Philosophy and the Return of Violence

Studies from this Widening Gyre

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continuum
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Chapter 7

BEYOND CONFLICT: RADICAL HOSPITALITY
AND RELIGIOUS IDENTITY

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Among the many alarming, incisive, and even subtle ways in which the problem of violence is manifest today, there is the cumbersome though vital question of how to navigate the intersection of religious belief and secular norms. Common experience and philosophical discourse alike will testify that this threshold marks an uneasy site of translation, perhaps even a collision course, charged with the familiar tensions between public and private spheres, confessional and constitutional commitments, and what philosophers have described as the longstanding reductive dualism between what is same and what is other. Arguably one of the most interesting philosophical contributions to the contemporary discussion concerning the role of religion and secularity is that made by Jürgen Habermas in his debates with figures like Jacques Derrida and Joseph Ratzinger. Interestingly, both Habermas and Derrida agree on the central importance of “hospitality” in our modern world. For Derrida, it is the best alternative to the friend–foe distinction, made intellectually familiar by figures like Leo Strauss, Francis Fukayama and Samuel Huntington, and perilously enacted by political figures on both sides of the “axis of evil.” Faced with the Huntington thesis that “we only know who we are . . . when we know whom we are against,” the ethic of hospitality replies that the stranger is precisely the one who reminds us—not as enemy but as host—that the self is never an autonomous identity but a guest graciously hosted to its host. Thus, at a practical level, the ethics of hospitality opposes the apocalyptic dualism of pure/impure invoked by President George W. Bush and Osama Bin Laden after 9/11 and among other religious and political leaders since. Hospitality opposes such gnostic divides between friend and enemy, where God is always my ally and the stranger forever my adversary.

My aim in this chapter is to redirect the path of approach to these matters of religious conflict and identity. Though I am unable to treat the face of religious violence with the rigor it deserves, my discussion is oriented precisely by an attunement to those confessional roots and practical experiences of religious difference that so often yield aggressive and antagonistic expressions. With Habermas’s goal of institutionalized secular discourse as a point of departure, I will suggest that the priority of securing peaceful creidal coexistence is insufficiently served by effecting a program of rational assimilation. Alternatively, I argue that a hermeneutic practice of radical hospitality and religious auto-critique is not only more appropriate to the gyre of religious difference, but also more intrinsic to the resources of faith traditions themselves. I propose a model of translation that plumbs the depths of religious identity, a pilgrimage
to the "deep ground" of faith that is pluralistic without being syncretistic, singular without being dualistic, and ultimately a kenotic practice that retrieves interreligious translation on the basis of humility.

Translation and the Risk of 'Rational' Assimilation

Treating the question of religious identity and practice within the larger paradigm of secular or public discourse involves opening oneself to the promise and peril of what is at root a matter of hospitality and translation. Aspiring to normative social–political safeguards, by the same token, may well involve an intended retreat from the pathologies of dogmatism, but also entails a potentially violent or reductive positioning of one norm over another, one logos adjudicating the terms of another. Habermas, for his part, appeals to an ethic of hospitality to overcome the state of nature and its multiple frictions on the basis of mutual respect. While Derrida acknowledges the deeply "messianic" structure of hospitality as an affirmation of the "impossible," Habermas prefers to sublate and liquefy the religious roots of hospitality into a discourse ethics of rational norms and universalisable laws. He holds that religion, defined as a "comprehensive worldview which claims to structure a life in its entirety," must be translatable into the language of secular society, where it can be adjudicated and negotiated. But Habermas does concede that political liberalism goes too far if it maintains that only secular reason counts in the public sphere. Religious identity, he admits, is something other than socio–political–normative existence. "The liberal state," he clarifies, "must not transform the requisite institutional separation of religion and politics into an undue mental and psychological burden for those of its citizens who follow a faith." In this way, he is attuned to the subtle though consequential risk of enabling dualistic suppression in the name of singular liberal affirmation. And here Habermas introduces what he calls the "institutional translation proviso," which allows religious believers, who accept that only "secular reasons count beyond the institutional threshold," to express their beliefs in a specifically confessional language if they find "secular translations for them." Non-translatable religious convictions (what Habermas terms "private reasons") may, thus, be admitted to the public sphere for functional and discursive purposes. This admission aims to avoid an unbridgeable chasm between private (religious faith) and public (political reason) and is accompanied with the proviso that religious beliefs remain open to possibilities of further translation and assimilation. Once admitted, under the guise of confessional language, it remains the task of a democratic liberal society to encourage the "religious consciousness to become reflective and the secular consciousness to transcend its limitation in a mutual learning process."7

While this seems like a fair apportioning of responsibilities, it nevertheless remains more a one-way street. A close reading will show that for Habermas,
the goal of such “mutual” learning is for religion to become more and more translatable into the rational normative pedagogical process, not for secular reason to “transcend its limitations.” The pedagogical process is surely admirable, but it should, I submit, work in both directions at once. Secularity should be humble enough, in other words, to acknowledge the possibility of a certain untranslatable remainder, a surplus of meaning that surpasses the limits of normative rationality. For Habermas, it becomes clear, the ultimate goal of a democratic society is to integrate a plurality of faiths and cultures into an institutionalized discourse of deliberative decision-making and generally accessible language. And here he explicitly cites Judeo–Christianity as a suitable candidate for such progressive pedagogy, since many of its religious legacies have already been translated into core principles of democratic enlightenment. “For the normative self-understanding of modernity,” writes Habermas, “Christianity has functioned as more than just a precursor or a catalyst. Universalistic egalitarianism, from which sprang ideals of freedom and a collective life in solidarity, the autonomous conduct of life and emancipation, the individual morality of conscience, human rights and democracy, is the direct legacy of the Judaic ethic of justice and the Christian ethic of love. This legacy . . . has been the object of a continual critical reappropriation and reinterpretation. Up to this very day, there is no alternative to it. And in light of current challenges of a post–national constellation, we must draw sustenance now, as in the past, from this substance. Everything else is idle postmodern talk.”

However, the underlying difficulty haunting such a view (quite apart from the neglect of the Islamic legacy) is this: how do we react to the radically new and surprising? How do we respect the stranger without trying to translate him or her into our terms? How do we respond to what Derrida and Walter Benjamin call the “messianic”? In short, it would seem that for Habermas, the final aim of philosophical and political reason is to “completely assimilate, translate, rework and sublate all desirable religious content.” If this assimilation is indeed the endgame of his project, one is left wondering about the hermeneutic and phenomenological elisions it assumes and/or enables. How then, can the divine remain a transcendent Other who comes to us? A visitor from outside our home [unheimlich], opening doors to novel events and inviting us to epiphanies “never dreamt of in the philosophies” of Horatio or Habermas? How, in a word, is secular reason to account for that aspect of alterity, which—precisely as foreign and sacred—always remains partially unassimilable and inaccessible to our normative or normalizing grasp? Such a remainder may not be the operable keystone joining the arches of creedal confession and religious identity, but it is in the very least a vital cornerstone to the architecture of belief. Can others only become our guests as Gästarbeiter tolerated in so far as they surrender their irreducible uniqueness and difference? It is not clear that Habermas’s public sphere can really welcome strange gods or practices fated to strangeness on the basis of otherwise-communicable standards. He does not seem, that is, to have a host language to
respond to what Benjamin calls the “untranslatable kernel” at the heart of every guest language, namely, that inimitable transcendence that puts us into question, shatters our self-security, and opens us to the incoming other.\textsuperscript{11}

If there is a decision to evade the unsettling horizon of alterity fundamental to religion, there is also an adjacent, and perhaps resulting, decision to overlook the insecurity Habermas’s telos of “universal rational translatability” would face when responding to religions other than the European tradition of Judeo–Christian humanism. What of the religions of the East or, closer to home, the religion of Islam both inside and outside the borders of the Western “postnational constellation”? Are only those believers to be accepted whose translation from faith into reason has “already occurred . . . in the political public sphere itself”?\textsuperscript{12} On this score, Lovisa Bergdahl is right to say that Habermas has a limited and somewhat Euro–centric notion of religious pluralism, one that prefers familiar religious neighbors to unfamiliar strangers. The real task of translation, as Benjamin and Bergdahl note, is to acknowledge the double call of the stranger: translate me/do not translate me! For the real challenge is to respect “the unfathomable, the mysterious and the poetic” superfluity of meanings while making as much sense as we can.\textsuperscript{13} In short, the biggest temptation for the translator—in politics no less than in poetics—is to conserve the meaning presiding in one’s host language without allowing it be transformed by the foreignness of the guest tongues.\textsuperscript{14} To yield to such temptation is to close the door on the stranger. It is to decline, even violently, interlinguistic and interconfessional hospitality. One telos, conceived according to one logos, that is, entertains and employs the terms of a constructive project while at the same time harboring a potentially destructive course of arbitration.

\textit{The Wager of Alterity}

Its instigating integrity notwithstanding, the pitfalls of Habermas’s design for institutionalized discourse necessarily return us to the more hermeneutic question of religious meaning, a question that remains vital, difficult, and, to an important extent, incongruous with the game of classifying and managing religious “identity.” If religion is to mean anything in the third millennium it should, I believe, mean more than a set of common norms. Such norms are necessary but not sufficient. In searching for a shared “essence” or “universal structure” of religion, it would be folly to neglect what is most strange and different in each faith. Interconfessional hospitality means respecting the otherness of each other as much as acknowledging the sameness in all. For without the former there would be no guest to be invited and no host to receive. In other words, it is not enough to distill the overlapping moral elements of the great religions into one syncretist brew. It is also crucial to acknowledge the very distinct paths that each wisdom tradition takes to reach that shared ethical vision. Without this appreciation of deep confessional and cultural difference, there can be no real sense of hospitality at work between religions. For, I repeat,
without the recognition of alterity, there can be no experience of the stranger and, so, no opening to what is not ourselves.

But, I hasten to add, alterity is not always on the side of the angels. If religious difference bears the potential for welcoming aliens, it also bears the opposite potential to enclose, exclude, and expel. The double plot of hospitality and hostility does not dissolve as one reaches the roots of diversity; it thickens. The retreat from the pathologies of assimilation and reduction under rational norms is by no means assured by a naïve expansion of the many into one. Reinstituting a productive posture of hospitality within the practical horizon of interreligious identity and difference, rather, turns on an ongoing decision to live, move, and speak in proximity to the tensions of pluralism.

Let me try to put this in another way: if all religions are reduced to the same—be it via discursive assimilation or via radical equivalence—there is no way of recognizing the equiprimordial potential for both love and hate inherent in each religion. There are seeds of dogmatic exclusivity and violent self-assertion within any confessional tradition. That is why every religion needs to carry on a radical autocritique of its own violent tendencies if it is to rescue what is genuinely tolerant and emancipatory at its core. In short, any faith must be prepared to purge itself of the inherent temptation to violently impose its own version of the “absolute” on others. For only then is it capable of acknowledging the multiple receptions of the Word in faiths not its own. As Anthony Steinbock puts it, obedience to a Word that surpasses human language is the source of both “vertical” and “idolatrous” interpretations. Hence the deep ambivalence of such religious terms as “surrender,” “submission,” and “sacrifice.” There is always a hermeneutic wager. And if one opts to follow the path of hospitality, of listening to others, one must be open to the possibility of discovering in the other faith something which is not—or not yet adequately—discovered in one’s own. Believers in the Bible, for example, may well discover in Buddhism a sense of unconditional compassion for “all sentient beings” still dormant or undeveloped in the Abrahamic religions, just as Buddhists may discover in biblical religion a greater attention to the realization of a Kingdom of justice in history or to the emancipatory power of divine desire. It is possible such autocritique might disclose some of the norms Habermas means to privilege and translate in secular discourse, but it is important to bear in mind that religious autocritique is an exercise of reflection that has affirmation, not simply distillation, in view.

One might also mention here how Hindu sages like Vivekananda, Tagore, and Ramakrishna confessed that their understanding of Vedantic religion was amplified by their exposure to Abrahamic faiths and practices (see the example of Gandhi). And this gesture of interconfessional exchange between East and West was reciprocated, in turn, by pioneering figures like Abhishiktananda, Bede Griffiths, and Sarah Grant, who believed their Christian convictions were greatly deepened (and at times critically revised) by exposure to the Hindu tradition of Advaita. These are anecdotal illustrations, but they serve to indicate how the disrupting the dualism of same and other is already a constitutive
concern for believers—how the very strength of what may be termed religious identity is in part anchored on a mode of interconfessional hospitality.

**The Word of Hospitality**

Though I have highlighted the perils of seeking an institutionalized public discourse, and have suggested a more hermeneutic and practical alternative centered on hospitality, it is important to recognize that the distillation of all religions into a set of common denominators does have its purpose. But the distillation I have in mind is only effective if it is instigated by communities of believers and not by theoreticians or policymakers seeking to contain and translate religious identity at the expense of intrinsic alterity. An impressive example of this is the project of the Parliament of World Religions, convened in 1992, to develop a global ethic of peace based on the Golden Rule that we should treat all others as ourselves. The project echoed similar attempts to establish principles of interfaith dialogue such as the Snowmass Conference of 1986, the Scorboro Interfaith movement of the 1990s, and more recently the “A Common Word” document of 2007 signed by 138 prominent Muslims reaching out to non-Muslims to come together on the basis of certain basic shared religious principles. These mark crucial steps in the reconciliation of competing and often warring religions in our world and should be applauded as measures against the seeds of exclusivity that so often bloom into factionalism, even violence. But there is a further step to be taken that supplements the move towards universal principles. And this second step, much like the need for autocritique outlined above, involves a radical descent into the specificities of each spiritual tradition—a descent into difference, in addition to the ascent towards oneness: a plunge which seeks, at the root of each religion, a silent, speechless openness to a Word, which surpasses us. The hermeneutic wager of radical hospitality is, therefore, that in the deep belonging to a faith conviction unique to one’s confession, there may arise the humility to counter the violence of exclusivity with a generosity of attention. For if it is true that all religions involve a special acoustic of obedience to a Word beyond our finite language, this may lead to a modest ability to listen to otherness as much as to a claim that our religion alone has an absolute take on the absolute. Hosting the radical stranger means that verticality leads to latitude.

I do not for a moment wish to deny that most religions have, at one time or another, invoked creedal partisanship to prove their superiority over others, and sometimes assure it in violent words and ways. *In hoc signo. We have God on our side. There is no God in all the earth apart from ours.* These are not catchcries of the past. One need only mention the ongoing struggles between Hindus and Muslims in Kashmir, between Buddhist Sinhalese and Hindu Tamils in Sri Lanka, between Muslims and Jews in Jerusalem, between Christians and Muslims in Kosovo—not to mention countless examples of intra-religious wars in places like Northern Ireland, Iraq, and the Balkans.
These are sorry truths, and there is no point pretending that our secular post-Enlightenment world has exorcised such atavistic passions. There is, it would seem, a tendency in the “inaugural energy” of almost every religion (with possible exceptions like Buddhism and Jainism) towards some form of exclusivism, exceptionalism, or absolutism. It is one side of the Janus-face of religion. But there is, I am arguing, another side: the ability of each confession to delve into its own hidden foundation and discover there, in a moment of bold auto-critique, a countervailing drive towards hospitality and healing.

That such healing hospitality emerges from each religion’s unique depths rather than from a surpassing of these depths may seem paradoxical. It marks a retrieval of what is best against the very worst that belief can offer: difference cuts both ways. And this is what I might call an ana-theist recovery of a religion before religion—a recovery stemming from a foundation without secure foundation, namely, a foundation founded on something other than itself. It is this mystical fond sans fond, I suggest, which ultimately invites our wager that the other—the foreigner—has more to offer us than we can ever find in ourselves alone. In this sense, ana-theism may be said to come before as well as after religion.

Retrieving the Original Remainder

My approach to the problem of religious identity by way of radical hospitality and interreligious dialogue has at root a simple premise: the hermeneutic maxim that the shortest route from self to self is through the other. Just as in linguistic translation we discover something in the “guest” language that has never been said in our “host” tongue, so, too, in interconfessional translation we may discover in another faith something not dreamt of in our own. Though, as we have just seen, we have to dwell deeply in our own faith to be able to recognize such disclosure as new, as basically other than our own. The discovery of the wisdom of the stranger presupposes that the self knows itself as different from the stranger. Thus, certain messages in one’s own faith—say, in the case of a Christian, the wise detachment preached in the Sermon on the Mount—may find confirmation of this otherwise “impossible” message in the teaching of a very different tradition, for example, the Buddhist notions of compassion, detachment, and sunyata [the emptying of self]. In fact, to pursue this example further, I would say that the biblical messages of kenosis and Zimzum might actually need exposure to foreign teachings like the Heart Sutra (“Emptiness is form and form is emptiness”) in order to better understand themselves. Confessional adherents do not need to pledge their allegiance to secular norms in order to preserve and enact this depth of dialogue, or to appreciate the constitutive way in which it prevents aggressive demarcations.

The ethics of radical hospitality suggests that religions can best recover their own unique secrets through reciprocal exposure to others. (Just think of the illuminating readings of the Gospels by Thich Nhat Hanh or of Eastern texts
by Thomas Merton). Reciprocity is the key here. In faith as in love, you discover your true self in the self revealed to you by the beloved. Self-discovery presupposes the discovery of one’s other (and vice versa). This other may be a million miles away or in our very midst, or both: a paradox Camus poignantly captures when he writes of those moments when “under the familiar face of a woman, we see as a stranger her we had loved months or years ago, and perhaps come even to desire what suddenly leaves us so alone.”

This is where ana-theist hospitality returns to the appreciation of not just others’ theism but of atheism tout court. For in the otherness of the atheist who does not know (unlike the anti-theist who knows everything), we encounter an estranging and dispossessive challenge that: (a) compels autocritique, and (b) reveals our innermost convictions in a movement of response and recovery. So, rather than too rapidly renouncing our respective convictions—in the name of one global religion or morality—might it not be wise to equally acknowledge what differentiates us? For in thus recognizing the existence of otherness in each other, we may mutually attest to a *surplus of meaning* that exceeds all our different beliefs. A surplus that is other than every other. Stranger than every stranger. This something “more” is what enables humans to do the impossible, to break with conditioned patterns of thinking and behavior (any AA member will attest to this). This discovery of something “different,” “ulterior,” “more,” is stronger, I suggest, when it is made from *inside* each confession than when imposed from *outside* by some abstract God’s-eye view. In short, an ethics of radical hospitality proposes the challenging route of embracing complexity, diversity, and ambiguity rather than prematurely endorsing a spiritual Esperanto of global norms. It holds that the universal can only be reached through singular others—that is, others that are other to each other.

If this is so, it means that the answer to religious conflict requires more than a sociology of comparative religions based on some common “essence.” One also needs to take the internal journey to the silent, unspoken root of each religion. For we might then be in a better position to practice a hospitality of translation between different root convictions deeper than a set of universal principles, though in no way counter to it. The road to an ultimate reality preceding and exceeding our belief systems passes through each of these beliefs.

To return, then, to the hospitality wager we might say that when we translate—interconfessionally—we export ourselves into strangers and import strangers into ourselves. And in daring to translate across borders, we encounter the limits of translatability. This invariably implies risk, as aptly expressed in Antoine Berman’s phrase “l’épreuve de l’étranger.” The process of interreligious hospitality summons us on a pilgrimage to the depths of the inaugural moments of different religions rather than to some super-theological summit adjudicating rival claims from On High. For it is in the depths, as Paul Ricoeur insists, that we “touch on something unsaid . . . a mystical ground (*un fond mystique*) of what is most fundamental in each religion and which is not easily translatable into language but rather borders on a common profound silence.”
In other words, the best way to tackle the violent tendency within religious conviction is to go all the way down to the source which that religion does not master and which refuses to be rendered into dogmatic formulae or ideological manifestos. Each religion will have its own unique access to this ineffable genesis-point: the work of illumination for the Buddhist, the prayer of Thanksgiving for the Christian, the learned meditation on scriptural texts for the Muslim or Jew, the practice of yoga for the Hindu. In each case, the specific way acknowledges a source which it does not initiate or control, but which it heeds with modest vigilance. And it is in this hearkening to a source beyond and beneath oneself, a superfluity that one does not possess or manipulate that we may find new resources for nonviolent resistance and peace.

The most effective antidote to fundamentalist perversions, therefore, may well be to attend to the “deep ground,” which no religion can ever appropriate or contain. Every religion is capable of taking this action against itself, brushing against its own dogmatic grain, purging itself of its pathologies so as to reach the silent source that not only surpasses but disarms it. This implies a conversion of the heart whereby each religion finds at the ineffable root of its belief the means to reverse the violent impulses that inform religious claims to master absolute truth. It involves a moment of critical and therapeutic self-retrieval (what Ricoeur calls “un mouvement de retournement contre la composante de violence d’une conviction”). Precisely here we discover a complementary partnership between an inner descent to ineffable mystery and an outer ascent to enlightened awareness. And it is at this anathesist chiasmus, I would argue, that theism and atheism can become, once again, salutary allies.

The autocritique of religious power is, I conclude, doubly assisted in this way—from both within and without. And this bilateral gesture is crucial for the critical self-surpassing of religion. In encountering strange gods, we are invited to discover hidden aspects of our own God (often congealed in convention and defended with dogmatism); while the recovery of such hidden depths opens us further to stranger gods. But this two-way encounter does not imply sublation into some all-embracing infinite. We are reminded here again of the necessary limits of translation. For at the root of every translation between self and stranger, within or without, there remains that “untranslatable kernel,” that irreducible alterity that resists complete assimilation into a home whose doors could finally be closed. This fundamental alterity is what makes translation between religions at once necessary and always inadequate. There is always something more to be said and understood, some inexhaustible remainder never to be known. And it is this “more”—which many religions call “God”—that allows the stranger to remain (in part, at least) always strange to us. This is why every authentic religious experience is a re-legere, a returning again and again from surplus to signification to surplus, an ongoing odyssey of reading that makes translation endless.

All great ethical teachings share a set of precepts—do not kill, tell the truth, be just, look after the weak. What religions, anathesistically retrieved, can add
to such common principles, as inscribed in world charters of human justice, is a deep mystical appreciation of something Other than our finite, human being: some Other we can welcome as a stranger if we can overcome our natural response of fear and trauma. For beyond the indispensable provisions of juridical, ethical, and political peace, there are deep spiritual resources that can bring an extra dimension to the peace table—the surprise of the stranger, the gracious surplus of faith, hope, and caritas.

If peace is ever achieved on our planet, it will not, I suspect, be brokered solely by global politicians and constitutional lawyers. It will also be a peace brought about by what Karl Jaspers called a "loving combat" (liebender Kampf) between different faiths and non-faiths. Radical hospitality is not about a facile consensus that ignores the reality of conflicting convictions. It is an effort to retrieve a unique hospitality towards the stranger at the very root of each belief, a counterweight to the violent specters of antagonism that we assume (rightly or not) will accompany the partisan fate of religious identities. In thus exposing ourselves to the gods of other traditions, we take the risk of dying unto our own. And in such instants of kenotic hospitality, where we exchange our God with others—sometimes not knowing for a moment which is true—we open ourselves to the gracious possibility of receiving our own God back again; but as a gift from the other this time, as a God of life beyond death. In losing our faith we may gain it back again. First faith ceding to second faith, in the name of the stranger. That is the wager of ana-theism. And the risk. For in surrendering our own God to a stranger god, no god may come back again. Or the god who comes back may come back in ways that surprise us.

Notes

1. Habermas and Derrida, Philosophy in a Time of Terror, 55f. See also de Vries and Sullivan, Political Theologies; this volume which soberly demonstrates how excessive the political take on religion has become. I am grateful to Lovisa Bergdahl for several of these references.

2. Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, 21. I am grateful to Donatien Cicura for this reference. Cicura explains in his Identity and Historicity: Hermeneutics of Contemporary African Marginality: “According to Huntington, the process of creating enemies is an inherent component of the process of being a self, of acquiring or appropriating an identity. Identity is made of allies (those who belong to my group) and enemies (those with whom I compete either individually or as a member of a group). In this line of thought, Huntington’s idea of identity is analogous to the interpretation Francis Fukuyama gave of Plato’s thumos in The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Penguin, 2002). Human beings identify themselves in thymotic terms, that is, they need self-esteem, recognition, and approbation. To this extent, conflict with an enemy reinforces the above qualities in a group, and procures comfort and a sense of gratification” (Cicura, 75). As Huntington himself puts it: “The need of individuals for self-esteem leads them to believe that their group is better than other groups. Their sense of self rises and
falls . . . with the extent to which other people are excluded from their group” (Huntington, *Who Are We?* 25). For recent critiques of this adversarial model of politics and of religion, see Sen, *Identity and Violence*; Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*; Nussbaum, *For Love of Country*; and Kearney, chapters 1, 3 and 5 in *Strangers, Gods and Monsters*, 23–140.

3. Habermas and Derrida, 55.
5. Ibid., 55.
7. Ibid., 18.
8. Ibid., 10.
11. See Benjamin, “The Task of the Translator.”
13. Benjamin, “Task of Translator,” 70. On the limits of interreligious translatability as both a possibility and impossibility of symmetrical dialogue, see Cornille, *The Im-Possibility of Religious Dialogue*. See also Edith Stein in *On the Problem of Empathy* where she describes our phenomenological encounter with the other as a “primordial experience of the non-primordial,” that is, as a direct sense of the indirectness and elusiveness of the “stranger” within every person we encounter, be they familiar or foreign. On this theme, see also Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy* and Derrida’s discussion of Husserl’s Fifth *Cartesian Meditation* in “Hospitality, Justice and Responsibility,” in *Questioning Ethics*, ed. R. Kearney and Mark Doolan (London: Routledge, 1999), 66–83.
21. Ibid., (“*non seulement ce message me dépasse mais aussi il me désarme*”).
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.: “Je crois que nous avons besoin de la parole de l’*Aufklärung*. Et la grande chance du christianisme c’est d’avoir été confronté dès le début, grâce à la Grèce et à tout l’héritage du rationalisme, à ce conflit de ce que j’ai appelé le conflit de la conviction et de la critique. C’est dans la mesure où nous menons ce combat de l’intérieur de la conviction, et avec l’appui de ceux du dehors, et de dehors de toute religion, que nous avons besoin de l’athée, pour nous comprendre, nous croyants, et pour comprendre les autres croyants qui sont dans d’autres croyances que notre croyance.”
24. Benjamin, “The Task of the Translator.” Contrast this with Habermas’s view of translation between religions as a process of mutual public exchange and exposure in “Religion in the Public Sphere.” The ana-theist approach seeks a middle route between the positions of Habermas and Benjamin.