self to the imaginary self of the emerging Hamlet.

'It is not', Sartre tells us, 'the character who becomes real in the actor, but the actor who becomes unreal in his character' (16).

His analysis also holds good for the art of music. If we consider the matter carefully, we discover that the symphony can be reduced neither to one or all of its performances, nor to its historical creation by Beethoven. It exists to be sure: but not here, not on the 'real' score sheets, nor issuing from the 'real' orchestra. It exists elsewhere, out of reach, beyond the real. The symphony, of course, needs the real in order to exist. It needs an actual 'performance' to serve as analogue to its imaginative re-creation. But the analogue only functions in so far as it is negated as a reality and becomes an unreality. Sartre insists at this point however, that he is not claiming that art exists in some celestial heaven or platonic other-world. To claim that a Beethoven symphony or the Prince of Denmark exist elsewhere, does not mean that they exist some where else. It simply means that they are other than every thing that exists here. We do not actually behold Prince Hamlet or the Seventh Symphony; we imaginatively behold them. It is precisely this shift from a perceptual to imaginative consciousness that determines the funda- mental, sui generis nature of art.

Sartre offers the interesting suggestion here that it is this mutual exclusiveness of the intentionalities which accounts for the peculiar discomfiture one experiences when leaving a theatre or concert hall. This experience is engendered not so much by the passing from one place to another one, i.e. from hall to street, but by the passing from one attitude to its opposite, i.e. from imagination to perception. 'Aesthetic contem- plation', Sartre states, 'is an induced dream and the passing into the real is an actual waking up' (17).

Sartre contends that this fact exposes the myopia of those who persist in confounding the aesthetic with the moral. Art can never be moral
for morality is only concerned with reality while art is, in its essence, a negation of reality. His analysis here sheds some new light on the 'disinterested' character of aesthetic experience so often spoken about by the German Idealists, Kant, Schiller and Schopenhauer. Beauty is always unreal and so can never be used or possessed by an 'interested' or 'realistic' attitude:

It is untouchable, it is beyond our reach; hence arises a sort of sad disinterest in it. It is in this sense that we may say that great beauty in a woman kills the desire for her. In fact we cannot at the same time place ourselves on the plane of the aesthetic when this unreal 'herself' which we admire appears and on the realistic plane of physical possession. To desire her we must forget she is beautiful, because desire is a plunge into the heart of existence, into what is most contingent and most absurd (18).

In The Psychology of Imagination Sartre avails of the phenomenological method and insights of Husserl, in order to explore the whole complex of psychological, and more importantly, ontological workings of imagination. It is clear that his revolutionary discovery of the 'negating' power of imaginative consciousness would not have been possible without the methodical guidelines of a phenomenology which prescribed 1) a suspension of all naturalistic and traditional prejudice, 2) a reduction to the intentional activities of transcendental consciousness, and 3) a consequent reflection, intuition and description of its essence (19). By thus revealing the 'essence' of imagination to be a unique mode of intentionality, Sartre was able to both confirm and complete Husserl's rejection of the Hellenic fallacy. Going beyond Husserl he was able to show how each man uses his intentional powers of imagination to magically transform and negate the world around him. Sartre de-mystified art by demonstrating that it is not the prerogative of the professional but the preoccupation of every living individual. In this sense, he came far closer to Shakespeare's notion that 'the poet, the lover and the madman are of imagination all compact' than to Wordsworth's view that the 'imagination is reason in her most exalted mood'.

But if there are many things to applaud in Sartre's phenomenology of imagination, there are also things to criticise. Perhaps the most obvious objection to Sartre's theory is his tendency to treat imagination
in a 'pathological' light. This is explicit in his treatment of the 'abnormal' expressions of imagination, i.e. hallucination, schizophrenia, neurasthenia etc.; but is merely implicit and diplomatically understated in his treatment of such 'normal' forms of imagination as dreaming, infatuation, fascination or aesthetic appreciation. We find here the germs of the Sartrian doctrine that man is an 'absurd', 'useless' and 'nauseated' creature. Since Sartre's overall analysis in *The Psychology of Imagination* seems to imply that every attempt to evade or negate reality is in some sense a symptom of pathological self-deception, the 'unreality' of the imagination cannot be construed as anything other than an infirmity of man (20). Furthermore, since Sartre insists that the very constitution of our world is ultimately based on such a negating and unrealizing power, he has no option but to conclude that all men are pathological by nature, crippled by their own nothingness. Imagination emerges in the final analysis as an illness man cannot afford to do without (21).

Another major objection to Sartre's concept of imagination concerns his dualism between the real world of moral and political practice, and the unreal world of reverie and art. 'The real is never beautiful' Sartre asserts in *The Psychology of Imagination*, 'beauty is a value which can only apply to the imaginary and whose essential structure involves the nullification (neantisation) of the world'. And that is why, he concludes, 'it is foolish to confuse ethics and aesthetics' (22). By defining their relation as one of antithetical non-relation, Sartre is in effect denying that art can ever be practical or that praxis can ever be artistic. Not only is this view incompatible with many of his later aesthetic theories, it is also, based on a non-dialectical conception of the nature of art (23). As I will argue in the final part of this thesis a phenomenological concept of imagination can only be fully understood and developed within terms of a dialectic. Even if one gives credence to Sartre's view that the aesthetic and the real can never function in the same mode of intentionality at the same time, it does not thereby follow that we are obliged to deny any relationship between them. Precisely as alternative and alternating orientations of consciousness, art and politics may fruitfully interact; for without fact, fiction is irrelevant and without fiction, fact is blind. Sartre could not concede this simple truth because he lacked and still lacks to this day, an adequate ontology of synthesis (24). Although he berates the dualism of
traditional philosophies of imagination, he himself enunciates an equally uncompromising antithesis between the real and the imaginary.

A third objection has been that Sartre's excessive emphasis on the negating aspect of the imagination ignores the intimate rapport between the image and other activities of consciousness such as cognition, perception and visualization. Sometimes this criticism stems from the belief that the image is merely a modified form of one of these activities. Its principal exponents come, broadly speaking, from the British analytic school of philosophy and include I.A. Bunting, Gilbert Ryle, Kathryn Morgan, A.G. Pleydell-Pearce, H.E. Hetherick and Douglas Rabb (25).

These critics argue that Sartre's definition of imagining as a sui generis act of negation is a partial one and prevents him from recognizing the logical distinctions between various grammatical constructions in which 'imagine' and its cognates can occur. If one were to remain true to his definition for instance, one would have to deny the obvious differences between such statements as 'I imagine my brother', 'I conjure up an image of a centaur', 'I am imagining that I am in Spain' or 'I only imagined that the shadow was a monster' etc. The source of Sartre's error, according to these critics, lies in his refusal to acknowledge that the imaginative acts of seeing an analogue as something else, are merely modifications of (perceptual) seeing in general.

In an article entitled 'Sartre on Imagination' I.A. Bunting attempts to refute Sartre's view that imagination and perception are mutually exclusive. Bunting aims to show that our ordinary language usage belies such a dichotomy. He argues that if while looking at a coloured canvas I say 'I can see Peter', this implies that I have scored some 'special perceptual success' connected with an ambiguity in the painted canvas. Although my statement must be about the painted canvas, it need not imply that the real Peter is present, but rather that Peter can be seen in or by means of the canvas. That is to say, if I take this area of paint to be Peter's hair, this to be his distinctive nose, this to be his eyes and this to be his chin, etc., I will see that the configuration of all the colours and curves looks like a full face of Peter. Briefly stated, Bunting is arguing 1) that the statement 'I can see Peter' implies that the shape and pattern of the colours on the canvas, must really look like the shape of Peter's face seen from a particular angle, and 2) that the
'special perceptual success' the statement claims, is precisely that of recognizing the perceptual ambiguity of the paint-on-canvas: that of utilizing perceptual knowledge of both the looks-on-canvas and the looks on Peter's face in discriminating parts of the surface of the paint-on-canvas from other parts. The equivalence of the statements 'I can see Peter' and 'I imagine Peter' to describe the experience of beholding an aesthetic object clearly indicates, Bunting says, that imagination is merely 'unusual' perception. Bunting concludes that the unusual nature of such perception is to be explained by my utilizing a prior knowledge of the looks of the real Peter to discriminate objects which are not, the real Peter. In other words, to say I imagine Peter is equivalent to saying that I see something as both a configuration of colours on canvas (which it is) and as something which looks like Peter (which it is not). It is not equivalent to saying that I see nothing as Sartre maintained. By extension, since our seeing what a painting 'represents' is always a seeing of the paint-on-canvas, it follows for Bunting, that the aesthetic object per se is not some unreality as Sartre maintained, but the painting-on-canvas itself (26).

Whatever about the merits of this linguistic analysis, Bunting's disagreement with Sartre's theory of imagination lies ultimately in his rejection of Sartre's phenomenological standpoint, that is, in his implicit refusal to acknowledge the intentionality of imagination. Bunting's refusal derives largely from Ryle's analysis of imagining as a 'seeing as' in The Concept of Mind, and its validity depends accordingly on the validity of this latter. Indeed Ryle's analysis seems to be the source of almost all the analytical criticism of Sartre (27).

Briefly stated, Ryle's analysis of imagination as a 'seeing as' stands in direct opposition to Sartre's description of imagining as an intentional and sui generis act of consciousness. The point of contention is ultimately the choice of method: Ryle's linguistic behaviorism versus Sartre's phenomenology. This difference becomes particularly clear if we compare Ryle's definition of imagining as a 'seeming to perceive' with Sartre's account of 'quasi-observation'. Although Ryle agrees with Sartre that the traditional doctrine of immanence lacked a valid criterion for distinguishing between percepts and images of equal intensity, and failed to appreciate the cognitive status of images (28),
he disagreed about how one should remedy these shortcomings. Thus, while Sartre's phenomenological method described the image as a sui generis intentional synthesis, of which cognition is but one element, Ryle's linguistic method lead him to classify imagination as a subsection of the general cognitive category 'seeming to perceive' (29). Sartre sought to account for the phenomenon of 'quasi-observation' in terms of a complex theory of intentional-analogical synthesis. But his talk of analogues providing the imagined object with a 'localized' and 'differentiated' presence (30), seems to contradict his initial description of the image as non-spatial and undivinduated, and leads into all sorts of paradoxes about absence in presence and presence in absence etc. (31). One could perhaps defend Sartre here by declaring that he means 'localization' to refer not so much to the imaginary object itself, as the analogue by means of which this object is presented (32). It is probably more honest to admit, however, that the price Sartre pays for methodical superiority on the level of depth and complexity is an inferiority to Ryle's method on the level of logical clarity and consistency.

Because Ryle lacks any phenomenological appreciation of the synthetic and intentional make-up of the image, his analysis lapses into reductionism. The limited nature of his method tends to reduce the image to a mere manipulandum of the mind, 'one among many ways of utilizing knowledge' (33). In other words, rather than recognizing with Sartre that cognition is but one element of imagination, Ryle's linguistic investigations lead him to declare imagination to be but one component of cognition. Ryle elevates the image from its immanentist role as a second-hand copy of perceptual reality, to the role of a second-hand copy of cognitive reality; but he still regards it as 'second hand' rather than as something existing in its own right. Fraser Cowley's critique of the methods used by Ryle and Sartre in their study of imagining, is of direct relevance here (34). Cowley goes to great lengths to demonstrate the superiority of the phenomenological approach of description and reflection vis-à-vis the analytical preoccupation with logical grammar. The mistakenness of the latter is obvious, he says, in Ryle's total failure to relate affectivity and imagination or to recognize the central role which experience must play in philosophy. His objections to Ryle's account of an 'imagined' shriek capture the overall thrust of his critique:
"Ryle has missed an essential point about the ear-splitting shriek. It is that if one imagined an ear-splitting shriek, it is an ear-splitting shriek that one is imagin- ing. To say an imagined shriek is not ear-splitting is entirely misleading. The point is simply that one is not hearing it, not that it is not ear-splitting, nor that it is not a shriek. We will never get this kind of point through the study of logical grammar - one has to imagine ear-splitting shrieks...(Ryle) did not think that the analysis of actual experience was his, or perhaps any philosopher's business. But he cannot ultimately avoid appealing to experience, which is to appeal to reflective consciousness, and giving reflective descriptions' (35).

A third British analytic philosopher Douglas Rabb, goes beyond Bunting and Ryle in that he challenges Sartre on his own ground (36). Rabb argues that even if one admits Sartre's phenomenological premiss that images are intentional, one can still show that his conclusions contradict essential linguistic distinctions. The most important of these are: 1) the distinction between imaging (visualization or thinking in images) and imagining (imageless thought or imagining that or how something is the case without visualizing it); 2) the distinction between the image as referential and the image as appositional.

Concerning the first, Rabb argues that the only way to adequately distinguish between a phenomenological description of an imaging of something and an imagining of something, would appear to be a positing of the former as an image in the mind, and the latter as not being in the mind. But, as Rabb points out, this is to lapse into the illusion of immanence which phenomenology is desperately seeking to avoid.

Concerning the second, Rabb says that a linguistic analysis of the common usage of expressions like 'the imagining of x' reveals two quite different senses which are confused by Sartre. The former he calls the 'referential' sense. This, the most common usage and the only one Sartre allows, refers us always to the object imaginatively intended. Here the meaning of the variable x may be anything from 'Peter in Paris' to a 'dragon in hell'. The second sense of 'of' in expressions like the 'imagining of x' is one which leads onto a phrase which serves to explain or elucidate the process of activity indicated by the verb it follows, in this case, 'imagining'. For instance, in the phrase 'the imagining of art' the term 'art' is an appositional or coanimate accusative, more descriptive of the precise type of imagining ('artistic') than indicative.
of any object imagined. The appositional 'of' is concerned with the manner in which the imagining occurs, rather than the matter it refers to.

By means of this secondary distinction between appositional and referential types of usage, the primary distinction between imaging and imagining may be made without lapsing into the illusion of immanence. Only in terms of such linguistic categories, Rabb concludes, can one differentiate between an 'image of something' and a 'consciousness of an image', for we may now determine that in the latter instance 'of' is used in its appositional sense, i.e. to tell us what kind of consciousness we are concerned with (imaging, imagining, etc.), rather than what precise object it is conscious of (Peter, a dragon, etc.) (37).

All the proponents of this third critique belong either directly or indirectly to the analytic school of philosophy. For this reason many of the objections tend to be merely comparative and second-hand in nature, and fastidiously detailed in execution. These considerations do not detract however, from the positive contribution which such criticism can make to a phenomenology of imagination. This is particularly true of critics like Rabb who accepting Sartre's premisses argue for a revision and refinement of his conclusions.

There is a fourth corpus of critique which, by contrast, stems from within the phenomenological school. This comprises primarily a discussion of the anomalies, inconsistencies and contradictions inherent in Sartre's own phenomenological treatment of imagination.

The most striking contradiction in Sartre's treatment is the whole question of the mental image, briefly touched on earlier. Outlining three attempts to recall Peter's face 1) by means of a photograph, 2) by means of a caricature, and 3) by means of a mental image, Sartre concludes that 'the three cases are strictly parallel' in that in each case, 'the act of imagining aims at an absent object in its corporeality through a content which is given not for its own sake, but only as an analogical representation of the object aimed at' (38). This is equivalent to saying that it matters not at all whether the analogue is physical (a photograph or caricature) or merely internal to the psyche. In the latter case, we saw that the analogue comprises some sort of affective-kinaesthetic synthesis which exists only to carry the intention and
disintegrates as soon as it withdraws. We also saw that this whole question leads towards contradiction. We shall now examine the precise nature of this contradiction.

If Sartre is correct in his equation of physical and psychical images, then it follows that the latter must exist as some sort of analogical contents in the mind, just as photographs and caricatures exist in the real world. As Mary Warnock puts it: 'The ghost is back in the machine' (39).

One possible defence here might be to state that the mental analogue for Sartre is both similar and dissimilar to the external analogue: similar in that it constitutes an image of consciousness, and dissimilar in that it does so not as a thing in the real world, but as a no-thing, created psychically for the sole purpose of carrying an intention towards a transcendent object. But this brings us to the complex problem of exactly what Sartre means by 'nothing'. We shall return to this presently.

Another possible defence would be to emphasize Sartre's suggestion that the psychic no less than the physical analogue is transcendent of consciousness. In this way one could explain how the former can be a material content like the latter, and still obviate the charge of immanence. But this solution only leads us deeper into contradiction. On closer scrutiny, we are compelled to recognize that Sartre's argument for the transcendence of the mental analogue is a logical expediency of his initial description of the image as intentional, rather than the result of any description of the analogue itself. In other words, the mental analogue must be transcendent, for the simple reason that if it were not it would contradict Sartre's theory of intentionality, by introducing a material content into consciousness. The argument for transcendence is, in brief, the result of logical deduction, rather than phenomenological description (40).

To understand what Sartre means when he declares that the mental analogue is both internal and transcendent, we must look back to his division between the ego and consciousness in 'le Transcendence de l'Ego'. Viewing the problem in this perspective, we would say that the mental analogue is immanent in the ego, but transcendent of consciousness. In
order to establish the intentionality of consciousness, Sartre felt
obliged to expel all material and substantial things from consciousness
and to rehabilitate them in some 'ego' transcendent of consciousness. This
cleavage of the mind into immanent consciousness and transcendent non-
consciousness or 'ego', is presupposed by Sartre's whole treatment of the
mental image. But however much this cleavage may resolve the paradox of
immanence and transcendence it is not itself a satisfactory theory. In
his eagerness to dispel the traditional illusion of 'the ghost in the
machine', Sartre seems to have merely replaced the internal dualism of mind
with an external dualism of consciousness and ego. Instead of being
defined as a ghost in the machine, the mind would now have to be defined
as a ghost and a machine: the dualism remains, but now in the guise of
antithesis rather than immanence (41).

The problematic nature of the mental image is, of course,
compounded by admission that it cannot be phenomenologically described.
This is so, he says, because even though the analogue is transcendent, it
disappears as soon as the imagining intention itself does (42). Sartre
is forced to concede that one is ultimately 'reduced to conjectures'. For
someone who chose the phenomenological method precisely because of the
'certainty' which it afforded this is a grievous confession. But more
damning is the suspicion that this same 'uncertainty' applies to the
description of every intentional act, imaginative or otherwise. For if
every time we attempt a phenomenological reflection of a non-reflective
intention we inevitably 'reduce' this original intention to the purely
immanent life of consciousness, we can never be 'certain' that what we are
describing is the essence of this act or not (43).

Related to this is Sartre's frequent confounding of the mental
image per se with the intention and the analogue which go to make it up (44).
This confusion stems primarily from Sartre's allegiance to two opposed
but equally fundamental premises of his phenomenology. On the one hand,
the image must be an analogue transcendent of consciousness in order to
fulfil its intentional nature as a 'consciousness of something'. On the
other, the image must be a relation between consciousness and a transcendent
object (not to be confused with the transcendent analogue which merely
deputizes for it), in order to fulfil its nature as a 'consciousness of
something'. This role of the image as a double agent lies at the heart of
the whole contradiction. Looked at from one side, the mental image is an
intentional relation between consciousness and the object of which it is conscious, and cannot be described independently of this object. Looked at from the other, the image is considered to be an analogue as independent of its object as the photograph and picture are independent of the person whom they portray. Looked at from both sides, however, the mental image simply contradicts itself.

This consideration leads us right to the kernal of Sartre's dilemma - the question of the 'nothingness' of the image. The essential paradox of the image is that it both is and is not that which it intends (44). The image of Peter, for example, is recognized as not-being Peter even though it in some sense presents Peter to us. In order to be able to imagine Peter I must be able to negate both Peter as he really is and the world in which he really is; and this double negation leads to the presentation of an unreal Peter in an unreal world. So far so clear. But then Sartre moves from this notion of negation, to a complex notion of nothingness borrowed largely from Hegel and Heidegger, and plunges into a quagmire of confusion (45).

What this transition means, in effect, is that imaginative consciousness must now be understood not only as intending an object which is not in the world, but as intending an object which does not exist at all, which is 'nothingness'. As Sartre puts it:

If I imagine Peter as he might be at that moment in Berlin...I grasp nothing, that is, I posit nothingness' (46).

But even though the essential structure which consciousness must possess in order to be able to imagine, is the ability to posit nothingness, because the imagination is 'intentional' it must also be a positing of an object other than itself. And since consciousness is itself nothingness, that of which it is conscious cannot also be nothing, but must be something. Sartre is thus led to the conclusion that imagination is the consciousness of a nothing which is something. He says so much himself, though he does not advert to the paradox which it constitutes:

It is of the very nature of consciousness to be intentional; and a consciousness that ceased to be a consciousness of something would ipso facto cease to exist. But imagination must be able to form and posit objects which possess a certain trait of nothingness in relation to the whole of reality (47).
If Sartre means the 'object' here to refer to the image as intentional-analogue, he is clearly mistaken, for far from being a 'nothing', it must always serve as a material 'something' transcendent of consciousness. Alternatively, if he means it to refer to the object aimed at by means of the intentional-analogue, Peter for example, he is equally mistaken, for Peter in this sense is a real person existing in the real world (48). In order therefore, that the object be a nothingness, Sartre must posit a third modality of 'objectivity', independent of both the object as analogue (the portrait of Peter) and the object as real (Peter himself). But Sartre never explicitly made this distinction and so his whole treatment of the nothingness of the image remains profoundly confused.

This third object, what might best be called the 'imaginary' object, is to be understood as the 'absent' object Peter, precisely as presented to the imaginer by means of the 'analogue' object or portrait (49). All three are objects in the sense that they are transcendent of consciousness, but only the third can be properly understood as a transcendent 'nothingness'. The imaginary object will always be a nothingness regardless of whether the 'absent' object is in itself real like Peter, or unreal like the centaur (50). But nothingness here must be understood in a very special sense however; in a sense, I would suggest, very similar to Husserl's notion of pure and teleological possibility (51). Only in this way, can we hope to understand how the image can be both something of which consciousness is an intention, and yet nothing existing in either consciousness or reality.

Although Sartre does not refer to Husserl's notion of the image as possibility or distinguish between the three senses of an object of imagination, he does occasionally hint in this direction. A case in point is the following passage where he admits that the image cannot be fully explained in terms of its common 'intention-analogue-intended' synthesis, but points instead towards some imaginary telos beyond these given:

An image, (like all psychic syntheses) is more than the sum of its elements. What counts here is the new meaning which penetrates the whole. I want to be with Pierre...my whole consciousness is directed towards him, it is fascinated in some way. And this spontaneity, this intention towards Pierre, causes to flash forth this new phenomenon, which is comparable to nothing else, the consciousness of an image (52).

In another passage in the conclusion to Psychology of Imagination Sartre
makes this point even more forcefully. This time indeed the telos of imaginative consciousness is recognized as being an inseparable part of all acts of consciousness:

If it were possible to conceive for a moment a consciousness which does not imagine, it would have to be conceived as completely engulfed in the existent and without the possibility of grasping anything but the existent. But it is exactly that which cannot be: all existence, as soon as it is posited, is surpassed by itself. But it must retreat towards something; and the imaginary is in every case the something towards which the existent is surpassed (53).

The terminology used in both these passages - 'the meaning which penetrates the whole' and is 'more than the sum of its elements', which 'fascinates' consciousness and causes images to 'flash forth', the imaginary as 'something concrete towards which' reality is transcended etc., - seems to suggest that the imaginary is somehow more than the imagining. This is of course contrary to Sartre's initial description of the image as an empty nothingness of consciousness constituting an 'essential poverty' and thus unable to teach us anything that we do not already know (54). While contradicting his earlier position however, this picture of the imaginary as a concrete telos towards which reality is surpassed, would seem to be borne out by our experience of being able to learn new truths by means of imagining. It is, for example, only by means of imagining models that scientists discover new things about the world and artists discover new things about human nature (55). Husserl as we saw, was well aware of this. More important, however, the teleological characterization of the imaginary, alone explains how it can be a nothing-something different from both reality (pure thingness) and consciousness (pure nothingness).

Unfortunately, Sartre's dualist framework of reality and consciousness prevented him from espousing such a teleological notion of imagination; even though his own reasoning and terminology frequently pointed towards it. The only solution lies in a movement beyond dualism to a dialectic which would be able to acknowledge and incorporate this third teleological category of imagination. But this is the concern of our final chapters. In conclusion to our present chapter we shall consider the implications of such a telos for Sartre's notion of imagination as freedom.
Sartre's most succinct formulation of the relationship between freedom and imagination comes in his conclusion to The Psychology of Imagination:

We may conclude that imagination is not an empirical and superadded power of consciousness; it is the whole of consciousness as it realizes its freedom. Every concrete, real situation of consciousness in the world is big with imagination in so far as it always presents itself as a withdrawing from the real (56). Although there is some confusion in Sartre's mind as to whether man is free because he imagines or imagines because he is free, the important point is that consciousness is freedom in so far as it is always transcending the real towards the imaginary. 'There could be no developing consciousness without an imaginative consciousness', Sartre says, since 'that which is denied must be imagined' (57). Thus understood, the imaginary serves as a sort of telos towards which consciousness strives in its perpetual negation of the real.

The nearest Sartre comes to an acknowledgement of this telos is in his allusions to the 'meaning' and value of imagination (58). Stating that all imaginative consciousness uses the world as the negated foundation of the imaginary, Sartre adds that 'reciprocally', all consciousness of the world calls and motivates an imaginative consciousness as grasped from the particular meaning of the situation' (59). This notion of meaning (sens) or value (valeur), appearing in the conclusion of The Psychology of Imagination for the first time, is to play a central role in Sartre's whole theory of possibility-projection in Being and Nothingness. Although Sartre never alludes to the link himself, it is in this discussion of imaginative freedom and value that one discovers the most fundamental line of continuity between the two works.

Although all our acts are freely motivated in some way rather than determined, Sartre seems to suggest that we only truly become free when we lucidly and reflectively assume this freedom. We do this, he says, by discovering that the power to imagine is our 'essential and transcendent-al condition of consciousness' (60). Only by such a discovery can we grasp the 'meaning' of the situation which is the telos motivating our surpassing of the real in the first place:

When the imaginary is not posited as a fact, the surpassing and the nullifying of the existent are swallowed up in the existent; the surpassing and
the freedom are there but are not revealed; the person is crushed in the world, run through by the real, he is closest to the thing. However, as soon as he apprehends in one way or another the whole as a situation, he retreats from it towards that in relation to which he is a lack. (61).

Sartre seems to be suggesting here that as soon as we discover ourselves as 'lack' we discover that we are lack only in relation to a telos which we are not. It is precisely this teleological image of fulness which serves as the 'concrete' motivation of the imaginative structure of consciousness' (62). Our imagining therefore is not generally an arbitrary expression of freedom. It is not just an empty nothingness, as Sartre 'officially' maintains, but a nothingness teleologically directed toward some ideal 'value', which Sartre 'unofficially' concedes, 'represents at each moment the implicit meaning of the real' (63).

This view is also intimated in Sartre's treatment of the work of art. Sartre argues that the Seventh Symphony of Beethoven is a 'nothingness' in the sense that it cannot be reduced to the real sounds which a real orchestra plays from a real score sheet. These realities merely comprise the analogue of the symphony, but the symphony itself is not subject to the laws of empirico-metric reality. It is a 'nothing' which can only be imagined. It seems quite obvious that Sartre employs the term 'nothingness' here to denote neither arbitrariness nor emptiness, but some teleological 'meaning' beyond both reality and consciousness. This nothingness could not, of course, exist without consciousness and reality, that is without the imaginative negation of the latter by the former. But such negation is merely the prerequisite. It accounts for the non-existence of the world, but not for the existence of the imaginary. The image of the symphony itself seems to require some form of positive existence also, some particular telos of which it serves as the incarnation (64).

Only such a teleological reading can resolve the contradiction between the imagination's claims to both freedom and fascination. If, according to Sartre, the imagination can become 'fascinated' by the images which it intends, and if it is true that imagination is a sui generis mode of consciousness which relates to nothing other than itself, then how is one free to break this fascination. In other words, even if it were possible to be fascinated by pure nothingness - a highly dubious supposition in itself - how could it then be possible to ever negate this nothingness?
since negation must always be negation of something. Taking the example of someone fascinated by an impersonator, it seems possible to explain his freedom to switch his mode of intention so that he may 'perceive' the real person behind the imaginary one, as long as one holds that imagination can have recourse to nothing outside of itself. But experience tells us that we are in fact free to switch our intention in this way. When watching Cordelia die on stage, or Scarlet O'Hara die on screen, for instance, we can always take solace in the reminder that such suffering is only imaginary and that as real people they are not suffering at all. Indeed, the whole principle of tragic 'catharsis' by pity and fear, presupposes this ability to move freely between imaginative identification (pity) and perceptual distance (fear). Brecht was to make great use of this factor in his theatre of 'alienation'. On a more everyday level, we might point to how an adolescent 'fascinated' by the image of a star, breaks the spell as soon as he realizes that she is not a goddess at all, but merely an ordinary human being.

Sartre's dualist theory of the image cannot account for this phenomenon of freedom, however, for by refusing to acknowledge that the image exists in a manner different from both consciousness and reality, he excluded any possibility of explaining how one can mediate between them. In short, only if the image is beyond not only the reality which it negates but the imaginative consciousness which intends it, can one account for the fact that one is free and fascinated at the same time. That is, be aware that the image is not real and yet behave as if it were. If Sartre wishes to be consistent with his initial description of the image as an empty consciousness, then he has no choice but to be inconsistent with his later definition of imagination as an agent of freedom. If the image is a nothingness with no existence other than the consciousness which intends it, then one is simply not free not to be fascinated (65).

I have spoken of 'existence' of nothingness several times, and it seems impossible not to do so, if we take Sartre's claims for the image seriously. If 'beauty' for instance, is an epithet which can only be attributed to nothingness, then clearly nothingness is not the mere 'lack' or 'negation' of reality which Sartre originally described it as, but some sort of 'telos' towards which each thing transcends reality. This imaginary telos is obviously not something which can exist actually.
But is is equally not something which cannot exist at all. Something like a solution seems to be contained in Husserl's notion of the image as possibility. Following this lead, we would say that the imaginary telos exists neither actually, nor not at all, but potentially.

As 'possibility' the image is sufficiently absent not to be confused with reality, and sufficiently present to function as a telos which in some way motivates the imaginer's transcending of the real. At times, Sartre seems very close to acknowledging the existence of a telos in the light of which every imaginative act negates reality; as for instance, when he concedes that 'it must retreat towards 'something''(66). But he refuses to grant this 'something' any ontological status. This refusal can only be understood in terms of Sartre's fetish for freedom.

Sartre peremptorily excludes any consideration which might threaten the Reign of Freedom. Accordingly, he will only allow of a two-tiered model of being, the first called freedom, the second called non-freedom or facticity. The former presents the power of imaginative consciousness to negate reality, and is synonymous with nothing: in Being and Nothingness it goes under the name 'pour-soi'. The latter represents that which is negated by consciousness, that is, reality or what in Being and Nothingness he calls the 'en-soi'. Sartre could not admit of the existence of any third tier in this model, for the simple reason that he could not tolerate the possibility of freedom being sponsored by any agency other than itself. There is either freedom or non-freedom. There is nothing between or beyond. But because of his fierce defence of the virtue of freedom, Sartre fell into the vice of dualism (67).

In a world where everything is either pour-soi or en-soi, anything suggestive of synthesis is rejected as 'absurd'. Although Sartre frequently characterizes the imagination as that which enables us to apprehend things as pointing to a meaning beyond themselves, he ignores the teleological implications of this view. But the fact remains that the 'meaning' of things can only be imagined, not perceived. Indeed, it is highly significant that Sartre's own philosophical procedure, especially in Being and Nothingness, is based on just this use of imagination. Objects and events are phenomenologically described and intuited by Sartre, not simply for their own sake, but in so far as they embody a significance beyond themselves. For instance, Sartre's description of a
waiter’s project to unite his 'pour-soi' and his 'en-soi', presupposes the use of the imagination to intuit this 'meaning' in all of his gestures. As perceived, they are no more than gestures. Similarly Sartre suggests that our likes and dislikes are symbolic of a whole way of being in the world. If, for example, we are drawn to skiing or repelled by viscous substance, it is in order to symbolically exhibit our power to transcend the intransigence and overwhelmingness of matter. Sartre develops a whole inventory of such ontological behaviour, under the heading 'existential psychoanalysis' (68). In short, Sartre seems to employ imagination as a method for intuiting the imaginary symbol which surreptitiously structures our actions and constitutes the 'meaning' of our intentions.

Such 'meaning' is best understood as the imaginary 'possibility' of things. If Sartre is correct in Being and Nothingness when he rejects the traditional notion of possibility as something existing in things, he is mistaken in regarding it as a mere projection of consciousness. Imaginary 'possibility' must be ontological, in a sense different from both the being of reality and the non-being of consciousness. It must be ontological in order to be that of which the imaginative intention is conscious; it must be different from reality in that reality is precisely that which is negated by it; and it must be different from consciousness in that consciousness is always conscious of the image as something different from itself. If the traditional error was, according to Sartre, to regard possibility as determined by the same being as actuality (i.e., ens in potentia and ens in actu both being determinations of Ens) (69), then his own error is to consider possibility the mere creation of an empty choosing consciousness. Sartre would not admit of possibility as a third ontological category between the extremes of consciousness and reality, for its dialectical implications seemed to jeopardise the unconditional sovereignty of freedom. Accordingly, in Being and Nothingness he dismisses the possibility of a dialectical synthesis between the en-soi and the pour-soi as 'absurd', even though he identifies this as the Supreme Value toward which all things are teleologically directed. Freedom best dialectic, but only at the price of 'absurdity'. It is a pyrrhic victory.
In this chapter I shall discuss the fundamental impact and influence which Sartre's notion of the imagination as source of value had on his entire existentialist philosophy. I shall treat of this influence in terms of the following three areas 1) Ontology 2) Aesthetics 3) Political philosophy. The question of value, which arises in the Psychology of Imagination for the first time, is one of the most central concerns of Sartre's ontology. While going under the name of 'Beauty' in The Psychology of Imagination (1940) it is re-christened the 'pour-soi-en-soi' synthesis in Being and Nothingness (1943). It is important to note that, because of the highly original and specialized nature of Sartre's terminology in this later work, imagination itself travels incognito in the guise of such less ambiguous terms as 'play', 'bad faith' or simply 'negation'. In Being and Nothingness, significantly subtitled 'An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology', Sartre provides three particular analyses of man's quest for value which I believe to be directly related to his phenomenology of imagination. These are a) bad faith, b) possibility, c) existential psychoanalysis, and shall be dealt with respectively in the first section of this chapter.

As we move from his ontology to his literary writing we find Sartre referring to value straightforwardly as 'Being', and contrasting it with the absurd contingency of man's 'existence' (1). This nomenclature is witnessed most clearly in his novels and plays, though also operative throughout his considerable corpus of aesthetic criticism. A detailed study of the relationship between value ('Béling') and imagination in this quarter shall comprise the second section of this chapter.

Lastly, in his more recent writings on politics and society Sartre tends to designate Value as 'the Concrete Universal', and an analysis of the fundamental though largely implicit role which imagination plays here will make up the third section of this inquiry.

The important point is, however, that regardless of whether Value is named 'Beauty', 'pour-soi-en-soi', 'Being' or 'Concrete Universal', it always refers to that ideal and absolute synthesis which eye has not seen nor ear heard, but only imagination imagined.
CHAPTER SIX: CONSEQUENCE OF SARTRE'S THEORY OF IMAGINATION
THE EMPTY ABSOLUTE.
And it is precisely because it is imagined, and only imagined, that it constitutes in all cases an 'empty absolute'.

1. IMAGINATION AND ONTOLOGY

In The Psychology of Imagination Sartre arrived at the paradoxical conclusion that imagination is the source of both man's freedom and his slavery. On the one hand, it was seen to liberate man from the binding determinations and constraints of his world by enabling him to negate and surpass them. On the other hand, it was shown to be conducive to self-enslavement in so far as it becomes fascinated by its own images and so reverts to an inertia of solipsistic consciousness. In the first instance, it is free because it is the negation of reality. In the second, it is incarcerated in this very nothingness precisely because it has no outlet or recourse to reality. The same activity of 'negation' is operative in both cases and fits imagination with this Janus-face. What is more, this nihilating function of imagination is also identified by Sartre as the 'essential characteristic' of all consciousness. In Being and Nothingness Sartre develops some of the ontological implications of this paradox (1a).

a) Bad Faith. Because of Sartre's conclusion in The Psychology of Imagination that to be is to imagine, it follows logically that his ontological definition of man in Being and Nothingness should be as a 'being the nature of which is to be consciousness of the nothingness of its being' (2); that is, a being perpetually out of joint with himself, at once himself and beyond himself. More exactly, because man is a consciousness the 'essential characteristic' of which is to negate being, it is entirely consistent that he be ontologically classified as the 'being such that in its being, his being is in question in so far as this being implies a being other than itself' (3). Although Sartre is surprisingly slow to establish the continuity between the two works, the central role played by imagination in man's being-in-the-world becomes obvious in his treatment of 'bad faith'.

In so far as man is fundamentally a being who negates, he is what he is not and is not what he is. Suspended thus between being and nothingness, he strives perpetually for a reconciliation
of these two opposing ontological conditions called by Sartre en-soi and pour-soi respectively. Above all else man wishes to be identical with himself (4). This identification of free transcendence (pour-soi) and brute facticity (en-soi) is what Sartre terms the ideal of 'sincerity' (5). Sincerity is the supreme value of man. But for all its supremacy it is an impossible value, for to be 'sincere' is to be what one is and that for Sartre is a contradiction in terms. In Being and Nothingness Sartre sets out to demonstrate by a series of vivid phenomenological descriptions, that to be 'sincere' is to be in 'bad faith'. 'Bad faith' being understood, in short, as the condition man is in when he imagines the impossible to be possible.

To illustrate what precisely Sartre means by 'bad faith', let us examine his example of the waiter in the cafe. Sartre offers us a detailed phenomenological description of a man who 'plays at' being a waiter. The waiter exaggerates what he considers to be the typical gestures and actions of a waiter - brisk movements, eagerness, affability, dare-devil balancing of tray etc. - in order to make himself identical with this role. But having to make himself identical with it precludes the possibility of ever being it. The waiter's playing at being a waiter is merely an 'image' to convince others and himself. But precisely in so far as it is an image rather than a reality, it testifies to the fact that he is not at one with the role; that he is always in some sense separate or absent from what he is. The waiter emphasizes his role in order to expel any absence from the presence of 'waiterness'. But it is just this special emphasis which defines him as absent. The waiter cannot ultimately escape the fact that he fails to coincide with his 'being a waiter' on every side, and that he is always beyond his own condition. In brief, that he is only a waiter in the mode of being what he is not. Sartre accounts for the waiter's performance in the following fashion:

In vain do I fulfil the function of a cafe waiter. I can only be he in the neutralized mode, as the actor is Hamlet, by mechanically making the typical gestures of my state and by aiming at myself as an imaginary cafe waiter through these gestures taken as an 'analogue... I can not be he. I can only play at being him; that is, imagine to myself that I am he (6).
The waiter wishes to be the ideal image of what a waiter is. But since he can only be a waiter in imagination he can be it only in the mode of not being it. The waiter is really never more than an analogue for an unreality which he is not. And in so far as he imagines himself as a 'meaning' and 'value' which he is not, he is damned to his own nothingness. This same argument is used by Sartre to define our emotions also. To be sad is, Sartre argues, first 'to make oneself sad'. But if I have to make myself sad it is, in fact, because I am not sad. 'The being of sadness', he concludes, 'escapes me by and in the very act by which I affect myself with it. The being-in-itself of sadness perpetually haunts my consciousness of being sad, but it is as a value which I cannot realize; it stands as a regulative meaning of my sadness, not as its constitutive modality' (7).

We have discussed examples of man being in 'bad faith' to the extent that he plays at being what he is not (a waiter, sad etc.). But man may also be in 'bad faith' by playing at not-being what he is. Here Sartre gives us the example of the homosexual who recognizes his deviant inclinations but refuses to consider himself 'a pederast'. Sartre says that this duplicity is in 'bad faith', but reminds us that its alternative (i.e. to 'sincerely' admit that he is a 'pederast') is equally in 'bad faith'. In short, to declare himself as either being or not-being a homosexual is 'bad faith'; for the reason that both declarations equally refuse the ambiguity of human existence as being what one is not and not being what one is. This condition of being always absent in one's presence derives directly from man's essentially 'imaginative' consciousness and ensures that he is always in 'bad faith'.

Even if, as a last resort, one chose to live out this ambiguity of existence one would still be in 'bad faith'. To make this point Sartre furnishes us with the example of the secretary who flirts with her boss in such a way as neither to be or not to be promiscuous, but to profit in 'bad faith' from both possibilities. If man's ontological condition is indeed both to be and not to be what he is, how then can one ever evade this vicious circle of 'bad faith'? Sartre seems to conclude in Being and Nothingness that one cannot and that consequently human existence is absurd.
Ultimately, all attempts at good faith are nothing more than disguised forms of their opposite.

The ideal of good faith... is an ideal of being-in-itself. Every belief is a belief that falls short; one never really believes what one believes... Good faith seeks to flee the inner disintegration of my being in the direction of the in-itself which it should be and is not. Bad faith seeks to flee the in-itself by means of the inner disintegration of my being (8).

Although Sartre professedly set out to discover those conditions of human being which make it possible for one to be in 'bad faith', he discovered instead the conditions which make it impossible for one to be otherwise. Precisely because man 'imagines' himself to be what he is, he is not what he is 'really' but only 'unreally'. In other words, because man imagines himself to be what he is not he is always negating what he is; and so is always in some sense absent from himself. 'Bad faith', it seems, proves not only the necessary but the sufficient description of man's being-in-the-world.

In fairness, it must be admitted that Sartre does anticipate this objection, and states accordingly that 'bad faith' is not necessarily the last word on the matter (9). He asserts that some sort of 'self-recovery of being' is possible and that this should be called 'authenticity' in contradistinction to both good and bad faith. But since he declares that the description of this category of behavior 'has no place' in the present discussion, his apologia constitutes nothing more than an empty assertion. It is highly debatable whether Sartre ever in fact succeeded in positing a satisfactory or consistent theory of 'authenticity'(10). Certainly the subsequent phenomenological descriptions in Being and Nothingness of man's 'concrete relations with others' such as love, desire, indifference etc. fall, as we shall see, into a similar vicious circle of failure; the only difference being that the terms "sadism" and "masochism" replace those of "good" and "bad" faith. The thread which joins this analysis of the failure of faith with the later analysis of the failure of love is, of course, Sartre's initial discovery of man as an essentially 'imaginative', and therefore 'negating' being-in-the-world. Of the many critics and commentators of Being and Nothingness Iris Murdoch is, to my knowledge, the only one to have explicitly
identified this link:

Sartre presents love, even at its most vigorous, as a dilemma of imagination... Sartre's lovers are each engaged in perpetual speculation about the attitude of the other. Their project is appropriative, their torment of the imagination... What each one seems to crave, according to Sartre, is that he should be imaginatively contemplated by the other - a craving which is frustrated because of the reciprocal nature of the demand and because of the loneliness and 'essential poverty' of the imagination. (11).

But Murdoch, regrettably, fails to provide any comprehensive argument of exactly why and how love is a dilemma of the imagination. The clue here lies, I suggest, in Sartre's treatment of the image in The Psychology of Imagination as Value which is a nothingness set over against the plenitude of reality, and for the sake of which reality is imaginatively negated and surpassed. This paradoxical conclusion that man's supreme 'value' is also his supreme 'poverty' is the root of the dilemma of human intersubjectivity in Being and Nothingness. The 'Value' projected by imagination is now no longer seen in terms of the aesthetic category of Beauty but in terms of the ontological category of a pour-soi-en-soi synthesis. Sartre argues that in his relationships with his fellows men seeks to incarnate this ideal image of synthesis. Love constitutes the primary possibility of this synthesis in that it promises to enable the lover both to be in the eyes of another what he is for himself ( a pour-soi ), and to be for himself what he is in the eyes of the other ( an en-soi ). Love then is 'imagined' to be the ideal possibility of reconciling one's opposing selves. But the reality is altogether different.

Failure is inevitable here for the simple reason that to imagine the other as the other imagines me, is to posit a nothingness (the other) which would contemplate another nothingness (me). But this is patently impossible in terms of Sartre's phenomenological assumption that nothingness is always consciousness of something. In effect, love is for Sartre the ideal of both becoming a something (an in-itself) and yet remaining a nothingness ( a for-itself) for the other. It is, moreover, an absurd ideal in that man's ontological make-up as a being who 'negates being', makes it impossible for him to ever be both nothing and something at the same time. More simply, if I am nothingness the other must be something,
and if the other is nothingness I am something; but we cannot both be something and nothingness simultaneously. The Value of love is consequently an empty illusion. As soon as the lover becomes aware of this fact, he resorts to various other modes of relationship. Firstly, he tries to seduce his partner by becoming a 'fascinating' object for the beloved. He tries, that is, to deceive the beloved into believing that his presence is an 'image' devoid of all absence and outside of which there is nothing. This he may try to achieve by using his money, influence, good looks or charisma as analogues; but it is ultimately subject to failure. Sooner or later the intrusion of a third person or object will break the spell of the lover and render him just one object 'relative' to other objects, rather than an 'absolute' object in his own imperious right.

At this point, the lover has a choice between the options of masochism (to reduce himself to a common en-soi), sadism (to reduce the other to a common en-soi) or indifference (to ignore the existence of the other altogether). In all three however, the fundamental project of achieving an ideal synthesis between the pour-soi and the en-soi is defeated.

On top of this Sartre denies the possibility of any social solution in terms of a 'we' community. Here again, it is the dualism between imaginative consciousness and objective reality which proves to be the rub. The insurmountable nature of this antithesis ensures that any attempt to establish community relapses into either a 'we-subject' which is strictly pour-soi in relation to some en-soi - a vanquishing army, for example, in relation to a vanquished one - or a 'we-object' which is en-soi in relation to some pour-soi - e.g. a vanquished army in relation to a vanquishing one. Sartre's last word on the matter is an unequivocal avowal of failure: 'The relation between consciousnesses is not essentially a 'being-with' but a conflict' (12). Iris Murdoch is correct, it seems to me, in her diagnosis of Sartre's refusal of community in terms of a solipsism of imagination:

Sartre fails to emphasize the power of our inherited collective view of the world - save where it appears in the form of social prejudice and is labelled 'bad faith'. In effect, he regards all unreflective social outlooks as in bad faith... He isolates the self so that it treats others, not as objects of knowledge certainly, but as objects to be feared, manipulated and imagined about. Sartre's is not a rational but an imaginative solipsism (13).
Our relationship to things as well as to people is motivated by the same spectre of 'Value'. That is, the ideal of being at once an in-itself and a for-itself. In the final section of Being and Nothingness Sartre demonstrates how our various modes of behavior towards things i.e., eating, knowing, destroying, playing, assimilating, all express a fundamental desire to 'appropriate'. This is what Sartre calls the Jonah complex; the desire to reduce an object to oneself as pour-soi without annihilating it as an en-soi; like Jonah intact within the stomach of the whale. One also seeks to appropriate objects by projecting one's subjectivity into them so that they come to symbolize the imaginary value of synthesis. 'In the special link of appropriation there is always', as Sartre says, 'something of oneself in the object'(14).

What is more, since no particular existing object can satisfy man, he tends to either imagine that a single chosen thing (be it a woman, a fascist leader or the latest sports car) symbolizes the whole of being, or else he imagines that if one consumes as many objects as possible as quickly as possible, that one will finally succeed in appropriating the totality of the en-soi to one's own pour-soi. Therefore, just as the lover loves all women in one woman, so the human subject in his possession of a single object or a succession of objects, imagines vainly that he is consuming the totality of being (15). This phenomenon accounts, Sartre says, not only for such religious practices as relic-worship, superstition and idolatry but also and more generally for the rampant fetishism and materialism of contemporary culture.

But the ideal image of becoming a for-itself-in-itself can never be realized for precisely in so far as man imagines that he really is this image, he is what he is not and is not what he is. (16). Appropriation like love and play is yet another mode of 'bad faith'. Thus Sartre concurs, willy-nilly, with those Christian moralists who declared all worldly wishes and possessions vanity. But while someone like St. Augustine saw here a springboard for a leap of faith into the Absolute ('Inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in Te, Domine!'), Sartre concludes that man is but a 'useless passion' and that ultimately the world is so absurd that it matters little whether one leads a revolution or gets drunk in a bar (17).
b) Possibility. Husserl concluded his phenomenological study of the image with an identification of imagination and possibility. Possibility plays a central part in Sartre's ontology also, but its relation to the imagination is, as I have already remarked, something implied rather than stated (18). It is essential, however, that we acknowledge this implicit rapport and develop its implications for the Sartrean notion of 'value'.

Human Existence, Sartre tells us 'cannot appear without being haunted by value and projected toward its own possibility (19). What precisely does Sartre mean by the term 'possibility'? Sartre admits that there is the greatest difficulty in understanding the being of possibility. While it is equally true to say that it is given prior to the being of which it is the possibility, it is equally true to say that it must have some sort of being (20). Clearly, this being cannot be the being of the in-itself, for the in-itself is precisely the opposite of possibility, that is, pure fullness of being. It seems therefore that it must share in some way the being of the pour-soi.

Sartre categorically rejects both the 'logical' and the 'magical' conceptions of the traditional philosophies of the possible. As exponents of the 'logical' interpretation, he takes Spinoza and Leibniz: Spinoza held that possibilities exist only in relation to our ignorance, that is as a subjective stage on the path to perfect knowledge; and furthermore, that they disappeared as soon as ignorance was overcome. Leibniz tried to confer a certain weight on possibilities by making them objects of thought for the Divine understanding. But it follows from such a position, Sartre argues, that possibility must already be either in full being (in which case it ceases to be possibility at all) or merely one among an infinite number of other figments of Divine consciousness (in which case its independent existence is swallowed up in the subjective being of representation). Both Spinoza and Leibniz Sartre concludes, committed the error of reducing possibility to 'thought'. At the other extreme, Aristotle made the mistake of construing possibility as a 'magical' property of objective being. But 'being -in-itself cannot', Sartre objects, be potentially or have potentialities. In itself it is what it is - in the absolute plenitude of its identity' (21).
Sartre proclaims the necessity of choosing a midway position between these extremes of subjectivity and objectivity, but such an option is doomed to failure from the very start by Sartre’s dualist framework. On the one hand, he declares that ‘if possibility is not first given as an objective structure of beings or of a particular being, then thought, however we consider it, can not enclose the possible within it as its thought content’ (22). On the other hand, Sartre emphatically declares possibility to be a project of human consciousness precisely in so far as it imaginatively negates objective being:

There can be possibility in the world only if it comes through a being which is for itself its own possibility... the possible is that element of the for-itself which by nature escapes it qua for-itself (23).

But here we find the kernel of the dilemma: if the pour-soi can only be a possibility beyond itself as pour-soi, then how can possibility be something other than the pour-soi? And yet if possibility is not other than the human consciousness then, according to Sartre’s phenomenological premises, it is impossible for consciousness to be conscious of possibility at all.

We are once again confronted with the problem of imaginative circularity. Sartre comes close to a resolution of this problem when, having stated that the possible can only come into the world through a being which is its own possibility i.e. a pour-soi, he adds: ‘But to be its own possibility is to be defined by that part of itself which it is not, is to be defined as an escape from itself towards - ’ (24). Unfortunately Sartre neglects to fill in the hiatus here, and thereby fails to acknowledge the implications of his reasoning. The implications are, of course, that between the for-itself which surpasses and the in-itself which is surpassed there is a third modality of being - the possible - which is precisely that towards which the for-itself surpasses the in-itself. But Sartre will not admit of such a mediating element for that would be to invalidate his whole dualist framework in favour of a dialectic (25).

Nevertheless, while refusing to explicitly acknowledge possibility as an independent ontological modality, many of his statements point in this direction. The following is a case in point:
To comprehend possibility qua possibility or to be its own possible is one and the same necessity for the being such that in its being, its being is in question... In short, from the moment that I want to account for my immediate being simply in so far as it is what it is not and is not what it is, I am thrown outside it toward a meaning which is out of reach and which can in no way be confused with immanent subjective representation(26).

But for all his disclaimers Sartre cannot rescue possibility from the jaws of subjectivity. Since possibility cannot under any circumstances arise from the in-itself, which is by definition that which is what it is; and since it has no independent ontological status of its own, then how can it be anything but the projection of the for-itself in so far as it negates the in-itself?

Before we close the case, however, we must allow Sartre a further hearing. Some new light may be shed on the problem when we examine more closely the precise nature of the relationship which Sartre conceived between possibility and Value. 'Possibility and Value belong to the being of the for-itself' Sartre says. For 'the for-itself is defined ontologically as a lack of being and possibility belongs to the for-itself as that which it lacks, in the same way that Value haunts the for-itself as the totality of being which is lacking'. And he concludes accordingly that 'ontologically it amounts to the same thing to say that value and possibility exist as external limits of a lack of being which can exist only as a lack of being - or that the upsurge of freedom determines its possibility and there by circumscribes its Value' (27). Value is for Sartre the ideal image of self-coincidence which stands before man and his sovereign possibility. This image is that which is lacked (Mangue') by man in his desire to be a for-itself-in-itself. As such it presents itself to consciousness as an absence, that is 'imaginatively'. But this image is a contradictory one. It is impossible to realize, since man cannot really be both lack and fulfillment at the same time. And yet that is precisely what he imagines. As Sartre so vividly put it: 'What desire wishes to be is a filled emptiness, but one which shapes its repletion as a mould shapes the bronze which has been poured inside it'. And he adds: 'We know moreover, that the coincidence with the self is impossible, for the for-itself attained by the realization of the possible will make itself be as for itself - that is, with another horizon of possibilities' (28). Hence for Sartre, the rationale of that constant feeling of disappointment which accompanies all instances of repletion. Hence
To comprehend possibility qua possibility or to be its own possibles is one and the same necessity for the being such that in its being, its being is in question... In short, from the moment that I want to account for my immediate being simply in so far as it is what it is not and is not what it is, I am thrown outside it toward a meaning which is out of reach and which can in no way be confused with immanent subjective representation (26).

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also the famous 'Is it only this?' which is not so much directed at the concrete pleasure which fulfillment gives but at the inevitable ephemerality of the coincidence with self. Value is precisely that possibility of being which it is impossible to ever be.

But we could readily grant Sartre his pessimism if only he were consistently pessimistic. But he is not. Although at one moment Sartre can declare possibility a nothingness in so far as it is a 'being which qua lack, is beyond being' (29); at others he defines it as 'the something which the for-itself lacks in order to be itself' (30), and categorically affirms its positive existence: 'If we are not to be taken in by fine words and rhetoric we must recognize that this being which is beyond being possesses being in some way at least'(31). This inconsistency springs, I believe, from Sartre's conception of Value as an absence (the lacked) which is also in some sense a presence (in that it motivates the human existent who lacks it and is imaginatively aware of himself as lacking). In illustration of this point Sartre cites the example of a crescent moon whose 'meaning' and 'Value' depend upon a human consciousness being able to imagine a full moon as the 'lacked' of its 'lacking'. In other words, in order that the crescent shape be grasped as a moon at all, it is necessary that a human imagination surpass its actual state towards its possible totality. Because the full moon does not yet exist in fact it can only exist in image. But as such, Sartre seems to credit its imaginary being with an extraordinary power over actual being. 'It is the full moon', he concedes, 'which confers on the crescent moon its being as crescent; what is not determines what is. It is in the being of the existing to lead out of itself to the being which it is not as to its meaning' (32).

This certainly seems a far cry from Sartre's description of the image as an 'essential poverty'. What, after all, could be less poor than the totality towards which man transcends his present reality, that 'unconditional beyond of all surpassings of being' (33)? But it is just this notion of 'beyond' which compels Sartre to return to his original negative judgment. Since Sartre will have no truck with dialectic, the only status which a Value beyond being can lay claim to is the status of nothingness. And not,
as for Heidegger, a nothingness existing in its own right over and against human consciousness, but a mere project of this very consciousness:

Nothing makes value exist - unless it is the freedom which by the same stroke makes me myself exist - and also within the limits of concrete facticity - since as the foundation of its nothingness, the for-itself cannot be the foundation of its being (34).

And so once again Sartre's dualist premise abrogates his wiser instinct for synthesis. For Value to exist as a supreme possibility in its own right appears to Sartre to threaten the sovereignty of freedom. While the refusal of any ontological status to Value is clearly incompatible with his concession that this Value is nothing less than the totality which lies beyond man and towards which he surpasses himself and the world, it is entirely consonant with his division of being into the radically opposed extremes of for-itself and in-itself. Sartre's ultimate word on the matter seems to be: better false to the logic of one's intuitions than to freedom. Value is reduced to the nothingness of consciousness. Consequently the possibility of a coincidence between the for-itself and the in-itself which all existing beings imagine and desire, can never be realized. This supreme possibility is, in the final analysis, best described as an absence without the possibility of presence; and Sartre is forced to conclude accordingly that if human reality is free it is by the same token 'an unhappy consciousness with no possibility of surpassing its unhappy state' (35).

Sartre's theory of possibility is in sharp contrast to the theories of possibility advanced by his fellow phenomenologists, Husserl and Heidegger. In Husserl, as we saw, possibility was granted a positive 'teleological' being. In Heidegger it was similarly acknowledged as a 'fundamental' (as opposed to metaphysical) dimension of Being, as the following passage from a Letter on Humanism makes clear:

Being as the element is the quiet power of the loving potency i.e. of the possible. Our words 'possible' and 'possibility' however are under the domination of logic and metaphysics taken only in contrast to 'actuality' i.e. they are conceived with reference to a determined viz., the metaphysical - interpretation of Being as actus and potentia... When I speak of the 'quiet power of the possible' I do not mean the possible
of a merely represented possibilitas... but Being itself, which in its loving potency commands thought and thus also the essence of man, which means in turn his relationship to Being (36).

Whatever about the validity of Heidegger's own theory of possibility, his refutation of Sartre's theory as a mere inversion of the traditional metaphysical theory seems to me to be essentially correct (37). To identify possibility with a product of an imaginative or negating consciousness prior or opposed to being, as Sartre does, is merely to reverse the Aristotelian priority of act over potency, losing in the process, however, the single most important insight of Aristotle i.e. that possibility is in some sense a mode of being (38). Thus Sartre's theory of possibility, like his notion of the imaginary of which it is a form of pseudonym, founders into non-being.

c) Imagination and Existential Psychoanalysis. Sartre attempts by a process of 'existential psychoanalysis' to determine the fundamental nature of the 'ends' by which human reality identifies and defines itself. He refutes the determinist consideration of man as capable of being reduced to original givens or determined desires supported by the subject in much the same manner as properties are supported by an object. Sartre retorts that man can only be understood in terms of 'fundamental projects' which propel all his actions toward a certain imaginary end. Because man is continually imagining himself to be more than he is, he is essentially free (39). Indeed he only knows himself as limited precisely in so far as he can project a state of 'ideal' freedom. Although the rapport between freedom and imaginative projection is first outlined in The Psychology of Imagination, it is not until Being and Nothingness that it receives a thorough ontological analysis. Sartre illustrates some of the implications of this rapport in his discussion of consciousness:

In so far as man is immersed in the historical situation, he does not even succeed in conceiving of the failures and lacks in a political organization or determined economy; this is not as is stupidly said, because he 'is accustomed to it', but because he apprehends it in its plenitude of being and because he cannot imagine that he can exist in it otherwise (40).

No factual state, be it political or psychological, can ever determine an act. Every act is in some sense the result of a projection of the imaginative consciousness towards some ideal image
which it is not. It is only after man has imagined the possibility of an alternative state of affairs that the present one will appear intolerable to him and in need of change. Sartre's argument here is a direct extrapolation of his analysis of imagination in *The Psychology of Imagination* as a double nilhilation. The link is unmistakable:

It is after he has formed the project of changing the situation that it will appear intolerable to him. This means that he will have had to give himself room, to withdraw in relation to it, and will have to have effected a double nilhilation: on the one hand, he must posit the actual situation as nothingness in relation to this state of affairs. He will have to conceive of a certain happiness attached to his class as a pure possible - that is, presented as a certain nothingness - and on the other hand, he will return to the present situation in order to nilhilate it in turn by declaring: 'I am not happy.' (41).

Because this class happiness does not yet exist and has never been experienced but only 'imagined' (i.e. posited in terms of a double negation), Sartre calls this image an 'ideal nothingness' (42).

Whereas empirical psychoanalysis seeks to determine the 'complex' which indicates the meanings which are referred back to it, Sartre's existential or phenomenological psychoanalysis seeks to determine the original choice of an 'end' which would give meaning to man's action. The former sees meaning as a thing of the past; the latter affirms it to be a possibility of the future, an end which can present itself only to the imagination but which is the very raison d'être of my being. In order to decipher precisely what this imaginary telos is, Sartre psychoanalyzes the various different projects of 'doing', 'having' and 'being' (43).

The example he takes is, not insignificantly, the project of aesthetic creation. I create a picture, a melody or a drama, he says, in order to be able to be at the origin of something which I am not. This something interests the creator only in so far as it is his; that is, in so far as his activity of creation gives him a certain right of appropriation over it. But at the same time, it must not be him. The artist wishes the art object to exist also in itself and to perpetually renew its existence by itself. Sartre accounts for this contradictory project as follows:

I stand to it (the art object) then in the double relation
of the consciousness which conceives it and the consciousness which encounters it... It is in order to enter into this double relation to the synthesis of appropriation that I create my work (44).

A similar project is operative in the appreciation of art: the beholder wishes to consume the image before him and yet preserve it as something independent of his own imagining. The for-itself thus dreams that the object may be entirely assimilated by it while still retaining the structure of the in-itself. Sartre gives numerous examples of how this image of an ideal synthesis between the self and the non-self extends into such disparate realms as knowledge (which seeks to devour the known without destroying it), eating (which seeks to digest the object without dissolving it) and loving ('the lovers dream is to identify the beloved object with himself and still preserve for it its own individuality'). All these activities 'symbolize' a contradictory project to let the other become one without ceasing to be other.

Collectively considered, these projects reveal man's most fundamental modality of existence to be 'play'. As Sartre puts it: 'As soon as a man apprehends himself as free and wishes to use his freedom, then his activity is play' (45). This freedom may as often be the cause of anguish as joy, but the important thing is that man in play 'imagines' himself as the first origin of his own being. Sartre contrasts this modality of play with the modality of seriousness which epitomizes those men 'of the world', who because they ignore their imaginative resources, can no longer even imagine the possibility of getting out of the world. The serious man is he who takes himself as an object, a mere being-in-the-midst-of-the-world, and considers everything in terms of foregone conclusions rather than originating choices (46).

The first principle of play is freedom. Its purpose is to transform the world into a sort of emanation of the self while still remaining in-itself. Or to use another idiom, play seeks to project a form onto the world which is so deeply synthesized with its matter that the matter would appear to exist for the sake of the form. This is what Sartre suggests when he says that 'the order of the instruments in the world is the result of my projecting into the in-itself the image of my possibilities' (47). In play the project is to in-form matter by surpassing it towards some
imaginary end. This is so regardless of whether the matter be marble surpassed towards the image of Apollo, or a snowfield symbolically surpassed by the speedy passage of the skier towards his goal (48). Nevertheless, Sartre points out, while play unfolds its significance primarily in the language of 'having' or 'doing', its real concern is with a synthesis of two opposing types of 'being'. The desire to do and to have is at bottom reducible to the desire to be related to a particular object in a certain ideal relation of being. All play then is shown to be an expression of a fundamentally imaginative project to be myself as an in-itself in relation to my for-itself. This imaginary relation of being is what Sartre's existential psychoanalysis ultimately identifies as God:

This ideal being is defined as an in-itself which, for itself, would be its own foundation, or as a for-itself whose original project would be a mode of being, but a being precisely the being-in-itself which it is. We see that appropriation is nothing save the symbol of the ideal of the for-itself or Value. The dyad, for-itself possessing and in-itself possessed, is the same as that being which is in order to possess itself and whose possession is in its own creation - God (49).

Sartre's characterization of man as a creature of play is reminiscent of similar theories advanced by Schiller, Nietzsche, Heizinger and, in modified form, Eliade and Cassirer (50).

But, Sartre's formulation of play is more extreme. While they maintained that play is one particular way in which man may behave, Sartre went so far as to declare that everyone is compelled to play by virtue of his ontological condition.

Because we are beings who are always negating being, we are condemned to play just as we are condemned to freedom. Even the 'serious man' who Sartre initially contrasted with the 'man of play' is ultimately exposed as nothing more than a man who plays at being serious. This further corroborates our earlier suggestion that for Sartre, man cannot escape the circle of 'bad faith', for the simple reason that he cannot avoid imagining himself as being other than he is.

From this insight into the ontological meaning of play Sartre extrapolates a psychoanalysis of qualities. This ranges from a study of 'certain constants' in poetic imaginations - Rimbaud's
fascination for 'geological' images or Poe's for 'aquatic' ones to a study of man's everyday tastes i.e., repulsion from things slimy or attraction to things solid or perforated etc. In contrast to the conventional understanding of such quirks and predilections as irreducible givens, Sartre shows how they symbolize very definite imaginative projects. What chiefly concerns the existentialist psychoanalyst is 'to determine the free project of the unique person in terms of the individual relation which unites him to these various symbols of being' (51). This approach is, I believe, original to Sartre. His emphasis on the freedom of play, stemming from his theory of imagination, departs radically from the Freudian or behaviorist approach which sees man's play as determined by some sexual trauma or social disturbance in his past life. While Freud, for example, saw play as a symbol of our sexual being, Sartre sees our sexual beings as but one among many other forms of ontological play.

Sartre's introduction of a theological perspective also represents an advance in the whole philosophy of play. His claim that all human projects are ultimately aimed at the realization of an ideal image of God is an entirely original one, carrying with it profound implication for both our understanding of the imagination and God (52). Sartre's theology of imagination is an atheistic one, however. Even though he grants that God is our most supreme possibility, he declares in the same breath that it is an impossible possibility.

But possible or otherwise, God is what man is seeking when he plays-in-the-world. Sartre's existential analysis makes it convincingly clear that human reality is the desire to transform its own for-itself into a for-itself-in-itself; and that it is this ideal image of an Ens Causi Sui which underpins all our choices of possible. But this Absolute is for Sartre merely 'imagined' not encountered, and man's desire is in vain:

Every human reality is a passion in that it projects losing itself so as to found being and by the same stroke to constitute the in-itself which escapes contingency by being its own foundation, the Ens Causi Sui, which religions call God... But the Idea of God is contradictory and we loose ourselves in vain. Man is a useless passion (53).
Nevertheless, while Sartre’s existential psychoanalysis reveals the essence of man as the desire to be God, his fundamentally dualist premiss condemns this desire as 'absurd'. This dualism stems, as I have argued, from his division between imaginative consciousness (nihilation) and being in The Psychology of Imagination. The critique which applied there may be applied again here. In short, just as in L’imaginaire Sartre made the contradictory claim that 'Beauty' is 'nothing' and yet 'something' which can effectively motivate and enthral men, so too here in Being and Nothingness Sartre admits that 'God' is both non-existent and a moving force of all our actions:

The Ens Causa Sui remains as the lacked, the indication of an impossible vertical surpassing which by its non-existence conditions the flat movement of consciousness; in the same way the vertical attraction which the moon exercises on the ocean has for its result the horizontal displacement which is the tide (54).

The fundamental flaw in Sartre’s analogy is, of course, that whereas the moon does exist, God (for Sartre) does not. Nevertheless, since man is conscious of God, as the ideal image towards which all his surpassing aims, then God must exist somehow even if this means as an absence. Framed in this way Sartre’s statement that 'everything happens as if the world, man and man-in-the-world succeeded in realizing only a missing God', could be considered as much grounds for theism as atheism. For we may legitimately ask ourselves whether there is any great difference between the ‘missing God’ of Sartre and the ‘Deus Absconditus’ of Pascal, or the ‘Deus Adventurus’ of Moltman. Since all three acknowledge God (be he missing, ascended or yet-to-come) as the Value towards which all things strive, the only difference would seem to lie in the attitude each takes vis-à-vis this Value. While Moltman and Pascal choose the way of Faith (to believe in spite of God’s absence), Sartre chooses the way of absurdity (to disbelieve because of God’s absence). It ultimately depends on whether one emphasizes God’s absence or God’s absence. But the all important point is that we recognize this emphasis to be a question of choice, and not a question of ontological necessity as Sartre seems to suggest. Had Sartre opted for a dialectical rather than a dualist framework in the first place he could quite easily have affirmed God’s existence. Or at least there would have been nothing in
the nature of being itself which would prevent him. Then instead of maintaining as he did that 'the in-itself and the for-itself are in a state of disintegration in relation to an ideal synthesis', he could have maintained - following Husserl's hint - that they are in a state of teleological integration.

In a final section, comprising no more than three pages, Sartre discusses the 'ethical implications' of his existential psychoanalysis. We witness here a remarkable volte-face. Whereas up to this, Sartre had construed Value as an essentially 'aesthetic' category i.e., as an ideal project of the imagination called either Beauty or God, he suddenly transmutes it into an ethical notion. 'It follows', he now purports, 'that the various tasks of the for-itself can be made the object of an existential psychoanalysis, for they aim at producing the missing synthesis of consciousness and being in the form of value or self-cause. Thus, existential psychoanalysis is moral description' (55). But this sudden switch from the realm of the aesthetic to the moral is a patent transgression of Sartre's dualism of reality and unreality. Whereas Value was considered by Sartre as an absolute and unreal beauty, the good by contrast was seen as a component of the real world, relative to each individual's choice in each situation. Indeed, it was precisely the lack of any absolute notion of good that induced Sartre to concede that it amounted to the same thing whether one got drunk in a bar or became a leader of nations. This dichotomy of the aesthetic and moral was first set forth in The Psychology of Imagination thus:

Beauty is value and is applicable only to the imaginary and which means the negation of the world in its essential structure. This is why it is stupid to confuse the moral and the aesthetic (56).

This definition of Value (be it called Beauty or God) as an aesthetic category of imaginative consciousness rather than a moral category of real action is equally operative in Being and Nothingness - with the notable exception of the final pages. The following citation is representative:

The perpetually indicated but impossible fusion of essence and existence is Value as transcendence, it is what we call Beauty... Beauty therefore represents an ideal state of the world, correlative with an ideal realization of the in-itself. It haunts the world as an unrealizable. To
the extent that man realizes the beautiful in the world, he realizes it in the imaginary mode (57).

These two quotations from The Psychology of Imagination and Being and Nothingness respectively, should make it quite evident that Value for Sartre is primarily an aesthetic category of imagination, and that any attempt to construe it as something which could be realized in the real world is sheer 'stupidity'. I have already expressed much criticism of the solipsistic and segregated nature of this division but the fact remains that this is the position Sartre consistently espoused. Consequently any last-minute grafting of the arena of 'play' onto praxis can be judged as nothing short of 'bad faith'. One might move to defend Sartre on the grounds that these final remarks on ethics in Being and Nothingness are more suggestions for a future work than conclusions to the present one. Be this as it may, a contradictory note is struck and as we shall see Sartre's later theories of politics and society are seriously impaired by this blatant confusion of the aesthetic and the moral.

Sartre concludes Being and Nothingness with a question as to whether 'it is possible for freedom to take itself for a value as the source of all value' or whether it 'must necessarily be defined in relation to a transcendent value which haunts it?' (58). The option here is clearly between Value as something genuinely transcendent of man or Value as a creation of human freedom (i.e. nothingness). This crisis of Value was to prove one of the most central motifs of both Sartre's literary and political writings.

11. IMAGINATION AND AESTHETICS

In Sartre's first novel Nausea (1938), written contemporaneously with The Psychology of Imagination, the role of the imagination in man's quest for the Absolute is a central theme. Avoiding the complex philosophical terminology of The Psychology of Imagination and the later Being and Nothingness, Sartre makes a simple distinction between 'existence' which he equates with the absurd and contingent reality man is, and 'Being' which is the ideal condition he imagines.

In the Municipal park the anti-hero Roquentin experiences this 'existence' when suddenly the veil of common illusion is removed from things and he is gripped with nausea at the 'sight' of their
ultimately fluxile and meaningless nature (59). In the Municipal Gallery, by contrast, Roquentin recognizes in the 'Being' of the painted images of Renaudas and Bordurin, a possible alternative to existence. Art, he surmises, is capable of transforming the contingency of nature into an ideal necessity, devoid of corrosion or ugliness. Looking at a portrait of the 'Club de L'Ordre' Roquentin remarks that 'the power of art is truly admirable: of this shrill-voiced little man, nothing would go down to posterity except a threatening face, a superb gesture, and the bloodshot eyes of a bull' (60). But Roquentin is equally aware that if these portraits of the dignitaries of Bouville are 'perfect', they are also perfect lies: for these dignitaries were rogues and scoundrels in their real life. And so he exits from the gallery with the following curt dismissal: 'Farewell you beautiful lilies, elegant in your painted sanctuaries.. Farewell you Bastards' (61).

Similarly, Roquentin acknowledges the art of music to represent a state of ideal 'Being' in contradistinction to the absurdity of 'existence'. 'Melodies', he says, 'can carry their own death within them like an internal necessity; only they don't exist. Every existent is born without reason, prolongs itself without reason and dies, by chance' (62). And so the jazz melody of the American negress becomes a constant refrain in the novel, extending to Roquentin the promise of immortality. But the tune, unfortunately, does not exist. It is on the other side of existence, out of reach and 'redeemed', in a world where everything is symmetrical and 'in strict time'. Roquentin knows that he can only experience it by 'imagining' its 'Being' behind the analogue of perceived notes. He articulates this mutual exclusion of 'Being' and 'existence' in terms strikingly reminiscent of his analysis of the symphony in _The Psychology of Imagination_:  

It does not exist. It is even irritating in its non-existence; if I were to get up, if I were to snatch that record from the turntable which is holding it and if I were to break it in two, I wouldn't reach it. It is beyond - always beyond something, beyond a voice, beyond a violin note. Through layers and layers of existence, it unveils itself, slim and firm, and when you try to seize it you meet nothing but existents, you run up against existents devoid of meaning. It is behind them: I can't even hear it, it does not exist.. It is. And I too have wanted
to be... that's what lay at the bottom of my life (63).

Roquentin's fundamental project is his desire to 'Be'. And the way he seeks to achieve this, is the only way available to him: through the imagination. Consequently, Roquentin tries to give meaning to the life of one. *Monsieur de Rollebon*, whose historical biography he is writing, by imagining what he might have done rather than reporting what he actually did. 'Not a single glimmer comes from Rollebon's direction', he confesses, 'slow, lazy, sulky, the facts adapt themselves at a pinch to the order I wish to give them, but it remains outside them. I have the impression of doing a work of pure imagination' (64). Realizing the impossibility of ever reconciling imagination and reality, Roquentin abandons his study on Rollebon and decides instead to put his own life into 'strict time' by transmuting it into fiction. By changing life into an adventure 'which could never happen', Roquentin hopes to cleanse himself of the 'sin of existing'. In the form of a confessional novel, life could re-emerge as a series of those 'perfect moments' which his girlfriend Anny is forever in search of (65). It could be 'beautiful and hard as steel, and make people ashamed of their existence' (66). But just as Roquentin realizes that Anny's search compels her to live a life of uncommitted and irresponsible 'play', so too he suspects always that the 'image' of art is so totally different from the reality which it pretends to perfect, that the whole enterprise is doomed from the start:

I wanted the moments of my life to follow one another in an orderly fashion like those of a life remembered. You might as well try to catch time by the tail (67).

Roquentin bears many striking resemblances to the young Sartre. The futility of Roquentin's project of transforming existence into Being by writing about it, casts a certain irony over Sartre's whole literary career. It also provides some hint as to why Sartre gave up novel writing in the forties before he had even completed the fourth volume of his *Roads to Freedom*. Many of the admissions in his recent autobiography, *Words* (1964), bear out this resemblance. He candidly confesses here that from an early age he found images more real than things. Because his father died the year he was born, Sartre grew up under the tutelage of his literary grandfather and claims that he discovered literature before
he discovered the world. He tells of how he would spend entire
days leafing through volumes of Maupassant and Flaubert, until he
became so totally absorbed by the power of 'images' that he came
to identify art with the Absolute. And this identification,
he admits has never been fully expunged from his psyche:

I had found my religion: nothing seemed more important
to me than a book. I saw the library as a temple.
Grandson of a 'priest', I lived on the tip of the world,
on the sixth floor perched on the highest branch of the
Central Tree... Every man has his natural place; it is
not pride or worth that settles its height: childhood
decides everything. Mine is a sixth floor in Paris with
a view of the rooftops... breathing the purified air, everything
was humbly begging for a name, and giving it one was
like both creating it and lacking it - without this
fundamental illusion, I should never have written (68).

But Sartre has no doubt that it was an illusion. Because he was
a 'fatherless child' as he puts it, Sartre thought of himself as
totally free to be his own cause and creator. Born unsatisfact-
orily, Sartre's life became a series of efforts to be reborn: to
recast himself as an ideal image other than himself and yet
the same (69). He could begin his life or end it whenever
he wished; it was simply a matter of tearing out one page and writ-
ing another. But this freedom to imagine himself as he wished led
ultimately to a world of solipsism (70).

In this fashion, the young Sartre became the emperor of his
own imaginary world. As time went on, however, Sartre had no option
but to enter the real world. But even here, as he confesses, he
was never anything but an impostor going from one 'role' to the
next, until he finally settled into the imposture of a professional
writer. At first Sartre wrote for the sake of writing. He
saw the work of art as a redeemed piece of life, as another diamond
in the Muse's chain, a gift of the Holy Ghost. He admits that for
a long time it never occured to him that a man might write in order
to be read. 'A man writes either for his neighbours or for God
and I decided to write for God' (71). The only relationship which
the young Sartre would tolerate with his fellow men was that of
Savior to saved. He wanted debtors rather than readers and so
approached his art as a sacrament rather than as a medium of communi-
cation (72). Sartre describes this religious impulse towards the
'Being' of art in the following vivid passage:
I discovered that the giver in Belles-Lettres can change himself into his own gift; that is to say, into a pure object. Chance had made me a man, generosity would make me a book. I could let myself chatter and consciousness flow into characters of bronze, replace the sounds of my life by imperishable inscriptions, my flesh by a style and the languid spirals of time by eternity (73).

Nevertheless, as soon as he began to commit this imaginary body to a perceptual analogue of ink and paper, Sartre became quickly cognizant of the frailty of his dreams. Although his initial project was to try and conquer reality through flights of imagination, he soon discovered that it was reality which threatened to swallow up his images. 'Nothing disturbed me more', he writes, 'than to see my scrawl little by little exchange its will-o-the-wisp sheen for the dull consistency of matter: it was the imaginary made real' (74). Increasingly, Sartre became aware of the fact that because he had discovered the world through images, he had mistaken images for the world. He realized that his metamorphosing of life into imagination had really been a kind of death, a sacrifice of the imperfect present to some ideal future; and that his youth had, as a result, been entirely 'posthumous' (75). In the final analysis, the rupture between the fiction he was living and the reality all around him became so deep that he was forced into the traumatic discovery of his own imagination:

I was an impostor and I was relating nonsense that no one would want to believe; in short, I discovered the imagination. For the first time in my life I re-read myself, scarlet in the face. Was it really me, me taking pleasure in these childish fantasies... I stopped writing (76).

But Sartre, as we know, started again soon afterwards and has since written some four novels and a dozen plays. Even though he became fully conscious of the fact that his writing was nothing other than a way of asking death or religion, in the guise of imagination, to rescue his life from contingency, he could not cease from this petition. Indeed, his first novel, Nausea, was as we saw a renewed attempt to justify his existence by turning it into images. 'I was Roquentin', he finally confesses in Words, 'describing in Nausea the unjustified, brackish existence of my fellow-creatures and vindicating my own'. There is no reason to believe that all his other works of art do not share this same project of imagination - the ideal image of self-coincident Being.
Sartre has no illusions that this project is doomed to failure. He knows that art saves nobody and that existence cannot be justified; and yet he keeps on writing. As he himself explains: 'You can get rid of a neurosis but you are never cured of yourself... I have renounced my vocation, but I have not unfrocked myself. I still write. What else can I do... If I put away Salvation among the stage properties as impossible, what is left?'

In his later novels and plays, the whole question of the 'Being' of the artistic images frequently recurs. In the Roads to Freedom trilogy for example, we find Gomez, the painter leaving 'an unfinished canvas on the easel' (78) in order to participate in the flesh and blood struggle of the Spanish Civil War. Gomez opts for war rather than painting, not for the sake of glory - he knows that the cause is a hopeless one - but to avoid the uncommitted and unreal nature of his art. When Mathieu asks him what will become of him, he answers 'What difference does it make? I'll have lived' (79). This choice between art and action is a central dilemma of Sartre's protagonists; and one rendered all the more dramatic because of Sartre's radical opposition in The Psychology of Imagination between the aesthetic and the ethical. In Iron in the Soul we find Gomez as an art critic assigned to review a collection of Mondrian's abstract paintings in New York. Gomez is shocked by the whole American approach to art as something pure and aetherial and 'in which questions of sex or the meaning of life or poverty are never asked' (80). An American critic who accompanies him explains 'It's seraphic: we Americans want painting for happy people or at least for those who try to be happy' (81). But Gomez, having just heard of the outbreak of war in Europe, is disgusted by this naive idealism. To him the whole gallery appears as nothing more than 'sterilized painting in an air-conditioned room... protected from microbes and human passions'. Gomez's commitment to the real lives of men leads him to a repudiation of 'images'. Art only tells half the story. But for Gomez 'if painting isn't everything, it is just a bad joke'. Whenever art pretends to represent the contingency of reality by the hand, it becomes even more of a lie in that it justifies evil by turning it into a thing of beauty. Revolutionary or realistic art is, accordingly, to be accounted just as much of a lie as ideal-
istic art. Sartre elaborates on this point in an essay entitled 'Le Peintre sans Privilèges':

Actually, if an attempt has been made, up until now, to depict the evil that men do to one another, an unpleasant alternative has suddenly been revealed: betraying painting without benefiting Morals, or if the paintings are beautiful, betraying the rage and suffering of men for Beauty. Betrayal everywhere (82).

What this in effect means is that it is not so much the content which constitute the 'lies' of art, but its very form as 'imaginative' negation of reality.

Mathieu's attitude to art is as ambiguous as that of Gomez. Mathieu is both drawn to and repulsed by the ideal and eternal 'Being' of art. While contemplating a stone statue in the Luxembourg Gardens, he reflects on how his own life is transforming itself into something equally solid and fixed. In a movement of recoil from this process Mathieu recalls how as a child he had gained a tremendous sense of freedom by destroying an ancient Chinese vase (the eternal art object) which belonged to his uncle (83). On the other hand, Mathieu is fascinated by Ivich, a young student who, like Anny in Nausea, tries to sculpt herself into a perfected image. Ivich and Mathieu visit a Gaugin exhibition together. Ivich particularly is attracted to the paintings because she finds in them an inspiration for her own desire to be an ideal image of beauty. Indeed, when Mathieu thinks of Ivich he likes to think of her precisely as 'painted and vanished like a Tahitian woman on a canvas by Gaugin, unutilizable' (84). Ivich refuses to allow anyone to touch her for fear that this would adulterate the immutable self-portrait she has enshrined in her imagination. To this extent, she resembles Gaugin's own project of redeeming his flesh by using it to fabricate an eternally enduring 'image' - a project symbolized by his conspicuous self-portrait as a Christ who sacrificed his life for art. It is this state of detached Being, heightened whenever she is herself contemplating something beautiful, which lures Mathieu to Ivich. 'It was in those moments' he admits, 'that he was most drawn towards her, when her charming, delicate little body was inhabited by a distressing force, a passionate, disturbing, unprepossessing love of beauty' (85). In fact, Mathieu seems so fascinated by this ideal Beauty that
Ivich teases him with the quip 'you behave as if you were going to Mass' (86). The resemblance here to Sartre's own experience of art as religion is obvious.

While Ivich and Mathieu are engaged in the contemplation of these images, a garrulous couple enters the gallery and breaks the spell of magic. Here again Sartre illustrates his The Psychology of Imagination thesis that the image can exist only with the active participation of the imaginer (87). Mathieu himself makes the point quite explicitly when he declares that 'paintings don't get you... they propose themselves to you; it's up to you whether they exist or not; standing before them you are free' (87).

Indeed, once the 'spell' of the paintings has been broken by the intruders, he is in an even better position to acknowledge the essential 'nothingness' of art-images:

The paintings had burned out; and it seemed monstrous, in this bath of relevance, that there could be people who painted, who depicted non-existent objects on canvas' (88).

Mathieu's sudden vacillation here between attraction and recoil is a perfect illustration of the paradox of freedom and fascination which we first identified in Sartre's theory of the image in The Psychology of Imagination. Another central facet of this theory, the division between the 'real' and the 'imaginary' self is also manifest in Mathieu's various attempts to imaginatively negate the cruel reality which surrounds him. Take, for example, his effort to transcend his present self in favour of an absent self, on the mobilization train to Nancy:

'I am in Juan-les-Pins, I am in Berlin. I have no more life, I have no more destiny. But there is always the tablecloth which obstructs my vision' (89).

Mathieu, like every other character in the trilogy, is guilty of 'bad faith'.

Two other protagonists, Daniel and Philippe, are significant examples of the project towards the imaginary condition of 'Being'. Whereas Mathieu initially felt threatened by the eternal nature of 'statuery', Daniel hails it as the ultimate alternative to the gratuitousness of everyday life. The sculpted image is the telos of Daniel's project to be, the most sublime instance of
what he calls 'Beauty, my destiny' (90). In emulation of it, he
wishes to fix himself for eternity in the eyes of others, and by
so doing finally coincide with his own image of himself: 'to be
of stone, immobile, insensate, no sound, no movement... a statue
with an empty stare without a worry' (91). But because the look
of others tends to contradict his own image, and because his own
look separates him from his own image, Daniel seeks his solution
in the look of the ideal spectator, God. God, he believes, will
prove the ultimate 'glance of Medusa' to petrify his existence into
a statue of Being (92). Daniel is fascinated by the 'repose' and
'necessity' of a recumbent tomb figure in a church, and prefaces
his prayer for a similar transfiguration with Mallarmé's famous
line 'Such as into eternity Himself eternity at last changes him' (93).

Young Philippe Gresigne is another character whose project for
Being is styled on the perfectly sculpted image. Philippe plays
out his life in the form of a poetic drama and scripts the events
that will suit this role. His behaviour is distinctly pathological
to the extent that his creation of an imaginary world arises from
a need to compensate for his failings in this one (93a). Like
Roquentin in Nausea, and by extension, Sartre in Words, Philippe
discovers that the artist can only be 'posthumously'. Consequently,
he toys continually with the idea of suicide, and envisions himself
ultimately as a 'Hearth, lying on his back, like a recumbent effigy
of stone, with two sorrowing angels at his head' (94). But
Philippe no less than Ivich in her attempt to freeze existence into
some ideal self-portrait, is condemned to failure. Only through
self-deception can the Sartrian character believe himself to be
immutably fixed (95). While the condition of Self-coincident
'Being' may be imagined, it cannot be. Indeed, it is precisely
because it is imagined (something which is not) that it cannot be.
Thus, one of the predominant messages of Sartre's novels seems to
be the impossibility of ever reconciling the opposing claims of art
and reality.

Sartre's dramatic writings also exhibit man's fundamental con-
cern to transcend his existence towards an imaginary mode of
'Being'. A central theme of Sartre's play Les Mouches (1942) is
the question of the power and fascination which 'the image' of
Jupiter has over man. Electra dares to look the image of the deity squarely in the face and so sees the statue for what it is - a hollow analogue of pine wood covered with varnish. But she cannot destroy its spell over the other citizens of Argos, for they refuse to acknowledge that it is the active power of their imaginations which keeps the god alive in the first place.

Even Aegisthus, the king, is caught in the magic of the image which he has helped to create. It takes Clytemnestra to remind him of this when she asks: 'Have you forgotten that it was you who invented these fables for the people' (96). Orestes, by contrast, has freed himself from the supernatural magic of the work of art through his extensive learning and study of the fine arts. Jupiter's attempt to convince him otherwise by means of the miracle of theatrical lightning - recalling his mythical thunderbolt - proves futile. Aegisthus and Jupiter are totally vulnerable before Orestes, for they are painfully aware that men are fundamentally free and that if Orestes reveals this secret to them, the statues and images which keep the people servile would be destroyed. The complaint of Aegisthus that he has become nothing but a mask sustained by the gullible fantasizing of the crowd prompts Jupiter to reply with violent anxiety: 'I too have my image. Don't you think it makes me dizzy' (97).

Orestes sets out to free the people of Argos from the magic of the work of art. He reviles its use as an agency of establishing and preserving the privileged order of the hegemony by providing a model for men's lives. By his sacrilegious descent from the pedestal of the deity and by his forsaking of the temple altogether, Orestes dispels the magic with which the sculptor and the architect respectively, had endowed these objects. He lifts the veil of Being to expose the flesh of contingency which lies beneath. Thus Orestes serves as the iconoclast of the image, determined to reveal 'the freedom of men in their existence', even if this be an 'obscene, insipid existence given to them for nothing' (98). The truth is, assuredly, more unpleasant than illusion but it has the virtue of dissolving Being into becoming and so permitting the people of Argos to be the creators of their own lives for the first time. As Orestes puts it in his farewell address: 'Everything is new
here, everything must begin anew' (99).

In Les Mouches Sartre seems to be clearly of the conviction that images are created in 'bad faith' and when used to regulate men's lives can only have the most pernicious results. He himself has described the play accordingly as a 'tragedy of freedom as opposed to a tragedy of fatality' (100). But ironically, it is precisely by fascinating his audience with the power of images (i.e. theatre) that Sartre attempts to free them from this power (101).

Sartre's use of the Barbedienne bronze in Huis Clos (1943) to show that man's 'Being' is fixed in death by what he did in life, and his use of the paintings of the girl and the grandmother in La Putaine Respectueuse (1946) to symbolize the prostitutes yearning for innocence and tradition respectively, represent further variations on man's quest for an imaginary Absolute. Yet another is represented by Goetz's confrontation with the sculpture of Christ in Le Diable et le Bon Dieu (1951). Goetz rails vehemently against the power of religious works of art - 'marble Christs and ivory virgins' - which can lead hordes of the faithful to devotion, self-sacrifice and even death. And yet as the drama unfolds Goetz himself becomes enthralled by these 'obscene pagan statues' (102). Finally he calls upon the 'image' of the crucified Christ to torture his own sinful body with the stigmata in order to free the dying Catherine. Taking a page from the magician's book, he inflicts upon himself the sacred wounds of the statue, which the people in turn imagine to be a miraculous effect of the talismanic powers of the Christ-effigy.

In brief, Gaet's blood serves as an analogue for the 'image' of the crucified God. He becomes a living statue with the same powers over people which the crucifix has. But the magic which such religious 'images' exert over people is by no means a strictly medieval enchantment as Sartre discovered when the play was performed in Paris for the first time. 'The first night', he wrote, 'the audience was afraid. In the stigmata scene, when Goetz apostrophizes the crucifix, the spectators wondered if Christ were going to strike him dead' (103). It is unfortunate that Sartre did not ever develop this insight into a comprehensive analysis of the role of imagination in religious ritual and relicry in general.
Lastly, a word about two of his later plays Les Séquestrés d'Aïtona (1959) and Kean (1953). In Kean, Sartre explores the theme of man's ontological necessity to always 'play at' being. Play is, Kean tells us, the attempt to externalize what we imagine and thereby to manipulate life itself. 'I am nothing,' he cries out, 'I play at being what I am... an actor playing the part of Kean playing the part of Othello' (104). In Les Séquestrés this theme is brought to its logical and tragic conclusion.

Frantz von Gerlach creates a world in which the imaginary object is a ruined and ravaged Germany, and in which the physical analogue or theatre is the sequestered room in which Frantz lives. Frantz's tattered uniform, with its row of fake medals, and the picture of Hitler on the wall are further analogical supports (105). Through this complex analogue, sustained by his pathological emotion of guilt, Frantz justifies his acts of torture by reference to the ravaged state of Germany at the time. He must invent and preserve an 'image' of a destroyed Germany consequently, in order to assuage his obsessive guilt feelings. But if this scheme is to prove effective, Frantz has to believe that the image is an objective reality which determines him.

However the image for Sartre, as we know from The Psychology of Imagination, is always the result of a free choice and so cannot act as a 'determining' agent under any circumstances. 'We seek in vain', as Sartre tells us, 'to create in ourselves the belief that the object really exists by our conduct towards it' (106). It is because Frantz knows this that he locks himself away and avoids all contact with the outside world. Everything must be kept in quarantine, insulated from the world of change of responsibility. 'There's no time here' utters the criminal of bad faith, 'only eternity' (107). It is only in terms of the radical antithesis between the worlds of imagination and reality that we can understand Frantz's traumatic reaction to Johanna's intrusion. But mixed with a feeling of threat Frantz experiences a deep attraction to the infinitely rich possibilities which she offers as a 'real' person - a richness in marked contrast to what Sartre calls the 'essential poverty' of the imaginary. This attraction to Johanna proves fatal to Frantz however, and suicide is his only recourse. When the 'unreal' world collapses, he can see no other way of negating
reality than the ultimate negation of death. In this play as in his others, Sartre's thesis that the imaginary is something man freely creates in order to enslave himself, is clearly and forcefully illustrated.

(B)

Having briefly analysed the role of the image in Sartre's own art, let us now examine how Sartre develops his treatment of this role in his critical writings on the work of other artists.

The foregoing pages and indeed those that follow, are not intended to directly develop the argument of this thesis, so much as to substantiate the claim that Sartre's theory of imagination had a profound effect on the rest of his philosophy. In this section we are specifically concerned with showing how Sartre's approach to imagination and to art are more or less synonymous. This is particularly evident when we consider the predominance of such themes as play, infatuation, fascination, schizophrenia, obsession, escapism, projection of an ideal state of being etc. throughout his literary and critical works. It is, of course, not just the occurrence of such themes but their treatment that evinces the distinctive influence of Sartre's theory of imagination. That is, in short, the nauseating recognition that we are 'absurd' beings to the extent that what we imagine and what we are are always separated by an irreconcilable antithesis.

Since our aim is to substantiate rather than merely state our claim that Sartre's theory of imagination largely conditions his theory of art and literature, we must analyse the entire corpus of his writing in this area. This is a lengthy operation and inevitably subject to repetition. But by thus establishing a detailed inventory of the works in which Sartre's theory of imagination is evidenced, I hope to establish from a free variation of perspectives the invariant essence of Sartre's aesthetic: the vain struggle for a synthesis between the real and the imaginary.

Sartre, we noted, attacked sculpture in its use as a magical object for the perpetuation of a myth, be it political or religious. In the works of Calder, Hare and Giacometti, however,
Sartre believed that sculpture was undergoing a profound change. No longer does it pander to the 'bad faith' of mankind by representing the human form idealized in an image of fixity. Imagination no longer serves the purpose of creating 'a dead man on a dead horse to perfect a rigorous hierarchy of worth and power' (108).

Sartre is particularly partial to Calder's 'mobiles' which he interprets as an attempt to avoid the anthropomorphism of traditional sculpture not only by shaping abstract forms but also by his use of such 'unsacred' materials as zinc, tin and bone (109).

Unlike the image of Jupiter in Les Mouches, Calder's mobiles intend no meaning beyond themselves. As Sartre puts it:

Sculpture suggests movement, painting depth or light. Calder suggests nothing; he captures and embellishes true, living movements. His mobiles signify nothing other than themselves;

'They simply are, they are absolutes' (110). Mobiles display the quality of constant change in constant identity: 'always midway between the servility of statues and the independence of natural events' (111). It is because they exist as unfinished analogues, dependent on the imaginer to complete them, that they serve to solicit man's freedom rather than merely his fascination. 'The passing glance', Sartre argues, 'is not enough here. One must live with it... then the imagination can revel in these ever changing forms that are as free as they are fixed' (112).

Sartre also shows approval of David Hare's project of sculpting an image in its own landscape. Figure and ground are here balanced so as to detach the imaginer at the same time as it bewitches him. 'Hare', writes Sartre, 'wants the gesture locked into the statue, he wants the work to have a space of its own, distinct from any other space, and imaginary' (113). By thus providing the image with its own sui generis dimensions, Hare defies the spectator's habitual attempts to 'possess' it. While allowing man to intimate the necessity of the absolute, it never permits him to forget the ambiguity of his own existence. Unlike the pacifying and illusionist sculpture of the past, Hare's always keeps man uncomfortably aware that, as an imaginative being, he is 'always in advance of himself and that the world is both given to him and yet to be made' (114).
Nowhere are Sartre's views on sculpture more cogently expressed, however, than in his essay on Giacometti entitled 'La Recherche de l'Absolu' (115). Sartre hails Giacometti's choice of plastic rather than stone in so far as it avoids the tranquilizing inertia of the latter (116). He also praises Giacometti's ability to create inconsistent and self-contradictory images which place the burden on the spectator rather than laying claim to the 'perfection-in-itself' of classical sculpture. Speaking of the latter, Sartre claims that 'it is the imagination of the viewer, mystified by a crude resemblance which lends movement and life to the eternal ponderosity of matter' (117). The contradictory nature of Giacometti's images by contrast de-mystify the spell of art by forcing the imaginer into a distance and by thus making him responsible for the images which he aids the sculpture to bring into being:

By reversing classicism, Giacometti has restored to statues an imaginary indivisible space. His unequivocal acceptance of relativity has revealed the Absolute. He confers absolute distance on his images. He creates a figure 'ten steps away' or 'twenty steps away' and do you will it remains there (118).

By commingling our perceptual awareness of the sculpture as unfinished and our imaginative awareness of it as finished in this way, Giacometti approximates to the ideal of a 'relative Absolute'. His fundamental project, according to Sartre, is to invent an image which will symbolize the totality of the world as other than himself. Thus he could unite himself with what is not himself and achieve unity or 'Being'. But like Pygmalion in the ancient myth, Giacometti realizes that the whole project is futile unless the image can come to life; that is, really be other. As Sartre puts it in a startlingly vivid phrase, Giacometti wants to feel a shock or surprise before the image 'such as one feels on returning late and seeing a stranger walking towards him in the dark' (119). But Giacometti's art can only approximate to this ideal; it can never actually achieve it. What the imagination takes to be legal tender is in fact counterfeit currency. It is, in fact, the idol of a 'degraded' consciousness. Although full of promise, the Absolute invoked by his images must ultimately remain not only absent but empty. As Sartre explains:

Achilles will never catch the tortoise... his statues are
still largely incorporated in his flesh; he is unable to see them. Almost as soon as they are produced he goes on to dream of women that are thinner, taller, lighter and it is through his work that he envisions the ideal by virtue of which he judges it imperfect. He will never finish simply because a man always transcends what he does (120).

Sartre's attitude to the artistic 'image' is even more explicit in his criticism of painting. Sartre admires particularly the painting of Tintoretto, Lapoujade and Massignon, because he sees their works as constituting images which undermine their own claim to be Absolute. Or more correctly, because their works unashamedly attest the 'great universal void' which subtends the absolute quality of the image. These painters share a common refusal of the classical use of volume, line and surface to create an impression of passivity and inertia (121). Take, for example, Sartre's preference for the incompleteness and asymmetry of Tintoretto's style over Titian's conventional classicism (122). Sartre argues that Titian serves as an apologist for a corrupt political establishment in that his images soothe the onlooker with the lie of perfect 'Being'. Recalling Gomez's attitude towards American art, Sartre objects that in Titian's paintings 'discord is only an illusion, the worst enemies are secretly reconciled by the colours of their cloaks. Violence? A ballet danced by counterfeit tough guys with fleecy beards: there you are, war justified' (123). He concludes accordingly that the 'beauty' of Titian's paintings 'betrays men and places itself on the side of Kings'.

Similarly, in an essay entitled 'Le Peintre sans Privileges' (124), Sartre hails the non-figurative art of Lapoujade for its destruction of the Renaissance tradition of trompe-l'oeil perspective, clarity of line and 'finish' (125). The success of Lapoujade's painting lies, Sartre claims in his ability to invoke an imaginary 'Presence' whose being depends on the dual imaginative activity of artist and beholder. This quality of Presence legitimizes the image in so far as it keeps the imaginer continually aware of the fact that 'unity' of Being is never more than a 'diversity' of his own free becoming:

(Presence) does not itself determine the itinerary the viewer's eyes will follow, but it guides the eye's movement.
To construct, visual relations are adequate but in order to guarantee this construction, in order to save it from absurdity, transcendental unity is necessary. The unity ensures a movement that can never be stopped. It is this ceaseless movement which produces the permanence of an invisible unity. If we were to stop, the whole thing would explode (126).

'Presence' always presupposes that there be some flaw or unclarity in the art-analogue which will keep the viewer conscious of his own imaginative activity (127). And because it solicits the imaginative self-consciousness of the viewer, it functions as a sort of safety-valve against man's predilection to construe the image as some magical Absolute existing independently of him.

The theory of 'Presence' which Sartre outlines here definitively refutes the charge levied against him by Eugene Kaelin and others: that his theory of imagination holds only for 'figurative' art (128). Sartre's definition of Presence as the 'imagined work itself considered as an organic totality' (129) is a criterion as valid for the non-figurative art of the oriental and abstract movements, as it is for normal 'representational' art. What Sartre calls 'Presence' here is not to be reduced to the 'kinaesthetic presence' which he spoke of in The Psychology of Imagination though it certainly refers to this too. Presence is rather an ideal totality symbolized by the organic totality of the image itself. Or, as Sartre says: 'the incarnation of a totality which surpasses it but which cannot be grasped aside from it, and whose infinity does not allow adequate expression in any other system of signs' (130).

Presence is not then, as Kaelin suggested, signification but presentification. Indeed, in so far as he admits that artistic images may be evaluated according to the degree to which they 'present' a totality which eludes both our conceptual and perceptual consciousness, Sartre succeeds, I believe, in professing an aesthetic criterion capable of spanning the divide between figurative and non-figurative art. Far from being the token of an emotivist or an idealist theory of art, 'Presence' constitutes a third and more all-embracing alternative.

Sartre discovers this same quality of 'Presence' in the paintings of Hasson and Wols. He is particularly taken by their rejection of line and contour and a certain quality of spatial...
indetermination (what he calls 'whirlwind') produced by an interplay of real and unreal perspectives (131). Compelled by this fundamental ambivalence 'it is our eyes that bring about the transubstantiations, haunting flesh with the memory of marble and marble with the spectre of animal warmth' (132). By means of this permanent transubstantiation these paintings bear witness to the impossibility of ever realizing the unity of being and becoming, but likewise to the impossibility of ever ceasing to intend it. As Sartre puts it: 'The unity escapes me if I seek to discover it, but the detail forces me to return to it unceasingly; through its fixed, incessant metamorphosis, it reveals itself as an integral part of the totality, omnipresent in its presence' (133). It is by this quality of 'Presence' that the modern painters, Masson and Nolts, are able to demonstrate that imagination is not only a fundamental agent of aesthetic activity but also the fundamental agent of our everyday life. Thus Sartre reveals his criterion for evaluation in art, by elevating those works in which the 'project of painting cannot be distinguished from the project of being a man' (134).

The artist's quest for an imaginary absolute features equally prominently in Sartre's critical studies of the writer.

In What is Literature (1949), Sartre advances a theory of 'committed' literature. He expresses a marked preference for prose over poetry stemming from his suspicion of the power which the latter's richness of imagery has over man. Whereas the prose writer uses words as referential images which throw man out of himself into the midst of things (135), the poet uses words as self-referential images which, like notes or colours refer us to nothing in the real world. Poetic images are, according to Sartre, more concerned with contemplation than commitment. Rather than leading man to revolutionary action in the world, they enshrine man in a firmament of the imagination (136).

In view of this manifesto of a literature of 'commitment', it is all the more surprising to find Sartre's critical writings concerned almost exclusively with 'contemplative' rather than 'committed' writers. In an early essay on the poet, Francis Ponge, entitled 'L'homme et les Choses' (137) Sartre exhibits
an ambivalent reaction of both attraction and repulsion towards
the poet's project of 'ontological petrification'. In his images,
writes Sartre, 'he is transformed into statue: everything is finished
and the stupefaction of stone paralyses his arms and his legs'.
But Sartre's ultimate adjudication is unequivocally negative:
'Ponge's endeavour is doomed to failure like all others of its kind'
(138). Interestingly enough, if we count his work on Baudelaire,
St. Genet and Flaubert alone, Sartre has written and published
over five thousand pages on just these 'others of its kind':
a figure which in itself stands as indubitable testament to
Sartre's preoccupation with the absurdity of man's imaginative
quest.

In his Baudelaire (1947), Sartre identifies the fundamental
project of this poet to be the justification of his 'existence'
by transforming it into the finality of art. Baudelaire's dearest
wish is, according to Sartre, to be the art-image which he
creates, to be, that is, as origin and end of his own existence:
'He wants to be his own poem for himself: that is the game he
plays' (139). Like Anny in Nausée or Ivich and Philippe in
Roads to Freedom, Baudelaire tries to create for others an image that
would be at the same time an image he himself could see. Sartre
recounts how all his life Baudelaire used his pride and rancour as
affective analogues for a transmutation of himself into a thing in
the eyes of others and himself. He strove to stand aloof from the great
social fête, like a statue, definitive, opaque and inassimilable.
Hence his partiality towards images of mineral immutability i.e. gems,
metal, mirrors, the moon. 'In a word', Sartre writes, 'we can say
he wanted to be... but this being would have been intolerable for
Baudelaire if it had had the passiveness and unconsciousness of a
utensil. He certainly wants to be an object but not an object
created by pure chance' (140).

This same project is played out in slightly revised form on the
level of his love life. In choosing apparently unattainable part-
ers, Baudelaire places them on a pedestal, revering them as ideal
images of what he wishes to have, and by possession, to be. In this
way, writes Sartre,

he is able to enjoy his idol as he wishes, love it in secret,
and be overwhelmed by its disdainful indifference. No
sooner does she give herself than he departs. He can't play his game any longer. The statue has come to life, the cold woman grows warm (141).

What Baudelaire wishes to 'realize' is, in fact, precisely the 'unreality' of the woman's image; but no sooner has he done so than he has defeated his purpose. Failed in love, Baudelaire resorts to Dandyism. Having failed to make the imaginary real, Baudelaire now tries to make the real imaginary: 'to be his own object, to paint himself like a reliquary in order to be able to possess the object, to be absorbed in contemplation of it, and finally to melt into it' (142). But to identify with one's own image is, as Sartre pointed out in Words, to become a nothingness, death. Accordingly, Baudelaire's imaginary life becomes a permanent suicide. Poetic creation becomes linked with the suicide he perpetually ruminates on. He becomes, in Sartre's memorable phrase, 'his own witness and his own executioner, the knife that turns in the wound and the chisel that carves the marble' (143). In short, the poet cannot carve being from his own flesh without destroying himself; but once destroyed, he no longer is. Baudelaire is a useless passion.

In a lengthy article entitled 'The Poetry of Suicide' (1966), Sartre detects a similar futility underlying the poetic project of Mallarmé. Mallarmé's use of images epitomizes a certain strategy of 'alienation' from the world of things which Sartre calls 'a terrorism of politeness' (144). Scandalized by the death of God, Mallarmé seeks to create a unifying principle in the universe out of his own imagination. Here once again Sartre returns to an exploration of the 'theological' implications of man's imaginative consciousness:

Man is a volatile illusion that hovers above the movements of matter. His impotence is 'theological': the death of God created for (Mallarmé) the necessity of replacing him, but he fails (145).

But since for Sartre all men are essentially 'imaginative' beings, the potency of the poet comes to symbolize the very impossibility of being man. Sartre uses the suicide theme in Mallarmé to illustrate his notion of imagination as 'negation'. He declares that it is no accident that Mallarmé wrote the word 'Nothing' on the first page of his Poésies Complètes. Since
God was dead the only way to replace him was by dying oneself. Only by thus negating what is, could the poet attest the image of 'Beauty' which is not. As Sartre points out, Mallarmé conceived imagination as an unconditional faculty of denying the real, and the objet d’art was set up on the collapsing of the universe (146). Through a poetry 'absenting itself in flight' and thus creating itself out of its own destruction, Mallarmé wished to prove that 'lack of being is a manner of Being' (147). If the image could not 'present' God, then it would testify to his absence by condemning itself to failure:

In the complex system of this game, his poems had first to be failures in order to be perfect. It was not enough that they should negate both language and world, nor even that they should annul themselves; what the system demanded was that they should represent the fruitless draft-sketches of an unprecedented and impossible masterpiece which death prevented him from beginning. Everything falls into place if we view these symbolic suicides in the light of an accidental death - Being in the light of Nothingness (148).

In brief, Mallarmé's myth of the unrealizable poem intimates perfect Being by the poet's very failure to achieve it. But the Being is only intimated; it never is.

Lastly, in his voluminous studies of Genet (St. Genet: Comédien et Martyr, 1952) and Flaubert (L'Idiot de la Famille', 1971) Sartre identifies two other variations on this failure of imagination.

For the child Genet, an orphan and ostracized by his foster community because of a theft, existence presented itself as impossible. His traumatic childhood makes him more acutely aware than most of the rupture in his being. Consequently: 'unable to carve out a place for himself in the universe, he imagines in order to persuade himself that he has created the world which excludes him' (149). At first, Genet's 'imagination' of the world is aimed at creating a solipsistic and self-sufficient dream (150). As Sartre explains: 'he will choose himself as resolutely imaginary so as to have nothing to do with anyone other than himself' (151). In fact Sartre interprets Genet's resolve to renounce the world of perception by isolating himself in imagination, as a perfect illustration of his The Psychology of Imagination antithesis. Genet becomes accordingly a martyr for the kingdom of Beauty's
sake for whom 'the beautiful is what refuses to be perceived, what is isolated from the universe' (152).

But for Genet the imagination is not only an escape but also an act of defiance. By inventing a 'language of crime' Genet seeks to take revenge on society 'infesting their respectability with his own images' (153). Moreover, by objectifying his rebellion in art, Genet intends to use words to make himself the 'other' which he already is for others. His project is to create an image of himself which will coincide in verbo with the image which Society has of him in vibo, and thus to redeem his alienated being and get his own back on Society in the same stroke:

Genet was unable to be his own cause except in imagination, since it was the others who had first and spontaneously affected him with this otherness. He now realizes this imagination in an object-trap which forces to see him as he wants to be seen. He will be his own creature since his book is himself creating himself as another and making the others breathe life into his creation (154).

But Genet realized that to take revenge on society is also in some sense to redeem them. Art is the salvation of both artist and reader in that it makes both aware of their own freedom. The reader is just as free as the writer to create art by 'imagineing' it. He is totally at liberty to invent the imaginary characters and events proposed to him in the form of an ink and page analogue, for it is his participation along which 'draws these phantasms out of nothingness and maintains them in being' (155). Once again, the theory and terminology of The Psychology of Imagination are clearly in evidence. Aware that nothing can be created once and for all, Genet exploits the freedom of his readers thus illustrating the Sartrean thesis that 'artistic creation is imaginary in that it presents the entire world in a work of art as if it were produced and assumed for human freedom' (156). We are also reminded here of Sartre's description of 'aesthetic joy' in What is Literature as the appropriation of our freedom through an imaginative recreation of the world:

As the aesthetic object is properly the world in so far as it is aimed at through the imaginary, aesthetic joy accompanies the positional consciousness that the world is a value, that is, a task proposed to human freedom.
In aesthetic joy the positional consciousness is an image-making consciousness of the world in its totality both as being and having to be, both as totally ours and totally other (157).

But if Genet's art provides us with joy, it also provides us with 'solitude'. Sartre attempts to explain this solitude as an inevitable component of all imaginative communication reminding us that imagination is always 'negation'. Thus while enabling us to reconcile our subjective self as creator with our objective non-self as created, Genet's art also makes us aware of the fact that this reconciliation is carried out only once, and only in the realm of imaginary (158). Solitude then is our tragic awareness of ourselves as 'impossible nullities', as failures to really be what we unreally imagine.

Sartre defines this paradoxical mixture of joy and solitude in Genet's work as the essential response to the imaginary. Art's victory over life is merely imagined; and so we imagine in vain. In his conclusion to his study of Genet Sartre writes accordingly:

Today God is dead and art becomes an anthropodicy: it makes man believe that man created the world; it presents his work to him and justifies his having made it. There is an ethic of Beauty; it requires of us a kind of demiurgic stoicism: optimism without hope (159).

In L'Idiot de la Famille (1971) Sartre argues that Flaubert also mistook art for salvation. Although Sartre had completely rejected Flaubert's refusal to commit himself in What is Literature, he was compelled to return to him out of a compulsive fascination for his work (160). Unwanted by his father, and neglected by a disinterested mother, Flaubert belonged to a post-Romantic generation which, betrayed by the compromises of their predecessors and the contradictions of their class, took refuge in the world of the imaginary:

They go off into another world whose profound and blasphemous sense is quite deliberately to deny the real, and to give nothingness ontological priority over being (161)

Once again, Sartre expounds his thesis that the fundamental project of imagination is essentially 'negation'. Sartre proceeds to trace Flaubert's progress in the seminary of imagination from 'acteur' to 'poète' and finally 'artiste mystique' (162). As with Genet, Sartre interprets Flaubert passive and fetishistic temperament
in the light of his fundamental project towards an imaginary absolute. Operating on the basis of his *The Psychology of Imagination* hypothesis that the act of imagination is a magical act', Sartre charts Flaubert's development from a Poet who transforms the real into the imaginary to an Artist who tries to subvert the real by realizing the imaginary. Thus Flaubert reaches a stage where the real and the imaginary symbolize each other (*s'entresymbolisent*) and it is only in the light of this confluence, Sartre claims, that we can comprehend the intention behind his 'realist' technique. Thus viewed, the encyclopaedical detail of his descriptions is revealed as a device to expedite his project of 'derealizing the real' by creating a more convincing imaginary universe. Hence also his wish to totally objectify himself in his art, epitomized in his famous maxim: 'Madame Bovary, c'est moi.' Flaubert, explains Sartre, 'is perhaps the first to seize the ontological implications of the doctrine: to create art. It means being an artist... a worker whose efforts are directed towards transforming a material, language, in order to produce an object' (163). In this way, Flaubert tried to justify his existence by creating another one. His art is thus best comprehended as an imaginary solution to a real neurosis.

Sartre also demonstrates how Flaubert deployed style as a strategy of his imaginative project. Style was what 'bewitched' the reader and subjected his world to the 'power of nothingness' (164). But the power of nothingness is ultimately an impotent one. For all Flaubert's imagining reality remained unredeemed; and it was this bitter recognition which lead him to end his days in cloistered disillusionment. Sartre sees Flaubert's tragedy as the most comprehensive epitomization of his own description of man in *The Psychology of Imagination* as a being torn between 'two irreconcilable personalities', the imaginary 'moi' and the real 'moi' (165). Indeed, in a recent interview in *Le Monde* Sartre explicitly acknowledges this link between his work on Flaubert and *The Psychology of Imagination*:

I believe that the greatest difficulty was introducing the idea of the imaginary as the cardinal determination of a person. The book such as it exists at the time being, in this way joins up with *L'Imaginaire* which I wrote before the war... I have thought through anew some of the notions
put forward in L'Imaginaire but I must say that, despite the criticisms I have read, I believe that work still to be true (166).

The dualism of imagination and reality may in fact be used to account for the inevitable failure of all works of art, regardless of whether they be uncommitted and 'poetic' like those of Genet, Baudelaire and Mallarme, etc. or committed and 'prosaic' like the mobiles of Calder, the paintings of Tintoretto or the writings of Sartre himself. But even though Sartre champions the latter genre, it is clear from his almost exclusive critical concern with the former that Sartre himself was fascinated by the notion of imagination as salvation. In fact, he is quoted as admitting that 'it goes without saying that we all write from need of the Absolute' (167). Even his concluding definition of art in What is Literature as a 'classless Society... aware of itself as suspended in freedom' smacks of a certain teleological Messianism. But Sartre's own project towards an imaginary Absolute, like those of other artists he so passionately analysed, is doomed to failure. If imagination alone can redeem the world by holding out to us the possibility of a better one, then it is a possibility which can never be realized. Art, for Sartre, can never become conscious of itself as a perfect world without ceasing to be art; or alternatively, without unrealizing the world. Only a dialectical notion of imagination could envisage the possibility of a communion between art and reality. But it is just such a dialectical solution which Sartre ruled out when he built his ontology upon the foundation of radical dualism established in The Psychology of Imagination:

Beauty is a value applicable only to the imaginary, for the negation of the world is its essential structure (168). This is why it is stupid to confuse the moral and the aesthetic (168).

Sartre is hoisted by his own petard.
III: IMAGINATION AND POLITICS

We noted how Sartre concluded Being and Nothingness by meeting the possibility of resolving the circle of ontological 'bad faith' either in terms of an aesthetics (freedom defined in relation to a transcendent value which haunts it') or an ethics ('freedom taking itself for a value as the source of all values'). We have already demonstrated Sartre's admission of failure in the first field. It now remains to explore his attempts at a solution in terms of the second.

In 1946, three years after the publication of Being and Nothingness and ten years after the publication of The Psychology of Imagination, Sartre proposed an ethical account of value in his Existentialism and Humanism. Here he sought to refute the charges of nihilism and inhumanity levelled at his ontology by defining value in terms of a Kantian 'kingdom of ends' where each individual's freedom would be respected as an end in itself rather than as a mere means. But Sartre ran into the difficulty here of trying to explain how one nothingness can ever confront another without either becoming a 'thing'. In other words, the Sartrian 'kingdom of ends' can work as long as there is only one person in it. As soon as it comes to a question of society however, Sartre seems unable to reach any coherent, satisfactory solution. Since each individual's value is freedom, it must be a freedom other than his own if it is to be the 'end' of consciousness which motivates consciousness to moral action. Or put in another way: if it is to be the 'end' towards which consciousness actively transcends itself. Such at any rate is the logical reasoning from Sartre's phenomenological premises. But because the freedom of the other is necessarily a surpassing, and by extension - suppressing of my own freedom, the harmonious 'kingdom of ends' turns into a hell of other people (169).

Sartre cannot speak of 'authentic' moral action outside the context of the individual's solipsistic world. And even then it contradicts itself, for in so far as man is essentially an imaginative being in perpetual transcendence of reality, he is his freedom. But it is absurd, as we noted, to say that man's freedom transcends the real towards its own freedom (i.e. nothingness).
Value must be other than the self; and yet, for Sartre, it cannot be. In the field of moral action as well as art, man is a passion which contradicts itself.

Sartre himself was quickly alert to the shortcomings of this individualistic ethics, and subsequently renounced it in favour of a revolutionary Marxism. But even here, as Merleau-Ponty demonstrates in *Adventures of The Dialectic* (1955), the dualist implications of Sartre's theory of imagination lead him to espouse an untenable form of 'ultrabolshivism'. Criticizing a series of articles entitled *Les Communistes et la Paix* (1952), which Sartre wrote for *Les Temps Modernes*, Merleau-Ponty argues that Sartre's injunction to the Proletariat to follow the party regardless of circumstances epitomizes his desire to annex history to consciousness. Sartre's politics of extreme pragmatism thus serves as a mask for extreme fictionalism. Merleau-Ponty indicates how his division between an imaginative subjectivity (which is concerned with value) and objective reality (which must be transcended towards value), prompted him to consider history as devoid of any meaning other than the meaning given to it by the party. Revolution is then for Sartre nothing other than the 'decision' of consciousness to intervene in history. And since the objective structures of history can furnish us with no significance or directive (being pure 'en-soi'), it is imperative that revolution be the spontaneous and unmediated action of the party. To mediate this pure subjectivity of the party with external considerations would be to defeat its spontaneity. And so the argument runs, the proletariat must do nothing to hinder or detract from this subjectivity: they must pledge full and unconditional allegiance to the decision of the party.

For Sartre then, history has no value in itself. It is we, or rather the Party, who 'imagine' this value in it. Thus, Merleau-Ponty continues, politics becomes for Sartre a matter of magical fiat, 'and a magical fiat which would not even know what it is applied to if what was to be done was not simultaneously represented as an imaginary end which I choose' (170). Revolution is accordingly not so much a doing as an imaginative decree. Merleau-Ponty summarizes Sartre's view of politics as follows:
Sartre used to say that there is no difference between imaginary love and true love because the subject, being a thinking subject, is by definition what he thinks he is. He could say accordingly that a historically 'true' politics is always an invented one, that only by a retrospective illusion is this politics seen to be prepared within the history where it intervenes, and that, in a society, revolution is self-imagination (171).

Sartre treated praxis as a sort of magical power which will transform the brute hostility of history by fiat, since it cannot do so in fact. And the all important point here is that it is precisely because Sartre drove a chasm between imaginative consciousness and reality in The Psychology of Imagination making value the exclusive prerogative of the former - that his politics devolve into this form of 'play'. Political action is reduced to 'an imaginary action which tries to impose itself on things and suddenly returns to the unreal from which it was born: it becomes theatre' (172). We might say in fact that in the Sartre lexicon imaginative 'spontaneity' is synonymous with the pure choice of the party. The proletariat and the proletarian revolution appear as mere images in the Party's consciousness, suspended above the fabric of history and inexplicable in terms of anything outside of this consciousness. Thus the moment the proletariat disobeys the Party it disobeys its own _raison d'être_; it ceases to exist. By draining history of all meaning, Sartre 'negates' history and incarnates himself in the Solus Ipsi of imagination:

For him, to be committed is not to interpret and criticize oneself in contact with history; rather it is to recreate one's own relationship with history as if one were in a position to remake oneself from top to bottom; it is to decide to hold as absolute the meaning one invents for one's personal history and for public history; it is to place oneself deliberately in the imaginary (173).

Merleau-Ponty concludes that Sartre's theory of political commitment is really a transformation of the relationships of action into relationships of contemplation. It is, at best, action at a distance; a sort of politics by proxy. But such a politics is a complete denial of the fact that man is as
much a creature of history as he is a product of his own imagination. There is simply no avoiding the truth that we are inextricably bound up in the events of reality and that we are born into certain situations for which we are in no way accountable. By making man's imaginative consciousness the sole source of value in the world and by condoning no other relationship between them than that of negation (I74), Sartre condemned his politics to impotence. To operate on the basis of an ideal image of a future society is merely to blind consciousness to the complexities of the present reality. And worse: it leads ultimately to a politics of 'Ultrabolshevism' where the immediate decision of the Party and the unconditional obedience of the worker becomes the order of the day. Merleau-Ponty is quite correct then when he accuses Sartre's politics of constituting 'an oscillation from what one sees to what one dreams which contaminates the real with the imaginary and obscures the harsh present under the haze of a fictitious future' (I75).

But Merleau-Ponty's condemnation of Sartre is not unconditional or unqualified. He admires Sartre's attempt to construe politics as the striving for some utopian-imaginary end, which would challenge the present and make men responsible for the creation of a new world. His disagreement with Sartre stems from his conviction that this imaginary end cannot be totally unmindful of history. In other words, imagination can only become politically legitimate if it is understood not as a negation of history but as its dialectical complement. Such a dialectic would ensure that consciousness remain 'open' to the complexities of reality and forsake
solipsistic illusion. But while Sartre frequently intuited the necessity of such a dialectical synthesis and continually employed a dialectical terminology, his fundamental dualism of the imaginary and the real rendered this unfeasible. As Merleau-Ponty concludes:

The end is the imaginary object that I choose. The end is the dialectical unity of the means, Sartre said elsewhere; and this would have happily corrected his abuse elsewhere of this notion, if he had not deprived himself, by rejecting dialectical thought, of the right of recourse to an open consciousness (176).

Sartre admits in an obituary tribute to Merleau-Ponty (176), that this philosopher's critique constituted for him the 'history lesson' which reversed the train of his thought and prompted him to adopt a dialectical theory of Politics. The Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960) was the result of this conversion. In this work, Sartre attempts to marry the basic concepts of existentialism and Marxism by introducing the notion of Society as a mediating structure between individual freedom and historical necessity. Value is here redefined as a 'Concrete Universal'; that is, as a synthesis between the concrete creative self and the universal world-situation which it strives to totalize.

To illustrate this dialectical synthesis of the concrete and the universal - or to use his earlier terminology, the self and the Other-than-self - Sartre introduces the mediating category of the 'third man' (177). Let us briefly explain what Sartre means by this category. Finding himself in a group spontaneously fused together by a common goal (e.g. the storming of the Bastille), each individual can become a 'third man' franchised from both his inert otherness as a 'thing' and his isolation as a 'nothingness'; each can become, that is, a centre of synthesis. The 'third man' emerges, therefore, in the spontaneous action of the group as both human totalizer of a unity and a human part (detotalized) of the unity. In this way, Sartre can now maintain that
each man's freedom is not so much threatened as mediated by the other. The individual is no longer the alienated other but a 'third', that is, an other as mediated through a group which is, in turn, mediated through the individual. Indeed, it is precisely because this mediation is dual that the dialectical is possible: 'The mediation is double, for the group mediates between the third man, each third man with the other third through the group' (178). Thus the 'third man' is one who transcends the group at the same time as he participates in it. But, all importantly, this mutual synthesis can only be achieved in terms of a surpassing of both individual and group towards some common purpose or end. In brief: 'The third man is the human mediation through which directly a multiplicity of individual centres of action makes itself organized as determined by a synthetic objective' (179).

The synthetic objective is the clef-de-voutre which motivates the formation of the 'third man' in the first place. But it is just here that Sartre's analysis collapses. Sartre's theory is valid only when the objective referred to is some thing existing in reality. To admit otherwise would in fact, be to shift the whole dialectic back into the realm of consciousness which is the very error Sartre is seeking to avoid. On several occasions, however, Sartre states that the future, although not yet visible or present serves as a 'value' which can motivate the fusion of individuals into a group of 'third men' (180). But how else is this future to present itself as an 'end' of consciousness unless as an end which is absent - i.e. as an image? Secondly, it may be objected that even when the synthetic objective is conceived as a reality as in Sartre's famous example of the storming of the Bastille, the Bastille is a reality which 'symbolizes' something other than itself. In this case, the building attacked symbolizes the tyrannical power of Louis and the French gendarmes. It is to be stormed for a purpose, for an end towards the attainment of which it is merely a means. This 'end' is, of course, nothing other than the ideal image of 'the Concrete Universal' in the guise of a tyrant-free and classless utopia. We may conclude accordingly that the
Bastille only functions as a synthetic objective to the extent that man's imaginative consciousness has projected a certain symbolic 'value' onto it; in so far, that is, as it functions as an analogue of the image of 'Concrete Universality' (I81).

But to admit this much is to admit that Sartre's dialectic is one-sided, and so ultimately a failure. Value still remains the property of human praxis as opposed to objective history (the practico-inert). We see therefore that even in the Critique, Sartre's original dualism of imagination/reality, pour-soi/en-soi, is not so much transcended as elevated to a more subtle and complex level (I82). If there is dialectic in history it can only be in so far as the human praxis has projected that value into it; or more correctly, in so far as the material conditions affect man's striving towards the 'Concrete Universal' and in turn receive the imprint of human praxis. In sum, the dialectical synthesis between imagination and history is a false one, for it is by man in his quest for the ideal.

Despite all his efforts, Sartre's dialectic becomes in the final analysis, a soliloquy of the solus ipse with itself. And in consequence, the other be it in the form of nature, history or society, is once again reduced to the role of an Alter-ego. As Desan puts it in The Marxism of Jean-Paul, the only comprehensive study of the Critique to date:

The fundamental intuition in both Être et le Moi and the Critique de la Raison Dialectique claims accomplishments of the Ego which are immense. Neither god nor devil, neither state nor society, only man is responsible for man, only the individual man makes and assembles the totality through his praxis. There is nothing but the individual self and its unexplained and unexplainable power of synthesis. In the light of this enormous emphasis upon the self, we might expect the other to be overshadowed, as indeed he is...Merleau-Ponty wrote in Les Aventures de la Dialectique: 'pour Sartre la prise de conscience est un absolu'. Sartre has not altered his stand in the book under study (I83).

Sartre's own disillusionment with the dialectic propounded in the Critique, has made him - by his own
confession — party to the destiny of a 'communist on one's own' (184). Acknowledging the divisive consequences of his theory of imagination, he is forced to conclude that morality like aesthetics is 'for us simultaneously inevitable and impossible' (185). One cannot be without them, and yet one cannot be with them. When Sartre expresses this defeat in the statement that 'one isn't more saved through politics than through literature' (186), he implicitly admits that all his projects, be they philosophical, artistic or political, are merely different forms of the one 'fundamental project': the quest for an imaginary Absolute. This Absolute appears under several pseudonyms, 'Concrete Universal', 'Beauty', 'Value', 'Presence', 'Pour-soi-en-soi', 'Being' etc.; but regardless of its name, it invariably signifies the projected end of man's imaginative transcendence of the world (187). We should not be surprised then to find Sartre returning in recent times to his unfinished project on Flaubert (now going into its third volume). Nor should we be surprised to hear him describe this work as the sequel to his first major work, The Psychology of Imagination in that it is primarily concerned with the implication of man's imaginative being.

In his own words:

The reason for choosing Flaubert is that he represents a sequel to L'Imaginaire... In L'Imaginaire I tried to prove that imaginary objects — images — are an absence. In my book on Flaubert I am studying imaginary persons — people who like Flaubert act our roles. A man is a leak of gas, escaping into the imaginary. Flaubert did so perpetually; yet he also had to see reality because he hated it; there is the whole relationship between the real and the imaginary which I tried to study in his life and work' (188).

But there is another, though related, reason for his returning to this work on Flaubert. It affords him a certain possibility of reconciling the real (the fact about Flaubert's life) and the imaginary (Sartre's self-acknowledged fictionalizing of these facts). In other words, his biography of Flaubert is an admixture of what he imagines him to be and what he believes he really is (189). This is what Sartre means in his curious reply to the question as to why he has ceased to write novels:
Because I have felt no urge to do so. Writers have always more or less chosen the imaginary. They have a need for a certain ration of fiction. Writing on Flaubert is enough for me by way of fiction - it might indeed be called a novel. Only I would like people to say it was a true novel (I90).

In keeping with this remark, when accused by his former Maoist allies of betraying the political cause Sartre retorted that his work on Flaubert was not so much a denial of politics as a search for a brand of 'politics outside politics, projected towards the future' (I91). But which ever way he turned or whatever explanation he gave, Sartre's 'fundamental project' to realize the imaginary remained a failure. To be sure, in 1968, Sartre made a brief sortie form his seclusion to launch the watchword of the Paris student revolt: 'L'Imagination au pouvoir'. But he was quickly despondent. Within months he left this 'literary politics' and returned to his 'political literature' - his work on Flaubert. The search for salvation in an imaginary Absolute, which is the golden thread connecting the various stages of Sartre's life-work, remained a futile one. Sartre himself had prefigured this futility as early as 1946, when he declared that 'the most beautiful book in the world can redeem itself, and even the artist; but it cannot redeem the man' (I92). Because man imagines himself to be saved, and cannot do otherwise, he is not saved. He is a useless passion.
PART III  DIALECTIC AND IMAGINATION

CHAPTER VII:  THREE DIALECTICAL THINKERS

CONCLUSION
CHAPTER VII: THREE DIALECTICAL THINKERS
In this final chapter I shall attempt to identify various possibilities of a 'dialogue' between imagination and reality. To this end I will offer a critical analysis of three attempts made by contemporary thinkers, of implicit or explicit phenomenological persuasion, to develop a dialectical alternative to the monological theory of imagination presented by Sartre. The three thinkers in question are (1) Gaston Bachelard (2) Martin Buber (3) Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The original contribution of this analysis lies primarily in its identification, selection and synthesis of the pertinent sources in the respective writings of these thinkers (none of the three has a single coherent treatment of imagination); and secondly, in the contrasting and general appraisal of their views in the light of Sartre's dualist treatment. Many of the issues arising here in germinal form (i.e. dialectical intentionality, reciprocity, responsibility, the social and ethical importance of imagining) shall be taken up in our conclusion and explored in a more extensive and original way.

BACHELARD: In L'Eau et les Reves (1942) Bachelard writes: 'In its birth and emergence the image is, in us, the subject of the verb to imagine; but it is not its predicate. The whole world comes to imagine itself in human reverie'. Although the first sentence of this quotation could have been written by Sartre himself, the second most certainly could not. In this pithy pronouncement we find, I suggest, a neat paradigmatic illustration of the essential similarity and difference between Sartre's and Bachelard's phenomenologies of imagination. That is to say, while both agree that the image is the active subject of imagination, they differ radically in their interpretations of this. Sartre sees it as the stepping stone to a pathology of self-deception; Bachelard as the source of man's dialogue with the world.
For Bachelard creativity is not negation of being, but 'a flare-up of being in the imagination'. It is precisely in the creative act that the world comes to know itself in the images of man. This strange fact can only be comprehended within the terms of a phenomenology. 'In order to clarify the problem of the poetic image, philosophically, Bachelard writes: 'We shall have to have recourse to a phenomenology of the imagination' (2). And he goes on to explain that: 'By this should be understood a study of the phenomenon of the image when it emerges into the consciousness as a direct product of the mind, soul and being of man' (3). Bachelard is fully alert to the difficulties involved in a phenomenology of imagination which admits that each new image is an intentional creation of man and yet refuses Sartre's solipsistic conclusions. But this is precisely his position. He writes:

This crisis on the simple level of a new image,
contains the entire paradox of a phenomenology of the imagination, which is: how can an image, at times very unusual, appear to be a concentration of the entire psyche? How - with no preparation - can this singular, short-lived event constituted by the appearance of an unusual poetic image, react on other minds and in other hearts, despite all the barriers of common sense, all the disciplined schools of thought, content in their immobility? (4).

Bachelard's whole phenomenology of imagination is concerned with providing an answer to this question, that is, with providing a justification for a dialogical interpretation of the image.

Before proceeding to an analysis of the difference between Sartre's and Bachelard's theories of imagination, let us first say a word about what they share in common. Most importantly, Bachelard availed of the same phenomenological approach as Sartre. Taking up again the Husserlian quest for a 'science' of imagination, he acknowledged phenomenology as the only alternative to the reductionism of associationist psychology. It alone can provide access to the intentional structures of creative consciousness: 'Only phenomenology - that is to say, consideration of the onset of the image in an individual consciousness - can help us to restore the subjectivity of images and to measure their fullness, their strength and their transsubjectivity' (5). Time and again in his prefaces, Bachelard confirms Sartre's conviction that such a method of unprejudiced description can alone intuit the essence of the image as a sui generis act of consciousness, rather than a 'thing' in consciousness (6).
Bachelard was no less critical than Sartre of the orthodox psychoanalytic method which he felt to be as reductive as traditional psychology in its approach to the image. Freud himself defined the image as a mere sublimated coating for repressed and neurotic impulses\(^7\). The psychoanalytic method was thus conceived as a means for unmasking this veneer, treating the image as a symptom to be diagnosed and deciphered, rather than as something to be admired and appreciated for its own sake\(^8\). Otherwise put, psychoanalysis tried to explain the flower by the fertilizer.

For Bachelard, however, images are much more than the excretions of frustration. They are free expressions, created not from pressure but from play, not from necessity but inventiveness. Thus Bachelard endorses Sartre’s repudiation of the ‘determined’ imagination of psychoanalysis in favour of the ‘symbolic’ imagination of phenomenology. Phenomenologically viewed, the imagination is not the repository of childhood traumas, but the cradle of a renewed world. ‘On principle’, as Bachelard says, ‘phenomenology liquidates what is past and confronts what is new’\(^9\). But unlike Sartre’s phenomenological analysis which considered imagination in a ‘pathological’ light, Bachelard’s phenomenology – for reasons which we will explain shortly – defined it as the ultimate ‘happiness of expression’. Transcending Sartre’s solipsism he hailed the image as man’s stepping stone to the Other\(^10\). Consequently, the imaginative being-there (être-là) of the individual is conceived of by Bachelard as a ‘well-being’ rather than a ‘non-being’. What for Sartre was the epitome of human infirmity is now acclaimed as the epitome of health\(^11\).

Insofar as it condemns the ‘representational’ theories of the traditional psychology of the imagination, Bachelard’s analysis corroborates Sartre’s conviction that the image is an act which transcends reality and frees us accordingly from the constraints of both past and present\(^12\). The image is to be understood as a creation not an effect, and this is possible only in phenomenology where the suspension of all causal preconceptions allows for an assessment of the unprecedented nature of its being. As against classical philosophy, Bachelard claims that ‘a phenomenology of imagination can have no truck with a reduction of the image to a merely predicational form of expression; it must live the
images directly, for when an image is new, the world is also new" (13).

But above all, Bachelard choose phenomenology because of its unique
capacity to penetrate to the intentional significance of the image as
'origination'. 'I chose phenomenology', he says, 'because of its
ability to highlight the image's virtue of origin, to grasp their very
being as originality' (14).

This phenomenological discovery of the 'originality' of the image
leads in turn to the discovery of their 'transsubjectivity'. Unlike
Sartre who saw the intentional uniqueness of each image as implying
solipsism, Bachelard marvelled at the mystery that the image can be
both unique to the originating consciousness and yet common to different
subjects. For Sartre the image was construed as a word of monologue
between the mind and itself. It could be occasioned by an analogue in
the external world, but as an image it remained the prerogative of private
subjectivity. Because it could not reach beyond its own nothingness,
it was defined by Sartre as an 'essential poverty'. For Bachelard, by
contrast, the image was phenomenologically revealed as a word of
dialogue between intentional subjects:

It appears to us that the essential transsubjectivity of the
image cannot be accounted for in terms of objectifying methods.
Only phenomenology - that is to say, the consideration of the
origin of the image in consciousness - can enable us to understand
the subjective source of images and at the same time, their trans-
subjective significance (15).

For both Sartre and Bachelard the phenomenological analysis of imagination
leads to ontological conclusions - that is, a description of the essence
of man's being-in-the-world (16). But whereas the former describes man's
imaginative existence as fundamentally 'ipsorelative', the latter paints
an entirely different picture of the imaginer as 'aliorelative', i.e.
intentionally directed towards the other rather than the self.
Similarly, while Sartre often appears to regard imagination as one
particular mode of intentionality which leads to the disclosure of the
fundamentally negating power of consciousness, Bachelard reverses the
emphasis and regards negation as but one of the many powers of imagination.
Though he agrees with Sartre's definition of imagination as a sui generis
power distinct from perception and conception (17), he views this
distinction as the basis for a fruitful interplay of opposites rather
than for antagonism. Thus Bachelard can hold that 'what man imagines
dictates what he perceives'and that 'it is necessary to imagine too
much in order that we may think, and so realize enough\(^{(18)}\). Consequently, Bachelard concludes that the imagination's negation of reality is not a passage into nothingness but the prerequisite of a redemption of the real. 'To create an image is', he says, 'to renovate our power of seeing the world which for so long has been smothered in lazy familiarity\(^{(19)}\). In other words, the imaginary for Bachelard is not so much a world of unreality as of sur-reality. That is to say, it does not negate reality per se but only the ossified and habitualized crust of reality. It does not annihilate the real world; it transforms it. 'The imagination is not', Bachelard states, 'a faculty which fabricates images of reality; it is a power which forms images which surpass reality in order to change reality. It is the power of a sur-humanity\(^{(20)}\).

Bachelard makes an important distinction at this point between imagination as 'rêve' which is synonymous with pure negation reality (à la Sartre) and which Bachelard equates with common dreams of escapism or sleep; and on the other hand 'reverie' which is imagination in its creative commitment to the recreation of reality\(^{(21)}\). The imagination as reverie is the guardian of the emergence of being. It is the purest expression of human freedom\(^{(22)}\), for it resides at that interstice where being takes leave of itself and launches into becoming. It is precisely because the image (gr: phantasia) is concerned with being in its origination and emergence (phainesthai) that it calls for a phenomenology (phainomenon). Indeed, the artist is renowned for his imagination because he attends more acutely than most to the logos of being's emergence in the world. In this context, Bachelard adduces with full approval Van der Berg's maxim that 'poets and painters are born phenomenologists'\(^{(23)}\). But imagination is fundamentally tied to phenomenology not just because it caters for the 'appearing' of being, but because it exemplifies more intensely than any other human activity, the principal insight of phenomenology that man is an intentional being who 'ceaselessly lives above his being'\(^{(24)}\).

The Bachelardian notion of the imagination as sur-real, as opposed to unreal, does not lapse, as might first be expected, into the traditional error of confounding the imaginary and the real. As sur-real, it remains both sur-real and sur-real; that is, it succeeds in
preserving the claims of both transcendence (beyond the real) and commitment (to the real). For Bachelard there is a continuous path between the imaginative and the real even as there is a continuous divide. In _La Poétique de L’Espace_ he elaborates on this paradox as follows:

By the swiftness of its actions, the imagination separates us from the past as well as from reality; it faces the future. To the function of reality, wise in experience of the past, should be added a function of irreality, which is equally positive. Any weakness in the function of irreality, will hamper the productive psyche. If we cannot imagine, we cannot foresee... the function of the real and the function of the irreal must be made to cooperate(25).

We might summarize the main difference between Bachelard and Sartre here by saying that while the latter saw the image as a surpassing of the real towards nothingness, the former saw it as a surpassing of the real towards an _other_ reality. Consequently, Bachelard can discard the Sartrean conclusion that the image results from a degradation and dis-integration of consciousness, and hold instead that it is imagination which unites man's consciousness with the world and with himself. It is imagination which leads the subject towards his ultimate telos as _l’Homme Reconcilié_(26). Hence the poet's fascination with images which, in Coleridge's phrase 'yoke together opposites'. The imagination strives continually towards a syncopation of contrary elements, as Bachelard amply demonstrates in his analysis of the fascination shown by artists for images of 'roundness' (the synthesis of horizontal and vertical impulses) 'androgyeny' (the synthesis of the _anima_ and the _anima_) and 'cosmic harmony' (the synthesis of the _Natura naturans_ and the _Natura naturata_)(27). In short, imagination is the great synthesizer:

Imagination has the integrating powers of the tree. It is root and branch. It lives between earth and sky. Imagination lives in the earth and in the wind. The imaginative tree is imperceptibly the cosmological tree, the tree which summarizes a universe, which makes a universe(28).

This telos of reconciliation which the imagination presents to man is, of course, presented while it is still really absent. But that is not to say that the telos does not exist. We shall be returning to this point.
We saw how for Sartre the imagination became fascinated by its own creations and fell to the worship of an 'empty Absolute'. For Bachelard the Absolute intended by man is so ontologically rich that it can not ever be 'observed', only 'admired' (29). Sartre had little time for Bachelard's optimism and denounced his notion of imaginative 'quality' in his conclusion to *Etre et le Néant*. In *La Terre et Les Reveries de la Volonté* (1948) Bachelard wrote the following reply:

The imagination of qualities moves beyond given reality. We experience sensual joys but we make of them songs...Quality is, for us, the occasion of such great valorization that the passional value of the quality supplants our consciousness of the quality. The manner in which we love a substance and acclaim its quality, reveals certain resonances in our being. The imagined quality reveals us to ourselves as qualifying subject. And what proves that the field of imagination covers all and surpasses the field of merely perceived qualities is the fact that the resonance evoked in the subject manifests itself under the most dialectically opposed aspects: exuberance and concentration, the man of a thousand welcoming gestures and the man collected together in his sensible pleasure (30).

This conception of the imagination as an inspiration and expiration of Being transcends Sartre's notion of imagination as anihilation of the world condemned to solitary confinement in its own nothingness. Sartre's view is essentially what we might call ecologial: all attempts to move beyond the self and project oneself towards Being, rebound off the frontiers of the ego and slide back into consciousness. He could not accept Bachelard's belief that imagination 'valorizes' the world, for the very concept of valorization presupposes a 'positive' content in the imaginer in order to ground the valorizing intention. But the Sartrean imagination is defined by nothingness, i.e. the lack of all positivity (31).

Bachelard, by contrast, conceives of the imagination as alterological; it is not a privation, but an openness and a listening to the other than self (32). The alterological imagination is two-dimensional. It is at once a giving and a taking, a projection and a discovery, a centrifugal exodus towards things and a centrepetal return to the self. This notion of an interlacing 'rhythm' which spans the breach between subjectivity and being leads us directly to Bachelard's theory of the dialectical imagination.
Bachelard's exposition of a theory of the dialectical imagination is scattered over the prefaces and conclusions of some half dozen critical works. Consequently, it is extremely difficult to discern any systematic classification or development of its main features. For example, Bachelard speaks in all of over ten different types of dialectical imagination (formal, substantial, moral, energizing, poetic, reposing, material, dynamic, etc.). For the sake of clarity in the present analysis, however, we shall group these under the two central forms - the material and the dynamic.

The material imagination is concerned with the affiliation of images according to certain 'archetypal' elements, in particular those of air, fire, water and earth. Bachelard believes these primary elements to be connected in some way with the internal make-up of man. The being of certain materials 'corresponds' with the being of the human subject. Matter supplies the 'images which are necessary for the virtualities of the soul to be distinguished and developed'\(^\text{(33)}\). Through the objects' intentional 'otherness', a reciprocal energy is produced by consciousness' encounter with matter:

\[\text{Matter is our energetic mirror; it is a mirror which focuses our powers in illumining them with imaginative joys...in other words, in the realm of the imagination the dualism of subject and object is presented at its truest equilibrium...Matter contains beauty as an affective space hidden in the interior of things}\(^\text{(34)}\).\]

Correspondence is not so much a question of an intellectual abstraction from matter as a discovery of the self in matter. Matter harbours an objective correlative for all our possibilities within itself. And so 'the material imagination can', Bachelard maintains, 'find in the very depth of materials all of the symbols of the inner life'\(^\text{(35)}\). Imagination and matter are commensurate.

As examples of imaginative 'archetypes' particularly rich in their reconciliation of diverse associations, Bachelard cites the womb, the shell, the labyrinth, the snake, the forest and the house. These archetypes are not so much simple images as axes according to which a host of images may conspire to evoke 'typical' and aboriginal experiences\(^\text{(36)}\). But the archetypes of the material imagination are not confined to the
past. They do not 'determine' us like ancestral genes or private (Freud) or collective (Jung) traumas. They are concerned with 'origins' in a very different sense; in the sense of making us originators of our own future and allowing us to intuit matter teleologically as a task to be discovered rather than a 'thing' to be negated. As Bachelard states:

It is not a question here of the survival of primitive phantasms. The figure of origin is rather transformed into a symbol for the constructive reunion of contraries, into a truly 'reconciling symbol'. This archetype in its functional signification does not point backwards but forwards towards an end which is not yet attained.(37)

Thus we see that in his understanding of symbolism, Bachelard was once again in profound disagreement with Sartre. Sartre saw the symbol as an invention of the self which was irredeemably confined to the significance which the self gave it. For Bachelard, however, the symbol constitutes an archetypal conjoining of self-contents with other-than-self contents. The imagination's allegiance is not only to an origin in the ego but also to an origin in the other which motivates the ego's perpetual movement towards its end. Here, I suggest, Bachelard approximates very closely to the Husserlian notion of the teleological imagination.

Bachelard's theory of imaginative archetypes is an attempt to transcend both the egological psychology of Sartre and the reductive psychoanalysis of Freud and Jung. His aim is to inaugurate a 'counter-psychoanalysis' based on a 'hermeneutic of listening' as opposed to the traditional 'hermeneutic of suspicion' which decomposed every image in order to try and situate its source in the neuroses of the imaginer's past. In a sense, Sartre was as guilty as the determinists in this respect viz. his interpretation of Genet's, Baudelaire's and Flaubert's fascination for the imaginary in terms of some personal pathology of existence. Bachelard believed on the contrary, that images can have a life of their own and that in order to fully appreciate the ontological dimension of images, one must be prepared on occasions to 'forget one's private past for the sake of the speaking power of reverie.'(38)

But we must not misunderstand Bachelard here. He has no wish to advocate any monistic principle of Being à la Heidegger or Parmenides. To classify images according to archetypes is in no way to detract from
the multiplicity of being. The fact that one proclaims certain images to be 'isomorphic', as Bachelard often does, is not to suggest that they are synonymous or reducible the one to the other. It is simply to suggest that they share certain archetypal properties in common. Archetypes transcend the law of individuation in its limiting and isolationist sense. But they do so not in order to deny the plurality of existence, but rather to enable a plurality of existents to partake in a community of experience, at once transsubjective and transhistorical (39). In this sense, Bachelard rescues imagination from the Sartrean circle of solipsism, without falling into the other extreme of monism.

Bachelard relates the archetypal filiation of images to an 'essential cosmicity' (40). The material imagination, he claims, finds its echo in a certain cosmic rhythm which beats at the heart of matter. To 'imagine' the rhythm of any primary element is to create a liaison between this element as systole and diastole of one's own innermost self. This is why the different elements characterize, for Bachelard, different human temperaments - Nietzsche is a lover of air, Poe a lover of water etc. In brief, by creating images from the materials which mirror his own being, the imaginer enters into dialogue with his own self, rather than dividing him from himself as Sartre maintained.

The material imagination thus constitutes an at-one-ment between man and the world, a repose. Its tempo is a languorous one and it tends towards a condition of order and tranquility (41). But as we have already had occasion to remark, every primary image harbours within itself a certain diversity or contradictoriness, and this means that it foments movement and becoming, even as it approaches immobility and rest. This concomitant principle of becoming leads us to the second principal dimension of imagination, the dynamic.

The dynamic imagination is the formal counterpart to the material (42). It articulates man's desire for the free-ranging and more spiritual modalities of being. To this end it strives continually to subject matter to movement. For example, 'in the order of dynamic imagination, all forms are furnished with movement: one cannot imagine a sphere without having it turn, an arrow without having it fly, a woman without having her smile' (43).
This second major form of the dialectical imagination throws new light on the concept of archetype. As an agent of dynamism the originality of the Bachelardian notion is thrown into relief. The stress here on man's creative and transformative will differs from both the Neoplatonist conception of the archetype as a regulative and Immutable Idea, and its more sophisticated Jungian one as an innate repository of the Collective Unconscious. The archetype now emerges as the expression of an instinctual intentionality in man which, while indeed being 'regulative' as the Neoplatonists suggested and 'collective' as Jung realized, remains essentially anterior to the 'deterministic' principles of these two theories. As dynamic will man is neither determined from below (by ancestral archetypes) nor from above (by transcendental ones). He is not determined by anything, but determines himself in response to certain archetypal correspondences of his consciousness to matter. If a man imagines he is flying for example, this is not necessarily as the Neoplatonists might suggest because God 'implanted' this image of 'ascent' in his mind; nor indeed as Jung might suggest, because such an experience engraved itself in illo tempore into primitive consciousness. A man imagines he is flying, according to Bachelard, because such an image is one among other expressions of a free 'will to movement'.

Confronted with the materials of the world, the dynamic imagination charges man's instinct to form and cultivate. We are, as Bachelard once put it, 'like demiurges before the kneading-trough: we structure the becoming of matter'. For this imagination, matter does not signify - as for Sartre - an intractable and viscous resistance to our freedom. It is rather a call to our freedom: the very paste of possibility from which we must wrest a new form.

On several occasions, Bachelard identifies the will to movement with what he calls 'will to Logos'. In this connection he distinguishes between 'metaphors' which are mere mental illustrations of perceptions, and 'images proper' which are the utterances of an essential dynamism of being:

The metaphor gives concrete body to impressions otherwise difficult to express. It bears a merely accidental relationship to the being of the imagination. The image...on the contrary, takes all its being from imagination. The image, pure product of the absolute
imagination is a phenomenon of being, the specific phenomenon of speaking being (être parlant)\(^{(46)}\).

This connection between expression and imagination is a vital one for Bachelard and is deeply related to his conception of man as an intentional being. Most of the time, man masks the intentional power of his language by using words in a strictly utilitarian, viz. 'metaphorical' way. This power is revealed, however, the moment man uses words 'imaginatively'. Bachelard illustrates this point in his discussion of the literary image:

The literary image does not come to dress a naked image, nor to give word to a mute image. The imagination, in us, speaks...every human activity wishes to speak. When this word becomes conscious of itself then human activity desires to write...Literature is not therefore the offshoot of another activity. It is the fulfilment of human desire as it emerges in imagination\(^{(47)}\).

Bachelard situates this 'will to Logos' at the roots of the dynamic imagination\(^{(48)}\). It is a projection of the creative logos of man that is at the same time a discovery of the created logos of the world. This analysis of the close rapport between imagination and language is original to the phenomenology of Bachelard; certainly, there is no adequate discussion of it in either Husserl or Sartre. If anything in fact, Sartre's theory of the heterogeneity of image and sign would point to a denial of any such link. For Bachelard it was the linguistic expressivity of imagination which belied Sartre's theory of dualism by revealing its creative role in both thought\(^{(49)}\) and our relationship to nature:

Images are born directly from the murmuring voice...spoken nature awakens natura naturans which produces natura naturata - to which one listens in speaking nature. Yes, as so many poets have said, nature speaks for those who listen to it. Everything speaks in the universe, but it is man, the great speaker, who says the first words.\(^{(50)}\)

But more generally speaking, Bachelard's notion of the image as intentional dynamism concurs with Husserl's and Sartre's rejection of the traditional 'faint-copy' theory. In \textit{La Terre et les Rêveries de la Volonté} (1948), Bachelard declares it his express intention to 'refute this doctrine clearly and to try to establish a thesis which affirms the primitive and fundamental character of the creative imagination'.\(^{(51)}\).
This vindication of the creative power of the imagination was accompanied by the unprecedented conviction that any human deprived of this power is 'just as neurotic as someone deprived of the function of the real' (52). Far from being the traditional faculty for receiving and combining second-hand impressions, Bachelard conceived it phenomenologically as an activity which de-forms the habitual status of being and in-forms it with the status of becoming. Hence Bachelard's famous definition of man as a being who continually renews himself by means of the imagination: 'Man is a being to be imagined' (53). But because man is so firmly immured in habit and convention, his innate need for dynamic renovation is all the more acute. This need finds expression (when it does find expression) in the dynamic activity of imagination which Bachelard calls 'iconoclasm' (54). The iconoclastic function of imagination serves to demystify not only the immobilizing prestige of reality but also the 'fascinating' power of imagination itself. Bachelard avoided the Sartrean confusion concerning the role of imagination as both freedom and fascination, by making a distinction here between 'authentic' and 'inauthentic' imagination:

To be authentic, all imagination must learn again how to dream... and at the same time, how to break the fascination of images in order to keep the way clear for imagination's propulsion towards the absolute... the authentic image renews not by a renunciation of imagination but by its fulfilment... it does not represent something, it addresses someone (55).

It was, I contend, precisely Sartre's failure to appreciate the iconoclastic power of an 'authentic' imagination, that lead to his blanket characterization of the imagination as an impoverishment of being.

For Bachelard then the image does not only signify the intuitional fulfilment of an intention - à la Husserl and Sartre. It is also a dynamic propulsion towards novelty which is quite as destructive of its own 'inauthentic' images as it is of 'inauthentic' reality. That is to say, it is both critique of reality and auto-critique at the same time. The dynamic imagination smashes all idols of stasis regardless of their being, and calls for a continual metamorphosis. Here Bachelard makes the original point that imagination can be a discriminating and moral agent, or what he usually calls a 'valorizing' agency. 'Here', proclaims Bachelard, 'is one of the great ontological principles of imagination: valorization decides being' (56). We shall be examining this essential rapport between imagination and morality in our conclusion.
By recognizing imagination as an intentionality of perpetual self-transcendence rather than of self-fascination, Bachelard succeeded in exonerating it from the traditional charge of idolatry, dating back to the Hebraic prohibition of 'graven images' (57). In Bachelard's view, man's fascination for the 'empty absolutes' of his own imagination, cannot but be short lived for the reason that the very imagination which defies its own creations is at the same time driven by an opposing instinct for dynamic change and renewal. This recognition of a double intentionality in imagination— one material, tending towards incarnation and repose; the other dynamic and tending towards dis-incarnation and unrest— was what constituted for Bachelard the dialectical nature of this power.

If we were to deprive imagination of its dialectical complementarity, its material instinct would move towards a condition of inertia and idolatry, and its dynamic instinct towards a condition of frenzy and frustration. The dialectical imagination balances these two tendencies and makes of their opposition a creative interplay. As Bachelard himself puts it: 'the imagination of movement calls for the imagination of matter and vice versa' (58). For example, the freedom from the world affected by the dynamic imagination is dialectically converted into the material imagination's freedom for the world. And precisely because of this dialectic the world for which we are now freed is always other than the world from which we are freed. In the discovery of this 'other' world, moreover, the self discovers its 'other' self (59).

By allowing for this dialogue between my other-self and the other-world, the dialectical imagination reveals a new dimension of being. This new dimension is what Bachelard calls 'anti-existence' (50).

In sum, while the dynamic imagination discovers a reciprocal counterpoint in matter, the material reveals itself by means of a certain rhythmical dynamism: the former valorizes the latter; the latter grounds the former. As an agent of such dialectic, the imagination finds itself in a world of which it is both the creature and the creator. 'When the imagination speaks', as Bachelard put it, 'which speaks, it or the world?' (61). The archetypes of imagination, we now realize, can only emerge as the world's confirmation of an imaginative intention;
the material response to a dynamic address. They are the points of profoundest intersection between man and reality. Bachelard's repudiation of the Sartrean theory of imagination as nothingness could not be more explicit:

Imagination does not know non-being...the man of reverie lives by his reverie in a world homogenous with his being, with his half-being...the world is no longer opposed to the world. In reverie, there is no more not-I. In reverie, the not no longer functions: all is welcome(62).

BUBER: Bachelard's intuition of this dialogical nature of imagination is what sets him off most radically from Sartre, and aligns him with two other thinkers, Martin Buber and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Bachelard frequently availed of Buber's I-Thou terminology in order to describe man's dialectical relation to the world, and it seems that both his and Buber's understanding of the imagination stems from the same phenomenological principle of intentional reciprocity(63). There has been considerable critical debate as to whether Buber is a phenomenologist at all. The followers of Dilthey are particularly vociferous in their objections(64). But I do not intend to enter this debate in this thesis. Besides, the question has already been adequately dealt with by Patrick Hederman in his Phenomenology and Education (1975), where he examines the close rapport between Buber and three other phenomenological existentialists, Husserl, Levinas and Marcel, to support his conclusion that Buber can legitimately be called a phenomenologist. The important point here however, is that whatever about his philosophy in general, his philosophy of imagination is clearly based upon the phenomenological theory of intentionality.

In the Knowledge of Man (1953), Buber examines the personalist implications of a dialogical notion of imagination. Although he follows Sartre's basic tenet that the image is a presence-in-absence, his claim that imagination is indispensable to genuine human communication is a clear departure from Sartre's solipsistic conclusion. Buber explains the dialogical function of imagination as follows:
The realization of the principle in the sphere between men reaches its height in an event which may be called 'making present...'. It rests on a capacity possessed to some extent by everyone, which may be described as 'imagining the real': I mean the capacity to hold before one's soul a reality arising at this moment but not able to be directly experienced. Applied to intercourse between men, 'imagining the real means that I imagine to myself what another man is at this very moment—wishing, feeling, perceiving, thinking, and not as a detached content but in his very reality, that is, as a living process in this man (65).

The 'imagining of the real' may on occasion, Buber adds, accede to an even more fundamental plane of relation, when sympathy as an awareness becomes sympathy as an experience. No longer the 'object' of my concern, the other now enters into communion with me by means of my imaginative openness to him, and becomes 'a self for me, by becoming a self with me'. This move from a purely psychological empathy to an ontological experience can only occur when the other recognizes the fact that he is being made present to me and reciprocates my 'presentifying' intention with an intention of inmost self-becoming. In this mutuality of imaginative 'making present' therefore, men can succeed in transcending their given being and fulfil their promise of becoming. Beginning as two beings 'presenting' each other to each other from a distance, they gradually overcome this distance in a relation where the innermost will of the respective Thou coincides with the will of each I. 'In the full present', Buber writes, 'something of the character of what is imagined is joined to the act of the imagining of the other's act of will and so on' (66). Without this 'imaginative' movement beyond the self which confirms the self as the self, man cannot become what he instinctively desires to become - 'perfect'.

Buber elaborates on this notion of imagination as an intentionality of 'perfect relation', in an essay entitled 'Man and His Image Work' (1963). The analysis here extends the personality implications of this relation into the realm of aesthetics and ontology. Setting out to explain Durer's famous maxim that 'art truly is hidden in nature; he who can tear it out, has it', Buber develops a theory of dialogue remarkably similar to Bachelard's account of the dialectical imagination. Nature, Buber maintains, possesses a hidden potential which can only be actualized by man. Imagination is that specific human power capable of
'figuring forth' this unfinished blueprint. Instead of 'using' or 'possessing' nature as our habitual consciousness tends to do, imagination approaches it 'reverently' with a view to envisioning its possible modes of becoming. This vision is itself necessarily dependent on a prior dialogue between man and being:

Vision is figurating faithfulness to the unknown and does its work in cooperation with it. It is faithfulness not to the appearance but to being - to the inaccessible with which we associate...All visibility has a direction towards figuration(67).

In other words, imaginative vision presupposes a certain obedience to being. Bachelard, as we noted, called this a 'hermeneutic of listening'. In contrast, Sartre, whose dualism is entirely refractory to 'dialogue' of any sort, called it but another instance of 'bad faith'. Moving beyond dualism, Buber describes the artist as one who is so 'full of image' himself that he can intuit and recreate the image implicit in nature. The artist is usually the first to apprehend the image because he is prepared to 'play' with the world by means of imagination, rather than merely 'process' it in common perception. Once again we find the basic phenomenological insight that imagination and perception are sui generis modes of intentionality:

Perception draws out of the being the world we need - only vision and in its wake, art, transcend need and make the superfluous into the necessary. The artist is the man who instead of objectifying what is over against him, forms it into an image...apprehending it by virtue of the completed figuration, the becoming of the image(68).

By virtue of his dialogical relation to nature, the artist brings its undiscovered logos into being. Thus Buber defines 'artistic imagination' as a 'discovery through figuration'(69). The artist is one called by being to deepen ordinary perception into vision, and to thereby 'exceed the needed for the intended'. 'The intended' refers here to that innate telos of imagination which Buber describes as a 'perfection in relation'(70). He argues that this 'image-work' is 'a power available to all men who are prepared to imagine' and is as integral to love, education and religion as it is to art itself. In this sense, Buber's analysis confirms the central phenomenological postulate that imagination is not just a psychological faculty but a fundamental orientation of man's entire being. Indeed Buber's conclusion to this essay, while
thoroughly original in respect of his own 'personalist' approach, serves to confirm both Husserl's discovery of the imagination as sui generis and Bachelard's discovery of its dialogical nature:

The artist whose meetings with the object are of an intensity peculiar to him, does not content himself with beholding what the common human world of the senses makes perceptible to him. He wants to experience and realize the perfection of the relation to the substratum of the sense things, through the figuration in the vision and in work... It is indeed, neither the mystery of the things nor that of the spirit that is represented in art, but the relation between the substantia humana and the substantia rerum; it is the realm of the 'between' which has become form(71).

MERLEAU-PONTY: Unlike Bachelard or Sartre for example, Merleau-Ponty gave no continuous or comprehensive analysis of imagination. His pronouncements on the subject are as cursory as they are widespread throughout his works. There is, nonetheless, a consistency and perspicacity to his overall treatment which emerges, under critical scrutiny, as a significant contribution to the development of a phenomenology of imagination. The main works dealt with in the following summary presentation are The Visible and the Invisible (1964), 'Eye and the Mind' (1964) and The Phenomenology of Perception (1945).

Merleau-Ponty's treatment of imagination, despite its scattered and unsystematic nature, constitutes yet another attempt to formulate a theory of dialectical imagination. The following passage from The Visible and the Invisible clearly shows the author's disagreement with Sartre and agreement with Bachelard on this subject.

For Sartre (the imaginary) is negation of negation, an order in which annihilation is applied to itself and consequently counts as a positio of being although it would absolutely not be its equivalent and although the least fragment of true, transcendent being immediately reduces the imaginary... Being and the imaginary are for Sartre 'objects', 'entities' - for me they are 'elements' in Bachelard's sense, that is, not objects, but fields, subdued being, non-thetic being, being before being; and moreover involving their auto-inscription, their subjective correlatives is a part of them - this is not coincidence but a dehiscence which knows itself as such(72).
Merleau-Ponty reveals here a concern to rescue imagination from the alienated and 'objective' status with which Sartre endowed it, and to have it recognized as a fundamental expression of Being. He does not for a moment wish to suggest that the 'imaginary' is but one among other 'things'. Far from relapsing into the illusion of immanence, Merleau-Ponty, like his phenomenological colleagues, continually upheld the unique and irreducible intentionality of imagination. He differed from his most intimate colleague - Sartre, however, in arguing that the fact that the image is an intentionality different from all other modes of being, does not mean that it is a non-being; or worse, some sort of negative 'entity'. On the contrary, imagination may in fact boast of a privileged access to the hidden dimensions of Being: what Bachelard called 'anti-existence', what Buber called 'the secret of perfect relation' and what Merleau-Ponty himself terms 'the Invisible'. This Invisible, he says, can be imagined but it cannot be seen. It is not non-existent: but rather pre-existent in the visible:

This visible not actually seen is not the Sartrean imaginary: presence to the absent or of the absent. It is a presence of the immanent, the latent, or the hidden - something Bachelard understood when he said that each sense has its own imaginary(73).

As soon as a positive ontological validity is ascribed thus to the imaginary, the way is open for an investigation of the particular 'symbolique' of each realm of being. Every 'visible' dimension of being is for Merleau-Ponty correlative to an invisible or imaginary dimension. In this sense, not only each 'element', 'nation', 'individual' or 'sense' may be regarded as having a unique form of imaginative intentionality, but even each major function of the human body. To recognize such a pluralism is not only to deepen our understanding of the world but also to humanise our understanding of ourselves. As Merleau-Ponty puts it in Existence et Dialectique (1971) for example:

We refuse and have always refused to reduce the phallus to a part of the objective body as an organ of micturition and copulation, a power of causality governing a quantity of behaviours. What we have learned from our (phenomenological) study of dreams, images, and behaviour and finally, of the unique reverie of the body, is to discern an imaginary (imaginaire) of the phallus, a symbolic phallus, oniric or poetic. It is not the utilizable, functional, prosaic body which explains man: on the contrary, the body is precisely human to the extent that it discovers its symbolic and poetic charge(74).
Merleau-Ponty approaches the phenomenon of 'dreaming' in a similar way. The dream, he declares, is a unique expression of one's corporeal ontology. As 'imaginary', it signifies a mode of being without a real and perceiving body; or if one prefers, a mode of being 'with an imaginary body without weight' (75). Thus understood, the imaginary is salvaged from its Sartrean caricature as a non-being which falsely lays claim to perceptual being (hence his theory of quasi-observation), and is acknowledged 'as the true Stiftung of Being of which the observation and the articulated body are special variants' (76). There is, Merleau-Ponty suggests, a fundamental being of the 'body-subject' which persists throughout its many forms of expression, an invisible foundation from which all our visible actions spring.

Each realm of being is divided accordingly by a 'chiasmus' of visibility and invisibility. These chiasmic poles are not, however, mutually exclusive in the way that being and nothingness are for Sartre. For though they may be said to constitute the unique worlds of perception and imagination respectively, they remain at all times founded in a Being more fundamental than both, and in the light of which both are seen to correspond. In other words, the imagination addresses an invisible meaning in the visible world and the world responds, only because both participate in a common core of Being. It is precisely because of this cognate genesis that imagination may serve as an agent of creative dialogue rather than monologue. Above all else then, and here we find the common source of Bachelard, Buber and Merleau-Ponty's refutation of the Sartrean theory, imagination is dialectical. This point is made in the following classic, though unfortunately rather unclear, passage:

Meaning is invisible, but the invisible is not the contradictory of the visible: the visible itself has an invisible inner framework (membrane) and the in-visible is the secret counterpart of the visible - one cannot see it there and every effort to see it there makes it disappear, but it is in the line of the visible, it is its virtual focus, it is inscribed within it in filigree... One cannot account for this double 'chiasm' by the cut of the for-itself and the cut of the In-itself. A relation to Being is needed that would form itself within Being. This, at bottom, is what Sartre was looking for. But since for him there is no interior except me, and every other is exteriority, Being for him remains pure positivity, object, and the for-itself participates in it only through a sort of folly (77).

Briefly stated, Merleau-Ponty wished to ground the Sartrean imagination (as pure for-itself) in some fundamental ontology, and thereby rescue it from the hell of its own self-negation. He wished to establish the real
and the imaginary as two separate but corresponding realms: separate that is, on the level of ordinary being, but corresponding—though never identical—on the level of fundamental Being. That his theory and terminology is extraordinarily close to that of Heidegger is undeniable; nor does Merleau-Ponty himself have any wish to deny it. In fact in the final pages of *The Visible and the Invisible* (posthumously published), he explicitly acknowledges his debt to his fellow phenomenologist. This debt is nowhere more apparent than in his various attempts to formulate the ontology of the Invisible viz., 'the explosion of Being which is forever', 'the universal dimensionality which is Being', 'the existential eternity - the eternal body',(78) etc. But the influence of Heidegger's fundamental ontology does not detract in the least from the originality of Merleau-Ponty's application of it to the question of the imaginary.

In 'Eye and the Mind', the last study that Merleau-Ponty wrote before his death, he develops the dialectical notion of imagination and attempts to derive from it an ontology of art. He begins by confirming Sartre's exposure of the Hellenic fallacy of the image. 'The word image is' he says, 'in bad repute because we have thoughtlessly believed that a design was a tracing, a copy, a second thing, and that the mental image was such a design'. But if in fact, 'it is nothing of the kind', then, he concludes, 'neither the design nor the painting belongs to the in-itself.'(79) Merleau-Ponty then proceeds to explicitly establish the basic difference between his and Sartre's 'ontological' assessment of the imagination:

The picture and the actor's fantasy—imaginary—are not devices to be borrowed from the real world in order to signify prosaic things which are absent. For the imaginary is much nearer to, and much farther away from, the actual—nearer because it is in my body as a diagram of the life of the actual...farther away from the actual because the painting is an analogue or likeness only according to the body; because it does not present the mind with an occasion to rethink the constitutive relations of things; because, rather... it offers to vision its inward tapestries, the imaginary texture of the real(80).

The image, for Merleau-Ponty, is not just a ruse for making the absent present, but a unique mode of expressing that hidden logos of lines, colours, gestures and textures which determines our vision—much in the same way as marrow determines the growth of a bone. He attempts to
explicate Cezanne's puzzling credo that 'nature is in the inside' by outlining a certain dialectical interrelation between a secret visibility (i.e. in-visibility) of the body and a corresponding secret visibility of things. 'Things have an internal equivalent in me', Merleau-Ponty explains, 'they arouse in me a carnal formula of their presence'. Why then, he asks 'shouldn't these correspondences in their turn give rise to some external visible shape in which anyone else would recognize these motifs which support his own inspection of the world'. The artist is he who fashions these correspondences into such visible shapes. Thus each art work serves in some sense as a 'blueprint of the genesis of things'. Once completed, the work is capable of awakening those 'powers dormant in ordinary vision' which Merleau-Ponty calls, in a phrase similar to Bachelard's, 'the secret of preexistence'.

The artist breaks the skin of existence in order to disclose the generating axis of its becoming. And insofar as he is successful, his act of imaginative disclosure is reciprocated by an objective act of epiphany. The artist's vision is then much more than just a view upon the outside, a merely representational or imitative relation with the world. 'The world no longer stands before him through representation', Merleau-Ponty tells us, 'rather it is the artist to whom the things of the world give birth by a sort of concentration or coming-to-itself of the visible'. Thus it is that by reaching beyond the visual givens, the imaginative painter opens himself to the in-visible dialectic of Being:

He paints...because the world has at least once emblazoned in him the (invisible) cyphers of the visible...(which) is both out there in the world and here in the heart of vision - the same, or if one prefers, a similar thing, but according to an efficacious similarity which is the parent, the genesis, the metamorphosis of Being in his vision.

And Merleau-Ponty concludes from this that there must be a certain dialectical 'expiration and inspiration of Being, action and passion so slightly discernible that it becomes impossible to distinguish between what paints and what is painted'.

Developing Husserl's discovery of imagination as a sui generis mode of intentionality, Merleau-Ponty declares that the image can never be visible in the sense of a thing to be perceived; and that this accounts.
furthermore, for the spectator's inability to say exactly where the
da painting which he imaginatively intends actually is. It is, he suggests,
'more accurate to say that I see according to it or with it, than that
I see it'(85). The fact that the image is not a copy of visible reality
does not necessarily mean however, that it is its total negation as
Sartre concluded. The painted image does not renounce, but rather
redeems the visible by disclosing its in-visible genesis. Painting is
the transmutation of a carnal surface into a certain carnal 'essence',
which in turn relates to its surface not as a soul to a body or a Platonic
form to matter, but as an inside to an outside. This is why, for Merleau-
Ponty, the fact that one's gaze cannot situate the image of a painting
does not mean that one must gaze at 'nothing'. It is more correct to
say that one gazes at 'the halos of Being'(86).

In other words, the imagination's transcendence of reality is
grounded in a fundamental bedrock of Being which saves it from the verdict
of non-being. Though Merleau-Ponty frequently speaks of imagination as
both a presence in absence and an absence in presence, it is always as
an absence and a presence which presupposes Being. Imaginative vision
is not, he points out, 'a certain mode of thought or presence to itself';
it is the 'means given me for being absent from myself, for being present
at the fission of Being from the inside - the fission at whose termination,
and not before, I come back to myself'(87). The difference between this
dialectical notion of presence-in-absence and Sartre's non-dialectical
notion is made even more explicit in the following passage:

 Every visual something, individual as it is, functions also as a
dimension, because it gives itself as the result of a dehiscence
of Being. What this ultimately means is that the proper essence
of the visible is to have a layer of invisibility in the strict
sense, which it makes present as a certain absence(88).

It should now be evident that Merleau-Ponty's dialectical notion of
presence-in-absence as invisibility, no more signifies nothingness than
does Bachelard's dialectical notion of absence as otherness. Both
phenomenologists availed of the Sartrean term (absence) but invested it
with a positive ontological status. It was, indeed, one of their common
aims to root imagination in a 'primordial ground' and as corollary, to
demonstrate its privileged access to the 'genesis' of things. The
subsequent revelation of the imaginary as an invisible (Merleau-Ponty)
and sur-real (Bachelard) dimension of Being, led in both cases to the characterization of imagination as an agency of dialogue:

There is no break at all in this circuit: it is impossible to say that nature ends here and man or expression starts here. It is, therefore, mute Being which itself comes to show forth its own meaning (99).

By tracing the phenomenological discovery of the image as an intentional act of relation to its positive ontological ground, Merleau-Ponty and Bachelard, and indeed Buter also, unanimously declared the primary function of the imagination to be a dialogue between the inside and the outside, between the being-that-is-in-the-world and the world-that-he-is-in, grounded on a mutual rootedness in a fundamental Being which is in both. In this discovery, Sartre's dualism of imagination and reality is dialectically transcended.

Merleau-Ponty's acknowledgment of a dialogue between the imaginary and the real enables him to relate art to politics without committing the folly of reducing the one to the other as Sartre ultimately did. In Adventures of the Dialectic Merleau-Ponty, as we saw, put forward a convincing explanation of Sartre's swing from the extreme of an a-political imagination to the extreme of an imaginative politics. His monistic reduction of politics to the imaginary was shown to stem directly from its opposite - a naive dualism between the imaginary and the political. Both these extremes were seen to arise from the lack of any principle of dialectical mediation.

Consequently, Sartre's transition from a radically disengaged to a radically engaged notion of art, constitutes a volte-face. It has no explanation whatsoever other than Sartre's own choice. Consistent with this voluntarist premiss, the imaginative consciousness takes itself for an omnipotent magician and reduces the world of action to a theatre. Sartre's reduction of real praxis to unreal phantasy is what Merleau-Ponty in a now well known phrase called 'the myth of the mandarins which reunites the fantasy of total knowledge and pure action' (90). Unwilling to accept the delegation of the party's function to himself, Sartre chose to delude himself that imaginative writing is a pure political action. 'To judge otherwise', as Merleau-Ponty points out, 'one must live in a universe where everything is meaning, politics as well as literature: literature
and politics are really united to each other...but as two divergent viewpoints on a single symbolic life or history' (91).

In the perspective of a dialectical imagination, art and politics can converge to form a unity-in-distinction. Their distinctiveness as two principles of dialectical contrariety - art concerned with the emergence of the invisible; politics concerned with the organization of the visible - speaks for itself. On the other hand, their unity is to be understood in terms of a common symbolic life which subtends both. The ontological dimensions of this life were expounded by Merleau-Ponty in *The Visible and the Invisible* and 'L'Oeil et l'Esprit'. While we have already outlined his ontological position in these works, it is necessary - if we are to complete the picture - to situate this within the general perspective of his phenomenological psychology, with particular reference to his key distinction between 'primordial' and 'secondary' expression.

In *The Structure of Behaviour* (1942) and more importantly in *The Phenomenology of Perception* (1945), Merleau-Ponty advances the notion of a primordial expression by means of which the body-subject structures his experience in a movement towards equilibrium. This primordial structuring of the environment by an organism constitutes a certain 'style'. Style is like a fingerprint; it is possessed by all, but each in a unique way. Accordingly, human existence must be considered as a 'style' which each man 'embodies' in his struggle to achieve an individual equilibrium within a global environment.

All styles, which range from sexual to artistic expression, succeed in dialectically uniting man's imaginative and perceptual intentionalities in a common nexus of symbolic projection. For Merleau-Ponty, in contradiction to Sartre, there is no quarrel between the claims of imaginative unreality and perceptual reality. Both share a common cause of incarnating meaning in the world.

In order to best illustrate this primordial communion of the imaginary and the real, Merleau-Ponty chooses the act of love. He categorically rejects Sartre's alternativism of sadism and masochism, declaring that the body in an act of love is a perfect synthesis of the form of expression and the feeling expressed, both instrument for the one and
object for the other partner. He compares the act of sexual communication here to a successful aesthetic expression, where there is no distinction to be made between either intention and deed or body (en-soi) and consciousness (pour-soi). Because of his discovery of an internal rapport between imaginative and perceptual expression. Merleau-Ponty can conclude that all of men's actions are in some sense symbolic (92). The corporeal, far from being opposed to the imaginary is, he argues, its most effective mode of incarnation in the world. The body-subject as the organ which carries meaning and value into the world is the image made flesh. With this dialectic of the corporeal and the imaginary, Merleau-Ponty refutes the schism which vitiated Sartre's theory of intersubjective relations. 'There is no choice', he asserts, 'between the for-itself and the for-others...in the moment of expression, the other to whom I address my self, and myself in the act of expression are linked without reserve' (93).

Every individual has his own style - even if that style be an improvisation on some more collective or popular style e.g. Dadaism, Beatlemania, or Bogartism - and to this extent at least, is an artist. Whether this style is to be considered genuine art or mere artifice is a question which can only be decided at the level of what Merleau-Ponty calls 'secondary expression'. Secondary expression unlike the projective spontaneity of 'primordial expression' is reflective and critical. It presupposes, if it is to operate correctly, an 'eidetic reduction' whose aim it is 'to make our reflections equal to the non-reflective life of consciousness' (94).

Subjecting the whole question of style to critical scrutiny, Merleau-Ponty defines genuine art as the creative and original structuring of the world. Style becomes mere artifice, he says, when it no longer serves as a means to communicate and becomes instead an end in itself. He objects strongly to Malraux's apotheosis of subjective genius and continually reminds us that the imagination too must live and breathe 'in situation'. Genuine art is not then the prerogative of the individualist visionary but an act of cultural communication between the artist and his fellow men. Style should not be seen as something final as Malraux and many Formalist critics have argued, for it constitutes a primordial expression which epitomizes not only a synchronic project of the individual imagination but also a diachronic interaction of this imagination with the universal
history which grounds it. The modern movement in painting is seen by Merleau-Ponty as a good expression of this double allegiance:

Modern painting is concerned with quite a different problem from that of the return to the individual: the problem of knowing how one can communicate without the help of a pre-established Nature on which all of our senses are opened, how each of us is enmeshed in the universal by that which is most peculiar to ourselves(95).

This 'universal', as Merleau-Ponty shows in his later ontological works, can only be understood in terms of a fundamental dehiscence of Being which links together the dialectical poles of the imaginary and the actual. Because of this universal bedrock of Being, Merleau-Ponty can argue for a continuity of art and life. The painter or poet does not differ in any qualitative sense from his fellow men but only in terms of the precision, coherence and consistency of his form. Merleau-Ponty's position thus serves to derogate the Romantic cult of 'genius' and to emancipate the hidden artist in each man by demonstrating that his every gesture is constitutive of a primordially creative project. In short, the artist is nothing more nor less than man written large:

The movement of the artist in tracing his arabesques in infinite matter serves to amplify but also to continue, the simpler marvel of directed locomotion of simple grasping gestures...We are interested in the expressive function of the human body which was already begun in the least act of perception, and which has since been amplified into painting and art. The field of pictorial meanings has been opened up since the time of man's first appearance in the world. And the first designs drawn on the walls of caves were able to establish a tradition only because they reaped the benefits of another: that of perception(96).

In a study of Cézanne Merleau-Ponty reiterates Sartre's view that all art calls for an 'enlivening' imaginer. Merleau-Ponty goes far beyond Sartre, however, in his declaration that this enlivening is grounds for the celebration of their common humanity. Reciprocity, not solipsism, is the predominant theme of Merleau-Ponty's aesthetic. He writes:

The painter could only make an image. One must wait for that image to be animated by others. Then the work of art will have joined these separated lives; it will no longer exist solely in one of them like a tenacious dream or persistent delirium, or even in space as a colored canvass: it will inhabit several minds indivisibly, even presumably every possible mind, as a perpetual human acquisition(97).
Whereas Sartre had maintained that the image teaches us nothing since it is a mere investion of consciousness, containing nothing more than what consciousness already knew, Merleau-Ponty retorts that the artistic image is the greatest teacher of all since by means of it hitherto opposed realms are synthesized in order to bring forth some totally new dimension of Being. 'It is precisely', he says, because art is installed and installs us in a world whose significance is foreign to us that it teaches us to see and give food for thought as no analytical work can, since analysis never finds in its object anything other than what it has already put there.'

Merleau-Ponty's aesthetic could be summarized, therefore, as a critical investigation (secondary expression) of the symbolizing intentionality (primordial expression) which any work of art, or to a lesser extent any human gesture, embodies in the form of a 'style' which mediates between symbolizer and spectator. In this way, he succeeds in obviating the two major pitfalls of traditional aesthetics: (1) the motivational fallacy which reduces the whole aesthetic process to the artist's own psychological motivation - and only part of this motivation at that, for the original purpose of the artist may be aborted in its actual expression; (2) the affective fallacy, which reduces the aesthetic enterprise to the emotional reaction it can produce in an audience. Both of these positions are erroneous in that each, taken alone, falsifies the essence of art as dialogue. From a phenomenological standpoint only that motive of the artist is relevant which is 'embodied' in the style of the art work. Similarly, only those feelings are relevant to the work which are sponsored by the phenomenai structures of the work itself, as creatively intended by the artist and recreatively intended by the spectator. In brief, the essence of art can only be adequately appreciated as the dialogical mediation between the imaginative intentionalities of creator and recreator. Because traditional theories have tended to emphasize the subjectivity rather than the intersubjectivity of aesthetic experience they have almost invariably ignored the 'societal' essence of art. But for Merleau-Ponty the psychology of art can only be properly understood in terms of a phenomenology of human society.
Merleau-Ponty has hit here upon the possibility of a solution to the hermeneutic circle which seriously impaired the credibility of both Husserl and Sartre's theories of the imagination. If, in other words, in an act of imagination the individual creates an object to fit the requirements of an essence, then from a strictly practical point of view it cannot be denied that the imagination has a prior knowledge of essences in order to create its objects. Both Husserl and Sartre wish to deny this conclusion yet their undialectical division between the worlds of reality and irreality leave them with no alternative but to affirm it, i.e. to contradict themselves. Merleau-Ponty offers a way out of this dilemma by pointing out that an essence is, in large part, a symbol of social behaviour (i.e. our being with others in the world). Essences are the implicit structures of 'primordial expression' to be disclosed phenomenologically by means of a secondary form of expression, i.e. eidetic reflection (100).

Thus Merleau-Ponty brings imagination back to life by demonstrating that it had never left it in the first place. Imagination, he shows, is not opposed to perception but is its most creative dialectical complement. Even the most ordinary instance of perception relies on imagination: since the invisible essence of any object can never be exhausted in a single perspectival perception, its totality can only be anticipated by means of a proleptic imagining. This is very close to Husserl's notion of free variation, but differs on the important point that Merleau-Ponty believes the 'essence' to be primordially given by Being rather than constituted by consciousness (101).

The world is full with the imaginary. Not as Sartre maintained, because it is its negation, but because it is its expression. Even society itself is, in an important sense, an incarnation of human imagining. Each institution, as Merleau-Ponty argues, is 'a symbolic system that human subjects incorporate into their behaviour as a certain style of conduct'. Every individual's imagination is as charged by the symbols of society which surround it as it, in turn, recharges these symbols with its own creativity. Neither is at the expense of the other. The watchword is dialogue.
Because Husserl and Sartre held that the imaginary object intended by consciousness is always transcendent of consciousness and yet totally unrelated to reality, they opened themselves to the criticism of having reduced art to the status of an idealist essence; or in the instance of the later Sartre's theory of 'committed' art - to the status of an essential idea, i.e. propaganda\(^{(102)}\). Since Merleau-Ponty's theory of art argues for a dialectical communion between the visible (the perceptual) and the invisible (the imaginary), he eschews both the Husserlian-Sartrean danger of idealism and also its opposite extreme, i.e. materialism (which overemphasizes the visible, i.e. textual, sensual qualities of the art-work)\(^{(103)}\).

The operative term in Merleau-Ponty, Buber and Bachelard's treatments of imagination is 'communion'. For all three the imaginary is not a single act sequestered from reality, but a vital process of communication whereby man passes beyond himself towards what is other than himself\(^{(104)}\). While Merleau-Ponty shares this dialectical theory of imagination with both Buber and Bachelard, he breaks new ground in his discovery of the social and political importance of this theory. Buber and more particularly Bachelard jealously guarded the imaginary from all things political. The imagination could legitimately relate to the cosmic Thou (Bachelard) or the personal Thou (Buber), but never with impunity to the It-world of politics. Merleau-Ponty overcame this bias, however, and showed that the symbolizing function of imagination was as operational in political life as it was in the more 'poetic' realms of human interrelationship. Once grounded in a dialectical phenomenology - this point being all important - art and politics could be acknowledged as agents of a reciprocal interaction within the matrix of Being. As he concludes his Aventures of the Dialectic:

Politics and culture are reunited not because they are completely congruent or because they both adhere to the event, but because the symbols of each order have echoes, correspondences and effects of induction in the other\(^{(105)}\).
CONCLUSION
We began this thesis with a brief consideration of the double-claim 1) that imagination is the life source of phenomenology, and 2) that phenomenology can remove some of the traditional prejudices which governed the philosophical treatment of imagination, and reveal it in a new and original light. Now we are in a position to reassess this claim and to weave the many strands of our argument into some coherent conclusion.

Husserl inaugurated a phenomenological theory of the image with his description of its essence as an intentional activity rather than a static representation in the mind. His treatment was, unfortunately, fragmentary in execution and very often inconsistent in its conclusions. These criticisms notwithstanding, he did serve the indispensable function of outlining the principal implications of an intentional theory of imagination. Firstly, he showed that the image is an intuition (i.e. presentification) of consciousness, closer to perception than to either the concept or the sign. Secondly and perhaps most significantly, he revealed the sui generis natures of imagination and perception: the former as an 'as if' (als ob) or irreal intuition of the intended; the latter as a real one. But Husserl's claim that imagination and perception occupy two unique ontological regions was not only a resolution of traditional anomalies but the creation of an entirely new one. The problem was no longer how to distinguish the image and the percept - intentionality had provided the key here. It was how to justify the view that the imaginary can have any mode of being at all; or more correctly, to discover what kind of being the image possesses if it is not the being of ordinary reality.

We saw how Husserl went close to providing an answer in his notion of the imaginary as possibility. But his discussion of this subject was vitiated by the opacity and incompleteness of his treatment and it never succeeded in furnishing more than a hint of a possible direction. Husserl himself was quite aware of this shortcoming. Indeed, he repeatedly insisted that his work was an appeal to future disciples of phenomenology and was not in any sense to be taken as a fait accompli. His legacy, as we said at the outset, was to have left none.

Husserl's refusal to establish any school of conclusive doctrine, proved both a virtue and a vice. A vice in that his followers were enabled
to draw fundamentally opposed conclusions from the same phenomenological premisses. As a result the development of the phenomenology of imagination reads more like a spiral or chevron than a straight line. For the sake of clarity in the present study, I have divided these diverse interpretations into two main tendencies: the antithetical represented by Sartre, and the dialectical represented by Bachelard, Buber, and Merleau-Ponty. Husserl's refusal of a philosophical system proves a virtue, however, to the extent that the novelty of his insights, precisely because they were devoid of any dogmatic imprimatur, sponsored the originality of each of his disciples. Furthermore, the consequent pluralism of approaches served to highlight the strong points of one against the shortcomings of another. This is particularly true of the way in which the dualist impasse of Sartre's theory helps us to better appreciate the dialectical alternative of his critics. Indeed, as we have shown, Sartre's dualism was probably the reason that some of his critics advanced a 'dialectical' phenomenology of imagination in the first place. This is particularly apparent in Merleau-Ponty.

But we cannot dismiss Sartre so easily, even in conclusion. It was not without good reason that over a third of this thesis was devoted to an analysis and assessment of Sartre's theory of imagination. There can be no doubt that Sartre's contribution to a phenomenology of imagination is the most comprehensive and rigorous to date. We have attempted to establish this in our analysis of his extensive treatment of the imaginary ranging from his two major works on the subject to his development of its implications in his critical and creative writings.

But the priority of Sartre's theory is not just one of comprehensiveness and rigour. It is also one of influence. The very fact that the three dialectical approaches discussed in this thesis, were written after The Psychology of Imagination, and often represent critical reactions to Sartre's dualism, is clear evidence of a profound influence. Interestingly, it is invariably Sartre rather than Husserl who primarily engaged their interest in a phenomenology of imagination.

To the priorities of comprehensiveness and influence can be added that of originality. Many of the aspects which the dialectical thinkers inherit as part and parcel of a phenomenology of imagination, do not
derive from Husserl at all but from Sartre. Notable cases in point would be the links between imagination and affectivity, play, projection, magic and freedom. Some of these Husserl had commented on but it was Sartre who made them operative and indispensable coordinates of any phenomenological approach to the image. Sartre's discussion of these aspects did not, as we have seen, always prove either sufficient or satisfactory, but the important thing is that they were discussed for the first time within a phenomenological framework.

So much for the prominence of Sartre. As soon as one moves from the significance of Sartre's analysis to his ontological conclusions, the scales of assessment shift decidedly. His radical antithesis between the real and the imaginary displays a marked inferiority to the dialectical approach of his opponents. Indeed, it is in their dialectical orientation rather than any exhaustiveness of analysis that Merleau-Ponty, Buber and Bachelard surpass Sartre. And surpass Husserl, too, let us not forget, for the founder of phenomenology himself also failed to transcend the self-contradictory claims of a phenomenology of imagination, i.e., the claim that imagination is consciousness of both something and nothing real. In brief, while credit must go to Husserl and Sartre for discovering and developing a phenomenology of imagination, the ultimate validity of this new approach is only established, I contend, with the later innovation of a dialectical perspective.

II

It is regrettable that our three dialectical thinkers did not take up or develop Husserl's notion of possibility. The significance of this notion for a dialectical phenomenology of imagination is, I believe, immense. In conclusion, I shall try to outline some of the main areas in which such a dialectic might well prove important. This outline is, of necessity, cursory and does not aim at a comprehensive analysis of all the issues involved. Its purpose rather is to point to several important possibilities arising from a dialectical phenomenology of imagination, and particularly the possibility of formulating how our imagination functions in our everyday life; that
is to say, how the beautiful relates to the good.

The discovery of possibility as the ontological status of imagination springs directly from the discovery of intentionality as its epistemological status. Because imagination is a modality of intentional consciousness it is always consciousness of something other than itself. If then we are to be consistent with our phenomenological premisses, we must conclude that imagination must always be in dialogue with some mode of being other than that of consciousness or ordinary reality (for Husserl taught us that imagination is precisely the neutralization of perceptual reality). Now if the image is other than consciousness it cannot be nothing; for consciousness as the negation of reality is itself nothing. But since it is the neutralization of reality it cannot be something real either. The image then must occupy a realm of being beyond both reality per se and consciousness per se. This realm is, I contend, the realm of the possible.

As other, the imaginary is a possibility for objective reality as well as for subjective consciousness. In fact, it should be thought of as residing 'within', at the same time as it resides beyond, both dialectical components. It might be more properly defined as the invisible tension 'between' reality and consciousness; a between which motivates both, in much the same manner as an unseen moon motivates both the internal blood cycle of man and the tides of the ocean which surround him(2).

Possibility is an imaginative intentionality. (Imaginative, this is, as opposed to any other type of intentionality). It is sui generis: its being 'presents' itself to intuition in a modality quite different from that of real being. Now since 'real' being presents itself to perceptual consciousness, the only other mode of 'intentional' consciousness to which the possible could present itself is imagination.

Of course, this imaginative 'presentification' is at the same time an 'abstention' of being. To put it another way, possible presence is presence in absence i.e., presence not yet present to itself. But there is no reason to conclude from this that the possible and the real cannot be compresent. That is to say, it is conceivable that things be both present and absent in their presence at the same time.
Merleau-Ponty confirmed this point in his discovery of the role which symbolic projection plays in even the most ordinary of perceptions; and in his subsequent discovery of the dialectical league between the visible and the invisible which makes such projection possible. Bachelard's theory of the dialectical imagination as bridge between the internal essences of man and nature is operating on a similar principle of co-presence. To make this point simply we need only remark how the extraordinary power of a woman's beauty springs from the fact that the ideality which we imagine (possible presence) is simultaneously juxtaposed with the flesh and blood reality which we perceive (real presence).

Another group of phenomenologists, by contrast, endorsed Sartre's dualism between the imaginary and the real and so failed to recognize the unique ontological status of possibility. Once this status is denied, compresence becomes an impossibility. Two such phenomenologists are Ingarden and Saraiva (3). I have not dealt with their treatments of imagination in this thesis for I do not consider their work as representing any significant advance on the non-dialectical phenomenology of imagination already worked out by Husserl and Sartre. Although both Ingarden's and Saraiva's credentials as 'phenomenologists' are far less questionable than Buber's, for instance, their failure to move beyond the non-dialectical framework of imagination renders their copious work in this area of less interest to the argument of this thesis than Buber's brief but dialectical treatment of the subject.

The non-dialectical theory of possibility as advanced by Husserl and Sartre opposes any relationship between the beautiful and the good. Sartre categorically repudiated the notion of a moral imagination in the conclusion to The Psychology of Imagination. This repudiation was, as we saw, the logical consequence of his dualism between the imaginary and the real. It meant that for Sartre the imagination was ultimately an absurd and pathological property of man. Art consequently was reduced to a form of strategic neurosis or magic, as is clearly evident in Sartre's autobiography Words, and his critical writings on Genet, Baudelaire and Flaubert.
But this pathological description comprises only half the story: the half which underscores the dangers of imagination insofar as it remains an activity of the solipsistic subject. The other half of the story - though not for Sartre - tells of the imagination as source of man's health and regeneration. Let us examine some of the implications of this side of imagination. Here imagination is dialectically conceived as both a creation of a new world according to man's will, and a revelation of this new world by means of an obedience to Being. Obedience means a listening to (ob-audire) the possibilities latent in Being. By means of these possibilities Being calls to us to be imagined (presented in absence) and ultimately incarnated (presented in full presence). Possibility is Being's vocation for man.

Total incarnation is the telos of the possible. But the imagination, as quasi-incarnation, is indispensable to this total incarnation. This is so for several reasons. Firstly, there is the necessity of mediating between non-being (the absent as absent) and total being (the present as present) by means of an imaginary being (the absent as present). Or to put it in Blake's words: 'What is now proved was once only imagined'. This is particularly true of our relationship to time, and most particularly future time. Without imagination we would never be able to absent ourselves from the present (the new) and present the absent (the not yet) to ourselves. We could, in brief, never negate or transcend things as they are, while aspiring towards things as they might be. But even things as they might be must exist as possibilities; otherwise we could not be conscious of them.

The essential thing here is to distinguish between genuine imaginary possibilities and false ones. The criterion for such a distinction is to be found, I would suggest, in the notion of dialogue. If imagination is not just a soliloquy but a listening and response to a call from Being then the image may be accounted a genuine one. But there would seem to be further difficulties. Most immediately, how can one know when an image is a response to a genuine possibility of Being? Or to take a practical example, how can one tell whether the image of Venus rising from the waves is pornographic fantasy or genuine art?
I believe that part of the answer is to be found in phenomenological attentiveness to the 'origin' of the image. By origin I mean the situation or life-world in which the image is intended. The nature of the image of Venus, for instance, is going to be radically determined by the situation in which it 'originates'. The image will be quite different depending on whether it is intended in the context of a museum in Florence or the centrefold of *Playboy*.

Unlike the tendency of most philosophies of art to confine themselves to questions of 'objectivity', phenomenology is particularly sensitive to the historicity of the art-image. Historicity refers here to both the particular quality of the life-world (*Lebenswelt*) in which the image was first created (for Botticelli and his contemporaries the nude was considered in a specifically aesthetic context), and the life-world in which it is being intentionally recreated (for the readers of *Playboy* the nude is the object of consumer voyeurism).

Phenomenology refutes any aesthetic which treats the work of art as a timeless object. It reveals it instead to be a possibility of aesthetic response which may be variously intended by different people in different ages and contexts. The artistic image is not an object in some unchanging firmament but an intentional link between one life-world (that of the artist) and another (that of the audience). This is not to say that the experience of art, once intentionally understood, is reduced to relativism. It is merely to suggest that an attitude of genuine obedience to the possibilities latent in any work will ensure a certain variability from one intender to another.

On the other hand, obedience to art is not dogmatic or uniform. The art work is not only a possibility in-itself, but also a possibility for-the-beholder. While the in-itself coordinate is a constant, the for-the-beholder is a variant, since each beholder carries with him a unique intentional life; and by extension, a unique horizon of possibilities. Thus while the image remains the same, the intentional experience of this image is forever changing. Consequently, if there is some truth to the aesthetic maxim 'de gustibus non est disputandum', it is as an affirmation of the individuality of each imaginer rather than of the arbitrariness of the art-image itself.
A phenomenological appreciation of the importance of 'origin' in the whole question of imaginative obedience, calls for a hermeneutic sensitive to the subtleties of this interplay between the constancy and variation of the image\(^{(4)}\). Such a hermeneutic, moreover, may also help us to understand better the necessity of an obedient imagination in life as well as art. The life-world is analogous to the art-work in that it too harbours within itself a possibility which commissions the creative imagination of men to bring it to fulfilment.

The main difference between a hermeneutic of the experience of life-possibilities and of art-possibilities, lies in its approach to the question of their 'origin'. In art, this would concern itself largely with a study of the artist and appreciator respectively, their aims, tastes, capacities, expectancies etc. In life, it would lead directly to theology (the origin of possibility in God); or alternatively to some sort of 'fundamental ontology' (the origin of possibility in Being). In both instances, moreover, the hermeneutic is concerned with discovering the correct mode of 'listening to' the call of an origin, and responding to this call by assuming the vocation of co-originator. The combination of these two hermeneutical regions would point towards the conclusion, correct I think, that in all authentic art the imaginative experience of the recreator is an obedient response to the image of the creator, which is in turn an obedient response to the image latent in the being of the life-world which created him\(^{(5)}\).

Obedience and responsibility become then the water marks of the authentic imagination. At this point we must anticipate several likely objections. Why do we use an ethical term 'authentic', in order to describe imagination? Because obedience and responsibility are evaluative categories concerned as much with the good as with the beautiful. Would not the definition of authenticity as an obedience to Being, lead to a reductivist aesthetic something akin to that found in the marxist school of Socialist Realism? On the contrary, an aesthetic of obedience transcends all Realist reductivism by virtue of the fact that it is a listening not so much to reality as to the possibilities of being other than reality, albeit in some sense latent within it.
It may also be objected that the definition of authenticity as an obedience to Being says nothing by saying everything. In other words, how are we to defend ourselves against the charge that since all imaginative consciousness is consciousness of something, even the most idle and self-deluding of fantasies must in some sense be obedient to possibilities other than consciousness itself? Here we find it incumbent on us to revise somewhat the phenomenological claim that every act of imagination must be a consciousness of something other than itself. It would seem more prudent to say, taking a hint from Bachelard, that only authentic acts of imagination display this intentional relationship with the other-than-self. By contrast, unauthentic acts of imagination, or what might more conveniently be termed acts of fantasy, merely pretend to such dialogue. In actual fact, they are intending nothing but morsels of their own divided selves. In acts of fantasy no possibilities can be encountered or discovered, since the fantasy contains nothing more than what the fantasizer put into it. The man of fantasy is a victim of his own projections. If he succeeds in freeing himself from reality by negating it, it is only to enslave himself to an unreality of his own invention. In short, his is not the genuine world of possibility, for there is nothing new or other or unprecendented here. We shall be returning to this presently. It is obvious from even these few remarks that Sartre's treatment of imagination is largely a treatment of the unauthentic imagination or fantasy. Hence his refusal of both a dialectical imagination, and by extension, an ontological status to possibility.

This is not to deny the validity of Sartre's theory. As a diagnostics of the diseased imagination it is unequalled. But despite all Sartre's talk of freedom we find not the slightest hint of a therapeutics of the imagination. The imagination for Sartre is a token of man's absurdity. It is indispensable to man's being in the world - for the world only exists as a synthetic totality because of imaginative negation - but can never avoid the equally undesirable extremes of fascination (where the image's absence is ignored in favour of its presence) and alienation (where the image's presence is ignored in favour of its absence). While the first extreme provides a certain illusory distraction, the latter provides a certain freedom, but only at the price of a stoical estrangement from the life-process. These extremes
of the imagination are well illustrated in Sartre's writings. We need only recall the fascination for play which Anny or Philipe experienced or the sense of alienation suffered by Roquentin or Mathieu.

Hence Sartre's tendency to see beauty as the cause of either passionate infatuation or disinterested contemplation but never of genuine reciprocity. Had he admitted of possibility as a dialectical intermediary between the extremes of presence and absence, he would have been able to exchange alienation for a healthy sense of detachment from the world, and fascination for an equally desirable sense of commitment to the world. Briefly put, detachment and commitment are two imaginative dispositions indispensable to a meaningful life. Far from being the bugbear of inauthentic existence, as Sartre maintained, imagination can serve as one of the primary garants of authenticity. Without the iconoclastic powers of detachment, for instance, man would become an idolator of his own 'graven images'. Similarly, without the generous impulses of imaginative commitment - what Buber called 'imagining the real' - man would become totally self-engrossed and indifferent to the other.

This twofold movement of the authentic imagination is the privilege of every man. It is highlighted, however, in the activity of the artist. As Fritz Kaufman once explained, 'art converts the natural attitude toward the experienced world into the transcendental attitude towards one's experience of the world.' This conversion is due to the neutralizing or bracketing power of imagination which Husserl was the first to describe. The imagination transforms the world into an imaginative microcosm. This microcosm operates according to a grammar of possibility. That is to say, all the characters and events imagined are encountered as possibilities rather than as real people already known by us in the real world. Insofar as it is concerned with the possible, this microcosm is grasped as that matrix within whose horizon persons and events appear. In art, therefore, it is not the world but its horizon that gives itself to me. More simply, whereas in reality everything emerges against an horizon of possibilities, in art it is this very horizon that becomes the focus of attention.
In this shift of attention our common-sense existence is illuminated. The achievement of imaginative consciousness is thus the revealing of the transcendental structure of our daily life. Far from constituting a negation of real life, as Sartre maintained, the creative, and re-creative, activity of imagination allows us to acknowledge what we normally merely assume. This is not to say that art is a representation or imitation of the world. It is to say that art focuses on the transcendental in our experience of the world. In doing so the artist draws attention to the genuine possibilities of ordinary reality. Or to use the logician's distinction between token and type, we would say that the artistic imagination varies particular tokens until he arrives at an intuition of the relations of eidetic types. The artist's works are analogues. They are possibilities which can be enlivened only by the beholder's recreative imagination. In this sense, the art analogue may be defined as a necessary but not sufficient condition for the art-image.

The same argument might be applied, of course, to our everyday social living. That is to say, society itself is experienced by us as a complex system of analogues to be interpreted and enlivened by our imagination. The principal difference is, however, that in art the symbols and styles which invest our social language and action with significance, are further symbolized and stylized so as to enable us to apprehend the transcendental conditions which underlie them. Thus authentic art allows us to experience the world as it 'essentially' is, and at the same time to reflect critically upon this experience. The art-image then does not hold up a mirror to the world so much as to the transcendental conditions which underpin our being-in-the-world.

Art enables man to become conscious of his own subjective possibilities and of the objective possibilities in his life-world which grounds it. By neutralizing the binding power of our natural consciousness of being, art offers the spectator another possibility of being, and thereby another meaning of life. It leaves him suspended in the consciousness of possibility, where both the world and his own being-in-the-world may be investigated for their mutual implications, rather than lived for their immediate results. This suspension in possibility induces a feeling which Kusput has called 'benign anxiety'. By making us conscious
of our own possibilities, art puts us in question. It enables us to ask after the source of our common attitudes and intentionalities towards things. In his imaginative experience of art, the spectator is led to recharge his consciousness of his own possible intentions and of the authentic possibilities in Being. This radical conversion from one mode of existence to another is fringed with anxiety; but it is ultimately 'benign' in that it suggests an alternative series of life-worlds where our innate will-to-creation would no longer be frustrated but fulfilled.

A phenomenological aesthetic is, I suggest, requisite to the appreciation of this anxiety as a hallmark of the authentic imagination. Traditional and current attitudes to art have tended to focus almost exclusively on the art-object itself. This applies not only to the conventional theories of judgment which reduce the work of art to a categorical and eternal object, but also to the more fashionable theories of 'heightened sensibility', 'structuralism' and 'hermeneutical erotics' which emphasise the emotive or spiritual power of the 'form' of art(10). In all these theories, however various, the intentional bonds which unite the art-work to the being-in-the-world of both creator and recreator are severed, or merely ignored. Art is more or less considered for art's sake and certainly has nothing to do with the transcendental or constitutive meaning of our life. These non-phenomenological attitudes collectively constitute what Kuspit has called an 'aesthetic of taste' which 'denies that art is, as phenomenology thought, the royal road to the meaning of life, and instead makes it a comfortable way to everyday existence'(11).

This denial of the dialectical relationship between art and life reaches its logical, though paradoxical extreme in the contemporary aesthetic of 'happening'. By turning art into a common everyday event the artist is no longer relating to life but usurping it. Insofar as art is identified with life, it forfeits its claim to the possibility of alternatives. The 'happening' is, therefore, not an acknowledgment of the transcendental horizon which grounds our life, for the imaginer meets with nothing other than the life he already knows and the self he already is. While professing to lead the imagination into reality, the 'happening' serves in fact to reduce both to a single common denominator.
Man encounters his own existence without having to confront it. In sum, imagination is no longer a consciousness confronting life with the possibilities of its becoming, but a consciousness of life as nothing other than its actual being.

Authentic art goes beyond the actual towards the possible. But this going-beyond will always be correlative to a listening to the actual. Unauthentic art, pornography or propaganda for example, is a total denial of this dialectic. Here the reciprocity of artist and appreciator is abandoned in favour of a unilateral dictatorship of the fantasy-producer over the fantasy-consumer. Rather than soliciting a willing suspension of disbelief - to borrow a phrase from Coleridge - unauthentic art seduces the beholder. It enables him to 'imagine' without the slightest feeling of either responsibility (after all, he can retort that he did not will this fiction) or obedience (there is no reference, dialectical or otherwise, to the 'otherness' of either the artist or the art-work). In unauthentic art the imaginer is allowed, for a reasonable price, to indulge his subjective fantasies in a purely anonymous fashion. The pornographer has no interest whatsoever in using the image to communicate with his audience. He is a faceless entrepreneur concerned solely with providing the consumer with the escapism which he craves. As Rollo May said of the pornographer: 'he removes the fig-leaf from the genitals and places it over the face'.

Let us try and define more precisely some of the ontological implications of the authentic imagination. Rilke said of Cézanne that he did not paint 'I like it' but 'there it is'. That 'it' here is not only the world as it actually is, but the world as a possibility of Being. This possibility must first be listened to (obedience) and then responded to (responsibility) by the imagination. The possibility listened and responded to is not just an arbitrary 'nothing' as Sartre held. It is neither nothingness nor thingness but a dialectical intermediary. As such it is at all times other than consciousness insofar as it is that of which the authentic imagination is conscious. This other which perpetually summons man to bring it into the world, must be first mediated through the imaginary. What is is always possible before it is real. Otherwise put, presence is always present in absence before it is present in presence. We might say therefore, that while
the imaginary is temporally prior to the real, reality is teleologically prior to imagination. This is so because the ultimate end of the possible is always to be made incarnate in the real actions of man. In brief, the possible calls out to be imagined in order that it may ultimately be realized.

But rather than talk of priorities it is wiser, I think, to talk of a dialectical reciprocity between the possible as imagined and the real as lived. Without reality possibility is arbitrary; without possibility reality is blind. Reality reaches forward to possibility in order to transcend its habitual and ossified sterility. Similarly, possibility reaches back to reality in order to preserve a ground for both its beseeching and its becoming.

This dialectic between telos and ground, finds its clearest theological formulation in the Judeo-Christian notion of eschatology; that is the belief that a promised end motivates, calls forth and grounds itself in the creation of the beginning. This dialectical theology has received particular attention in the works of such modern thinkers as Rosenweig, Berdary and Moltmann. Elsewhere(14), I have shown how the two root-terms for imagination in the Torah, YZR and DMH, were both used to designate the divine 'possibilities' inherent in man. God created man in His own 'image' (Damah) and commanded him accordingly to imitate (Yezer) Him in his own creative life-style. But God also acknowledged the dangers attendant upon such a power of imagination the moment it terminates its dialogue with Him and reverts to an idolatry of its own fantasies: hence the prohibition against all 'graven images'. From the very beginning then, imagination was recognized as an ambiguous power, capable of the greatest good (to become like God) or the greatest evil (to mistake one's own images for God)(15). In the phenomenological debate on imagination we discerned, interestingly enough, a similar polarity of consensus. Imagination was seen to harbour the possibility of both man's fascination or his freedom, of both solipsistic monologue or creative dialogue.

Authentic imagining is intimately connected with authentic conduct. In this sense, art has a very important moral role. This moral role is complex and in need of elaborate analysis. But since such an analysis...
is not feasible in our present thesis, suffice it to mention three central areas where these moral implications are manifest: (1) Art allows for the mediation of the possible. That is to say, the quasi-incarnation of the imaginary points the way towards the total incarnation of action. (2) Art sponsors a reciprocal relation between the artist who creates (by listening to the hidden possibilities of his horizon) and the audience who recreates (by listening to these same possibilities as imaginatively presented by the artist). This exercise in free reciprocity serves to nurture an authentic imagination and, by extension, an authentic existence. (3) Art calls for a dialectical response of commitment and detachment which is essential to the good life.

This last point calls for a further comment. The art object is a possibility which calls for our creative engagement in order that it may come to presence, and yet remains sufficiently distant (i.e. other) to resist being subsumed into pure subjectivity. As both other than, and the same as, the imaginative consciousness which enlivens it, the image highlights the dialectic of an authentic existence. All genuine relation between men is preceded and accompanied by a genuine distance. Without this delicate equilibrium between distance and relation, man falls prey to the extremes of solipsism (too much distance from the other) and slavery (complete infatuation with the other); this extremism typified Sartre's treatment of imaginative behaviour. In brief, authentic imagination can detach us from oppressive reality without negating reality altogether; similarly, it can empathically relate us to the other without making this a feckless abdication of the self.

In *The Sovereignty of the Good* Iris Murdoch also points to the close connection between art and morality. She argues that true vision leads directly to right behaviour; but is equally aware that the imagination can become the victim of its own delusions. Her conclusion, despite its Platonic overtones, is, I believe, largely correct:

Art presents the most comprehensible examples of the almost irresistible human tendency to seek consolation in fantasy and also of the effort to resist this and the vision of reality which comes with success...A great artist is, in respect of his work a good man, and in the true sense, a free man. The consumer of art has an analogous task to its producer: to be disciplined enough to see as much reality in the work as the
artist has succeeded in putting into it, and not 'to use it as magic. The appreciation of beauty in art...is a completely adequate entry into the good life, since it is the checking of selfishness in the interest of seeing the real...This well describes the role of great art as an educator and revealer(16).

I entirely approve of Murdoch's attempt to relate the beautiful and the good, though I would wish to replace her use of the word reality with the term 'possibility'. The experience of both the beautiful and the good presupposes an obedience to the call of the possible. The call of the possible, we may now conclude, is to the re-creation of the world according to a Telos. The Hebrews knew this Telos as the 'image of God', Husserl called it the 'Apriori Eidos', Sartre 'the empty Absolute', Buber 'perfect relation', Bachelard 'Archetype' and Merleau-Ponty the 'blueprint of genesis'. Taking our lead from the latter three phenomenologist's revelation of it's 'dialectical' nature, we may conclude that the Telos resides neither in man alone nor in the world alone, but in the possible Being which subtends both. It can, accordingly, only present itself in a dialogue between the possibility intended by man and the possibility latent in the world. And before it is thus presented (as either beauty or good), it remains an absent possibility of both.

In fact, when viewed from the perspective of an ontology of possibility, we see that the beautiful and the good represent differences of degree rather than of kind. Beauty is a quasi-incarnation of the possible, whereas the good is its full incarnation; but both are criteria of incarnation. This is why it is both correct and incorrect to say of a work of art that it is moral. It is incorrect in that there is quite clearly a huge difference between being seduced by a character in a novel and being seduced by someone in real life. As the lawyer said at the Lady Chatterly's Lover censorship case: 'no girl was ever raped by a book'. Similarly we do not congratulate Lawrence Olivier on the moral courage he displays when acting Hamlet. It is correct to consider art moral, however, in that it is always in some sense promised to life. As a presence-in-absence it always longs for total presence. Hence the fundamental desire of the artist, from Pygmalion to Giacometti, that his images become real. Hence also, I would suggest, parents' fear that if their children read pornographic literature they
may be led to behave in an immoral way. The incorporation of an imaginary style into life is not, therefore, simply a question of 'imitation' as is commonly supposed. It is a question of incarnation. The imaginary, in short, is not only the concern of the beautiful but also in an important sense of the good. This is so insofar as the imaginary is always a possibility of further being and consequently a commission to further action.

Moral behaviour, according to our line of reasoning, would signify all action which is a dialogical response to the possibilities of being. Immoral behaviour, by contrast, would signify a refusal of such genuine possibilities in favour of false possibilities generated from a monological consciousness. The possibilities of Being, we may now suggest, are properly called 'good' insofar as they are enacted, and 'beautiful' insofar as they are imagined; never forgetting of course, that the two are always dialectically related(17).
FOOTNOTES
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I.


(2) ibid.


(5) Ideas, p.57.

(6) ibid., p.198.

(7) ibid., p.57.


(9) E. Husserli, Phenomenology of inner Time Consciousness (M. Nihoff, The Hague, 1964), trans. by J. Churchll from the German (Zur Phänomenologie des Inneren Zeit bewusstseins, Halle, 1928); henceforth abbreviated I.C.


(14) ibid., pp.13-18.

(15) ibid., p.20.
(16) Plato's Republic, bk. 7.


(20) ibid., pp. 50-2.

(21) ibid., p. 53.

(22) ibid., p. 56. This transcendence of reason is clearly expressed in
the following passage from The Timaeus: 'Beauty itself, shining
brightly, it was given to them to behold... being chosen to be eye
witnesses of images which are altogether fair... these are the
things which our minds did not see in pure light! It is following
in this mystical tradition that Spinoza says in Traité Théologique-
Poétique, (Appuhn), p. 172: 'Personne n'a reçu de révélations de
Dieu sans le secours de l'Imagination'.

(23) See Pico della Mirandola, op. cit., pp. 36-46.

(24) Bundy, op. cit., p. 63ff.

(25) De Somniis, 462a.

(26) De Anima, 33.

(27) ibid., bk. 3.

(28) ibid., bk. 3.

(29) ibid., bk. 3, 10.

(30) De Memoria, 450a. See Bundy, op. cit., pp. 70-82.

(31) B. Croce, Aesthetic, trans. by D. Ainstie. (Macmillan and Co., London,

(32) In., pp. 134-5. See here discussions of the similarities and
differences between the phenomenological and Aristotelian-scholastic
notions of intentionality; H. Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological
Vol. I, pp. 40-2; R. Chisholm, 'Brentano on Descriptive Psychology
and the Intentional', Phenomenology and Extantialism (J. Hopkins
Press, Baltimore, 1961), and 'Intentionality' in The Encyclopaedia
of Philosophy (Edwards, New York, 1967); A. Marras, 'Scholastic
Roots of Brentano's Conception of Intentionality' (read at the
International Congress "Tommaso D'Aquino Nel Suo VII Centenario"
in Rome, April 18, 1974); and Levi Williams, 'The Two Imaginations',
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (December 1964). An
adequate treatment of this area of critical debate would demand a
thesis in itself.

(35) ibid., pp.17.
(36) ibid., p.86.
(37) ibid., p.12.
(38) ibid., pp. 23, 109ff; See also F. Cowley's Critique of British Empiricism (London, 1968), pp. 25-34, 197-208.
(40) In., p.81.
(41) ibid., p. 83.
(42) ibid., p. 86.
(43) ibid., p. 117.
(44) ibid., p.146.
(49) R. Ingarden, Das Literarische Kuntswerk (Verlag, Tübingen, 1960).
(50) See Saraiva, op. cit., p. X.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II.


(2) See Ideas, op. cit., p. 21.

(3) ibid.,

(4) Ideas, p. 201. For contrasting view see Saraiva, op. cit., p. 258.

(5) Ideas, p. 200.


(7) Ideas, p. 309.

(8) ibid, p.306.

(9) ibid., p.312.

(10) F.T.L., op. cit., p.245.

(11) Ideas, p.313.


(13) See Ricoeur, op. cit., pp. 91, 108, 128-9; Farber, The Foundation of Phenomenology, (State University of New York Press, Albany, 1943), pp. 385, 411-412, 441-442; Ideas, p. 312, and 123: 'Between perception on the one hand and, on the other, the presentation of a symbol in the form of an image, there is an unbridgeable and essential difference'; Erfahrung Und Urteil (Verlag, Hamburg, 1954): 'Ein idealer gegenstand kann freilich, wie die raffaelsche Madonna, fatisch nur eine einzige Weltiehkeit haben und fatisch nicht in zureichender Identität wiederhobar sein. Aber dieses Ideals ist prinzipiell doch wieder hober, so gut wie Goethes Faust'.

(14) Farber, op. cit., p. 528; See also Kuspit, 'The Dialectic of Taste', op. cit., p. 125.

(14a) Noesis is the knowing and noema is that which is known.


(17) We find here the important distinction between eide that can be instanced only in imagination, like centaurs, and those that can be instanced in actual experience. These latter, we must remember however, are only presented as eide through imagination. See Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologischen Philosophie, Vol. III, Ed. H. Stämel, (Husserliana V., N. Niethoff, The Hague, 1952), section 7.

(18) Cartesian Meditations (N. Niethoff, The Hague, 1960), trans. by D. Cairns from the German (Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge, ed. S. Strasser, Husserliana I), henceforth abbreviated C.M., p. 105.; See also Ideas, sections 6, 70, 112, 140, 149; The Idea of Philosophy (N. Niethoff, The Hague, 1973), trans. by W. Alston from the German (Die Idee der Phänomenologie Fünf Vorlesungen 1907), henceforth abbreviated as I.P., sections 23, 25; Experience and Judgment, (N.U.P., Evanston, 1973), trans. by J. Churchill from the German (Erfahrung und Urteil, Hamburg, 1953), henceforth abbreviated E.J., section 87. There are several issues arising at this point: What guides the imaginative variation of the object? How does one seize upon the invariant? Is it by some a priori grasp of the essence? If so, how does the essence exist independently of or prior to its realization? These and other questions will be taken up in our critical discussion in chapter three.


(20) C.M., p. 71.

(21) Ideas, p. 149.

(22) Ibid, p. 72.


(24) Several phenomenological psychologists have illustrated this danger, i.e. Geld, Goldstein and Merleau-Ponty: see Gurwitsch op. cit., p. 384; also F. Kaufman, op. cit., 'It is imagination through which man lives in devising new possibilities of life and world, transcending each given state and dissatisfied even with the satisfactions that mark a relapse into the inertia of patterned animal habits. Man's life acquires new meaning by virtue of the new meaning he can bring to and elicit from the world...This is as in an artistic process where the painter emphasizes the features relevant
to the constitution of the beauty he wants to reveal. Indeed, this awareness of possibility, this transposition of the potential into actual presence, which is characteristic of human existence, is in itself the work of the imaginative genius of man' (p. 379). See also in this connection Kuspit, 'The Dialectic of Taste', J.B.S.P. (Vol. 4 No. 2), p. 126-136. Husserl understood imagination to be precisely that organ which allows men to suspend their belief in the real world and to return to the origin of this real world in the 'irreal world' of intentional consciousness. This exploration of the intentional nexus where man and world combine to form a single 'phenomenon' is the prerequisite of freedom. It is the concern of every man and the special concern of the artist. As Sartre says in What is Literature?, p. 63: 'The work of art is an imaginary presentation of the world in so far as it demands human freedom'.


(26) E.J., section 92.


(29) Ideas III, section 7.

(30) L.I., sections 31-33; See also Gurwitsch, op. cit., p. 192: 'In the performance of the process of free variation, it appears that, as long as certain structures remain invariant... the resulting products of our imagination are still conceivable as possible specimens of the call of the object chosen as the point of departure. When, however, these structures are altered, the process of free variation no longer yields possible specimens of this class. From the mere attempt and failure of this attempt to contrive in imagination an object of the considered class not exhibiting the structures under discussion, the impossibility of such an object to exist, whether at all or, at least, as an object of the class in question becomes evident'.

(31) L.I., pp. vi., 31-33; Also Sokolowski, H.M., op. cit., pp. 80-3.

(32) C.M., p. 120-123.

(33) For best critical discussion of this link between imagination and solipsism in Husserl see Lauer, op. cit., p. 82-3; Ricoeur op. cit., p. 92-108; Landgrebe, 'Husserl's departure from Cartesianism' in The Phenomenology of Husserl, ed. R. Elveton (Quadrangle, Chicago, 1970), p. 208ff, 233ff, 280-288.


(36) C.M., p. 36.

(37) ibid., p. 154-6.

(39) The Crisis, pp. 173-178. This principle of a teleological eidos holds good for the historical development of the imagination itself, from the objectivist prejudices of the Hellenic and Medievalist philosophies, to the subjectivist leanings of Kant and Hume, which though leaving much to be desired in themselves, pointed the way to the phenomenological concept of imagination as an intentional and constitutive power. Thus, the phenomenological imagination, as an agent of free discovery, proceeds to discover the curriculum vitae of its own historical becoming. Imagination becomes both the organ and the object of phenomenological research. (Qua object it is described and ultimately disclosed as a power of subjective intentionality: variation and neutralization. Qua organ it uses its own history of philosophy in general and the history of the imagination in particular. See F. Kaufman, op. cit., pp. 371-2.


(43) Ideas, pp. 82-3; see also on the relation between imagination and telos: De Muralt, op. cit., pp. 53-6; Gurwitsch, op. cit., pp. 422-426; L. Dupré, 'Husserl1's Thought on God', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (Vol. IXXX, 1969), p. 201. This talk of possible lifeworlds is reminiscent of Leibniz. Despite many striking similarities between the two philosophers (see C.M., pp. 139-41), the parallel in this instance is a superficial one. Husserl is concerned with a free variation of possibilities affected by man not, as Leibniz held, by God. There is to be sure a teleological Possibility which calls man to his task in the first place, but Husserl seems to suggest, it is entirely up to man to accept or reject this vocation (that is, to accept or reject 'the best of all possible worlds'). See L. Dupré, op. cit., p. 201ff.

(44) Ideas, p. 415.

(45) Dupré, op. cit., p. 208.

(45a) ibid., pp. 210-214.


(49) See Husserl Archives in Louvain, 15, IX, pp. 27-28.
(53) Ideas, section 9: 'The great era (of physical sciences) began in modern times when geometry which had already been developed on pure eidetic lines to a high pitch of perfection in the ancient world, was suddenly widely invoked for purposes of method in physics. It was realized that the essence of the physical thing is to be res extensa, and that geometry is consequently an ontological discipline relating to an essential character of things: spacial structure'.
(54) Sartre, In., p. 128.
(55) Ideas, pp. 171-194, 12-19; Forest Williams introduction to Imagination, pp. x - xiii; Lauer, op. cit., pp. 48-64.
(56) Ideas, section 23.
(57) Ideas, section 42: 'The inability to be perceived immanently, and therefore generally to find a place in the system of experience belongs in essence and in principle (Prinzipiell), altogether to the thing as such... Thus the thing itself simpliciter, we call transcendental. In so doing we give voice to the fundamental and pivotal difference between ways of being, that between consciousness and reality! - See here Saraiva, op. cit., p. 289. This procedure is similar in ways to the Thomistic notion of intentionality. On this link see A. Harras, op. cit., p. 6ff.
(58) The Idea of Phenomenology, p. 56-57: 'The consciousness in which the given object is brought to fulfillment is not like an empty box in which these data are simply lying; it is the "seeing" consciousness, which, apart from attention, consists of mental acts which are formed in such and such ways';
(59) Ideas, section 84;
(60) Sartre, In., p. 115.
(61) Ideas, section 23.
(63) Ideas, section 42, p. 120.
(64) E.J., p. 83.
(65) Ideas, section 23, p. 82.
(66) ibid., p. 82-3. Similar passages in L.I., II, pp. 443-487. For better exposition of this Husserlian theme see Saraiva's article: "O primado da percepção da obra de arte em Husserl" (in Perspectras da Fenomenologia de Husserl, pp. 73-76.).
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III.


(3) *ibid.*, p. 411; also 458, 462, 396. A certain heirarchy of intentional modes of consciousness begins to emerge, based on their degree of fulfillment. The lowest level is formed by the significive acts which have no 'fulness' (intuition) at all. Both perception and imagination have fullness but no matter how great the fullness of imagination, it is never as full as perception for it does not give the object itself, not even in part. Consequently, Husserl talks of the 'genuine' fulfillment of perception in contradistiction to the merely 'figurative' fulfillment of imagination.

(4) See *ibid.*, p. 462. The fact that Husserl is by no means consistent in his evaluation on this score is further evidenced later in the *Logical Investigations*, when he credits imagination as an equal and not a mere auxiliary to perception. Every object perceived is, Husserl argues, intuited in terms of different perspectives (Abschätzung). While in the case of a thing really existing before me (e.g. a house) only one of its many facets can be perceived at any one moment, the other facts must be given in the terms of possible fulfillments of imagination. Husserl was eventually to develop this complementarity of imaginative and perceptual intuition into a theory of horizons. But at this early stage he was content to merely describe how consciousness 'realizes beyond that which is perceived in partes to that which can be imagined in toto'.

('Imagination', he says here, 'is not mere perception, but adequate categorically formed perception, completely measuring up to thought', *L.I.*, Vol. III, part 2, 168; See also on this use of imagination in *L.I.*: (*Farber, *op. cit.*, pp. 406, 456). As developed into a theory of horizons, see: *C.M.*, pp. 48-9, 70-4, 122; *E.J.*, p. 306ff, and p. 128: 'Before it is itself given an object can also be explicated in an anticipatory way on the basis of a kind of interior picturing in the imagination'.

(5) *Farber, op. cit.*, p. 425-7. At another point Husserl goes so far as to define the 'imaginary' as an 'impossibility of meaning' in a division of meaning intentions into possible (compatible with themselves) and impossible (incompatible with themselves), quoted *Farber, p. 435.*

(6) *T.C.*, p. 29-39.


(8) *T.C.*, section 16: 'The originary appearing and passing away of the modes of running off of appearance is something fixed...on the other hand, presentification is something free; we can carry out the presentification more quickly and more slowly, clearly and explicitly or in a confused manner, quick as lightening, in a stroke or in articulated steps and so on'.

(9) T.C., p. 68.

(10) T.C., p. 136; see Sokolowski, H.M., p. 149: 'In imagination I do not have a sensible phantasm which is like a sensuous datum except that I apprehend it as an image or picture of something. Rather in imagination I reproduce myself as perceiving and acting. There are two tracks of consciousness, one nested inside the other, and my phantasm is within the inside, reproduced track. It is not a present datum pure and simple'.


(12) ibid., p. 24.

(13) ibid., pp. 24-5.

(14) ibid., p. 24: 'All the data of imagination...are open to intuition. We talk about them not just in vague hints and empty intentions. We inspect them and while inspecting them we can observe their essence, their constitution, their intrinsic character...in its full clarity'.

(15) ibid., p. 35.

(16) ibid., p. 54.

(17) ibid., p. 52.

(18) ibid., p. 59.

(19) ibid., p. 57.

(20) ibid., p. 57.

(21) ibid., p. 57.

(22) ibid., p. 59.

(23) ibid., p. 60.

(24) Ideas, p. 287.

(25) ibid., p. 281.

(26) ibid., p. 285.

(27) ibid., p. 80.

(28) ibid., p. 416; for additional treatments of this complex but central notion of Husserl's see F.T.L., p. 155, 168ff; C.H., pp. 78, 127-9;


(30) See In., p. 160n.

(32) Ideas, p. 245-6.

(33) C.M., p. 80-1. Husserl insists however, that both the active synthesis and the passive are modes of intentionality and that the eidetic laws of passive genesis should not be mistaken for the Hellenic (and particularly Human) notion of association: 'The old concepts of association and of laws of association though they too have usually been related to the coherencies of pure psychic life by Hume and later thinkers, are only naturalistic distortions of the corresponding, genuine, intentional concepts' (ibid., p. 70.) One might have expected Husserl to use this distinction to either compare or contrast the particular intentional structures of memory and imagination, but this he failed to do. See Saraiva, op. cit., pp. 252-3.

(34) Ideas, p. 199. For other ambiguous treatments of fiction see E.J., pp. 298ff, 173ff.

(35) Ideas, p. 56. See also in this connection: ibid., p. 57; E.J., p. 341: L.I., section 82


(37) Ideas, p. 200-201. Also Saraiva, op. cit., pp. 185-223.

(38) Ideas, p. 200. See also E.J., p. 173: 'In the actual world, nothing remains open; it is what it is. The world of imagination 'is', and 'is' such and such, by the grace of the imagination which has imagined it; a complex of fictions never comes to an end that does not leave open the possibility of a free development in the sense of a new determination'; and also Farber, op. cit., p. 441: 'Since the production of phantasy-images is subject to our will to a much greater extent than that of perception and positing in general, we are accustomed to relate possibility to phantasy-imagining'.


(41) Ideas, p. 200; see also L.P., pp. 54-5.


(43) Kuspit, 'Fiction and Phenomenology', op. cit., p. 27.

(44) Ideas, pp. 200-1. And Husserl continues: 'These are indeed fruits of the imagination but in respect of the originality of the new formation, of the abundance of detailed features and the systematic continuity of the motive forces involved, they greatly excel the performances of our fancy, and moreover, given the understanding's grasp, pass through the suggestive power of the media of artistic presentation with quite special ease into perfectly clear fancies'.

(45) Ideas, p. 199. For other ambiguous treatments of fiction see E.J., pp. 298ff, 173ff.
Ideas, section 111, section 140c.

Idea of Phenomenology, p. 52-53


Ideas, p. 119.

ibid., p. 309.

For the most concise treatments of the relationship between fiction and epoché see: F.T.L., p. 206; Ideas, section 111; L.I., Fifth Investigation, section 40.

In 'Fiction and Phenomenology', p. 32-3, Kuspit summarizes the implications of Husserl's revolutionary claim as follows: 'Phenomenology is the ultimate art...Phenomenology takes advantage of fictions to apprehend pure essences. Perhaps the best phenomenologist is one who treats the world in itself as a fiction, perhaps a production of God, the purest of egos. In any case to treat the fiction as a mere depiction ignores the process of fancy that produced it...Not only would this make knowledge impossible, ultimately it would destroy consciousness, for unless consciousness is fanciful at its core men are merely objects aping objects'. In the next section I shall discuss the theological implications of imagination briefly touched on here by Kuspit.

C.H., p. 28.

C.H., p. 28.

C.H., p. 70-1.

ibid., p. 130. See also ibid., pp. 104, 122; Knocklemans, 'Realisme-Idealisme en Husserl's Phaenomenologie', Tijdschrift Voor Philosophie (Vol. XX, 1958), p. 395ff; Wagner, op. cit., p. 252-3; E.J., pp. 127, 431; F.T.L., pp. 133-135; Zaner, Phenomenology and Existentialism, op. cit., p. 305, 313-315, 325; A. Schuettz, Collected Papers (M. Nijhoff, The Hague, 1967), p. 114: 'The eidetic investigations do not deal with concrete real things, but with purely possible imaginable things. It is in this sense that we must understand Husserl's frequently criticized dictum that phenomenology has to do not only with objects perceived, but also with objects imagined and that the latter are of even greater importance for the phenomenological approach'.


E.J., p. 330. 'Real possibility' he goes on 'belongs to the extension of empirical concepts and must not be confused with pure possibilities to which pure generalities refer'.

E.J., p. 381-2. Other important references to 'real possibility': E.J., p. 298, 29; C.N., pp. 44-5: 'Every reality involves its possibilities, which are not empty possibilities, but rather
possibilities intentionally predefined in respect of content 
and in addition having the character of possibilities realizable 
by the ego'. For critical commentary on possibility as 'real' 
see Lauer, op. cit., p. 145; Elvton, op. cit., pp. 229-231, 253, 
293; cf. E.J., p. 29: 'Every imaginative modification of experience 
in the mode of as-if is given precisely as a modification, as a 
transformation of previous experience and genetically refers back 
to it.'

(60) On former see E.J., p. 374; On latter see E.J., p. 341.

(61) See here H. Wagner, 'Critical Observations Concerning Husserl's 
Posthumous Writings', in The Phenomenology of Husserl, op. cit., 
pp. 220-3; L. Landgrebe 'Husserl's departure from Cartesianism', 
in The Phenomenology of Husserl, op. cit., p. 293ff.

(62) C.M., p. 105.

(63) E.J., p. 298. And he goes on: 'Only he who lives in experience and 
from there dips into imagination whereby what is imagined contrasts 
with what is experienced, can have concepts of fictions and actual-
ities'.

(64) E.J., p. 299.

(65) Even if Husserl had attempted to develop the fancy/imagination 
distinction of his Idealist-Romantic predecessors (i.e. Schelling, 
Scillier, Von Schlegel and, through their influence, Coleridge) he 
might have lessened the confusion considerably.

(66) C.M., p. 46. For further on this see: ibid., pp. 122-136.


(68) C.M., p. 46.

(69) ibid., p. 46: 'The horizons are 'predelineated' possibilities. 
We say also: we can ask any horizon what 'lies in it', we can 
explicate or unfold it, and 'uncover' the potentialities of conscious 
life at a particular time'.

(70) ibid., p. 46.

(71) ibid., p. 45. There is indeed some doubt here concerning the 
operative word 'mere'. This reads 'grossen' in the original MS. 
and 'blossen' in the revised typescript. Both Dorian Cairns in 
the English translation (as 'mere') and Emanuel Levinas in the 
French (as 'simple'), have followed the revised typescript: a 
decision perfectly consistent with Husserl's notion of possibility 
as 'real'; though interestingly enough, its opposite would have 
been equally consistent with Husserl's alternative notion of 
possibility as 'pure'.

(72) C.M., p. 48.

(73) In this connection Husserl speaks of man's discovery rather than 
invention of possibility, pp. 137-8, 141, 188-9.
C.M., p. 54. See also ibid., p. 154-6.

(75) Husserlianæ, iS. VIII, p. 121.

(76) ibid., VIII, pp. 92-8.


(78) E.J., p. 341-343. See also on this notion of 'horizons': Elveton, Phenomenology and Existentialism, op. cit., pp. 288-8, 14.

(79) C.M., p. 71. See also ibid., p. 60-1, where Husserl argues that essences are not 'truths for us' but 'truths in themselves'. A particular evidence, he says, 'does not yet produce for us any abiding being. Everything that 'exists in itself' in a maximally broad sense, and stands in contrast to the accidental being 'for me' of the particular acts; likewise every truth is, in this broadest sense, a 'truth in itself'. Or again p. 84: 'The phenomenological self-explicitation which goes on in my ego...gives the facts their place in the corresponding universe of pure (or eidetic) possibilities. This explication therefore concerns my de facto ego, only so far as the latter is one of the pure possibilities to be acquired by his free phantasy-variation (fictive changing) of himself'.

(80) C.M., p. 60-1.

(81) Ideas, section 23.


(83) C.M., pp. 155. And he continues, 'Since every eidetic universality has the value of an unbreakable law, eidetic phenomenology explores the all-embracing laws that prescribe for every factual statement about something transcendental, the possible sense of that statement'.

(84) C.M., p. 72.

(85) Few critics of Husserl have failed to remark on the decidedly Platonic flavour of much of his earlier and middle periods. Quite aware of this similarity, Husserl goes to great pains to stress the difference between his and Plato's notions of essence and possibility. See particularly E.J., pp. 341 and 330. See also here Elveton, Phenomenology and Existentialism, op. cit., p. 268-70.

(86) C.M., p. 75. See also iS., VIII, p. 98-9, and Elveton, op. cit., pp. 25ff, 292ff.

Husserl's most characteristic designation of God is as the supreme Eidos which 'gives all the constituting activities unity, meaningful coherence and teleology'. It is 'no mundane being' he says, 'but a final Absolute'. See here Strasser 'Das Gottes problem in der Spätphilosophie Edmund Husserls' in Philosophisches Jahrbuch (1967), pp. 131ff; also R. Dupré. 'Husserl's Deity is an immanent pan-theistic Telos rather than a transcendent and personal God'. He infers, and with some justice, that Husserl's appeal to a Deity, like that of Kant and Descartes before him, is a sort of philosophical Deus ex machina which would resolve enigmas and ambiguities otherwise unresolvable. See also Elveton on Husserl and the Absolute, op. cit., p. 43, 182ff.

ibid., E.III, 4, p.61.

ibid., E.III, 4, p.62.

ibid., E.III, 1, p.5.

ibid., E.III, 10.

ibid., E.III, 4, p.61.

ibid., E.III, 4, p.47: 'Man lives by faith and that is precisely why he lives in a world that has meaning for him and which he constantly confirms to the extent that he does justice to it. Correlatively with this, his existence in the world has meaning from him; he cannot give himself up or give up the world...precisely because he constantly negates the evil in himself and outside of himself as that which he recognizes to be co-responsible'. Husserl doesn't succeed in solving the problems of imagination and possibility by the introduction of his Divine theology, highly reminiscent of Aristotle and Kant,(see Dupré, op. cit., p. 214). He served a great purpose however, in making the link between imagination and God via the world of possibility. This was to become a central notion in Sartre, (see chapter five).

C.M., p. 151.

C.M., p. 152.

Landgrebe provides a detailed and scholarly analysis of this precise problem in his article 'Husserl's departure from Cartesianism', op. cit., p. 259-302. Note particularly his discussion, pp. 298-301. Elveton also offers a critical account of the paradoxical nature of Husserl's pronouncements on 'teleological possibility', op. cit. He concludes as follows: 'Is this teleology itself entirely compatible with the possibility of a fully achieved science of transcendental origins, or are human reason and self-understanding by their very nature always 'on the way' to such a result? Precisely how can these two motifs complement each other' (ibid., p.36).
(101) See particularly Letter on Humanism in Zaner's Phenomenology and Existentialism, op. cit., pp. 149-130: 'Thinking ceases when it withdraws from its element. The element is that by means of which thinking can be thinking. It is the element which is potent, which is potency...It brings thought into its essence'. Heidegger is availing of a certain play of words here. The verb 'vermögen' means to be able'; the noun 'Vermögen' means 'potency' in the sense of 'power' or 'possession'. Later in the letter, Heidegger states clearly what he means by possibility. 'Being as the element (of thought) is the quite power of the loving potency, i.e. of the possible. Our words 'possible' and 'possibility' however, are, under the domination of logic and metaphysics taken only in contrast to 'actuality', i.e. they are conceived with reference to a determined viz., the metaphysical - interpretation of Being as actus and potentia, the distinction of which is identified with that of existentia and essentia, when I speak of the 'quite power of the possible' I do not mean the possible of a merely represented possibilitas, nor the potentia as essentia of an actus of the existentia, but a Being itself, which in its loving potency commands thought and thus also the essence of man, which means in turn, his relationship to Being.' See also in this connection Heidegger's circle of sameness in What is Called Thinking? (Harper, New York, 1968), trans. by J. Gray from the German (Was Heisst Denken? Verlag, Tübingen, 1954), p. 124; On Time and Being, (Harper, New York, 1972), trans. by J. Stambaugh from the German (Zur Sache des Denkens, Verlag, Tübingen, 1969), pp. 8, 204; and Identity and Difference (Harper, New York, 1969), trans. by J. Stambaugh from the German (Identität und Differenz, Verlag, Pfullingen, 1957), pp. 23-40, 65; For a detailed critique of just this notion in Heidegger see E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity. For a contrasting view of the role of essence and existence as modalities of being, see Patrick Masterson's The Images of Man in Ancient and Medieval Thought (Studia Gerardo Verbeke, Leuven University Press, 1976), particularly p. 337.

(102) See chapter five.

(103) Husserl was not at all unaware of this confusion and ambiguity, see C.M., p. 59. Sometimes he tended towards the notion of possibility as freedom, exclusively: see Landgrebe, op. cit., p. 286-201; sometimes towards the essentialist notion of freedom as absolute necessity (see ibid., p. 297-8, Boehm, op. cit., p.174-204); never did he fully reconcile them.

(104) See Q. Lauer on this point, op. cit., pp. 56, 82, 61, 104, 113, 115-117

(105) Sartre, In., p. 143.
(1) In., op. cit., p. 143.


(3) See three main essays prior to Imaginaire (1940) : 'La transcendance de L'Ego', in Recherches Philosophiques (1937); 'Une idee fondamentale de la phenomenologie de Husserl, l'intentionnalite', Nouvelle Revue Francaise (1939); Esquisse d'une theorie des emotions, (Hermann, Paris, 1939).

(3a) Quite clearly Sartre adopts four of Husserl's major phenomenological insights 1) the necessity of the phenomenological method for a valid comprehension of the essence of the image 2) the Intentional nature of the image 3) the positional nature of the imagination 4) the difference between an active and passive intentional synthesis as basis for distinguishing between perceptions and images, In., p. 157. But as we shall see, Sartre goes on to develop and alter all these insights. In relation to the first point he will concede the need to support the eidetic method of investigating images with an experimental-empirical one. In relation to the second, he will argue that the image is the intention of an empty consciousness rather than a transcendental one. In relation to the third point he will contend that Husserl's 'neutrality modification' is merely one of four ways of negatively positing an object, thus transforming the former's notion of imagining as 'irrealizing', into an uncompromising theory of 'negation'. In relation to the fourth point, Sartre will show that the difference between active and passive intentionality is a necessary but not sufficient distinction between imagination and perception (In., p. 150). A necessary distinction would require an examination of the material or analogical constituents of these two intentions. On the original contributions of Sartre's phenomenology to our understanding of the imagination, see K.P. Morgan, 'A Critical Analysis of Sartre's Theory of Imagination', J.B.S.P., (Vol. V, No.1, 1974), pp.21-3; and H. Saratva, L'Imagination selon Husserl, op. cit., pp. ix-xi, 44-7, 94-6, 162-8, 244-255.

(4) In his translation of Husserl's Ideas I, P. Ricoeur remarks in a note on page 348 that 'le meilleur commentaire sur l'image est a prendre dans L'Imaginaire de J.P. Sartre'.


(6) Ibid., p. 4.

(7) 'The conception of intentionality was needed to renovate our treatment of the image', In., p. 144.

(8) But, on the other hand, we must not confuse this attending to the image of tree as relation, with the traditional 'introspective'
attending to the image as a static thing. For Sartre it is always a question of attending to the image as it functions as the conscious intention of a tree, never as a tree-image in consciousness. Simply put, Sartre would argue that to have an image of a big or small tree is not to have a big or small image. P.I., pp.6-8; see also Manser, p.22; op.cit.; Cowley, Critique of British Empiricism, op.cit. p.31

(9) The affinity with Husserl on this point is evident. See P.I., p.4.

(10) Kaelin neatly sums up the similarity between Husserl and Sartre here: 'One must keep in mind the unique position of examples in general phenomenology. Not being a matter of observation and empirical generalization, the procedure involves no multiplication of examples. There is no induction and properly speaking, no deduction. One example suffices to establish the fact, and intuition grasps the essence of the example as a pure possibility. The job of the phenomenologist is to describe these intuitions and it is in this sense that Husserl maintained that his method was purely descriptive...Since Sartre's phenomenological analysis is of images, his procedure is to produce an image, to reflect upon it, and to describe the essence reflected upon' (E.A., p.33).


(13) ibid., p.22.

(14) ibid., p.21.

(15) ibid., p.22.

(16) See Keefe, op.cit., pp.229-231, 238.

(17) ibid.

(18) Such indeed is the central thesis of two of his later works L'être et le Néant (Gallimard, Paris, 1943), trans. by Hazel Barnes (Philosophical Library, New York, 1947); henceforth abbreviated as B.N.; and 'Existentialism est un Humanisme'(Nagel, Paris, 1946), trans. by B. Frechtman as Existentialism (Philosophical Library, New York, 1947).

(19) 'La transcendance de l'Ego', op.cit., pp.85-123.

(20) ibid., p.93

(21) ibid., p.96. This initial view of consciousness as an 'impersonal spontaneity' was to be developed into the notion of consciousness as 'pure negation' in P.I. and B.N.
(22) Ibid., p.38: 'It is possible that those believing two and two
makes four to be the content of my representation may be obliged
to appeal to a 'transcendental and subjective principle of
unification, which will then be the I. But is is precisely
Husserl who has no need of such a principle. The object is
transcendent to the consciousness which grasps it, and it is
in the object that the unity of the consciousness is found'. See
here Robert M. Doran's excellent discussion of this point
'Sartre's critique of the Husserlian Ego' in The Modern Schoolman

(23) Esquisse, p.23.

(24) P.I., pp.418; B.N., p.19.

(25) See P.I., p.14 'L'homme qui, dans un acte de réflexion, prend
conscience d'avoir une image ne saurait se tromper'.
See also E. Casey 'Towards a Phenomenology of Imagination'
J.B.S.P. (Vol.V, No.1, 1974) p.16-17; O.Borrello'Sartre e la

(26) P.I., p.273.

(26a) See M.Saraiva, op.cit., p.247f; F.Kaufmann, Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research (Vol.VII, 1947), pp.272f; E.Casey,


(28) P.I. p.29.

(29) That is to say, the evidence taken from experimental psychology
is only 'probable' according to the phenomenological criterion of
essences. For an experimental psychologist it would, of course, be
'certain' evidence.


(31) Ibid., p.28.

(32) Esquisse, p.25.

(33) It is only correct to mention that there are several critics who
will not even grant Sartre this much, for example, Mary Warnock
pp. 323-336; P.K. Morgan, op.cit., p.33; E.F.Kaellin 'Phenomenology
in Sartre's theory of images' in A.E., pp.50-2. All argue that
even as a 'means' Sartre's method is not consistent with the
phenomenology of his mentor. Kaellin states the case well as follows:
'It is current knowledge that Husserl disclaimed the use of critical
techniques (transcendental deduction) as a substitute for
phenomenology. Since Sartre used them in both his treatises sub-
titled 'phenomenology' (L'imaginai: 'Psychologie phénoménologie'
and L'Être et le Néant: 'Essai d'ontologie phénoménologique') one
might very well pose the question in what sense is Sartre's method
phenomenology?...How do I know that the only alternative to
conceiving the image as a content of consciousness is to conceive
it as a conscious event? Rationalists prefer one explanation and
empiricists another, but these two methods are not essentially
exclusive of each other; nor are they exhaustive of the
possibilities. Kant himself had tried their synthesis, and in doing invented the method of determining what must be the case for experiences to be possible. In following Kant rather than Husserl, Sartre is led to talk of presuppositions of experience. But presuppositions are still suppositions and we look in vain to find the source of the necessity by which they are claimed to be valid... It can be said that Kant's rationalism is taken as a substitution for phenomenological analysis in Sartre's theories, and the (Kant's rationalism is taken) impartial student of the history of philosophy may wonder if this substitution is acceptable, especially since the analogical content of the mental image remains a hypothetical construct (a transcendental object) in Sartre's account of the imagination' (p.51). Kaelin concludes accordingly: 'Sartre's distinction between perceptive and imaginative consciousness depends upon his acceptance of Husserl's account of perception, but the force of this acceptance has been obscured by Sartre's use of Kant's method of transcendental deduction' (p.52). I would reject the validity of this criticism on the grounds that it bases its claim that Sartre adopts the Kantian method on no more than one sentence in P.I. (i.e. 'What must be the nature of consciousness in general in order that the construction of an image should be possible?' p.257). Not only does Sartre not refer to Kant here but he explicitly refers to phenomenology: 'We are now in a position to raise the metaphysical question which has been gradually shaping itself by theses studies of phenomenological psychology' (ibid.). Secondly, as I shall argue in the next chapter, I do not for a moment believe that Sartre succeeded in synthesing the opposing realms of perception and imagination. Thirdly, I feel that to ascribe the whole problem of Sartre's 'presuppositions' to a cumbersome incorporation of the Kantian method, is to fail to apprehend the far more significant contradictions and circularities, outlined above, arising from a specifically phenomenological approach to imagination.


(34) In., p.43
(35) ibid., p.76.
(36) ibid., p.5.
(37) ibid., p.121.
(38) See Cowley's Illustration of Sartre's point in Critique of British Empiricism p.201: 'If I now imagine the (ibid., p.29) ear-splitting shriek that the secretary let out when she saw the mouse, it is that very ear-splitting shriek I imagine — I mean that very shriek, the same shriek, which I then heard but now imagine. There are not two shrieks, one heard and one imagined, but one, just as there is one girl who let out the shriek, when seen, heard or imagined'.
(39) P.I., p.8.
(40) ibid., p.8.
(41) ibid., p.16.
(42) ibid., p.177.
(43) ibid., pp.23,25.
(44) ibid., p.160.
(46) P.I., p.13. He defines it concisely as follows: 'We are in effect, in an attitude of observation, but it is observation which tells us nothing. If I imagine the page of a book, I am in the attitude of a reader: I look at the printed lines, but I do not read. And, ultimately I don't even look at them, for I already know what is written'.
(47) P.I., p.10; see also on this point Casey, op.cit., pp.12-17. Sartre's analysis here is, unfortunately, more suggestive that systematic. Certainly a more adequate contrast between the concept and the image is required. This shortcoming is perhaps due to the fact that Sartre dedicated considerable space to the discussion of the precise role which knowledge plays in imagination in the second half of the book. We shall reserve our criticisms therefore until we reach this discussion.
(48) P.I., p.12.
(49) Sartre maintains that this 'quasi' characteristic is evidenced in the notable absence of all the laws of time, space and identity in images. We shall be returning to this point.
(50) This shall be discussed in detail in our next section.
(51) P.I., p.129.
(52) ibid., p.126.
(53) ibid., p.17.
(54) ibid., pp.17-18: 'Alive, appealing and strong as an image is, it presents it object as not being. This does not prevent us from reacting to the image as if its object were before us...as if it were a perception. But the false and ambiguous condition we reach thereby only serves to bring out in greater relief what we have just said: that we seek in vain to create in ourselves the belief that the object really exists by means of our conduct towards it: we can pretend for a second but we cannot destroy the immediate awareness of its nothingness'. See also here I.A. Bunting, op.cit., p.238; R. Goldthorpe, 'Sartre's Theory of Imagination'; J.B.S.P. (Vol. IV, No.2, 1973, pp.116-117).
(55) P.I., pp. 17, 179f.
(56) I have slightly modified the original translation here. The original passage is to be found on p.233 of French edition.

(57) P.I., p.167.


(59) P.I., p.187: 'There is not enough in an unreal object for it to constitute a definite individuality...This object that I pretend to produce in its totality and as an absolute is reduced basically to a few meagre relationships, general spatial and temporal determinations which no doubt, have a sensible aspect but which are stopped, which contain nothing more than what I posited explicitly'.

(60) For best analyses of the ways in which the image does not obey laws of individuation or identity see P.I., pp.130-131, 174.

(61) P.I., pp. 15-16.


(63) ibid., p.19.

(64) ibid., pp.116-117; Todes, op.cit.,p.7; Goldthorpe, op.cit.,pp.2,4,73. We shall have occasion to question the validity of Sartre's contention later.

(65) P.I., pp.22f. See also Kaelin, op.cit., pp.40-3. This distinction prefigures in an important sense Sartre's distinction between subjective motivation (motif) and objective motivation (mobile) in E.N., p.451.


(67) In this sense, every external analogue can be said to function as the basis of either a percept of something real or an image of something unreal. The difference depends entirely on what direction consciousness choses to intend.

(68) As Sartre points out, 'a psychic image occurs immediately as an image because the existence of a psychic phenomenon and the meaning it has for consciousness, are identical' P.I., p.25.

(69) For the phenomenologist of imagination the similarity of intention is of primary concern, and the difference of analogue merely marks the psychic images and the physical images (portraits, photographs, signs etc.) as varying species of the one genus-image. Sartre makes this distinction and inventories the members of the image family succinctly as follows: 'The image is an act which envisions
an absent or non-existent object as a body, by means of a physical or phychical material which is present only as an 'analogue' of the object envisioned. The specifications are determined by the material, since the informing intention remains the same. There is a distinction therefore between images whose material is borrowed from the world of things (images of illustrations, photos, caricatures, actors, imitations etc.) and those whose material is borrowed from the psychic world (the consciousness of internal movements, feelings etc.). There are also intermediary types which present us with syntheses of external elements and psychical elements, as when we see a face in a flame, in the arabesque of a tapestry, or in the case of hypnagogic images as constructed on a foundation of entoptic lights'. (P.I., p.26). For detailed analysis of this image family see ibid., pp.40-74.

(70) Sartre is merely taking up here where he left off in his treatment of Husserl's term 'hyle' in Imagination, transposing Husserl's term into the more explanatory term 'analogue'. On this link up between Husserl's Hyle and Sartre's analogue see Kaelin, op.cit., p.39.

(71) P.I., p.23.

(72) Ibid., p.23.

(73) Ibid., p.24: 'The purpose of all three is the same: to make an object 'appear'. The object is not before us, and we know it is not. We thus find, in the first place an intention directed on an absent object. But this intention is not empty, it is not directed on any content whatsoever but on one which is to present some analogue to the object in question'. Ibid., p.25.


(75) P.I., p.32.

(76) This phenomenon of imaginative re-incarnation occurs also in the instance of the photograph-analogue. If I am imaginatively conscious of a photograph of Pierre, then I am animating this celluloid analogue in order to present this absent person. The shades, figures and curves of the celluloid itself merely guide and carry our imaginative intentionality to its fulfilment.

(77) E. Gombrich (The Story of Art, Phaidon, New York, 1950, pp.31-40) and J. Berger (Ways of Seeing, Penguin, 1972, pp.94-108) have both developed this Sartrean insight into a thorough analysis of the whole historical phenomenon of portrait painting.

(78) P.I., p.40. Although Sartre uses signs here as 'expressive' components of the material analogue (Francony) which may imaginatively intend the 'essential' feature of absent Chevalier, elsewhere he makes a strict distinction between the sign and the image. The material of the sign he argues (p.28) is totally indifferent to the object it signifies (i.e. the steel pointer with Paris written on it bears no resemblance to Paris) and is related to it solely by means of convention. The material of the image by contrast, he claims, closely resembles the absent object which it presents (i.e. the portrait of King Charles does resemble
King Charles). In brief, while the sign points, the image presents. 
Sartre argues accordingly that there is a certain internal relationship 
(p.42) between an object and the image of that object, what he calls 
a relationship of 'presence' or 'possession', whereby via the 
material analogue the object itself appears to consciousness in a 
surrogate form. The sign by contrast, is externally related to the 
object which it signifies and remains visually empty; it in no way 
pretends to either present or possess the transcendent object (p.120). 
And elsewhere again Sartre makes yet another distinction: 'In every 
image, even in the one which does not posit that its object exists, 
there is a positional determination. In the sign as such this 
determination is lacking. When an object serves as a sign it 
causes us to envision something at the very outset, but we affirm 
nothing about this something, we limit ourselves to envisioning it' 
(p.31). These distinctions between the image and the sign are most 
informative and one can only regret that Sartre also used sign in 
an entirely different, i.e. imaginative, sense as in a Chevalier 
example above.

(79) P.I., p.40.

(80) ibid., p.73. This goes some way also to accounting for the 'typicality' 
or 'generality' which, as we saw in our discussion of quasi-
observation, is so integral to the image. It also sheds some 
interesting light on Da Vinci's theory of 'sfumato' which held 
that blurred outlines and nebulous features always led to a better 
portrait insofar as they enlisted the reciprocal imaginative activity 
of the beholder in order to create from them a vivid and coherent 

(81) An example of reciprocal imagination would be the appreciation of 
a portrait; an example of unilateral imagination would be reading 
the future from coffee beans.

(82) P.I., pp.62-64.

(83) ibid., p.67.

(83a) See text, p.21.

(84) ibid., p.74.

(85) ibid., pp.75-6.

(86) ibid., pp.171-172.

(87) ibid., p.75.

(88) ibid., p.76.

(89) ibid., p.77.

(90) ibid., p.77; also Bunting, op.cit., p.241.

(91) ibid., p.77.

(92) ibid., pp.115-117.
At first, Sartre was wary of using this term at all, because of its 'immanent' connotations, but did so for reasons of expediency: 'Really the expression 'mental image' leads to confusion. It would be better to say 'consciousness of Peter-in-image' or 'imagined awareness of Peter'. As the word image has served for a long time, we cannot reject it completely. But to avoid all ambiguity, we must remember that the image is nothing other than a relation. The imagined awareness I have of Peter is not awareness of the image of Peter. Peter is directly reached, my attention is not directed on an image but on an object' (P.I., p.8). His notion in this second part of the book (the 'probable' rather than the 'certain') of the image as a synthesis as well as a relation, complicates the issue considerably as we shall see.

(94) ibid., p.120.


(97) ibid.

(98) The fact that the imaginative knowledge is 'generalized' in nature accounts for its 'essential poverty'; but it also and by the same token distinguishes it from perception and saves it from the 'illusion of immanence'. On this point see Morgan, op.cit., p.29.

(99) Kaelin, op.cit., p.52.

(100) Cf. Grimsley, op.cit., p.60; Flynn, op.cit., p.435; Monsen, op.cit., p.31. Sartre himself left this point very vague.

(101) P.I., pp. 138-142. (For a more detailed analysis of a synthesizing role of emotion see Esquisse. Undoubtedly a main reason for Sartre's laconic treatment of the role of affectivity here (less than nine pages) is due to the publication of Esquisse some months earlier. In this work, Sartre offers many observations on the 'magical' power of affectivity which bears a direct relevance to the imagination. On this relation between affectivity and emotion see also 'La psychologie et l'imagination chez J.P. Sartre et chez F. Schneersohn'; M. Openchaim Revue D'Histoire de la Medecine Hebraique, Vol. 30, 1956.

(102) ibid., pp.97f.


(105) Grimsley explains this better than Sartre himself, as follows (op.cit., p.60): 'An adequate analysis of the image requires more than the use of the method of phenomenological interpretation adopted at the beginning of Sartre's analysis, for it has to take into account not only the obvious visual aspects of the image, but also the less easily discernible analogical features...The image is not a clear-cut static phenomenon; originating in the depths of creative consciousness, it has a complete structure that involves a movement toward possibilities lying beyond immediate observation; it thus expresses itself dynamically as it transforms its analogical aspects in accordance with its needs'.

(106) P.I., pp.104-119.

(107) P.I., p.8,13,131-2; In., p.vi. It must be remembered, of course, that the analogue could not be an analogue of Pierre at all, were it not for the intention which aims at the real object Pierre through the analogue.

(108) P.I., p.76.


(110) P.I., p.138. Sartre's interpretation of symbolism is a highly original one involving a radical revamping of the conventional notions of the symbol as a sublimation or material incarnation of some previously existing feeling or thought. 'The function of the symbolic scheme,' he says, 'is in no way to aid understanding; it has a function neither of expression, nor of support, nor of exemplification. I would say, using an indispensable neologism, that the role of the scheme is presentificatory'. (Translation from original version, p.137).

(111) The extraordinarily complex nature of this experimental evidence compels Sartre to admit that there are many borderline cases where an intention of one mode of intentionality tends to confuse itself with another. For example, a conceptual intentionality may entangle itself with an imaginative one and find great difficulty in reversing the intentional direction in order to return to its own unique path: take the mathematician who keeps imagining his girlfriend's face in the circle which he is using to demonstrate a Euclidean theorem. But if Sartre indeed admits of such crisscrossing of intentional rails, he is not contradicting his original position that these intentional rails, however transversed, always remain sui generis. See P.I., pp.160-170.

(112) Sartre also develops here the criticisms he made in Imagination of the Associationist and Würzburg schools for their construction of the image as a symbolizing thing over and against consciousness. He goes to great lengths to adduce empirical evidence supportive of his view that the image arises not by chance or association, but by a unique intentionality of consciousness. See p.153f; see also p.174: 'We can say that the imaginative attitude represents a special function of mental life. If such an image appears in place of simple words, of verbal thoughts or pure thought, it is never the result of a chance association: it is always an sui generis attitude which has meaning and a use. It is absurd to say that an image can harm or check thought, or then this must be understood to mean that thought hurts itself, loses itself in windings and byways...Thought takes the image form when it wishes to be intuitive, when it wants to ground its affirmation on the vision of an object. In that case it tries to make the object appear before it, in order to see it, or better still, to possess it'.


(114) ibid., p.188.

(115) 'It cannot be denied that my hunger, my sexual desire, my disgust undergo an important modification in passing through the imaginative state' (ibid., p.198).
(116) ibid., p.179.
(117) ibid., p.189.
(118) ibid., p.193.
(119) ibid., pp.137, 196.
(120) ibid., p.205.
(121) P.I., p.205.
(122) ibid., p.205.
(123) ibid., p.205.
(124) ibid., pp.211-212.
(125) ibid., p.209.
(126) Les Mains Sales, Act 4, Sc.2.
(127) P.I., p.212.
(128) P.I., p.214.
(129) ibid., pp.222-3.
(130) ibid., p.243.
(131) P.I., pp.231-250.
(132) ibid., p.255.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER V

(1) P.1., p. 259 f. See also on this point Iris Murdoch, Sartre (Fontana, 1953), p. 99.

(2) P.1., pp. 259-260.

(3) ibid., p. 260.

(4) ibid., pp. 261-265. At this point, Sartre embarks on a fascinating analysis of the particular characteristics of: 'constitution', 'isolation' and 'nihilation' which distinguish the imagination per se from similar modes of intentionality such as perception of hidden objects, recollection and anticipation; all three of which operate as forms of a continuous inference founded on the real. One lucid example should serve to illustrate this distinction: 'If while lying on my bed, I anticipate what might happen when my friend returns from Berlin, I detach the future from the present whose meaning it constitutes. I posit it for itself. . . . I give it to myself exactly while it is not yet, that is, as absent, as nothing'. On the other hand, however, Sartre points out how I may live this same future in a real and continuous way, grounded in the development of the present, 'as for instance, if I look for Peter at the station and all my acts have for their real meaning the arrival of Peter at 7.35 p.m.'.

(5) ibid., pp. 267-8.

(6) See Hazel Barnes elucidation of this complex process in her introduction to Being and Nothingness (Philosophical Library, 1956).

(7) P.1., pp. 268-9.

(8) ibid., p. 270

(9) ibid., p. 263.

(10) ibid., p. 271.

(11) ibid., p. 271. 'The gliding of the world into the bosom of nothingness and the emergence of human reality in this very nothingness, can happen only through the position of some thing which is nothingness in relation to the world, and in relation to which the world is nothing. By this we evidently define the structure of imagination... We therefore conclude that imagination is not an empirical and super added power of consciousness, it is the whole of consciousness, as it realizes its freedom.'

(12) ibid., p. 272.

(13) ibid., p. 272.
(14) ibid., p. 273.
(15) ibid., p. 255.
(16) ibid., p. 278.
(17) ibid., p. 281.
(18) ibid., p. 282. See also Kaelin, A., p. 126: 'In fact, when Sartre's phenomenological ontology replaces Plato's transcendental idealism poets became liberated from the latter's moral condemnation on the very same metaphysical considerations which brought about the proposed censorship. If the artist is dealing only with an analogue of the aesthetic object, which is unreal, there is no longer any ground for the charge of formenting the passions of criminals. The attitude of aesthetic contemplation precludes the activity which is thought detrimental to well-being'.
(20) P.1., pp. 213-230.
(22) P.1., p. 254 and 281. Several critics, notably Flynn (op. cit., p. 430), Murdoch (op. cit., pp. 68-69, 100-103) and Desan *The Tragic Flaneur* (Harper, New York, 1960, p. 111), have argued that Sartre's penchant for sharp and irreconcilable dichotomies derives ultimately from a lingering Cartesian dualism.
(23) Flynn, op. cit., p. 437. For a more detailed treatment of this point, see my 'The Artist in Revolt', *The Crane Bag*, (Polens, Ireland) April, 1977, p. 45f.

(26) contd.
109-24; and Gombrich's general theory of the imaginative 'illusion'
as a mode of 'perceptual classification' Art and Illusion,
(Bellingen, N.Y., 1960), pp. 26-11, 260-5; and above all Ryle's
theory of imagination in The Concept of Mind.

(27) See the two previous footnotes.

124-5.

(29) Ryle, ibid., p. 255.

(30) P.l., p. 117.

In his attempt to cope with this contradiction of non-present
presence, Sartre finds common ground with Ryle. Both agree
that we create images out of what we already know and so cannot
learn anything from them - though they disagree of course as to
the nature of this knowledge, Ryle viewing it in an empirical
light, Sartre in an intentional one. Compare, for example,
Ryle's treatment of 'auditory images' op.cit., p. 265 with P.l.,
p.81f. But while agreeing on the cogential import of
imagination, Sartre's phenomenological treatment displays a
decided advantage over Ryle's linguistic-behaviorist one. It not
only permits Sartre a greater degree of 'certainty' in his remarks
about 'quasi-observation', but supports this by demonstrating
that the intentional make-up of the image ensures that
imaginative consciousness must always be aware of itself as such
'quasi' cognition. His 'eidetic' descriptions show how imaginative
knowledge is thus immediate to, and certain of, itself, since
'the object as an image is never anything more than the
consciousness one has of it' (P.l., p.20). But Sartre's
phenomenology also leads to the contradictory conclusion that even
though the imagination can provide 'certain' knowledge of itself, it
is never more than a 'degraded' knowledge. See also Casey,
op.cit., p.16 and K.P. Morgan, op.cit., pp. 28-9. On this point,
Husserl, we saw, was lead to a similar paradox, but his notion
of the image as 'possibility' prevented him from ever going so
far as to define the image as an 'essential poverty' like Sartre.
Because Sartre did not endorse Husserl's thinking on this subject,
the image was not granted any life independent of the imaginer,
and so could not teach the imaginer any 'eternal truths' which
he did not already possess. In brief, while Sartre's
phenomenological treatment of the image may be more 'certain'
and comprehensive than Ryle's, it is no less disparaging.

(32) (See Rabb, op.cit., pp. 74-81; also 'Imagining: An Adverbial
Abalysis, Dialogue, (Vol. XIV, No.2, 1975). We shall be
returning to this particular problem presently.

(33) For other comparative critiques of Ryle and Sartre on imagination
see: Morgan, op.cit., pp. 27-29; Casey, 'Towards a phenomenology
of Imagination' (J.B.S.P., Vol V, no. 1, 1974), pp. 7,9,12;
Samuel Todes 'A Comparative Phenomenology of Perception and
Imagination', op.cit., no.25., 1966, pp. 19f; A.P. Greenway,
(33) contd.

Imaginal Knowing', *op.cit.*, p. 41ff. Because Ryle failed to acknowledge the intentional structure of the image, he tended to reduce all acts of 'visual imagining' (i.e. concrete visualization of a certain object) and all acts of 'imagining how' (i.e. visual or non-visual imagining of how a person might behave in a certain situation) to acts of 'imagining that' (i.e. impersonal visual or non-visual imagining that a certain state of affairs pertains). Ryle explicitly states that 'imagining is always imagining that something is the case', thus dismissing the concrete and personal dimensions of the image which Sartre acknowledged to be essential. See here *Concept of Mind, op.cit.*, p. 256, and also Ryle's 'Imaginary Objects', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, (Vol. XII, 1933), p. 43. Cf. Casey, *op.cit.*, pp. 7-9.


(35) *ibid.*, p. 201.

(36) D. Rabb, 'Prolongedman to a Phenomenology of Imagination', *op.cit.*, p. 75f.

(37) *ibid.*, pp. 75-80; Contrast these conclusions with those reached by B. Minkovsky L'imagination? *Revue International Philosophique* (Belg., Vol. II, 1960), p. 3-31, who analyses the linguistic usages of the term imagination from a phenomenological standpoint. The radically differing nature of these conclusions suggests that the opposition is due more to the methodological presuppositions of the opposing approaches, than to the language-content itself.

(38) *P.l.*, p. xii.

(39) *ibid.*, p. xii.


(41) Even if we were to condone Sartre's dualism, however, we still have to admit that the traditional immanonist could easily concede the transcendency of images in terms of Sartre's definition of consciousness, but assert that the immanence of the images in the 'ego', as defined by Sartre, is in fact just what they were arguing for all the while. See here Morgan, *op.cit.*, pp. 32-3. Whether about the validity of this immanonist defence, it is clear that Sartre's attack on the 'illusion of immanence' is far from unimpeachable. For a defense of Sartre against charges of dualism and immanence, see Natanson 'Existentialism and the theory of literature' in *Literature, Philosophy and the Social Sciences*, (M. Nijhoff, Hague, 1962).

(42) *P.l.*, p. 77: 'It must be admitted that reflective description does not tell us directly anything concerning the representative material of the mental image. This is due to the fact that when the imaginative consciousness is destroyed, its transcendent
content is destroyed with it; no describable residue remains, we are confronted by another synthetic consciousness which has nothing in common with the first.'

See Morgan, op. cit., p. 33.

Ibid., Flynn, op. cit., pp. 66, 68; Manser, op. cit., p. 22f.

It is interesting to note that the phrase which Sartre uses here 'n'est qu'il est et être ce qu'il n'est pas' is a literal translation of the Hegelian formula of negation 'das nicht zu sein, was es ist, und das zu sein, was es nicht ist'.

P.l., pp. 210-211. See Mary Warnock's introduction, p.xvi; also her article 'Imagination in Sartre', op. cit., pp. 326, 336f.

On page 336 of this latter she states: 'However sympathetically it is treated there is no doubt that the concept of nothing remains ambiguous, misleading and extraordinarily far from clear. Heidegger and Sartre make different uses of it: Sartre himself makes different uses of it within a single work'. Warnock argues that Sartre identified imagination and negation in order to promote the idea that man is free because he can envisage nothing, that is, transcend this world of things. This is, of course, very similar if not identical with Hegel's notion of negation in the Logic: see also Werke (Vol. xx, p. 186-1, Knox translation). On other occasions, Sartre seems to use nothing in a more Heideggerian sense to denote something which 'exists', but in the normal 'at hand' sense of existence: see What is Metaphysics? (1929, Brock translation in Existence and Being, op. cit., p. 360-2). The first or Hegelian sense of negation is not unique to imagination (that is, when I perceive a chair I am conscious that it is not a table etc), while the latter is (that is, I cannot perceive something that does not exist 'at hand' before me). Sartre never sorted out this confusion in usage. Nevertheless, while the emphasis in the Psychology of Imagination is clearly on the latter in order to substantiate his radical differentiation between perception and imagination, in Being and Nothingness it is most certainly on the former, the central preoccupation here being with negation as a general activity of consciousness, rather than as a sui generis activity of imaginative consciousness. Many critics become totally exasperated with the opacity and inconsistency of Sartre's treatment of 'nothingness'. See for example Manser, op. cit., pp. 30-6; or A.J. Ayer, 'Imaging' Horizon, (Vol. XII), p. 18: 'In particular Sartre's reasoning on the subject of 'le neant' seems to me exactly on a par with that of the king in Alice through the Looking Glass... The point is that words like 'nothing' and 'Nobody' are not used as the name of something insubstantial and mysterious. They are not used to name anything at all'.

P.l., p. 271. Warnock has some interesting critical comments on this particular point in her 'Imagination in Sartre' article, op. cit., p. 326: In taking over certain Hegelian expressions to expound the connection between the imagination and nothing, Sartre comes dangerously close to reintroducing the thing-like image
which he tried to exclude. For he says of the imagination that it concerns itself with objects which have the property of "being not what they are and being what they are not... a kind of object has been introduced, albeit mysteriously into the account of imagining". Later in the same article, Warnock offers a more elaborate explanation: "Difficulties immediately arise if one moves from saying that imagination is intentional to saying that the object of the imagination (i.e. the image itself) is intentional. For then it is once again necessary to raise the question about what question is being referred to.' She concludes: 'There is no way out of the conclusion that Sartre fails at this point to make his theory as different as he would like it to be from the theories of Descartes or of Hume, in which the image is an object'. See also her book The Philosophy of Sartre (Hutchinson, London, 1965), pp. 26ff; and Nansen, op.cit., p. 37.

Sartre failed to adequately distinguish these two meanings. This confusion is obvious in the following passage, to take but one example: 'It is impossible to study the mental image separately. There isn't a world of images and a world of objects... the two worlds, the imaginary and the real, are made up of the same objects' (P.1., p. 27.) This can pass so long as the transcendent object is also a real existent; when it is not, however, Sartre presents us with such unsatisfactory accounts as the following: 'Someone may be tempted to oppose to my view the case where I evoke an image of an object which has no real existence outside myself. But it is precisely the case that the chimera does not exist as an image. It exists neither in that way nor in any other way'. (P.1., p. 7.)

Sartre himself does occasionally use the term 'imaginary object' e.g., pp. 270-273, but always ambiguously - as referring to the image-analogue or the absent person, or both. It is never explicitly recognized as a third term separate from both. See here Cowley's interesting distinction between Objects in verbo and Objects in re to clarify the confusion in the Sartrian theory of the image as object, op.cit., pp. 203-5.

P.1., p. 271.

This link between nothingness and possibility was, as we shall see, to become a central theme of Being and Nothingness. See Nansen on the relationship of Sartre's notions of imagination and possibility, op.cit., p. 27.

P.1., p. xii.

(This admission) P.1., p. 272. This admission, although entirely consistent within the terms of Sartre's postscript, contradicts his earlier view that the imaginary object can be 'something' only for the mentally ill. Indeed hypnagogic illusion was defined as a seeing of 'nothing' as 'something'. Under such an illusion the consciousness intends an object as if it were a true perceptual representation: 'I really
see something, but what I see is nothing' (ibid., p. 70).
This judgement that the imagining of an image as 'something'
is pathological, stems from Sartre's initial description as
a nothingness projected by the nothingness of intentional
consciousness. The image is 'spontaneous' he argued
accordingly, precisely because the image is a nothingness
motivated by no agency external to itself. And yet it must be
motivated, for how else is Sartre to account for the fact that
an image is always of a particular thing or person. Sartre
would undoubtedly say that a mental image of something is
motivated by my previous 'knowledge' of that particular something.
But this is only to remove the problem one degree : we must still
ask where our knowledge of this particular has come from.
Since Sartre has effectively rejected any question of its being
stored as a perceptual residue in consciousness; and since
he will have no truck with any 'innate' idea theory (see Kaelin,
E.A., p. 49), his only solution - had he followed the implications
of his own reasoning - would have been to accept the fact that
the imaginary object is indeed 'something', albeit 'nothing'
similar to either consciousness or reality. But Sartre as
we shall see, was more loyal to the premises than to the
implications of his reasoning.

(54) P.l., pp. 14f, 136; see also Iodes,op. cit., pp. 7-7.

(55) We can only be 'fascinated' by an image, that is, if it is in
some sense other than, and beyond, ourselves - a point,
incidentally, remarkably similar to Heidegger's theory that in
order for us to be able to 'dread' nothingness it must somehow
exist as something other than us (What is Metaphysics? op.cit.,
p. 36ff.). Casey is approaching a similar insight in his
examination of the Sartrian notion of imaginative 'spontaneity'
in his article, 'Toward a Phenomenology of Imagination'
op. cit., p.12: 'Approached phenomenologically... the felt
quality of imaginative spontaneity is to be described in such
terms as 'gliding', 'floating', 'sliding', into or before
consciousness. There is, something peculiarly automatic
about spontaneous imagining - something that is strictly self-
generating, requiring no intervention from an outside agency
(not even by the imaginer himself). The imaginative act appears
to arise sui generis and without having been willed into
experience'. Unfortunately, Casey does not here explore the
implications of this insight. He has a book presently to be
published with Indiana University Press entitled Imagining, a
Phenomenological study. Hopefully these and related issues will
be dealt with in greater detail and depth.

(56) P.l., p. 270.
(57) ibid., p. 272.
(58) ibid., p. 273.
(59) ibid., p. 273.
(60) ibid., p. 273.
(61) ibid., p. 273.

(62) ibid., p. 272.

(63) ibid., p. 272.

(64) See here Gaston Bachelard’s critique of the contradictions in Sartre’s theory of imaginative projection. Final chapter.

(65) Sartre’s official theory rejects this reading. P.l., p. 127: An image has no persuasive powers but we persuade ourselves that we form an image; and again, p. 28: ‘However touching or strong an image may be, it gives its object as not being (comme n’étant pas)’. Todes more than any other critic comes close to something like this teleological interpretation of the imaginary in his article ‘A Comparative Phenomenology of Perception and Imagination’, op. cit., p. 15: ‘Rather than talking of the ‘imaginary object’, Todes talks of the ‘imaginary idea’: ‘The imaginary idea is not, strictly speaking, produced in our imagination. It is produced by our imagination but only as the imaginative instrument for producing images in our imagination as representing the imaginative idea with which we produced them; but the imaginative idea is not itself entertained in our imagination. We imagine some image... but we imagine that some imaginative idea obtains’. Todes’ treatment of the image as possibility is as suggestive as it is vague: ‘Only an image indirectly produced by means of an imaginative idea appears capable of further occupying us in a progressive unfolding of its significance. Such an image illustrates its controlling idea in such a way as to reflect the idea itself, by somehow making all its possible aspects implicitly apparent in the one imagined aspect which appears to stand for them all. In this way, a single image controlled by an imaginative idea reveals the possibility of many other imaginary representations of this same idea. Our sense that we can actualise those possibilities is our sense that we can progressively unfold the significance fully implicit in the given image’ (ibid., p. 12.)

(66) P.l., p. 272. The implication here is that since consciousness must be always consciousness of something, the moment it negates the reality it was perceptually conscious of, it must simultaneously posit something else which it is imaginatively conscious of.

(67) Alphonse de Waellens argues that Sartre never succeeded in reconciling his dualist and phenomenological approaches, and that accordingly phenomenology was greatly prejudiced: ‘A philosophy of Ambiguity’, introduction to Merleau-Ponty’s Structure of Behaviour (Beacon, Boston, 1963), trans. A. Fischer from original La structure du Compartiment (P.U.F., Paris, 1949) pp. v-xv. Merleau-Ponty himself and Bachelard express a similar view: see final chapter. But it is E. Maclin in his ‘Phenomenology in Sartre’s theory of Images’, op. cit., p. 46, who offers the most comprehensive formulation of this critique: ‘For Sartre, consciousness is pure spontaneity. In what sense
(67) contd.

therefore, can an object affect a consciousness in perception? Sartre claims that it does not. But if this is so, what is the relation between consciousness and object in an act of perception? The statement which constitutes the phenomenological axiom 'every consciousness is conscious of something' solves the issue by fiat and the question is begged. We still face the issue of discriminating between percept and image. To call the one an object and the other an intention is perfectly valid, if only one can describe the nature of the relation between object and intention in an act of purely perceptive awareness. Since Sartre choose to bind himself between two disparate explanatory categories, the 'pour-soi' and the 'en-soi', spontaneity and determined essence, he has failed to solve the problem of perception, as others have failed. The question of the interaction of the two orders of existence has clearly been begged.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VI

(1) 'Being' in this sense (always capitalized) differs from the being of his ontology in that it represents the ideal representation of the pour-soi and the en-soi, rather than their absurd dividedness as in Being and Nothingness.

(1a) Iris Murdoch makes a similar point in her Sartre, op.cit., p.103: 'For Sartre imagination - which in effect he identifies with consciousness, it is the 'essential characteristic' of consciousness - is both liberation and enslavement. It is the power to set things at a distance. It is also the tendency towards self-enslavement, the inertia of consciousness'. And she goes on to conclude that 'This view of imagination is the root of Sartre's misunderstanding both of contemplation and of action. Any imaginative movement which is not the scattering of a given complex is a piece of self-deception, a self-protective dodge of consciousness'. We shall examine this criticism in detail later. See also Kaelin, An Existentialist Aesthetic (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1969), p. 337: 'Central to Sartre's aesthetic doctrine is the notion that man is free because he is possessed of an imagination, the power to 'see' what does not exist or what is not present to a perceiving consciousness. Only after this conclusion had been reached in his phenomenological study of the imagination did he conceive Being and Nothingness. Given the conclusion that a literary artist does in fact create an object... which did not exist before the novelist's intentional act, Sartre became interested in the ontological structures implicit in the act of free creation. Thus if the historical order of his works is considered, it will be seen that the dialectics of Being and Nothingness followed upon his aesthetic conclusions rather than supplying the premises upon which his aesthetic conclusions rest'. See similar argument in Dufrene, Phénoménologie de L'Expérience Esthétique (P.U.F., Paris, 1953), pp. 265, 122.

(2) B.N., op.cit., p. 47.

(3) ibid., p. 47.

(4) ibid., p. 53.

(5) ibid., p. 62. "What can be the significance of the ideal of sincerity except as a task impossible to achieve, of which the very meaning is in contradiction with the structure of my consciousness?"

(6) ibid., p. 60.

(7) ibid., p. 61. See also development of this position in Theory of the Emotions, op.cit., pp. 59-92.

(8) ibid., p. 69.
(9) *Ibid.*, p. 70m: 'If it is indifferent whether one is in good faith or in bad faith, because bad faith reapproaches good faith and slides to the very origin of the project of good faith, that does not mean that we can not radically escape bad faith. But this supposes a self-recovery we shall call authenticity, the description of which has no place here.'


(11) Iris Murdoch, *op. cit.*, p. 102. Unfortunately Murdoch merely mentions this point en passant and does not give it the detailed treatment it deserves.

(12) B.N., p. 429.


(14) B.N., p. 682 (Fr. edition).

(15) *Ibid.*, p. 689. See also p. 596 (Eng. edition): 'To appropriate any object is to appropriate the world symbolically... to be in the world is to form a project of possessing the world; that is, to apprehend the total world as that which is lacking to the for-itself in order that it may become in-itself-for-itself. It is to be engaged in a totality which is precisely the ideal or value or totalized totality and which would be ideally constituted by the fusion of the for-itself as a detotalized totality which has to be what it is with the world, as the totality of the in-itself which is what it is'. See also here Boris's maxim in The Reproduction, (Paris, 1974): 'To love one woman is to have loved all women!'.


(17) B.N., p. 615.

(18) Some critics make this identification (between imagination and possibility) quite blithely without even remarking on the 'implicit' nature of this rapport in Sartre's own treatment. See for example, R. Courtney, 'Imagination and the dramatic art', Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism. (Vol. XXX, U.S.A., 1971), p. 163-170: 'In Being and Nothingness he says that when I imagine, this allows me to add the possible to the real; possibility is imagination and this is the negation of reality. Human action is a constant effort to realize imaginative possibilities, to transform the real!' (p. 169).

(19) B.N., p. 96.


(21) *Ibid.*, p. 98. The implausible nature of Sartre's view of being-in-itself springs, I suggest, from his equally rigid view of negating consciousness (i.e. imagination). The extreme of negativeness on the side of non-being produces an extreme of
(21) contd.
positivity on the side of being, so that we end up with a sort of
uncompromising Parmenidean conception of being. See Philip
Petit, 'Sartre and Parmenides', Philosophical Studies, 1968,
p. 161-188.

(22) ibid., p. 98.

(23) ibid., p. 99.

(24) ibid., p. 100.

(25) To be sure, Sartre is not so foolish as to reduce possibility
to a content in consciousness; such is the illusion of
immanence which he rejects in Leibniz's and Spinoza's
subjectivism. But for all that, his refusal to posit possibility
as something existing independently of consciousness seems to point
in such a direction.

(26) ibid., p. 100. See also here B.N., p. 537. Speaking of
possibility as the end toward which consciousness surpasses
itself in desire, Sartre writes: 'Let us beware then of
considering these desires as little psychic entities dwelling
in consciousness; they are consciousness itself in its
original productive transcendental structure, for consciousness
is on principle consciousness of something'.

(27) ibid., p. 565.

(28) ibid., p. 101.

(29) ibid., p. 102. For an interesting gloss on this notion of
possibility see 'Revolution and the Intellectual', Politics
and Literature, trans. by J. Calder, (Calder and Boyers, London,
Journal of the Philosophical Seminar (U.C.L. Vol. 1. 1977),
p. 30f.

(30) B.N., p. 102.

(31) ibid., p. 93.

(32) ibid., p. 87.

(33) ibid., p. 93.

(34) ibid., p. 94.

(35) ibid., p. 96.

(36) Letter on Humanism, in 'Phenomenology and Existentialism'

(37) This rejection is made in both Letter on Humanism and
Being and Time.

(39) B.N., p. 537.

(40) ibid., p. 434.

(41) ibid., p. 435.

(42) ibid., p. 434.

(43) ibid., pp. 575-613.

(44) ibid., p. 577.

(45) ibid., p. 579.

(46) ibid., p. 580.

(47) ibid., p. 582.

(48) ibid., pp. 584-5. Sartre claims that in the latter instance the activity of sliding appears as identical with a continuous creation on the matter of the snow. The speed is comparable to consciousness and here symbolizes consciousness; but if it does so the snow always remains impenetrable and out of reach. 'This synthesis of self with not-self which the sportsman's action here realizes is expressed, as in the case of speculative knowledge and the work of art, by the affirmation of the right of the skier over the snow. It is my field of snow... It is mine.'

(49) ibid., p. 592.

(50) In literature the notion of roleplaying and masks as projective synthesis of man's several selves has proved a central preoccupation viz. the works of Goethe, Wilde, Yeats, Pirandello and Borges. And in cinema, where the medium is particularly suited to the ambiguities and metamorphoses of the whole question of 'imaging' (we often speak for example of a 'play' of images), play has been the boon the theme of several fascinating studies, notably Altman's *Images*, Roeg's *Performance* and Bertolucci's *Spider's Stratagem*. The unmistakable originality of Sartre's treatment lies, I believe, in his study of play in the light of a phenomenological understanding of man's imaginative consciousness. In other words, what Sartre's phenomenological analysis of play does is to explain for the first time the peculiar ontological structure of man which finds expression in the work of all these artists and thinkers. This structure being, of course, man's perpetual suspension between the being which he is and the being he 'imaginatively' intends. It is because of this ontological divideness, that man is always 'playing at' being something he is not. Sartre hints at the importance of the Cinema's play of images when he writes in B.N., p. 593: 'The synthesis of in-itself and for-itself... is what movie producers have
attempted to render by overprinting the film. The destroyed object resembles a consciousness although it has the irreparability of the in-itself. At the same time it is positively mine because the mere fact that I have to be what I was keeps the destroyed object from being annihilated. I recreate it by recreating myself; thus to destroy is to recreate by assuming oneself as solely responsible for the being of what existed for all. This leads onto the additional insight that play may as easily be appropriation by 'destruction', as it is appropriation by 'creation'. See also *ibid.* pp. 594-5.

(51) *B.N.* p. 614.

(52) The only other existential psycho-analysis of the link between imagination and God that I am aware of is Eliade's treatment of the 'Symbols of ascension' in his Myths, Dreams and Mysteries (Fontana, 1960), pp. 106, 116f. Eliade offers us here many analyses of the images of passage and flight 'in as much as they are of interest to the phenomenologist and philosopher'. The conclusion of his study is remarkably reminiscent of Sartre's own: 'Now if we consider the flight and all the related symbolisms as a whole, their significance is at once apparent: they all express a break with the universe of everyday experience; and a dual purposiveness is evident in this rupture: both transcendence and at the same time freedom are to be obtained... The creation of these countless imaginary universes in which space is transcended and weight is abolished, speaks volumes upon the true nature of the human being... It is the longing to go beyond and 'above' the human condition, to transmute it by an excuse of spiritualization' (p. 106-7). The all important difference between Sartre and Eliade, however, is that the former considers it a valid project, the latter an absurd one.

(53) *B.N.* p. 615.

(54) *B.N.* p. 620.

(55) *B.N.* p. 626.

(56) *P.I.* p. 281.

(57) *B.N.* p. 195.

(58) *ibid.* p. 627.


(60) *ibid.* p. 136. Also *ibid.* 'They (the official of Douville) had been painted with great exactitude and yet, under the brush their faces had been stripped of the mysterious weakness of men's faces'.

(61) *ibid.* p. 138.
(65) Anny's obsession with 'perfect moments' turns her whole life into an act. Life for her is a stage which she peoples with her own characters, always making sure to keep them at arms length in case they should start inventing their own lines. 'I live in the past. I recall everything that has happened to me and I arrange it. From a distance, so that it doesn't do any harm, it might almost take you in. Our story is all quite beautiful. I add a few touches here and there and it makes a whole string of perfect moments. Then I close my eyes and try to imagine I'm still living in it' (ibid., p.217). But Anny is also aware that her acts are useless unless, there is an audience there to enliven the analogue for her. Here again Sartre's theory of imagination in P. L. is in strong evidence. To them (the audience) we were presenting a perfect moment. But they didn't live in it: it unfolded in front of them. And do you think that as the actors lived inside it? In the end, it wasn't anywhere, either on one side of the footlights or the other, it didn't exist: and yet everyone was thinking about it'. And it is precisely because it doesn't exist that Anny's lifetime of attempts to make it so, is futile.

(66) ibid., p. 151.

(67) ibid., p. 63. As Merleau-Ponty points out astutely in his essay on Sartre in Sense and Nonsense (N. J. P. Evanston, trans. by H. Dreyfus, 1964), p. 45: 'Nothing man does is absolutely pure or venerable, not even, especially not, the 'perfect moments' he contrives for himself in life or in art. At the end of the museum a strain of music at last offered something incontestable, but it was no accident that Sartre selected 'Some of these Days' for this final elevation. He thus refused in advance the religion of art and its consolations. Man may get beyond his contingency in what he creates, but all expression even what is known as great art, is an act born of man'.


(69) In an interview given to La Nouvelle Observateur, Jan.26, 1970, Sartre admits that this basic experience is what he is trying to analyse in all his critical studies of other authors also: 'I wrote les Mots in order to reply to the same question as one finds in my studies of Flaubert and Genet: How does a man become someone who writes, someone who wishes to speak of the imaginary?'

(70) 'To escape the desolation of created things, I prepared for myself the middle-class solitude for which there is no sure: that of the creator... Everything took place in my head; an imaginary child, I protected myself through the imagination.
I had made a false entrance, so I returned behind a screen and started my birth over again at any selected point. Also here ibid., p. 97. 'I began to discover myself. I was virtually nothing; at most an activity without a content, but that was enough, I was escaping from the comedy: I was not yet working but I had already stopped playing, the liar was finding his true self in elaborating his lies. I was born from writing: before that, there was a reflection in a mirror'. As he goes on: 'From my first novel, I knew that a child had entered the palace of mirrors. By writing, I existed, I escaped from the grown-ups; but I existed only to write and if I said: me - that meant the one who wrote. It did not matter: I knew joy; the public child gave himself private assignations'. The only consolation that Sartre could find in this loneliness was the sense of tyrannical power over all things: 'I set about transfiguring my vocation by filling it with my old dreams; there was no stopping me: I twisted 'ideas, destroyed the meaning of words, and cut myself off from the world for fear of bad company and comparisons. The emptiness of my soul gave place to total and permanent mobilization: I became a military dictatorship' (p. 110).

As he says himself 'I thought I was giving myself to literature when in fact I was taking holy orders' (ibid., p. 155).

And he goes on: 'I could appear to the Holy Spirit as a precipitate of language... I would start by giving myself an everlasting body and then yield myself up to my perfectors. I would not write for the pleasure of writing, but to carve this glorious body in words'. That is to say, Sartre felt that by writing he could mystically transform himself into an ideal image that would somehow remain himself.

See also these related passages: 'The urge to write contained a refusal to live' (p. 120). 'I looked at life through future eyes and it seemed to me a moving and wonderful story... that is the mirage: The future more real than the present. It is not surprising: in a completed life the end is taken as the truth of the beginning. The dead man stands halfway between being and value, between the crude fact and its reconstruction: his history becomes a kind of circular essence which is summed up in each of his moments' (p. 125-6). 'I was looking at my life through my death and saw only a closed memory which nothing could leave and nothing could enter... everything was according to my plan' (p. 115). 'I could not believe that a person received his being from outside, or that the movements of the soul were the results of previous movements. Born of future expectation, I leapt about, complete and shining, forever repeating the ceremony of my birth' (p. 117). 'I wanted to realize myself straight away and embrace at one glance the totality which haunted me when I was not thinking about it' (p. 152). No great amount of existential psychoanalysis is needed to interpret these passages.
(75) contd.

In the light of Sartre's fundamental project of imagination - a pour-soi-en-soi synthesis.

(76) ibid., p. 134.

(77) ibid., pp. 157-8.


(81) ibid., p. 27.


(83) The Age of Reason, p. 54-5: 'On the table there was a fine Chinese vase... three thousand years old. Mathieu had gone up to the vase, his hands behind his back. Shifting his feet nervously and looked at it. It was frightening; in this venerable overbrowed world, to be a little dough ball of bread faced with an impassive vase three thousand years old... Suddenly he had gone up to the table, lifted up the vase and hurled it to the floor; It had happened just like that, and immediately afterward he had felt as light as gossamer'.

(84) ibid., p. 58.

(85) ibid., p. 66.

(86) ibid., p. 79.

(87) ibid., p. 77.

(88) ibid., p. 78.

(89) The Reprieve, p. 249.

(90) ibid., p. 117. See in this connection Bauer's excellent analysis in Sartre and the Artist (University of Chicago Press, 1963). Another excellent example of the way in which man used his imagination to escape reality is Sartre's description of the 'imaginary town' which the prisoners of occupied France create for themselves out of a profound sense of 'absence': 'Leur attente a fait lever de l'autre cote de l'enceinte toute une ville de garrisons avec des jardins, des bordels et des cafés; la ville fantome haute ses toits et ses feuillages par-de sus l'enceinte de la prison, elle se reflete sur les faces aveugles de les danseurs fantomes' (Mort Dans L'Ame, p. 245).

(92) ibid., p. 109: "He was the object of a look. A look which
peared deep into him, pierced him with knife thrusts, and was
not his look; an opaque look, night in person, waiting for
him there deep within him, condemning him to be himself;
coward, hypocrite, pederaste for all eternity".

(93) ibid., p. 158. Sartre was to devote considerable space to this
Fetishism of the Imaginary in his 'Nallarme', Les Écrivains

(93a) See L. Jaubert, op.cit., p. 255: "L'artisan exemplaire d'un
anti-monde est Philippe, parce qu'il en a besoin pour compenser
ses lâchetés réelles. Il imagine en tous ses détails son
existence de martyr, ses actions heroïques, la supériorité
de ceux qui l'ont connu comme lâche... et leur admiration
tardive: 'plus tard ils mettront une plaque de marbre sur le
mur de cet hôtel... mais je serais mort' (The Reprieve, p. 146).

(94) The Reprieve., p. 145.

(95) Bauer, op.cit., p. 91. 'The work of art must not serve as a
model for man's life, as Sartre repeatedly shows in his fiction.
It can only serve to show the impossibility of being in life
and become the basis on which a new myth might be created in
stone, pigment or words'.

(96) Les Mouches, in Théâtre de Jean-Paul Sartre (Gallimard, Paris,
1947), p. 78.

(97) ibid., p. 85.

(98) ibid., p. 144.

(99) ibid., p. 120.

(100) Interview with Yvon Novy, Comedia (April, 1943).

(101) See I. Mézaros on this point 'J.P. Sartre: A critical Tribute'
in the Socialist Register ed. Milliband (Merlin Press, London,
1975), p. 35: "Sartre's tragedy of freedom... accepts necessity
and fatality as the guiding principle of all art forms.
Consequently, the spontaneity and polyphony (of the image) can
only soften the blow: they cannot transcend the fundamental
determination and limits of fatality. Characteristically
he has us to admire cinema's 'inflexible but supple
enchainment' which is not much more than a consolation prize
in the form of a verbal-paradoxical 'solution'. Ex punice
aquam - one cannot squeeze spontaneity and freedom out of
fatality by calling it 'supple'!.


(103) 'Jean-Paul Sartre Répond à la Critique', Figaro Littéraire
(June 30, 1951). See also Kenneth Douglas 'Sartre and the
Self-inflicted Wound', Yale French Studies, (Vol. 9, 1952),
pp. 123-31, and Sartre on Theatre, ed. M. Contat (Quartet
Quoted R. Courrèges, 'Imagination and the Dramatic Act', op. cit., p. 169. This notion of play was also to prove the central preoccupation of all the central protagonists Sartre's collection of short stories, Le Mur (Gallimard, Paris, 1939) - Pierre, Julien, Lulu, Jean and Estérate. But Sartre remained convinced that drama was the medium most suited to the portrayal of this fundamental activity of play which Sartre calls 'the eidos of our daily existence' (Itinerary of a thought in New Left Review, 1969, p. 56).

See I. Mazes' comment on this point in the Socialist Register, op. cit., p. 26: 'What is important is the definition of myth in Drama as the 'Eidos of daily existence'. This makes it clear that the issue at stake transcends the limits of the theatre and leads us right into the heart of Sartre's overall quest. Indeed, this is the key that opens not only the door of his literary vision but also of his conception of art in general, and beyond. Sartre himself admits as much in an article written in 1959 entitled 'The purpose of writing' (in Between Existentialism and Marxism op. cit., p. 11-12): 'Philosophy is concerned with man who is at once an agent and an actor who produces and plays his drama while he lives the contradictions of his situation. A play is the most appropriate vehicle today for showing man in action. This is why the theatre is philosophical and philosophy dramatic. Drama is, in effect, the presentation of play within play. Thus when Sartre has Hugo cry out in Les Mains Sales, 'Je vis dans un décor', he is using fiction to reveal to us the fiction of our everyday existence. This procedure of focusing or condensation is what Sartre calls Myth. By grasping the work of art as an image of our own existence we experience it as a synthesis of 1) our subjective selves, and 2) an objective universality and typicity beyond ourselves. Thus Sartre proclaims, 'the function of theatre is to present the individual under the form of myth' (interview Alain Kochler, Perspectives du Théâtre, 1960).

Only in Myth can man achieve a synthesis of his pour-soi and his en-soi in so far as myth represents 'the singularization of the work by the man and the universalization of the man by the work' (Socialist Register, op. cit., p. 60).

See also in this connection Myth and Philosophy: Sartre talks to Tyron', The Observer (June 25, 1961); 'Myth, reality and Theatre' in Literature and Politics (Calder, London, 1973), p. 45-57. But the synthesis in myth is an unreal one. This is why in an article written in 1967 entitled 'A Structure of Language' (Literature and Politics, op. cit., pp. 53-55) Sartre declares the 'Imaginary content' of theatre to be entirely secondary to the real content of politics. For a good critical discussion of this point see H. Marcuse 'Sartre's Existentialism' in Studies in Critical philosophy (N.I.B. 1972), pp. 178, 186; and Jameson Marxism and Form, op. cit., pp. 276, 396 and 'Three Methods in the Literary Criticism of J.-P. Sartre' in Modern French Criticism, ed. J. Simon (Chicago, 1977).

(105) contd.
Frantz's creation of a material analogue for his imaginary object has several consequences. It demonstrates that he wishes to deny the possible spontaneity of the imaginary consciousness in order to believe that the imaginary world determines his conduct. It further demonstrates the emotional force with which his imaginary world is charged. The image of Frantz is an effective-cognitive synthesis involving what Sartre calls a degraded knowledge. Further the creation of the material analogue enables Sartre to demonstrate the possible changes of intention from the imagining to the realising, together with the moral and psychological significance of such changes.

(106) P.L., p. 26. The effort of Pierre in Sartre's short story 'Le Chambre' in Le Mur displays an equally futile attempt to convince oneself that an imaginary world created by oneself has a real and objective existence.

(107) Les Squestres D'Altona, trans by the University of London Press, 1956, p. 97. See also Goldthorpe's excellent analysis of the triple unreality of time, space and intraworldly relationships in Frantz's room, op.cit., pp. 121-2.

(108) Words, p. 23.


(110) ibid., p. 124.

(111) ibid., p. 125.

(112) ibid., p. 125. Also Kaelin 'Aesthetic Theory of Sartre's Phenomenology' in E.A., p. 77.

(113) 'Sculptures à N Dimensions', Derriere le Miroir (no.5, 1947), p.3.

(114) ibid., p. 4.


(116) ibid., p. 294: 'The eternity of stone is synonymous with inertia, it is a present forever fixed'. Sartre's close critical attentions to the material the artist uses seems to me a sufficient testament to the mistakenness of the common criticism that Sartre's aesthetic theory is an idealist one which totally ignores the medium which carries the imaginative intention in favour of the end imagined. For Sartre the analogue of the artistic image became, in practice, an integral part of the image itself! See also Mzareos, 'Jean Paul Sartre: A Critical Tribute', op.cit., o. 32; Kaelin, op.cit., pp. 76-89, 363-4; Flynn, op.cit., p. 137.

(118) *ibid.*, p. 293.


(122) On Tintoretto, see 'Le Séquestré de Venise', *Situations*, IV, *op. cit.*, pp. 291-396. See particularly the relevance of his distinction between 'expansive' and 'retractile' art here. S. Genet, Comédien et Martyr (Gallimard, Paris, 1952) p. 129ff. ('expansive art') is not finitude but explosion, not inertia heaped on a being that is what it is and nothing else, but a certain manner of being all that it is and never being exactly what it is.

(123) *Situations*, IV, *op. cit.*, p. 339. Also: Titian forced his brush to render somber terrors, suffering empty of pain, the dead without death' (p. 367). 'He spends most of his time soothing princes gaurameeting them with his canvases that everything is for the best in the best of all possible worlds' (p. 339).

(124) *ibid.*, pp. 365-86.

(125) Essays in Aesthetics, *op. cit.*, p. 110. 'He seeks to produce an now being, a presence for all the mere austere because it feeds on an absence surreptitiously falsified by substitution... The artist wanted not to annihilate and make us experience the world's dishevelled meanings, but to create meanings that had never before existed. At the end of this long crisis in which the artist's creativity was submerged in disillusionment in his failure to understand that the only absolute is imaginary, the figure had the good sense to disintegrate'. See also 'The Writer and his language', *Literature and Politics*, *op. cit.*, pp. 93-4.


(127) Accordingly, Sartre chooses Guardi over Canaletto - as we earlier remarked for while the former allows for 'Presence' by a certain confusion and incompleteness, the latter avoids all inaccuracies of resemblance: 'There is no chance of mistaken identity. So the painting has no meaning: no more than an identification card' (Situations, IV, *op. cit.*, p. 372). In *Situations*, II (Gallimard, Paris, 1945) p. 107, Sartre describes 'presence' therefore, as 'an imaginary consciousness of the world in its totality as simultaneously being and having to be'.

(129) Situations IV, op. cit., p. 83. Kaolin asks the question 'if' for Sartre, aesthetic object is an ideal entity, what can be said of these art objects which do not refer to anything beyond themselves', and concludes - wrongly as I shall argue - that Sartre's metaphysical approach simply cannot do justice to the aesthetic quality of textural materials. See L.A., p.83.

(130) Situations, IV, op. cit., p. 30. See also Situations II, op. cit., 'Presence is always a presence in absence for it is never quite identical with its presentification in the work of art itself. The work of art is not a simple description of the present but a judgement of this present in the name of a future: as every book finally contains a call its presence has already outstripped itself'. Cf. St.Genet, op. cit., p. 222; Kaolin, op. cit., p. 120ff; Essays in Aesthetics, p. 104.


(132) Situations IV, op. cit., p. 403.

(133) ibid., p. 431.

(134) ibid., p. 388.


(138) ibid., p. 287.


(140) ibid., p. 90.

(141) ibid., pp. 140-1. See Durand, op.cit., p. 191 on the role of the imaginary in Sartre's Baudelaire.

(142) ibid., p. 156.

(143) ibid., p. 216.


(145) ibid., p. 172.
See his discussion of Mallarmé's 'art of nothingness' in \textit{What is literature} op. cit., p. 130. Also Kaelin, p. 155.

'Mallarmé', p. 176.

ibid., p. 177.


His work is accordingly defined by an 'expansive' not a 'retractive' imagination, \textit{ibid.}, p. 429. For commentary, Bauer, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 172.

\textit{St. Genet.}, p. 334.

\textit{ibid.}, p. 363.

\textit{ibid.}, p. 334. See also in this connection: 'Since the synthesis of the Non-being of Being and the Being of Non-being is appearance, and since appearance is a manifestation to the wicked person of his terrifying freedom, what would happen if Genet, by an extraordinary effort, transformed his acts into gestures, his being into imaginary experience, the world into phantasmagoria, even himself into a more appearance? What if he substituted for the impossible destruction of the universe the destruction of its reality? What if this young man would transform himself - like Divine (one of his characters) - into an imaginary woman? And what if, by this play-acting, he would bring everything - trees, plants, tools, animals, women and men into a reality-destroying maelstrom? We shall learn later on that this mad attempt to replace the entire world by an appearance of a world is called 'aesthetic' and that the aesthetic is a wicked person. Genet was an aesthete for ten years of his life, and beauty was, at first, nothing more to him than a hateful dream of universal conflagration' (\textit{ibid.}, p. 153). 'If some proud and abandoned soul should love images for their own sake and seek to create order or false appearances, a parasitic universe than the imagination becomes a blasphemy and defiance .... His aim is to oblige society to assume the images which he invents and conjure objectivity on them' (\textit{ibid.}, p.388). Genet saw Evil as identified with Beauty in that both are concerned with absence, emptiness, non-being- the imaginary. Or in other words, the impossibility of ever Being: 'Evil and Beauty, two names for the same vermin, the same impossibility' (\textit{ibid.}, p.362). See also Kaelin, \textit{op. cit.} p. 132f and Ross Mckenna 'The Imagination: A Central Sartrean Theme', \textit{J.H.SP.} (Vol.V. no.1, 1974).

\textit{St.Genet.}, p. 489. Also Mézaro, 'A Critical Tribute; op.cit., p. 32.

\textit{St. Genet.}, p. 404.

\textit{ibid.}, p. 585.
(157) *What is Literature?*, p. 59.


(159) *St. Genet*, p. 589.


(162) *Ibid.*, p. 1586. 'L'Option mystique', Sartre explains, 'implies non-thesis consciousness of being a choice of the imaginary'. It is important to note, however, that Sartre distinguishes sharply between the imagination of the artist and that of the common bourgeois escapist. 'Whereas the latter all too easily, becomes fascinated by his own and other peoples' images, the artist is always in some sense 'free and in full control of his fantasies. See also here Sartre on art and religious vocation, *Between Existentialism and Marxism*, pp. 27, 30, 31.

(163) *L'Idiot de la Famille*, pp. 1484-5.


(166) Quoted Keith Gore, *op.cit.*, p. 106.


(168) P.L., p. 281. See Kazan’s discussion of Sartre’s total apathy towards all social and political questions, 'A Critical Tribute', *op.cit.*, p. 140.


(171) *Ibid.*, p. 132. Cf. A. Rossanda ‘Sartre’s Political Practice’ the Socialist Register, *op.cit.*, p. 70: 'The rightness of a political direction of the subject, in fact, has only to measure itself against itself. This is where emerges what seems to us to be the abiding limitation of Sartre’s thought, his purely subjective reading of Marx... Paradoxically the root of his present pessimism, lies in what Sartre still shares with the Communist Parties: the lure of Leninist voluntarism, with its inevitable corollary of opportunism retributions or betrayal by the leadership groups'.

(173) ibid., p. 195. See here Sartre's statement to Camus 'Réponse à Albert Camus' in Les Temps Modernes, 1952 (reprinted in Situations IV, op.cit., Paris, 1964): 'The problem is not to ask whether history makes sense or not, and whether we should design to take part in it or not... the problem is to try to give it the meaning which seems to us to be most right'. Also Merleau-Ponty: Adventures of the Dialectic' by L. Spurling, J.R.S.P. (Vol. VI, No.1, 1975), p. 63.

(174) See Mézoros, op.cit., p. 34, and Marcuse, op.cit., 175-6.

(175) The Adventures of the Dialectic, p. 167. Merleau-Ponty expresses his disapproval of this contamination of reality by imagination more indulgently later in the book when he writes: 'There are two distinct ways of going to the universal one, the more direct, consists in putting everything into words; the other consists in entering into the game in all its obscurity and creating there a little bit of truth by sheer, audacity, one cannot therefore reproach the writer with a professional deficit when he tries to see everything and restricts himself to imaginary action'. For by doing so, Merleau-Ponty goes on, 'he maintains one of the components of man. But he would be quite mistaken if he thought he could thus glue together the two components and move to political action because he looks at it' (p. 178). He comments: 'If the marxist revolution was only a general idea there would be nothing to say against this play of the imaginary and the real' (p. 167). But for Merleau-Ponty it is not just a general idea, it is a practical concern of history.

(176) ibid., p. 137. Compare with Marcuse, op.cit., p. 176: 'The ontological foundation of Sartre's existentialism frustrates its efforts to develop a philosophy of the concrete human existence... Sartre's concepts are, in spite of his dialectical style and the pervasive role of negation, decidedly undiluted'. For another similar critique of the relationship between imagination and history in Sartre see L. Krieger 'History and Existentialism in Sartre' in The Critical Spirit (Beacon Press, Boston, 1967), p. 250: 'Since the imaginative consciousness must grasp reality in order to deny it, we are left with the apparent paradox that what Sartre calls 'human reality' is constituted by the faculty which constitutes the unreal. Since, moreover, the imaginary is for Sartre a 'fact' and he confers on it the status of existence - 'unreal existence' - an unstated generic notion of being underlies the two-dimensional existence. It was this tendency of Sartre's art and imagination to slide over into reality which explains his toneous attraction to the history he denies'.

(176a) 'Merleau-Ponty' Situations IV, p. 247; and also p. 255.


(178) ibid., p. 401.
(179) ibid., p. 398.

(180) ibid., p. 302: 'Value is that towards which my praxis tends, as it does toward its future'. See Desan, Marxism and Sartre (Anchor, New York, 1967), pp. 234, 252-4, 601. Also Mézaris, op.cit., p. 39.

(181) In a salient passage in the Critique, Sartre admits as much in terminology which betrays the continuing influence of his L'Imaginaire: thesis: 'Man is for himself and for others, a projecting being, since one can never understand the slightest of his gestures without going beyond the pure project and explaining it by the future. Furthermore, he is a creator of signs to the degree that he employs certain objects to designate other absent or future objects. But both operations are reduced to a pure and simple surpassing... What we call freedom is the irreducibility of the cultural order to the natural order. The meaning and value of a conduct can be grasped in perspective by the movement which realizes the possibles as it reveals the given. Also Jameson on the implicit role of the 'imaginary' in the Critique in 'Sartre and History', Marxism and Form, pp. 226-229. Indeed, in so far as Sartre considers the group as a common project to become something it is not yet (the concrete universal) rather than the objectively existing organic community, he returns to the inevitable circle of ontological failure; and, in effect, admits that success is impossible. As a good gloss on this see Sartre's 'A plea for Intellectuals' in Between Existentialism and Marxism, op.cit., p. 231f.


(183) ibid., p. 265.


(187) Indeed, one could say of Sartre what he said of Giaccommetti: 'The marvellous unity of this life is its intransigence in the quest for the Absolute'('La Recherche de L'Absolu', Situations 111) p. 283. The Absolute which all imagining seeks is the telos of totality. Hence Sartre insists that 'the Beauty of literature lies in its desire to be everything... only a whole can be beautiful!' ('The Purposes of Writing, Between Existentialism and Marxism, op.cit., p.13). 'If literature is not everything', he concludes here, 'it is nothing'. Given these alternatives Sartre could not hope to succeed. Failure was the only valid testament to his vocation to Beauty.
'Itinerary of a Thought' in *Between Existentialism and Marxism*, op. cit., p. 53.

Ibid., p. 55: 'I try to achieve a certain level of comprehension of Flaubert by means of hypothesis. Thus I use fiction-guided and controlled — but none the less fiction — to explore why, let us say, Flaubert wrote one thing on March 15th and the exact opposite on March 21st, to the same correspondent without worrying about the contradictions. My hypotheses are in this sense a sort of invention of the personage'. Then he goes on to elaborate the meaning of this paradox by declaring what he describes 'is Flaubert such as I imagine him, but being in possession of methods which I consider to be rigorous, I believe it to be Flaubert such as he is and was. In this study I used imagination at every instant'.


Interview called 'Maos': see R. Rossanda, op. cit., p. 50. To my knowledge the only critic to acknowledge the imagination as the 'fundamental project' of Sartre's literary and philosophical career is Ross McKenna, 'The Imagination: A Central Sartrean Them', op. cit., But McKenna merely states this in a three page article, he does not demonstrate it, as I hope to have done.

What is Literature? op. cit., p. 238.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VII


(3) P.E., p. xiv.

(4) Ibid., p. xv.


(6) Bachelard rejects the procedure of the traditional psychologist as follows: 'Pour lui l'image est double, elle signifie toujours autre chose qu'elle même' (La Flamme d'une Chapelle henceforth La Flamme (P.U.F., 1961), p. 10). 'Le mot image est lauré de confusion dans les ouvrages de psychologie: on voit des images; on garde des images dans la mémoire. L'image est tout sauf un produit de l'imagination (P.E., p. 16).


(8) See here also M. Préclaire, Une Poétique de L'homme (Sellarmin, Montréal, 1971).

(9) P.E., p.xxviii. Cf., 'If it is concerned with the past it is so as 'value' never simply as fact: 'The recalled past is not simply a past of perception. Already, since one remembers, the past is designated in reverie as a value of image. Imagination colors from the very beginning the pictures it likes to review. To return to archives of memory, one must go beyond facts to regain values... Reveries are impressionist paintings of our past'; La Poétique de La Rêverie, (P.U.F., Paris, 1960), pp. 89-90; henceforth abbreviated P.E.,

(10) P.E., pp. xii, xiv, xxv; also Durand, op.cit., pp. 19-21; Ramnoux, 'Avec Gaston Bachelard vers une Phenomenologie de L'Imagination', in Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale (Vol. 70, no. 1, France, 1965), pp. 30-2; and Kaplan, op.cit., p. 18: 'Bachelard's phenomenology of imagination views the image as the origin, not the product, of a new consciousness, restoring to language its autonomy'; 'The metaphor comes to give a
(10) contd.
concrete body to an impression difficult to express. But it is relative to an imagination, takes its whole being from imagination (P.E., p. 79). Bachelard's insistence on the psychological purity of absolute imagination is a reflection of his polemic position in favour of a phenomenology of imagination in his Poétique, books, his last two monographs on imagination: The poetic image illumines consciousness with such a light, that it is quite vain to seek unconscious antecedents for it! (P.R., p. 3). The literary image should be the birth of a new meaning, rather than a resumed of old ones.


(12) L'Imagination, dans ses vives actions, nous détaache à la fois du passé et de la réalité. Elle ouvre sur l'avenir, à la fonction du réel, instruite sur la passé, telle qu'elle est degagée par la psychologie classique, il faut joindre une fonction de l'irreal! (Eau, p. 23). Cf. P.E., p. 16; (All references to this work unless otherwise indicated will be The Eng. translation, Beacon, New York); Bagnolet, op.cit., p. 31 and Kaplan, op.cit., p. 3.

(13) P.E., p. 58, See similar point expressed by Ricoeur in Finitude et Culpabilité, Vol. 1, p. 20 and 2: Nous cherchons maintenant une détermination phénoménologique des images... entendons par là une étude du phénomène de l'image poétique quand l'image emerge dans la conscience comme un produit directe du coeur, de l'âme, de l'être, de l'homme saisi dans son actualité!

(14) P.R., op.cit., p. 2. Also P.E., p.xxv.


(16) Air., op.cit., p. 21: Nous n'hésitons pas à prendre prétexte des observations psychologiques pour développer nos propres thèses sur la métaphysique de l'imagination, métaphysique qui reste pourtant, notre but avoué.
(17) Bachelard was quite as adamant as Sartre in his insistence that the image differs from both the concept and the percept. On several occasions he explicitly expounded the view that imagination exceeds the homeostatic limits of conception: 'Les images ne sont pas des concepts. Elles ne s'isolent pas dans leur signification. Elles sont figées à dépasser leur signification. L'imagination est alors multifonctionnelle' (Hépoë, op.cit., p.3). 'Les images ne se laissent pas classer comme les concepts. Même lorsqu'elles sont très nettes, elles ne se divisent pas en genres que s'excluent (ibid., p. 289).

To specify exactly what a phenomenology of the image can be, to specify that the image comes before thought, we should have to say that poetry, rather than being a phenomenology of the mind, is a phenomenology of the soul. We should then have to collect documentation on the subject of the dreaming consciousness! (P.E., p. xxvi). Bachelard was even more determined that there be no confounding of the radical heterogeneity between perception and imagination. He tells us that if we look at a flame 'imaginatively', we transcend its concrete perception and behold a resonance which leads beyond itself to some 'other' dimension. We no longer view it as a thing in itself but as a hint of something more, as a dis-position of openness and becoming: 'La flamme nous force à imaginer. Devant une flamme, des qu'on rêve ce que l'on aperçoit n'est rien au regard de ce qu'on imagine!' (La Flamme, op.cit., p. 12). He states accordingly that to perceive and to imagine 'sont aussi anti-thétiques que présence et absence. Imaginer, c'est s'abstraire, c'est s'enfouir vers une vie nouvelle' (Eau, p. 10). The image is not a copy but the spontaneous inspiration of an 'au-delà' which breaks the procrustean conformity of the real: See Précise, op.cit., pp. 89-100.

(18) On Poetic Imagination and Reverie, ed. Colette Gaudin (Bobbs, Merrill, New York, 1971), p. 23. Or again: 'On ne peut étudier que ce qu'on a d'abord rêvé: la science se forme plutôt sur une rêverie que sur une expérience' (quoted Précise, op.cit., p. 17); 'Nous verrons avec quelle facilité, avec quel naturel, la génie assemble la pensée à l'imagination; comment chez un génie, l'imagination produit la pensée - loin que ce soit la pensée qui alla chercher des crâneux dans un magasin d'images' (Air, p. 25).

(19) Air, p. 34.

(20) Eau, p. 23.

(21) E. Minkowski, 'Imagination?' op.cit., p. 12-13. See also Dufrêne, la Poétique, op.cit., p. 163.

(22) P.E., p. xiii; Ramiou, op.cit., p. 11; Dagonnet, op.cit., p. 31; Kaplan, op.cit., p. 17. The creative imagination is then concerned with the deformation of perception in order to producing 'changing' images. (Air, p. 149). It is because imagination affords a freedom from a mental imitation of reality and sponsors a process of self-transcendence that
(22) contd.
Bachelard's phenomenology of imagination demonstrates a profound moral commitment, 'to reestablish imagination in its living role as the guide of human life' (Air, p. 209). Elsewhere he explicates this point: 'La vie morale est donc, elle aussi, comme la vie de l'imagination, une vie cosmique; le monde entier veut la rénovation' (Eau, p. 202).


See also Kaplan on this point: 'Participating in an act of self-consciousness in imaginative creation, the dreamer of reveries is aware of himself as a creator (poeitizing-1). This self-consciousness is the spiritual freedom of man in reverie' (op. cit., p. 21).

(25) P.E., p. xxx.

(26) P.E., p. 211f.

(27) For the best examples of such images of synthesis see P.E., pp. xx and 235ff. Relevant commentaries Kaplan, pp. 5-6; Dagognet, pp. 38-40.

(28) Repos., pp. 299-300.

(29) Repos., p. 46.

(30) Volonté, p. 80-1. For commentary on Bachelard's rejection of Sartre's dualism in favor of dialectic see Minoski, op. cit., pp. 4-5, 27-30. See also Dufrenne on Bachelard's rejection of Sartre's solipsistic imagination in La Poétique, p. 185 'Mais la pour-soi n'est pas séparé et vide s'il est capable d'être inspiré du vrai. Les analyses de Bachelard vont en sens inverse: elles suggèrent plutôt que la Nature naturelle sollicite l'humanité et oriente l'imagination'.

(31) Etre et le Néant, op. cit., p. 695.


(33) Volonté, p. 357.

(34) Volonté, pp. 23-4.

(35) Eau, p. 202. See also ibid., pp. 46-7: 'Ainsi les parfums verts comme les prairies sont évidemment des parfums frais; ce sont des chaires fraîches et lustrées, des chaires pleines comme des chaires d'enfants. Toute la correspondance est soutenue par l'eau primitive, par une eau charnelle, par l'élément universel'. For other instances of Bachelardian
Correspondence see Lammeux, pp. 33-440. Note also the
close similarity here to the Thomistic notion of cor-
respondence: "Marras' 'Scholastic Roots of Brentano's Conception
of Intentionality' (read at the International Congress
'Tommaso D'Aquino nel suo VII Centenario' in Rome, on

(36) Volonté, p. 211. See also Kaplan, op.cit., p. 7. 'Imagined
images are sublimations of notions revealed by the archetypal
structure of the collective unconscious... this sublimation
is not one of formal determinism but of process, the
fundamentally dynamic characteristic of imagination, e.g.,
sublimation as a transcendence of rigid psychological
complexes'. Mansuy makes a similar point: 'Les inventions
de l'imaginaire échappent au déterminisme. Si telles
nuances de la rêverie changent avec les temps et les lieux,
il n'en va pas de même des façons de rêver fondamentaux qui,
soules, intéressent Bachelard. Car l'un de ses buts est
d'inventer le songe que l'humanité fait depuis des
millénaires et qui correspondent aux expériences essentielles,
aux grandes émotions à la manière d'être, bref, aux archetypes
de l'homme' (p. 132).

(37) Quoted in Précieux, op.cit., p. 81-2. Also P.E., p.xxi,
Eau, p. 16: 'Aux matières originales où s'instaure l'imaginaire
matériel sont attachées des ambivalences profonds et
durables... Et cette propriété psychologique est si
constante qu'on peut en énoncer, comme une loi primordiale de
l'imagination, la reciproque: une matière que l'imagination
ne peut faire vivre durablement ne peut jouer le rôle
psychologique de matière originelle. Une matière qui
n'est pas l'occasion d'une ambivalence psychologique ne peut
trouver son double qui permet des transpositions sans fin!'
Bachelard maintains in fact, that every material valorized
by the imagination harbours a contradiction within itself,
and this is why the poets can speak of the black secret of
milk, the goodness of the serpent, the hardness of water or the
seed that must die in order to live (see Mansuy, op.cit.,
p. 160). Bachelard is convinced of the pervasiveness of
this principle of constant interchange: 'Impossible d'échapper
to cette dialectique: avoir conscience de bruler, c'est se
refroidir; sentir une intensité, c'est la diminuer'

(38) La Flamme, p. 44. This creative and autonomous power of
rêverie is particularly apparent in poetry: 'Cette image que
la lecture du poème nous offre, la voici qui devient vraiment
notre. Elle prend racine en nous-mêmes. Nous l'avons
recue, mais nous naissions à l'expression que nous aurions
pu la créer, que nous aurions dû la créer. Elle devient un
être nouveau de notre langage, elle nous exprime en nous
faisant ce qu'elle exprime; autrement dit, elles est à la
fois, un devenir d'expression et un devenir de notre être,
Ici, l'expression créé de l'être' (Air, p. 283). Compare
this with Binswanger's, another phenomenologist, view in La
Sciences des Rêves: 'Le rêve comme toute expérience
imaginale est un indice authentique de transcendance et
dans cette transcendance le monde nous parle: il parle dans un
(38) **monté**.
langue de symbols. Un symbol est une image fournie par la Nature même. Dans l'image de l'enfance originelle, le monde parle de sa propre enfance: il dit quelque chose de soi qui, exprimé par le monde, est tout autant lever de soleil que naissance d'une enfant" (p. 63).

(39) **Mansuy, op.cit.**, pp. 132-3.

(40) **Repos.**, p. 164.

(41) **Eau.**, p. 96.

(42) **Eau.**, p. 2. 'On pourrait distinguer deux imaginations: une imagination qui donne vie à la cause matérielle, et une imagination qui donne vie à la cause formelle'. See also Kaplan, p. 6.

(43) **Air.**, p. 58. For Bachelard all images created by imagination manifest man's need to create his own world of being. Will becomes one with imagination in an absolute affirmation of human creativity: Volunté, pp. 20, 71; Eau., p. 117; Repos, p. 312; P.E., p. 11. Cf. Kaplan, op.cit., pp. 9, 13 and Minowski, op.cit., p. 9.

(44) For best discussion of Bachelard's relation to Jung see Mansuy, op.cit., pp. 98.

(45) **Volunté.**, p. 78.


(47) **Air.**, pp. 283-4. See also: 'Dans la fougue et la rutilance des images littéraires... les mots ne sont plus de simples termes. La poésie fait ramener le sens du mot en l'entourant d'une atmosphère (Volonté, p. 7). 'La rêverie poétique ranime le monde des premières paroles... le dire du poète est foundation par la parole et dans la parole' (P.E. p. 2). See also Mansuy, op.cit., p. 122f, Preclaire, op.cit., p. 16-51.


(49) For Bachelard 'les formes ne sont pas des signes mais les vraies réalités' and man himself is nothing other than 'la parole de ce macro-antropos qu'est le corps monstrueux de la terre' (P.E., p. 161). Imagination is not therefore opposed to thought and language but their very inspiration: 'Connaître vraiment les images du verbe, les images qui vivent sans nos pensées, dont vivent nos pensées, donnerait une promotion naturelle à nos pensées. Une philosophie qui s'occupe du destin humain doit donc non seulement avouer ses images, mais s'adapter à ses images, combiner le mouvement de ses images' (Air., p. 302). For an interesting discussion on this subject see Kaplan, pp. 15-6; Dufrenne (Esthétique et Poétique), p. 61.
Air., p. 302.

Volonté, p. 3.


P.R., p. 70.


Quoted Précaire, p. 38.

Air., p. 90. Also Durand, op.cit., p. 20 and Kaplan, op.cit., pp. 4-5.


Air., p. 300. Why the material imagination is essential to dynamism: 'Ce qui est certain c'est que les rêveries matérielles changent la dimension de nos puissances; En éparquant dans le travail d'une matière cette curieuse condensation des images et des forces, nous vivons la synthèse de l'imagination et de la volonté (Volonté, p. 24). Why the dynamic (i.e. iconoclastic) is essential to the material: Seule un philosophie iconoclaste peut entreprendre cette lourde besogne: détacher tous les suffixes de la beauté, s'évertuer à trouver derrière les images qui se montrent, les images qui se cachent, aller à la raacine même de la force imaginante (Eau, p. 3). The dialectical imagination establishes a certain liason between the material drive towards incarnation and the dynamic drive towards re-incarnation: we shall return to this point in our conclusion.

La rêverie poétique nous donne le monde des mondes... Elle est une ouverture à un monde beau. Elle donne au moi un non-moi qui est le bien du moi; le non-moi mien... C'est ce non-moi qui me permet de vivre ma conscience d'être au monde' (P.R., p. 12).

Quoted Précaire, op.cit., p. 133. (One can only regret at this point that Bachelard did not combine his dialectical phenomenology of imagination with the Husserlian and Sartrean notion of 'possibility'. Had h.e done so he would have avoided the awkwardness and inevitable contradictions involved in the posting of a dimension of being which is before (anti) being).

P.R., p. 161. See also this notion of reciprocity ibid., p. 118: 'Soudain le rêveur est rêveur de monde. Il s'ouvre au monde et le monde s'ouvre au monde et la monde s'ouvre à lui'. Allo Eau, p. 11: 'L'imagination est une univers en érection, un souffle odorant qui sort des choses par l'intermédiaire d'un rêveur'. For the best closures on this
topic see Dufrenne *Phénoménologie de l'expérience esthétique*, p. 197; Kaelin *A.P.*, p. 360; *Kaplan op. cit.*, pp. 9, 10, 13, 20, 23f.


(63) For example, *Air.*, p. 210. It is also significant that Bachelard wrote the preface for the French translations to Buber's famous work *I and Thou*.

(64) This is all the more surprising considering Husserl's remark in a letter to Dilthey: "We are preparing a new philosophy, which is fundamentally the same, only starting from different angles" (M.P. Hederman, *The Phenomenology of Education*, PHD Thesis, U.C.C., 1976, p. 61).


(66) *ibid.*, pp. 70-1.

(67) *ibid.*, p. 167.

(68) *ibid.*, p. 161.

(69) *ibid.*, p. 161. On the notion of discovery as creation see also Kaelin, *E.A.*, p. 360.

(70) *ibid.*, p. 163.

(71) *ibid.*, p. 165.


(73) *ibid.*, p. 245.

(74) *Existence et Dialectique* (P.U.F., Paris, 1971), p. 85. It is interesting to note that Rollo May, an American psychologist deeply influenced by phenomenology and particularly the notion of intentionality, came to a similar recognition of the vital connection between the imaginary and the phallic. The imagination, he argues, in his book *Love and Will*, (Fontana, New York, 1974), functions not just as a forger of surrogates, a symptom of frustration or an evasion into nothingness, but as an openness to hidden possibility: 'We can let our imaginations play on it (i.e. cros), dwell on it, turn it over in our minds, focus on it, 'invite' the possibility of love in fantasy' (p. 282).

(75) *The Visible and the Invisible*, p. 262.

(76) *ibid.*, p. 263.
(77) ibid., p. 215. This bears a conspicuous resemblance to the following passage from Bachelard's Eau, p. 24: 'Les événements les plus riches arrivent en nous bien avant que l'âme s'en aperçoive. Et quand nous commençons à ouvrir les yeux sur le visible, déjà nous étions depuis longtemps adhérents à l'invisible'.

(78) ibid., p. 265.


(80) ibid., p. 155.

(81) ibid., p. 164.

(82) ibid., p. 182.

(83) ibid., p. 181.

(84) ibid., p. 166.

(85) ibid., p. 164.

(86) ibid., p. 164.

(87) ibid., p. 186.

(88) ibid., p. 187.

(89) ibid., p. 186.


(91) ibid., p. 201. See also Kaelin, B.A., p. 145.

(92) Phénoménologie de la Perception (Gallimard, Paris, 1945), trans. by C. Smith, (Routledge and Keegan, 1962), p. 193: 'On this side of the conventional means of expression which manifest my thoughts to another only because within him there is a meaning assigned to each symbol and which, in this sense, does not produce a veritable communication, one must recognise a primordial operation of signifying in which the thing expressed does not exist outside of the expression itself and in which the signs used themselves induce outward a meaning'. More often than not, in fact, Merleau-Ponty used the word 'symbol' where Bachelard and Sartre would have used 'image'. This is so, I would suggest, firstly because Merleau-Ponty tended to work within a linguistic framework, and secondly, because he did not wish to have his theory confused with Sartre's solipsistic one.

(93) Les Temps Modernes (Vol. XIX, 1952), p. 82.


(96) Ibid., p. 76.


(98) Les Temps Modernes, op.cit., p. 86.


(100) Phenomenology of Perception, p.xi.


(103) As errants on the side of a 'materialist' aesthetic see S.ontag's theory of an 'erotics of art'; also Alexander's lecture on 'Art and Material' in his Philosophical and literary pieces, Alain's Système de Beaux-arts, Parker's Principles of Aesthetics, Langer's Feeling and Form, Soriau's La Correspondance des Arts. Notable exponents of an 'Idealist' aesthetic would include Kant, Critique of Judgement, Croce, Aesthetics, Collingwood, Principles of Art, and Hegel, Lectures on Aesthetics.

(104) By extension, dialectical phenomenology ensures that the image is a commune to the other rather than a mirage of the self i.e., communication not negation. On this point see Kaelin, op.cit., pp. 361-5, and Dufrenne, Phénoménologie, op.cit., p. 443f. Both of these phenomenologists endorse three principal tenets derived from Horlou-Ponty's aesthetic 1) that the aesthetic image is a primordial structure 2) that the unity of aesthetic communication (between artist and audience) constitutes the unity of the aesthetic object, and 3) that imagination works in the form of a dialectical intentionality which uses an 'indirect language' to communicate to the community at large. Both, however, tend to prejudice their cause by introducing a Kantian critical method instead of a presuppositionless phenomenological one. Indeed, in so far as their work remains phenomenological, it remains so in the
form of an elaborate critical commentary on Merleau-Ponty rather than an original contribution. In fact, one could say that the main thrust of both works is to refute the 'idealist-dualist' premises of Sartre's phenomenology of imagination in favour of Merleau-Ponty's dialectical one; see Kaelin, _op.cit._, p. 368f and Dufrenne, _op.cit._, p. 276f.

FOOTNOTES TO CONCLUSIONS

(1) This is particularly so of Bachelard and Merleau-Ponty but also, I contend, of Ruer. Ruer's 'unacademic' approach to philosophy is, of course, unhelpful when it comes to the question of determining influences. However, his interest in the 'dialectical' and 'intentional' implications of phenomenological existentialism and his clear repudiation of the 'monological' character of aseptic existentialism in Between Man and Man, trans. by G. Smittel (Fontana, 1977), seems to me to justify his inclusion in this discussion.

(2) It is precisely such an ontological notion of possibility which Sartre rejects in a recent interview with Piere Verstraeten entitled 'The Writer and Language': 'I believe that man is at the centre... any retrograde relationship to Being, or any overtute to which presupposes Being, both behind or before that overtute and as conditioning it, seems to me to represent an alienation - a feeling this with Merleau-Ponty for instance. I mean that I reject Being as itself conditioning an overtute to Being'. Revue d'Esthétique (July -December, 1965); reprinted in Situations IX (Gallimard, Paris, 1972, and in translation in Politics and Literature (Calder and Boyars, London, 1973).

(3) Both Ingarden (The Literary Work of Art, trans. by G. Grabowits, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1973; The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art trans. by Crowley and Olson, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1973); 'Phenomenological Aesthetics', op.cit., and Sarraiva (L'Imagination selon Husserl, op.cit., p.255f fail to concide the transcendent status of the image. Both construe it as a mere neutralisation projection of the imaginer's consciousness. In this sense, they are more Sartrean than Sartre himself: they accept his monological conclusions but in order to render his theory internally consistent, reject his claim that the image is somewhat transcendent of consciousness.

(4) For an encouraging first attempt at such a phenomenological hermeneutic, see D. Huspit's 'Dialectic of Taste', op.cit., pp. 215f.

(5) For a similar point see Dufranq in La Poétique (Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1963), p. 197. 'No faut-il pas dire que l'état poétique c'est dans le lecteur une réponse au poème, et dans le poème une réponse à la poésie de la Nature'.


(8) In a more detailed study one would have to distinguish here between several different types of possibility: the image as possibility before it is converted into an analogue by the artist; the image as possibility before it is converted into an intuition by the audience; the image as possibility before it is converted into reality by the man of action.

(8a) See similar points in Natanson, op. cit., pp. 106-7, 128; M. Dufrene in Esthétique et Philosophie (Klincksieck, Paris, 1967), pp. 55, 115f and particularly p.60: 'Des qualités effectives que découvre l’expérience esthétique constituent des aprioris spécifiques. D’abord... on ce qu’elles font l’objet d’une connaissance virtuelle que s’explicite dans l’expérience, et sans laquelle cette expérience ne serait pas possible: ceux qui peuvent sentir le tragique de Racine, le pathétique de Beethoven ou la sérénité de Bach, c’est qu’ils ont quelque idée antérieure à tout sentiment du tragique, du pathétique, ou du serein. Mais ce savoir n’est pas aux comme une essence déposée dans leur entendement; il est plutôt comme une certain style existentielle de leur personne... Ainsi l’apriori et singulièrement dans l’expérience esthétique, qualifie à la fois le sujet et l’objet... L’apriori est ce quelque chose de commun, et par là l’instrument d’une communication: c’est à quoi l’engage la théorie de l’intentionalité. Elle éclaire donc l’idée difficile de constitution (transcendental) qui chez Husserl, accompagne la théorie de l’intentionalité.'

(9) Kuspit, 'Dialectic of Taste', op. cit., p. 133f.

(10) Kuspit cites here the theories of Plato, Kant, Hume, Schiller, Santag and Giedion.

(11) ibid., p. 137.

(12) For a more elaborate discussion of this point see my 'Overview' in The Black Book, (Dorin and O'Connor, Dublin, 1975); and more particularly my 'Beyond Art and Politics' in the Crane Bag (Folens, Dublin, 1977) pp. 11f and 'Responsible Art' in The Mongrel Fox (Anglo-Celt press, Dublin, 1976), Vol. 1, p. 9f.

(13) 'The Hebrew Imagination', to appear shortly, in The History of Philosophy (McGill University, Montreal, 1977)


Beauty is not, of course, an entirely satisfactory term here since the authentic imaginary possibilities for a particular artist in a particular age may often be extremely ugly: that is particularly true of Modernist art.

But there is a crucial dilemma here. If we can say that authentic imagining (beauty) is a 'possibility of Being' for authentic action (good), how can we deny that unauthentic imagining (fantasy) is a 'possibility of Being' for unauthentic action (evil). Here we are impelled to make a very important distinction between 'possibilities of Being' and what we might call by way of contrast 'possibilities of being.' The former comprises those possibilities which are authentic because teleologically motivated by Being; the latter, those possibilities which are unauthentic because invented and enacted by a self-enclosed being, disobedient to the call of the other in Being. Evil, we would say therefore, is being, but it is not Being. It is the lack of Being as it ought to be. In other words, while evil is, good is. Both Parmenides and Augustine had somewhat similar notions, though unrelated to the dialectical notion of possibility. This distinction between 'possibilities of Being' (or more simply Possibilities) and 'possibilities of being' (possibilities) is highly intricate and requires detailed and comprehensive treatment. Much thought would have to be given, for example, to such questions as how possibility is to be related to the Telos? How Being can differ from being without being dualist? how an adequate criterion for judging whether ambiguous actions or images (e.g., the glorification of the martial for the sake of self-defence) are instantiations of Possibilities or possibilities, or both, can be developed? how dialectic can play a role in all these areas etc.? But this is material for another work. A work which would endeavour to establish a comprehensive ontology, or theology, of Possibility, starting from the phenomenological conclusions of our present study of imagination.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

This bibliography does not include all that has been written on the topic under discussion. It lists only those sources quoted or consulted. Wherever the source is of particular importance to our argument I have listed the original text in addition to its best English translation, where available. Since the nature and aim of this thesis has demanded reference to a wide and disparate field of writing and research, division into different bibliographical sections would serve to confuse rather than clarify. Consequently, the entries will be arranged in a single alphabetical order by surname of the author.
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